Solar geoengineering (also known as solar radiation modification, or SRM) is a controversial subject, at the best of times. This emerging group of technologies aims to artificially modify global or regional climatic conditions by reflecting a small portion of incoming sunlight back into space, thereby lowering temperatures and addressing one of the effects of anthropogenic climate change. The concept of solar geoengineering, inspired by the cooling effect of volcanic eruptions, is often presented as a way to avert the worst effects of climate change, reduce the risk of hitting climatic tipping points, or buy time to achieve the necessary emissions reductions. At our current state of knowledge, geoengineering – which, more broadly, refers to large-scale interventions in the Earth’s oceans, soils and atmosphere with the aim of reducing the effects of climate change – is not necessarily advisable for immediate deployment due to serious environmental, social, ethical, and geopolitical concerns. However, some of the world’s leading climate and geoengineering researchers[1] argue that, in the absence of rapid and sufficient emissions reductions, it may be the only remaining measure to prevent temperature rises beyond two degrees Celsius.
Climate Security Risks and Solar Geoengineering
The study of climate security is exposing how ongoing climate change is increasingly becoming a threat multiplier for conflict and instability, as “it intensifies resource scarcity and worsens existing social, economic and environmental factors.” – an issue important enough that NATO chose to launch its own hub of expertise to address the issues through its Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence. In the context of the Canada-U.S. relationship, for instance, considering some of the current continental defence issues ranging from access to the Arctic resources, access to and control over the Northwest Passage, water security, and the intensification of natural disasters such as fires and floods, climate change will continue to play an outsized role in the future security landscape. These existing global climate challenges are further compounded by growing geopolitical tensions driven by competition over access to and control of critical resources, supply chains, and strategic technologies (such as microchips and artificial intelligence). In this context, it is hardly surprising that the race to control technologies with the potential to manipulate the global climate has taken on critical geopolitical importance, even if the potential security implications of such technologies are not well reflected in contemporary climate and security discourse.
Several solar geoengineering technologies are currently being explored by academics, governments, NGOs/philanthropies, and private companies – the most extensively studied being stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI). The SAI technique uses a high-altitude aircraft to place reflective aerosol particles in the stratosphere, which then reduces the amount of sunlight reaching the planet’s surface, creating a widely distributed cooling effect. While other geoengineering technologies (solar and otherwise) are worthy of discussion, SAI is the most advanced in terms of both research and plausibility of deployment in the near future. It is also the technique that poses the most significant challenge to contemporary climate conflict and security considering it can be conducted with existing equipment and has the broadest potential geographic reach, as even regional use could have global impacts.
From Science Fiction to Strategic Reality
To some, geoengineering may sound like nothing more than science fiction, and indeed some alternative approaches such as reflective space mirrors stray further into the fantastical. However, recent findings show that the technological ability to deploy these technologies is already well within reach of great powers, and likely even some middle powers. This is particularly true in low-altitude, high-latitude circumstances, making this issue especially pertinent to arctic nations such as Canada.
Research on solar geoengineering, more specifically, has entered the landscape surreptitiously. While the premise of solar geoengineering has been theorized for the better part of a century, it broke through taboos in academic climate discussions via Paul Crutzen in 2006. Although climate security scholars such as Dr. Simon Dalby began deliberating on the subject a decade ago, and academic research into the technology and its potential predates this, political engagement on the topic has been lagging behind.
Only recently has scholarship begun to seriously examine solar geoengineering through the lenses of statecraft, security, and weaponization. This work suggests that solar geoengineering, “could be used as military negotiating tools, as mechanisms to build military capacity or secure resources and supply chains, as physical or cyber targets in ongoing conflicts, or as major causes of new conflicts arising from direct weaponization, direct and adverse impacts on insecurity, or even the risks of miscalculation or escalation via counter-geoengineering.” It is likely that military and intelligence organizations have conducted additional assessments of risks and benefits, but any covert or unilateral pursuit of solar geoengineering in an era of raised geopolitical tensions could be a sociopolitical watershed moment triggering miscalculation, escalation, and competitive technology races. One academic paper found that, “For security-related actors, drivers of unilateral development (or use) [of geoengineering techniques] resided much more in distrust towards (and competition with) other countries than [to mitigate] climate risks”, and that “unilateral research and development efforts are highly likely to trigger a research race.”
Therefore, while it may not be possible to directly weaponize these technologies., international security practitioners have demonstrated that solar geoengineering can be used as a potential source of disinformation, a strategic resource in contexts of mutual distrust, and an overall geopolitically disruptive technology. The power to influence global or regional climatic conditions – whether technologically feasible or only in theory – thus presents a unique challenge to modern geopolitical order: countries have both incentive to pursue research and development in private, and simultaneously present opposition to its advancement in public.
Canadian versus U.S. Approaches to Geoengineering
Historically, Canada has followed American policy on numerous fronts on issues ranging from international trade to foreign policy, and even defence procurement. Recent events such as tensions over tariffs and provocative statements regarding Canada becoming the 51st state have shown that this long-standing friendship is strained and that some priorities may no longer be closely aligned. One of the key elements of this disconnect centres around climate change: while climate change is barely mentioned in Prime Minister Carney’s Mandate Letter, his past work suggests that Prime Minister Carney takes climate change seriously and will likely maintain the willingness to act on it, though perhaps without flashy policies. In stark contrast, it is hard to imagine a President more opposed to climate action than Donald Trump. His recent actions include withdrawal from key climate accords, absentia of American representatives from scoping meetings for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Seventh Assessment Report, recent announcement of outright withdrawal from the IPCC, and methodical dismantling of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – amongst others. While this incompatibility of priority regarding climate science and action may foul relationships, it is not likely to directly impact Canada-U.S. relations to the same extent as current challenges over border and sovereignty issues, trade, and military procurement. However, the long-term impact of the misalignment of priorities should not be overlooked.
American research on geoengineering has historically been funded through federal organizations such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), including approximately $4 million in funding provided to its Chemical Sciences Laboratory. More recently, however, private philanthropic funding for solar geoengineering research has increased substantially. At the same time, expanded federal support for such research is unlikely under the current administration, given that a growing number of individual states have pursued bans of geoengineering – often driven by baffling conspiracy theories. These claims espouse the belief that governments, or other nefarious actors, are engaged in mind control, mass sterilization, or covert weather manipulation. They have been amplified by prominent Republican politicians (current or former Trump supporters), such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, suggesting that weather control is already within reach. While this rhetoric and the resulting bans may suggest that solar geoengineering is broadly opposed in the United States, this is not necessarily true. Research is being conducted to understand public perceptions on the topic and what drives them. This is vital, as shifts in public opinion could switch from anti-geoengineering sentiments into support for a competitive, security-driven arms race aimed at strategic dominance and technological weaponization, rather than cooperative approaches to managing climate risks.
Canada, by contrast, has no public research program on geoengineering. Nor has the Canadian government developed public analysis or articulated an official position on the topic, with the exception of brief mentions of geoengineering techniques by Environment and Climate Change Canada and Policy Horizons Canada (a foresight branch of the Canadian government) as issues which may be worthy of future research. This raises the question: should Canada care? A lack of domestic research on geoengineering will not prevent Canada from being on the receiving end of decisions made by other geopolitical powers on the topic, as the use of these technologies anywhere would almost certainly have global impacts.
The Janus-faced dichotomy
The challenge is that how Canada should respond to the emergence of solar geoengineering remains unclear. Launching a research program would give Canada leverage and a leadership position in this space, but could further enflame Canada-U.S. relations by fueling perceptions that Canada is seeking a strategic advantage. Given Canada’s middle-power status and limited tolerance for brinksmanship, the geopolitical wisdom of this approach is uncertain. Conversely, failure to explore and understand these technologies would leave Canada poorly informed about the risks and opportunities associated with geoengineering, undermining its ability to make independent decisions in a rapidly changing world.
Similarly, if the U.S. engages in solar geoengineering research, it defies significant portions of voters who not only reject climate science but include geoengineering within various conspiracy theories. However, failure to advance their own research removes a potentially key tool of not just climate response, but future geopolitical power.
The Canada-US case reflects broader geopolitical dynamics. Nations that pursue solar geoengineering research may have good reason to do so in wanting to protect themselves from the worst effects of climate change. However, these same actions may be perceived as attempts to seize one of the greatest geopolitical powers in contemporary history: the (theoretical) ability to influence the global climate. This perception may drive some governments to ban research in order to appease public opinion or reduce geopolitical tensions. Achieving a global moratorium, however, is highly unlikely, and any country that ignored it would effectively gain control of this emerging tool. More realistically, states may publicly support a moratorium while covertly continuing research, creating conditions for a new technological arms race.
This produces a “Janus-faced” dynamic, in which nations like Canada and the U.S. may outwardly oppose geoengineering while privately exploring its potential. If even close allies cannot coordinate their approach, the prospects for preventing broader escalation are slim. Transparency, openness, and the proactive development of effective governance mechanisms therefore offer the best chance of ensuring that these technologies, if pursued, are used as safely and responsibly as possible. Collaborative research is essential to fostering governance progress, and a transparent Canada–U.S. partnership could help reduce emerging risks while providing a model for broader international cooperation on an issue with serious conflict and security implications.
[1] Disclosure: the author is a signatory of this letter.
Burgess Langshaw Power – PhD Candidate, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s/authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
