The genesis of Asian Values
The discourse of “Asian values” first appeared in socio-political discourse in the early 1990s in tandem with triumphalism related to the “Rise of Asia” by political leaders such as Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew.
Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani in his book Can Asians Think ? further doubled down on the Asian values discourse juxtaposing the “West” and “Asia” and the need to “avoid a “clash of civilizations” through a great deal of self-reflection required by all concerned.”
We also saw the late governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad subsequently penned the co-authored book “The Asia that can say “NO”/ NOと言えるアジア: 対欧米への方策”arguing that Asians can say no to the U.S. intimating that the U.S. was a hegemonic power that controlled much of the region.
There are many problems in these arguments.
The problems with the concept Asian Values
First, in their advocacy of their concepts of Asian Values these political and diplomatic leaders were assuming that Asia is culturally homogenous in terms of values or inclinations. They postulated that family values based on Confucianism or equivalent and group-oriented behavior were a commonality in countries from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and South Asia.
This argument is riddled with problems. Ask a South Korean and an Indian as to what they have in common. Do the same with a Japanese and someone from Papua New Guinea as to what is their shared Asian value.
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions are a useful empirical tool to highlight that Asian Values are a myth. Built on a large-scale survey of over 50 countries and over 150,000 people in three regions, the survey was used to create the six cultural dimensions of Power Distance, Individualism, Motivation towards Achievement and Success, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, and Indulgence.
Comparing India, Japan, Singapore, China and the Philippines, we see that Japan is a clear outlier on Motivation towards Achievement and Success, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, and
China, India and the Philippines most hierarchical. Even China, Hong Kong and Taiwan would be hard pressed to describe what their shared Asian values would be despite having common roots according to Hofstede’s survey.
Greg Sheriden in his book, Asian Values Western dreams, echoes the Hofstede Survey’s findings by skillfully demonstrating in his comparative study of Indo-Pacific region, that heterogeneity not homogeneity characterizes the politics, economics, religions and cultures of the region.
Second, by stressing shared Asian Values, proponents of this concept are replacing one myth with another myth, that somehow Asia and so-called West is homogeneous in terms of values. Clearly neither are according to Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions but also other surveys such as The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute that shows even within subregions such as Southeast Asia that political, economic and security priorities are characterized by a diversity of views.
The Asian values delusion is akin to the contemporary juxtaposing of the so-called Global South and Global North/ West. Both are heterogeneous constructions with little shared political, social and cultural similarities.
Third, in an era of deepening great power competition between the U.S and China as well as Russia, white knight championing of the concept of Asian Values falls into the trap of authoritarian states that aim to create a shared antagonistic self-serving narrative of the Global South versus the West/ Global North.
Authoritarian states such as China and Russia superficially speak the language of comradery with the Global South in terms of crafting a more democratic international order that focuses on the developmental needs of post-colonial states of the emerging world.
Their narrative stresses that the current international order is one constructed by and for the West as opposed to their efforts to promote the ““democratisation” of the UN system, which means a bigger say for countries from the Global South, though it also entails equal acceptance of authoritarian forms of governance and values” according to Katja Drinhausen, one of the authors of Decoding China.
Ironically, “Democratisation” of the UN system and a bigger say for counties in the Global South does not seem to include United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform to include India, South Africa or Brazil.
Moreover, the fabrication that the current international order has not been shaped by both Russia and China also is an expression of intentional historical amnesia. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin were the architects and made important decisions regarding the future progress of the war and the postwar world at The Yalta Conference that took place in a Russian resort town in the Crimea from February 4–11, 1945.
In addition, according to Rana Mitter in his book Forgotten ally : China’s World War II, 1937-1945, China has been proactive in stressing its central role alongside the allies in contributing the defeat of Japanese and Global Fascism and constructing the post-WW 2 international order.
We have also seen China, Russia and other members of the so-called Global South contribute to international order including such as helping craft the Paris Climate Accords, taking on shared financial controls to stem terrorists from using the financial system to fund their activities, not to mention contributions to Peace Keeping.
Rather than being bystanders in our current international order, Russia and China have been contributors to it making their advocacy against the current international order and efforts to champion the Global South contradictory.
Fourth, it is critical to have clarity about what kind of international order different Indo-Pacific states and political entities prefer. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan and others want an international order based on rule-of-law. ASEAN members want ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN consensus-based approach to decision making to be the basis for regional integration. Russia and China continue to advocate for indivisible security.
The Russian concept is said to date back to the 1930s, when “Maxim Litvinov, Soviet foreign minister under Joseph Stalin, proposed the principle of the indivisibility of peace as one of the principles with which all nations were expected to comply to maintain peace among them. The principle implied that no nation could be at peace when another nation was not at peace.”
Xi Jinping’s China has adopted a similar framing of indivisible security using expression of anquan buke fenge (安全不可分割), which resonates with Russia’s views that nobody’s security can come at the expense of another country.
Engagement requires nuanced and differentiated diplomacy
Considering the inherent heterogeneity of the Indo-Pacific region, an “Asian value” approach for Canadian engagement in the Indo-Pacific is sure to lead to ineffectual policy engagement.
A more effective and sustainable approach should be based on a subregional approach to engagement that focuses on shared national interests of partner regions not necessarily shared values at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels.
For instance, ASEAN prefers non-binding agreements that are premised on consensus-based decision maker. Practical, meaningful and sustained engagement with ASEAN will need to work within this paradigm on issues that matter to ASEAN such as development, trade, and Illegal, Unregulated and Undocumented Fishing (IUU).
Furthermore, the plethora of political and economic systems in the region requires sensitivity to the language of the region. For example, human rights advocacy, democracy and progressive cultural value promotion will find few takers in the region and opposed to bringing potential regional interlocutors closer, they may feel alienated or that they are being lectured to in ways that remind them of their old colonial masters.
Focusing on good governance, the promotion of rule-of-law, and the eradication of corruption may be better avenues of engagement.
When engaging with the democratic polities in the region such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, there is more space to align national interests with shared political and economic values. Binding agreements and the normative language of human rights advocacy, democracy and progressive cultural value promotion may be more suitable for sustainable and results oriented diplomacy and engagement.
21st century trade agreements such as the CPTPP, advanced semi-conductor manufacturing coordination and cooperation, cyber and disinformation cooperation are all avenues of shared interest. These lines of cooperation also resonate with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other like-minded states boding well for broader cooperation and perhaps institutionalization.
While China was called-out for being “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base” and labelled as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. We have seen sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation, stemming from the PRC” in the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024, it would be a mistake not to find crosswalks of cooperation with Beijing.
China has a shared national interest in climate change cooperation, combating terrorism, trade, energy, food and water security and much more. Rather than a zero-sum approach with China, recognition that China is the biggest trading partner for the majority of countries according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) will be important in engagement with Beijing.
Carlo Dade, trade director at the Canada West Foundation illustrates China’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific economy and supply changes in his statement before the Special Committee on the
Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship arguing that “even if you tried to run away from China, you’re going to run into China, and you’re probably going to be doing so on roads built by China”.
With fundamentally different political values, engagement with China will require an astute understanding of its political system and asymmetric comparative advantages that are difficult to target if economic coercion is practiced. Australia, South Korea and Japan are strong examples of countries with robust trade relations with China and experience with economic coercion. They have knowledge as to what areas of their economies are more vulnerable to coercion and which aren’t.
Duanjie Chen, an independent scholar with a PhD in economics, is a Munk Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute has also demonstrated in their work Countering China’s Economic Coercion that Taiwan may also be a useful example when considering how to engage with China.
Finally, engagement with India like other Indo-Pacific economies should be through shared national interests not an assumption that India has shared Asian values with other Indo-Pacific states and political entities. India is not part of the RCEP or CPTPP. It continues to straddle Western minilateral cooperation such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and infrastructure and connectivity with participating in multilateral groupings like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This variable geometry of functional cooperation and multi-alignment into seemingly competing multilateral and minilateral groupings ensures that India’s interests are not marginalised in a minilateral organisation that includes neighbours New Delhi has security concerns with.
India’s multi-alignment and national interests-based approach to diplomacy and engagement translates into a partner that may be aligned only in a narrow sphere of cooperation while having a contradictory position in others. By way of example, India is aligned with the QUAD when it comes to public goods provision in the Indian Ocean but not aligned with the same members on policies towards Russia.
Engaging with India thus requires a state to order their priorities and have a clear understanding that cooperation in one domain does not necessarily mean cooperation in another.
Conclusion
Asian values do not exist. Engagement in the Indo-Pacific requires nuanced and differentiated diplomacy at the subregional level matching national interests with modes of diplomatic engagement to effectively engage with the existing heterogeneity of the region. Interests, not shared values, has become the currency of the region and as a result, sustainable, meaningful and results-oriented diplomatic engagement should proceed at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral level based on an understanding that large scale multilateralism is becoming less practical giving way to variable geometry and multi-alignment in cooperation in the region.
