This op-ed is part of a Special Series on the 4th Montreal Climate Security Summit (8-9 October 2025), co-hosted by the CDA Institute and the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE). The series features written reflections from Summit speakers, bringing key insights from this invitation-only event.
Operation LENTUS, the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) mechanism for responding to natural disasters at the request of provinces and territories, has become a defining feature of domestic crisis management in Canada. Intended for disaster situations where provincial authorities lack sufficient resources and require federal assistance to respond, the operation was initially designed as an exceptional measure.
However, between 2023 and 2025, CAF units deployed 19 times under Operation LENTUS, responding primarily to floods and wildfires. These deployments require time and resources that could have otherwise been dedicated to operational training. While averaging 10 days per year from 2010 to 2024, deployments peaked at 23 days in 2024 alone. As climate-driven disasters intensify, Operation LENTUS is becoming a routine demand on the CAF rather than an exceptional one. This shift raises concerns about over-reliance on the military and potential impacts on readiness, but it also provides operational benefits that are often overlooked. Canada now faces a strategic choice: continue relying heavily on the CAF for domestic crisis response or develop a sustainable civil–military model that protects readiness while strengthening resilience.
Civil-Military Cooperation: Foundational Principles
Civil‑military cooperation (CIMIC) is foundational to military operations. It is defined by NATO as a joint function that integrates civil‑environment awareness with military mission objectives in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. The objective is to ensure coordinated cooperation between civilian and military actors in an operational context. For the CAF, it provides a framework to support civilian authorities, with the caveat that only CAF personnel will adhere to the military chain of command, and that civilian authorities will not “lead” a military force. In such cases where civilian and military organizations cooperate in responding to natural disasters or climate events, cooperation is not a choice, it is a necessity.
In June 2024, the Canadian parliament emphasized that the CAF should only provide aid to civilian authorities as a last resort; when no other option is available in response to a disaster. However, the recent increase in requests for assistance received by the CAF suggests otherwise.
Canada’s Operation LENTUS in Practice
Provinces and territories – such as British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, and Ontario – increasingly rely on the CAF for emergency assistance, with 38 requests for assistance from 2017-2023. In 2023 alone, the federal government received eight requests, double the annual average between 2017 and 2021, and four times the annual average of 0 to 2 requests from 2010 to 2016. The support ranged from CAF personnel fulfilling Type 3 firefighting duties – which are less complex tasks requiring lower levels of training and experience, such as mop-up operations or working on fire lines that are already under control – to security, general labor, provision of specialized equipment, and evacuation support using military aviation assets. The trend shows that provinces increasingly rely on the CAF for disaster response, effectively using the military as an expedient first option rather than reserving it as the last‑resort capability it is intended to be.
Critics have argued that these deployments undermine readiness, particularly affecting Reserve training from May to September, and Regular Force personnel during the summer leave period. However, the impact is more nuanced. Frequent ‘real-world’ deployments, including military support to disaster relief, offer valuable training in command, control, sustainment, and engineering—offering critical skills transferable to operational missions abroad. The ability to plan, project, and sustain a military force is tested during Operation LENTUS. These same skills will prove valuable to a CAF unit that may be called to support a NATO or other expeditionary mission where the adversary is no longer a rising river or a forest fire.
Civil-Military Emergency Response as a Global Challenge
Canada is not alone in facing rising civil–military emergency demands. In Australia, during the 2022 New South Wales floods, Australian Defence Force (ADF) helicopters rescued individuals who had been stranded for up to thirty hours. This intervention renewed concerns about an over‑reliance on the military and highlighted shortfalls in volunteer capacity.
The United States has also seen largescale military involvement in disaster response. In 2024, Hurricanes Helene and Milton mobilized nearly 1,000 active duty soldiers and 6,500 National Guard troops. Working alongside local authorities, these forces cleared debris, rescued victims, distributed aid, and conducted evacuation missions across numerous states.
The United Kingdom has experienced similar mission creep in both humanitarian and domestic roles. In 2019, Royal Air Force (RAF) Chinooks dropped aggregate sacks to reinforce a dam at Whaley Bridge. More recently, in 2025, the Royal Navy’s Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Trent, an offshore patrol vessel, responded to Hurricane Melissa in Jamaica by providing engineering support, shelter kits, and power restoration expertise.
These examples illustrate a global trend: militaries are increasingly the first, and sometimes only, available responders, fueling debate within defence organizations over the proper role of military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR).
Toward a Sustainable Civil‑Military Strategy
Strengthening Canada’s disaster response requires a multilayered approach that balances civilian and military roles. First, provincial capacity-building should be prioritized by investing in civilian emergency response forces to reduce the default reliance on the CAF. Germany’s model of a youth-based civil protection capability offers a useful lesson in cultivating sustainable, community-driven resilience.
Second, clear military thresholds must be defined to ensure CAF intervention is reserved for capabilities that civilian agencies cannot realistically maintain. This would preserve military involvement as a strategic tool rather than an operational default, with criteria centered on the use of specialized aviation assets, such as CC130 Hercules aircraft or CH147 Chinook helicopter, for civilian evacuations.
Third, domestic deployments should be integrated into CAF training planning. By adjusting training schedules to reflect these increasingly predictable missions, the CAF can maximize operational synergy and ensure readiness without compromising broader defence obligations.
Finally, cross-sector coordination must be institutionalized through the establishment of a permanent coordination centre linking provincial emergency response authorities with regional CAF commanders. This structure would streamline communication, enhance joint planning, and ensure that civilian and military resources are deployed in a complementary and efficient manner.
There is no simple solution, as all these measures require significant resources, time, and training. Prioritizing civilian response capabilities and educating decisionmakers not to default to a request for CAF assistance is essential.
Climate Security and CAF Modernization
The Canadian Army’s Modernization Plan adds another dimension to this debate, particularly the proposal to establish a Defence of Canada Division. This Division would support national emergencies and homeland defence while maintaining ties with civil authorities and communities. However, by assuming that “Op LENTUS deployments will continue and may grow in frequency due to climate change-related emergencies”, the plan risks signaling expanded readiness to support provinces, potentially reinforcing reliance on the CAF at a time when training cycles and operational readiness are already under strain.
In parallel, Canada’s Defence Climate and Sustainability Strategy (DCSS) is the keystone document guiding the CAF’s adaptation to the security implications of climate change. It warns that increased reliance on the CAF for domestic response may erode readiness for other national and international missions, while emphasizing the need to adapt operational planning, equipment, and critical infrastructure to climate impacts. However, despite this policy framing, a notable gap persists: the absence of a clear guidance on implementation and translation into actionable plans.
Furthermore, greater time and resource investment is needed to assess the operational realities of the CAF’s expanding role in domestic disaster response. How has this shift reshaped CAF training? What measurable effects has it had on operational readiness? Addressing these questions is essential to understanding the strategic and organizational consequences of climate-related demands on the CAF.
Conclusion
Canada must proactively address the fact that Operation LENTUS is becoming a fixture, not an anomaly. By strengthening provincial response capabilities, instituting clear request thresholds, and modernizing CAF planning to include domestic deployment demands, Canada can maintain a robust defence posture without compromising civil resilience. Canada stands at a crossroads and must decide now: adapt by building a sustainable civil-military framework, or risk overburdening the CAF, compromising both national security and community safety. Turning lessons into lasting change now will better position the CAF for the challenges ahead.
Dr. Lloyd Chubbs, Environmental Management and Energy Management Advisor, Canadian Joint Operations Command, Department of National Defence
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s/authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
