“Oh! What a tangled web we weave…”
Sir Walter Scott, Marmion (1808)
The government’s tortured path towards an eventual replacement fighter aircraft took yet another bizarre twist on May 18th with the Global Affairs Minister’s announcement that “Canada is reviewing current military procurement that relates to Boeing.” However, this is only the latest in a string of apparently disconnected and sometimes self-contradictory steps that inevitably lead observers to question whether there is any coherent strategy guiding the government’s management of this important file.
Let’s briefly review the evidence:
Exhibit A
During the 2015 election the Liberal Party platform, among other things, promised to exit the F-35 program and instead “…purchase one of the many, lower-priced options that better match Canada’s defence needs.” The funds saved would be redirected to the naval shipbuilding program.
This may seem at first glance like a simple and reasonable rebalancing of defence requirements, but two major problems quickly emerge upon closer scrutiny. First, effective surveillance and protection of our maritime and air approaches are equally imperative “no-fail” tasks for Canada, both in terms of our own defence and our obligations to our US partner in the defence of North America. One capability can’t be privileged over the other without significant risk to our national security, sovereignty, and public confidence in the national government.
Second, even a cursory read of the many fighter costing studies and reports prepared by multiple independent authorities over the past five years will show that it is highly doubtful that substantial savings are to be found from buying any of the “lower-priced” alternatives. An advanced fighter capability costs somewhere north of $1B a year to acquire and maintain no matter which aircraft you buy.
Consequently, it is hard to see much serious deliberation having gone into this commitment.
Exhibit B
Upon taking office, the new government was forced to walk back from its promise to exclude the F-35 from its planned “open and transparent competition.” Quite apart from the fact that the promise was self-contradictory (which should have raised flags when it was being framed) the arbitrary exclusion of any single candidate would very likely be illegal.
At the same time, the government came face-to-face with the reality that the Canadian aerospace industry is heavily committed to the F-35 program, largely due to the privileged access partner nations have to related contracts. This access derives from a Canadian government commitment to the US-led multinational Joint Strike Fighter Program dating from 1997, and renewed by successive governments. Withdrawing from it would have a massive impact on Canada’s aerospace sector both in terms of business volumes and access to important new exploitable technologies, a fact that cannot have come as a surprise to anyone as the arrangement was public knowledge and had been a major area of focus for a 2012 Auditor General report.
The upshot of all this is that the election commitment to “not buy the F-35” morphed into a post-election commitment to “not necessarily buy the F-35” and the government continues spending many tens of millions of Canadian taxpayers’ dollars on the ongoing development of the aircraft in order to maintain access to the economic and technology benefits the program is delivering.
Exhibit C
Faced with the potential for its “open and transparent” competition to be won by the F-35 (it won Denmark’s competitive selection process last year hands-down) the government next decided to push the fighter replacement decision down the road as much as five years, i.e. until after the next election. It then subsequently opened the door to an earlier process.
Concurrently with the initial decision, and for reasons that it has still not explained, the government also chose to make a major defence policy change and require the RCAF to meet Canada’s NATO and NORAD fighter commitments simultaneously. Successive governments since the withdrawal of the Canadian Armed Forces from their Cold War bases in Europe have directed only that the RCAF risk-manage the commitments – in other words balance the forces assigned to each based on the available assets. This approach was more recently supported by a Defence Research and Development Canada analysis which concluded that the current fighter fleet would remain capable of meeting its present commitments long enough for an orderly replacement program to be undertaken, provided it was not unduly delayed.
The policy change did two things. It created a capability gap where none previously existed, which the government planned to fill with an interim purchase of 18 Boeing Super Hornet aircraft. But more importantly, it effectively committed the government to acquiring and sustaining a significantly larger fighter fleet.
The practical impact of this decision was to render the original intent to save money on the fighter program impossible to meet. Instead, the fighter capability will need significant additional funding to meet the revised policy requirement.
Exhibit D
Enter Boeing and its trade complaint against Bombardier. The company will not likely have been greatly surprised by the resulting Canadian government threat to terminate discussions about the potential buy of 18 Super Hornets. They clearly see the potential loss of this sale (representing less than 3% of total production for the type) as a much lesser risk than the long-term threat it sees in Bombardier’s C-Series Program.
This part of the drama will take some time to play out, but Boeing may have thrown the government a lifeline to potentially escape from what has clearly become a politically convoluted fighter replacement file. Whether it will take advantage of it remains to be seen.
How Does it All Add Up?
It is difficult, if not impossible, to see any strategic coherence in the handling of this file at any point up until now – or to see the process as anything but a series of lurches from decision to decision with little thought about what comes next and what the end state is intended to be. How else can we explain how a political promise to save substantial funds from the fighter program mutated into a policy imperative to spend substantially more on a larger fighter capability?
Fortunately, the government has an opportunity to reset the narrative and finally articulate a rational approach to fighter replacement in the context of the forthcoming release of its defence policy. It is to be hoped that it does so because the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian public need their governments to make and communicate rational decisions based on objective and sound analysis. It is also in the government’s own self-interest to do so, having campaigned on a core promise to bring back transparent, evidence-based decision-making. To get out of the tangled web that has been created around the CF-18 replacement it will need to begin walking that talk – and soon.
Charles Davies is a retired CAF officer and a Fellow of the CDA Institute. He has written extensively on defence procurement, defence policy, defence management, and other related issues.
So far, Federal governments, past and present of both political stripes, have spent as little on defence as they hope that they can get away with. The latest threat by the Feds to re-consider the ‘intended’ Super Hornet purchase does not change anything; rather, it is a ploy to save BBD’s bacon selling their C Series liner in the U.S. However, Boeing’s fortunes do not rest on selling in a foreign jurisdiction a few Super Hornets. Their priority is to protect their commercial narrow jet liner sales.
Has this government figured out its defence priorities yet? I don’t think so. Instead, the reduction in project management staff and expertise at NDHQ gives the government a handy excuse to delay (forever, I am afraid) significant procurement decisions for the CAF.
“But more importantly, it effectively committed the government to acquiring and sustaining a significantly larger fighter fleet.”
It did only if you think the Super Hornets weren’t simply the first batch of the final fighter purchase. To criticize the government for potentially spending to much on two fleets etc you have to believe them. That’s obviously unwise.
What could the recent Boeing business lead to? Not to F-35s but to simply to not buying “interim” fighters and letting the entire file slide right until after the next election. In the twisted way of Canadian defence procurement government dishonesty and ineptitude may serve the tax payer yet.
Lt. Gen Wm Carr, Ret’d has suggested the purchase of about 18 good used USN F-18’s from the USA, to serve to fill the apparent capability gap. Great idea!
To perhaps clarify the point I was trying to make in the comment, the policy decision to require the RCAF to fully meet both its NATO and NORAD fighter commitments simultaneously inevitably means that the government will have to buy a significantly larger number of aircraft than was previously contemplated. This is irrespective of the type or types selected.
Yes but only if you believe the requirement for simultaneity will remain after the “interim” fighters arrive. I don’t. It’s a pretty transparent ploy. I’d prefer the government to be honest but it is what it is.
I expect (indeed I hope) that the NATO tasks are scaled back so that 65 fighters are more than enough. 48 would be enough for NORAD alone wouldn’t it?
Surely Saab and Dassault’s interest must be picking up as the game opens up again.
What if we go to a “Danish” paper competition in late 2018 early 2019 for an “interim” fighter that is tilted towards planes that would be assembled in Canada? The competition could be held late enough that the results would not be available until after the next election and penalties from not buying F-35s would not be incurred while the Lockheed contractors here would have years more sales. Everyone wins. Nasty old Boeing is taught a lesson. Jobs galore with many in Bombardier. Trump is sent a message. We stand up to the Americans. The planes we buy will probably be cheaper.
Could this be the current plan?
Ladies and Gentlemen; As an old soldier I was in the Reserve Force when the Sr. Tradeau was leading this country and like his father he does not believe that our country is worth defending when He has so many political trips to foreighen Countries to visit and look good agreeing with anything that will use up tax dollars instead of defence dollars being spent. Bring out the forks and shovels, rakes so we can have an Army to train. We did that with Piere’ because He is using his Fathers book and he was a member of another Countrys
beliefs
M Sharon completely misses the core reason for CANADA to buy any fighter – interim or otherwise. Combat Capability. The fighter requirement is a very significant expense regardless of which way we go. We need the best bang for the buck. No interim fighter has the “bang” that will enable us to participate in joint operations with our allies for the life of the new fighter (35 years plus, from time of purchase). Only a free and open competition, unimpeted by artificial specifications, will be able to confirm what the best bang for our buck really is. A great deal of that work is already done. If the political will is there, a free and open competition could likely be completed well within two years,possibly even within one. That would eliminate the need for any “interim” fighter. We could go directly to the “real” fighter that gives us the best bang for our buck, thus saving a huge expense. Until there is agreement to conduct that competition, we should not waste any taxpayer funds playing political charades.
Sorry M Shannon. I didn’t catch the mis- spelling of your name.