“The old relationship we had with the United States, based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military cooperation, is over. … We must fundamentally reimagine our economy. We will need to ensure that Canada can succeed in a drastically different world.”
Canada now confronts a massive problem born of a grand strategy that offers little direction on how to manage its multiplying threat vectors. Still, this is very much a strategic moment for our country as only Canada can make the decisions on the future we desire.
For years, Canadian grand strategy has been underwritten by the assumption of a secure national base due to the benign presence of the United States. This has led to an approach that has been variously titled as “The Fireproof House”, “Defence Against Help” and more recently, “Walmart Defence”.
Historically, domestic missions have included disaster relief, strike breaking, and aid to civil power, but these were all missions of expediency, rather than of fundamental design. America’s geographic presence next to Canada, alone, has made this possible, bolstered by a variety of American security guarantees since 1941.
Despite the level of geopolitical security stemming from North America’s isolation Canadian strategy has always concerned itself with balancing fears of abandonment against fears of entrapment. For Canada, such entrapment includes the notion that the US might not go home once it had “helped” us. Further, Canada fears being abandoned by extra-continental partners, marooned with a hostile America.
“Contribution Warfare” and its Impact
A functional consequence of our grand strategy is what General Jon Vance called “Contribution Warfare”. Given a small military, Canada could not hope to decisively sway the fortunes of battle: its strategic effect was found in joining multilateral endeavours. Success has always been measured not in our operational impact on these ventures, but simply in “doing our part”.
This has worked well strategically for Canada by illustrating our role as a team player, but militarily, it was always problematic. This is because simply by making a contribution to an overseas coalition or alliance operation, the Government realises its strategic objective. However, this logic gives no direction to the military on what type of war to prepare for. As such, military “force development”, those tasks that determine what sort of capabilities the CAF will employ in the future, have tended towards highly general objectives.
Canada’s Military “IOUs”
2017’s Strong Secure and Engaged (SSE) defence policy notes that “Given the uncertainty and complexity of the global security environment, Canada will continue to invest in a multi-purpose, combat-ready force that is able to act decisively and deliver results across the full spectrum of operations.” The CAF is assigned nine different missions to meet those objectives, and lists critical force requirements for the pursuit of these objectives.
Yet, none of these objectives speaks to the utility of these forces in winning the wars they are assigned against, nor does SSE address the risk if these contributions are insufficient. These are “IOUs”, not “war plans”.
No matter how capable the equipment or professional those who use it are, the small size of what is available is what stands out most. In the context of the casualty levels being experienced in the ongoing Ukraine war, the numbers are remarkably small.
The Looming Uncertainty of America’s Direction
It is still not entirely clear how serious American plans regarding Canadian annexation are. Canada US relations may yet return to something approximating normal. But we can never again assume that all Americans wish us well. Trust will be difficult to re-establish.
The assumption that Canada faces no nearby threats now becomes an existential risk. Mark Carney’s bold assertion that Canada can stand up for itself are encouraging words in this dark moment, but evade the evident problem that in military terms, we can’t. While the occupation of Canada might be an operational nightmare for the US military, its invasion would be easier than either that of Afghanistan or Iraq.
Going it alone on the continent will be challenging. Canada’s geographic separation from its remaining allies means that any support will have to come from across oceans and be subject to the delay that entails. In this nightmare scenario, the USN could isolate us from overseas support.
Returning to SSE, the generality of our extant “war plans” are suited only to an age of US comity. Canadian strategy needs to ask fundamental questions about its purpose: what war should we prepare for? Unfortunately, once again, our geography gives us little help here.
Canadian Geopolitical Risks
Poised at the top of the globe, Canada now faces threats from all directions. To the north, Russia looks to exploit Arctic resources. To the east, Europe looks for Canadian support against equally menacing Russian threats. To the west, China seeks to refashion the geopolitical order of the Pacific. To the south, the Caribbean has regularly drawn Canada in, via disaster relief and foreign internal defence missions. And what of the US, should it begin to look north towards the resource bounty of our country?
Each of these contingencies demand very different types of military response. European commitments are overwhelmingly focused on land contributions, backed up by air capabilities. Pacific commitments are overwhelmingly maritime in nature. The Arctic is also a maritime environment, but one with highly bespoke environmental, communication, and logistic requirements.
Dealing with the consequences of Canada’s geographic isolation requires a complete strategic rethink of what we are seeking to accomplish, and what resources might be required to meet those aims rather than continuing to act as if this American pivot were no worse than its 2017 withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
It is not clear how much latitude a Trumpist America will give to Canadian diplomacy. Can we retain exclusive discretion in formulating our approach to the world?
Rethinking Canadian Security
Perhaps we can retain a business-as-usual approach. This would only be likely if annexation talk is mere bluster designed to disorient any future trade negotiations.
Perhaps we might confront some types of non-negotiable demands in terms of our external relations but still be given latitude on how we govern ourselves. Under this assumption, Canada would exist in a “Finlandized” state. While a definite limitation to our sovereignty, such an outcome gives the hope that better days might ultimately return.
However, an America determined to bring Canada to its knees would be much worse. A sovereign liberal Canada would harbour political dissidents fleeing northwards from which they could continue to conduct their resistance. Canada would be a continuous example of how America could be different, complicating the ongoing MAGA cultural revolution.
Could we expect the full weight of American international fiscal tools, including banking restrictions or denied access to institutions like SWIFT? If our internal cohesion held strong under such conditions, we could easily fall into a status not unlike Cuba. If it did not, annexation or our subjugation in the manner that Belarus exists with its neighbour Russia are likely outcomes.
These are the challenges confronting Canada at this point. For the first time in our history, we are literally on our own.
Addressing the Threats to Canada Ourselves: A Sovereign Moment
The first task is accepting, as Carney argued, that we have to stand up for ourselves. Our multilateral orientation has served us well, but no amount of membership in exclusive international clubs will alter the inescapable geography of North America: we are on our own as much as others may be rooting for us. However, if the American military is a threat, then the commitments we make to international peace and security come at the expense of Canadian needs.
As such, we need to be clear eyed about the threat that confronts Canada and what we can do about it. This calls for a return to grand strategy to understand how we are going to play on this field.
If the US is a threat, how can we make it less of one? Does it make sense to work against the US, no matter how much working with them may break our soul? Should Canada “sell out” and embrace the winds blowing south if the alternative is structural immiseration?
If it is not a threat, but America continues its “continental approach”, what goals does Canada seek in such an environment? Should it continue to work for a fading “Rules Based International Order”? Would it be in our best interests to turn inward ourselves?
Finally, what kind of military do we need for this era? One oriented solely around domestic missions, or one that also seeks to project Canadian power abroad?
None of these questions can be answered by existing Canadian policies. Those were designed for different environments, which no matter how desirable, will be unlikely to return in a stable manner. This is the moment Canada will finally be forced to grow up and accept its responsibilities as a fully sovereign nation.
