NATO loves Trump! Trump loves NATO! Many of the Alliance’s members approached this key summit in The Hague with considerable trepidation. It seemingly ended in considerable triumph. This was not only a victory for Donald Trump and his demands for fundamental changes in defence expenditures by the other Alliance members, but also for NATO cohesion and capabilities. Over a longer arc these changes are dramatic and the potential is enormous.
Going beyond routine Alliance statements, and effusive self-praise by President Trump, the tectonics hift at the summit promises to be not only symbolic but also substantive. The Hague Summit Declaration is focused and crucial, for it commits the Alliance to a new benchmark of spending 5% of GDP on defence, including 3.5% on core defence requirements and another 1.5% of GDP on critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, resiliency, and the defence industrial base, among other projects. Vitally, the Declaration reaffirms the Alliance’s “Iron clad commitment to collective defence as enshrined in article 5 of the Washington treaty – that an attack on one is an attack on all”. Seminally, this was readily signed by Donald Trump who also verbally agreed that he clearly supports article 5. Significantly, the Declaration also reaffirmed the allies’, “enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”.
It is important to appreciate how remarkable it is that the Alliance has reached this overall highly positive state given the crisis that it faced, particularly with Donald Trump’s return to the presidency. Numerous factors account for this most impressive progress.
No small credit should go to the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte. His lavish, and at times outlandish praise of President Trump could have easily descended into nauseous sycophancy, but for the former’s charm, diplomatic skills and strategic vision. Rutte understood that it was better to flatter than to fight President Trump, to make the agenda and the declarations as short as possible in order to his notoriously limited attention and to use fulsome praise at every turn to generate American goodwill and commitment. It was a wise recognition of presidential infantilism and a bromance that had a strategic purpose.
Second, Donald Trump’s shameless bullying, utter contempt for Europeans and his unyielding pressure ironically also played a role in persuading or certainly scaring Europeans into agreeing to dramatic changes in their defence spending and military preparedness. The fear of American abandonment was palpable in European capitals.
Third, Vladimir Putin mightily contributed to altering European perceptions and policies when his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated that his maximalist goals were a threat to the Euro-Atlanticsecurity itself. His most recent statements, in which he denied Ukrainian identity and denounced and threatened the West, have made it starkly obvious that his maximalist goals have not changed, and that the Alliance has to confront that threatening reality.
Fourth, the election this year in Germany of ChanceLlor Friedrich Merz has also been extraordinarily important. A committed Atlanticist, he also appreciated that the Europeans led by Germany had to embark on the road of far greater self-sufficiency in defence and to fundamentally change defence policy Europe could no longer rely on the U.S. to the same degree of confidence as before. Germany, with its vast economy and enormous industrial capacity, can indeed both drastically increase its military power, and also assume European defence leadership.
ChancelLor Merz shows a willingness to do what other German leaders have been reluctant to do particularly in the post-Cold War era but although the willingness to commit to this is pivotal, scaling up capacity will take considerable time. Germany will not only need to sharply increase defence spending, but it may also have to introduce some form of military conscription. In short, the United States will need to provide some “bridging” military support in the interim which may diminish over time as Europeans take on more of the burden of defence in NATO.
Germany’s commitment is also likely to have a multiplier effect. The mercurial but relentlessly ambitious French president Emmanuel Macron will not want to concede European leadership entirely to Germany and consequently will also have to deliver on his promise to sharply increase French defence capacity as soon as possible. In the case of the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, as German and French military capacity and spending are enhanced, he will need to move beyond creative accounting and actually spend the funds that the British military forces very much need, not only in order to preserve Britain’s crucial role in European defence but also to maintain its status as a primary ally to the U.S.
The seismic changes in perception and policy in the Alliance need to be answered with more than just good plans, but must expeditiously address limits and pitfalls given that there is not only need but also urgency.
Indeed, there are compelling caveats, because the commitments are neither uniform nor guaranteed. This cautionary note is not meant to minimize the achievements. NATO has made a decade-long commitment, but the goals are projected to be met fully only by 2035 even though many of the needs are immediate. Crucially the declaration was significantly watered down when instead of the vital term “The Allies” NATO compromised on “Allies”, giving Spain, in particular, an escape clause. The far-left socialist Prime Minister of Spain immediately took advantage of this to openly state that Madrid had no intention of meeting the 5% of GDP commitments. Donald Trump harshly denounced the Spanish leader but the latter has stuck by his refusal.
Though the Canadian Prime Minister did not follow the confrontational Spanish path, there should be concerns about his government’s intentions. Mr. Carney has not only chosen to emphasize that the new defence spending goal of 5% will be enormously costly for the federal treasury, at around $150 billion per year, but he pushed off dramatic changes in defence expenditures toward the end of the decade-long build-up, and additionally qualified that there would be conversations about people’s willingness to compromise in terms of trade-offs for sharply increased defence spending. Such hesitation is hardly reassuring given that Canada has been one of the worst laggards in defence expenditures in NATO. Despite its huge territory and great economic potential and Russian threats in the Arctic, Canada is scheduled to meet the now outdated 2% defence spending of GDP only by the end of this fiscal year.
Curiously, Mr. Carney also warned that boosting military spending significantly in the short term would create “choke points”, as if the grave strategic threat would allow the prioritization of accounting clearance. Yes, the current plans of the Canadian government are providing significantly more money for military salaries, pensions, and recruitment – all necessary – but its armed forces desperately need new equipment. Further, whereas it may be wise in terms of boosting economic relations with Europe, to purchase European tanks and possibly European-made submarines, putting in doubt the purchase of the 88 F-35 jets that Canada is committed to buying from the U.S. is extraordinarily unwise.
It might not only endanger relations with the U.S., but the F-35s are the only 5th generation fighters available, and a mix of jets would likely create nothing but confusion in Canada’s badly neglected air force where often pilots are flying aircrafts older than they are. For now, at least, it seems Canadian defence policy risks being seized more by evasion than urgency. A wise Canadian military policy is one thing, but one that is too clever by half will be a losing proposition for Canada, for the Alliance and for relations with the U.S.
Again. what was achieved at The Hague this year is truly remarkable in its promise and undeniably necessary to address current and future threats. It all demands painful sacrifices. Yet, every NATO member should have an interest in fulfilling the promises and ensuring that domestic political expediency does not undermine the crucial strategic safeguards that protect sovereignty and freedoms. Given the geopolitical threats, achieving the Summit goals should be viewed as a matter of necessity, not choice.
Aurel Braun is a Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto and Associate of the Davis Center at Harvard University. Among his books is, NATO-Russia Relations in the 21st Century and he is the co-author of a forthcoming book, The West, Russia and Arctic Security.
