Canada is committing billions to defence, and the scale of that investment makes it all the more crucial the government avoids repeating one of its worst procurement failures: the CF-105 Avro Arrow. The lesson of the Arrow is not technological tragedy or American interference –– it is simpler and more relevant today than ever: when cost, speed, and strategic relevance fall out of alignment, even the most ambitious defence project collapses under its own weight. If current procurement projects fail in the same manner as the Arrow, we risk losing the support of the Canadian public. When the public withdraws its support, the political class follows, and defence budgets become the casualty. Ten years ago, the thought of limited support for defence spending may have barely turned heads in Ottawa. Today, it is clear that if we do not invest in our future security, we risk sacrificing our sovereignty.
That urgency is now reflected in policy. Canada has committed to a range of major acquisitions –– fighter aircraft, naval vessels, Arctic capabilities, and long-awaited submarine replacements. The scale of this moment invites comparison to the early Cold War, the last time Canada undertook a rapid and sustained military buildup. Then, as now, money flowed quickly in response to a deteriorating global security environment. That surge, in both cases, created the conditions for costly missteps.
In the early 1950s, following the Soviet Union’s first atomic test and the outbreak of the Korean War, Canada dramatically increased defence spending –– from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1950 to more than 7 percent by 1953. Much of this went to the Royal Canadian Air Force, which sought to defend North America against a growing Soviet bomber threat. Even as the CF-100 Canuck entered service, planners worried it would soon be outclassed. The solution was the CF-105 (soon to be named the Arrow): a next-generation interceptor designed to meet an increasingly demanding and uncertain threat environment.
From the outset, the Arrow embodied the risks of a procurement system out of balance. Performance expectations were pushed to extremes, driving up costs and complicating production timelines. Well-funded and backed by strong institutional support, the project moved forward despite mounting warning signs. By the mid-1950s, costs were rising rapidly, forcing the government to scale back its initial orders. What had begun as an ambitious but manageable program was becoming something far more expensive and difficult to control.
More importantly, the strategic context was shifting. By the late 1950s, advances in Soviet missile technology were transforming the nature of the threat facing North America. Intercontinental ballistic missiles were beginning to eclipse manned bombers as the primary delivery system for nuclear weapons. Intelligence assessments increasingly pointed to this transition, raising serious questions about whether a high-speed interceptor like the Arrow would remain relevant long enough to justify its cost.
By the time the program was cancelled in 1959, the decision reflected a convergence of pressures: rising costs, delayed timelines, and a rapidly evolving threat environment. The Arrow had not failed as an aircraft. It had failed as a procurement project –– overtaken by the very dynamics it was meant to address. It was, in the end, a solution to yesterday’s problem at tomorrow’s price.
That pattern should serve as a warning.
Canada’s current procurement environment shows signs of the same underlying tensions. The planned acquisition of F-35 fighter jets, the construction of new River Class Destroyers, and the pending decision on a new submarine fleet all reflect necessary investments in national defence. But they also reveal how easily procurement can become entangled in delay, political hesitation, and escalating costs.
The F-35 program illustrates this clearly. Discussions about acquiring the aircraft began in the late 1990s. A commitment was made in 2010, reversed in 2015, and then reaffirmed in 2022. Decades of indecision have not only delayed capability delivery but have increased overall costs. What should have been a relatively straightforward modernization effort became a prolonged political and fiscal ordeal. As geopolitical conditions shift –– including renewed uncertainty in Canadian-U.S. relations –– the risk is that even finalized decisions may be reopened, further compounding delays and costs.
The same pressures are visible in naval procurement. Canada’s new surface combatants and future submarine fleet are essential to maintaining maritime capability, with a strategic eye to an enhanced presence in the Arctic. Yet long timelines and rising expenses loom over both projects. The longer delivery is delayed, the more costs increase and the greater the risk that the strategic assumptions underpinning these projects will evolve before they are completed.
This is the core lesson of the Arrow. Defence procurement is not simply about building advanced systems. It is about aligning three variables that are inherently in tension: cost, speed, and strategic relevance.
There is also a political dimension that cannot be ignored. When major procurement projects are perceived as failures –– whether due to cost overruns, delays, or changing requirements –– public confidence in defence spending erodes. In a country where military investment has historically required political justification, and received minimal public support, that erosion carries real consequences. The collapse of a single high-profile project can cast a shadow over an entire defence agenda.
Canada is not destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. But avoiding them requires discipline: clear strategic prioritization, realistic timelines, and a willingness to make and maintain decisions. Above all, it requires recognizing that delay is not a neutral act. The longer a project drifts, the more expensive and less relevant it becomes.
The Avro Arrow has long occupied a mythic place in Canada’s political imagination. It is often remembered as a lost technological triumph, undone by external pressure or short-sighted leadership. The reality is less dramatic and more instructive. The Arrow failed because the system that produced it lost sight of the balance required for successful procurement.
Canada now faces a similar test. The stakes are not symbolic –– they are measured in capability, credibility, and cost. If the lessons of the Arrow are ignored, the outcome will not be another myth. It will be another preventable failure.
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
Dr. David Borys is a military historian and senior fellow at the CDA Institute. He has taught and written extensively on Canada’s military history and is the host/producer of the popular Canadian history podcast Curious Canadian History.
