Indo-Pacific Minilateralism & the U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral in a Shifting Political Landscape
Donald Trump will retake office at the start of 2025 as the 47th U.S. President. At the end of his previous presidency in 2020, pessimism about the future of the global order was high. The past four years of the United States’ deteriorating relations with China, threats to withdraw from multilateral organizations, and the emphasis on equal, reciprocal, and proportional burden-sharing with allies fueled these concerns. These concerns only intensified as the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted vulnerabilities to constructive international cooperation in an era of great power rivalry. Leading up to the 2024 U.S. election, this ever-increasing perception of current affairs as one of instability remained a prominent characterization. A sentiment that once focused on the threat to international cooperation posed by the Trump presidency and exacerbated by the later pandemic continued on a larger scale due to the emergence of multiple global crises: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, deteriorating inter-Korean relations amid North Korean threats, the militarization of the South China Sea, and increasing tensions between the United States and China. With Trump’s return to the White House, the growing concern about further instability and disruption to U.S. foreign policy that his election will bring is rightly being considered and debated.
However, despite the dominance of focusing on instability and justified concern over the disruption his administration might bring, a contrary, more optimistic perspective still deserves reiteration. Over the last four years, an undercurrent of optimism has emerged, focusing on rapid development and resilience building with our partners and allies. The world has witnessed remarkable international collaboration in developing and distributing COVID-19 vaccines, widespread condemnation of Russia’s actions, support for the Ukrainian defense, and coordinated humanitarian efforts in conflict zones. However, what is more interesting is the critical driver of resilience beyond traditional, pre-existing international multilateral structures, evident in the growing prevalence of more targeted, regionally focused, smaller formulas of partnership based on shared interests, termed minilateralism. Notably, initiatives such as AUKUS, the QUAD, and the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership have propelled a vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and highlighted the importance of countries adopting Indo-Pacific Strategies (IPS). This networked approach, characterized by an overlapping and ‘latticework’ of minilateral cooperation centered in the vital region of the Indo-Pacific, exemplifies a proactive, inclusive, and resilient response taking place amid great power competition and instability concerns.
What began as a period of growing pessimism can be viewed through this lens as a transition into a renewed era of minilateral cooperation. This transformation demonstrates that even during eras of instability, resilience can grow through inclusive, rules-based cooperation, reinforcing a vision of shared global progress achieved through regionally focused, functional, and sustainable minilateral cooperation rather than relying solely on multilateralism, which often falls victim to the lowest common denominator or the practice of fractionating by opponents of the end goals of multilateral cooperation. Within this framework and perception, the international community must rely on a belief in itself to navigate future instability with resilient cooperation and optimism. With this in mind, one critical question remains: can this optimistic wave of resilience, anchored by FOIP principles, diverse IPS initiatives, and minilateral partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific, withstand the pressures of shifting domestic political landscapes?
Japan, the United States, and South Korea under the Yoon administration have been prominent champions of the Indo-Pacific concept and the FOIP ideals. Their significant progress in the trilateral partnership and bilateral relations during and since the 2023 Camp David Summit has been critical in furthering efforts toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. Notably, the re-establishment of shuttle diplomacy between South Korea and Japan, the growing cooperation in the maritime domain, and the commitment to overcoming previous issues of contention represent substantial developments that exemplify what future regional cooperation strives to achieve. Their commitment to consulting on common security challenges and the agreement to establish multi-domain military exercises highlight their recognition of collective security interests and further institutionalize the trilateral security partnership. Their leading roles lend credence to the notion that the US-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership is central to peace and resilience within the Indo-Pacific and further fosters the ideals of the FOIP.
However, in U.S. foreign policy, the Indo-Pacific idea goes back to only two administrations. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2019 shared vision marked the United States’ formal adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept, building on former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s promotion of the concept in 2016. Furthermore, the success of the United States’ IPS since 2022 has been achieved under only one administration, highlighting the fragility of these achievements. For Japan and Korea, the situation is similar regarding the relative infancy of these concepts and strengthened relations. Therefore, with the United States once again at this administrative transition point, perceptions of instability surrounding the United States’ commitment to multilateral organizations are called into question once again, generating concerns about instability regarding the potential erosion of the minilateral relationship that has been key to the formation of this resilient development.
While these concerns surrounding the United States are valid, the Indo-Pacific will remain a vital security focus for the United States, regardless of changes in administration. The reality of the importance of the Taiwan Strait, the location of its allies, and the proximity of aggressive actors will not change. However, the approach will most likely be adjusted. While the Harris administration was expected to continue the Biden era’s progress in this domain that favored more inclusive cooperation with partners, a Trump administration could be expected to increase burden-sharing among partners asymmetrically and lack commitment to the more inclusive aspects of the FOIP. In this case, the critical role in maintaining regional and global stability relies heavily on Japan’s and South Korea’s leadership and preserving the US-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership through cooperation, despite possible fluctuations in the United States’ commitment, approaches, and political realities in Seoul and Tokyo. Within this context, the true concerns lie not in the perception of global instability or the future instability of the United States but in the fear of instability regarding South Korea’s and Japan’s ability to lead and cooperate without a robust and consistent commitment from the United States amid growing domestic backlash toward the current leadership within their countries.
With Japan’s former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stepping down and the selection of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, many observers were confident about the future of U.S.-Japan security relations and the continuation of a robust relationship with South Korea. However, Japan’s snap election at the end of October resulted in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing its majority in the lower house for the first time since 2009, reintroducing concerns about instability stemming from a domestic leadership focus and the potential impacts it may have. The domestic situation in South Korea faces similar concerns. President Yoon’s approval rating has hit an all-time low of only 19 percent, along with a 72 percent negative assessment. Moreover, the National Assembly has an opposition-controlled majority in the Democratic Party (DP). Thus, the future sustainability of the trilateral partnership is also at the mercy of domestic politics in both Japan and South Korea. In the case of the former, Prime Minister Ishiba is fighting for his political life, attempting to maintain a newly inaugurated minority government and manage a civil war within the ruling LDP regarding the direction of the LDP and Japan. In the case of the latter, skepticism is mounting in South Korea that President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s foreign policy will be sustained concerning Seoul’s relations with Tokyo at the bilateral level, let alone those within the Camp David-based trilateral cooperative framework. This has led to cynicism about the survival of Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy and their position on Taiwan and semiconductor production cooperation.
However, there are still reasons to be optimistic. The dissatisfaction within the LDP that led to the loss of the majority centered on domestic issues and not on Japan’s foreign policy direction regarding minilateral partnerships and its increasing leadership role in the region for the promotion of the FOIP. Additionally, we continue to see that, despite President Yoon’s domestic unpopularity, or even as a further result of an increasing lack of political influence on domestic issues, President Yoon has continued to commit to a foreign policy focus and embrace the idea of South Korea as a ‘Global Pivotal State,’ initially seen in its National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity. With this in mind, Japan and South Korea have many domestic issues that must be addressed to build domestic trust and support for their leadership. Still, regardless of their ability to meet these concerns, their capacity to be a stabilizing force for leadership in the Indo-Pacific and the ideals of the FOIP remains a cause for optimism. The region’s progress in cooperation and leadership has come too far to abandon. It is positioned for continued development despite possible domestic obstacles that hinder faster growth. It is essential to remember that slowed growth is not equivalent to backward progression or a return to more hostile relations; cooperation remains.
Looking forward, under the expectation and necessity for critical areas that U.S.-ROK-Japan relations need to continue progressing to strengthen their security relations and enhance resilience in the region, the focus includes continuing along the path they have already been developing: strengthening their effective crisis response abilities by enhancing interoperability at the human, technical, procedural, and informational levels. At the human level, this means following through on their commitment to meetings between Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Commerce and Industry Ministers, National Security Advisors, and at the people-to-people level to increase mutual understanding and respect among the nations, regardless of administration. They should continue standardizing terminology, tactics, and engagement frameworks at the procedural level to mitigate doctrinal differences and act as a bilateral and trilateral conflict-avoidance mechanism. Technically, maintaining regular multi-domain joint military exercises is critical for these nations to act together coherently and effectively while prioritizing joint efforts in advanced technological development in areas such as AI and quantum computing. At the strategic level, more work needs to be done at the military, think tank, and political levels to converge strategic thinking on challenges and synergistic approaches to addressing those challenges, including the North Korea problem, the Ukraine-Russia conflict, contingency issues in the Indo-Pacific, and the production and positioning of munitions throughout the region. Finally, at the information level, the relationship needs to further utilize, optimize, and expand information sharing and communication within intelligence and surveillance by building upon and extending the existing use of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement (TISA), the Commitment to Consult, and the production of real-time sharing mechanisms for missile data or critical coordination issues.
While there is great fear in this era as one of instability, there is also good reason to be optimistic about the resulting cooperation and resilience development that has transpired, along with its future. The trilateral relationship between the U.S., ROK, Japan, and other networks of minilateral partnerships has laid the foundation for making the region and the international community more resilient and better positioned to address growing regional and global concerns. While the international community is in a transitional period with important administrations and shifting landscapes, establishing an inclusive supply chain that is resistant to coercion, protecting and upholding human rights and democratic principles, and adequately addressing threats and aggressive behavior by state actors can be achieved if we continue to have faith in the development of international cooperation, both multilaterally and minilaterally.
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