Chinese President Xi Jinping is committed to making the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a global scientific and innovation leader by 2035. During a recent speech, Xi declared that “when our science and technology flourishes, our race flourishes, and when science and technology is strong, our nation is strong.” This strategic belief is reflected in China’s increasing investment in scientific development as its main path to surpass the West militarily. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) confidence in its armed forces remains, however, suspect given concerns about endemic corruption, political loyalty, and a lack of actual combat experience. Chinese leaders also recognize that their “strong adversary”, the U.S., is bolstered by a battle-hardened military with global spanning capabilities and an extensive alliance network. To offset these disadvantages, China seeks to develop and enhance an indigenous defence science ecosystem in order to build a modern, combat capable military, particularly one able to secure Taiwan by 2027 (through force if necessary), achieve ‘intelligentized warfare’ vis-à-vis the incorporation of cutting-edge technologies into military operations by 2035, and have a ‘world class military’ by 2049.
The Chinese Ministry of Defence has stated that: “The high-tech field has become the forefront and main battlefield of international competition.” In no uncertain terms, China intends to win a potential conflict with its perceived adversaries not just by catching up with them technologically, but by surpassing them. Recent months have seen signs of shocking progress on this front with inter alia the unveiling of the J-36, China’s 6th-generation fighter, and the WZ-9 drone, capable of countering U.S. airborne stealth capabilities, the employment of AI in warship degaussing (lowering a ship’s magnetic detectability), as well as advances in electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP), and hypersonics.
While China’s military goals and the importance of defence science in achieving these ends are well known, the ways in which China’s defence research ecosystem operates is still largely under- researched. Due to language barriers and an extremely opaque domestic environment, the “black box” nature of China’s military research apparatus is hard to comprehend for Western security communities. This topic, however, is critical to understanding the nature and trajectory of the China’s technological threat to the West, especially with respect to defence innovation.
For decades, China has quietly been building an elaborate and well-funded research ecosystem of interconnected military and civilian institutions to accomplish its global innovation aspirations. At its core is a policy and large-scale program referred to as Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), designed to eliminate the barriers between China’s civilian research and commercial sectors and its military and defense industrial sectors. As U.S. government reporting indicates, this leverages not only China’s native research and development efforts, but also through the acquisition and diversion of world-class technologies – including through theft – the attainment of significant military advantage. Conventional wisdom argues that Chinese research is inflated through mass, with a large quantity of scientific publications lacking in quality. For critics, Chinese defence science is only suited to copying technologies and imitation, rather than driving genuine innovation. However, a survey of the current ecosystem clearly demonstrates that China now possesses both breadth and depth in its research infrastructure through a web of smaller, geographically dispersed universities combined with large-scale institutions capable of significant economies of scale. This duality now enables the PRC to lead the world in 57 of 64 critical technologies, many of which are dual-use. Moreover, in domains deemed of particular ‘high risk’ (with very sensitive defence applications) such as advanced information and communications, novel materials and manufacturing, space robotics and transportation, energy and environment, biotechnology, sensing, timing and navigation applications, as well as autonomous underwater vehicles and electronic warfare, China exhibits largely uncontested dominance and threatens to establish monopoly positions. As a result, the PRC is rapidly eclipsing other states in the development and operationalization of sophisticated new military capabilities in numerous aspects of modern warfighting.
The Seven Sons of National Defence
An example of the breadth of the Chinese defence science ecosystem is the Seven Sons of National Defence, a group of civilian universities considered “feeders” for the nation’s defence industrial base and research arms. Civilian universities have an outsized role in China’s defence science, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and defence conglomerates leverage research conducted by universities and affiliated institutions through joint ventures, enabling universities to realize considerable revenue streams from patent transfers.
Cooperation between elite Chinese research institutions is rapidly accelerating as they become increasingly synergized. Showcasing the deep cooperation between the state, military, and education sectors, a shortlist of these universities are now working at the behest of the CCP to implement unique programs designed to fill niche priority areas, such as “low-altitude technology and engineering,” stealth missile technology, and modular satellite platforms.
The Chinese Academy of Science
The overall depth of China’s defence research is best represented by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). Ostensibly an independent, national, civilian institution, its leadership is politically appointed. Evident of the depth of military and civilian research integration, the PLA is increasingly active in the CAS’s administrative affairs. Since 2018, when CAS signed a strategic cooperation framework with the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, intersecting networks of joint affiliation between staff and research institutes have been noted. For example, CAS’s recent forays into defence innovation include noteworthy breakthroughs in jet engine technology as well as deep-sea radars capable of targeting high-flying aircraft. Moreover, CAS now directly supports PLA objectives. For example, it recently purchased and operates the Tan Suo San Hao icebreaker used for research in the far north as Beijing strives to increase its military, economic, and geopolitical great power interests (often in collusion with Russia) in the polar regions.
In short, political top-down direction and enabling actions by the CCP are increasingly fusing China’s military, civilian, business, research and innovation sectors in common purpose. When these forces are focused on specific national military interests and outcomes, the risks posed by China quickly become evident, threatening, and worthy of informed reflection.
Looking Forward: China as a Defence Innovation Giant
A diverse network of defence laboratories, military universities, national conglomerates, and private research firms, anchored to ‘civilian’ academic behemoths like the Seven Sons and CAS, are propelling China to become a world leading defence science superpower. Former U.S. security officials have referred to the scientific competition with China as “a race that we cannot afford to lose” warning about the fast pace at which China is overtaking the West. Under Xi Jinping, the PRC is currently building on its momentum, having recently announced an unprecedented US$55 billion in new government spending on science and technology, a 10% increase from last year.[1]
A China dominant in defence research creates vulnerabilities for Canada, notably by impeding our ability to successfully undertake deterrence measures as we increasingly risk falling behind the innovation curve. The race does not solely concern the creation of new technology, but also the broader implementation of technological progress which may alter the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the PLA’s increasing integration and co-optation of Chinese civilian research institutions creates important caveats for ongoing collaboration between Canadian and Chinese universities. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by China’s increasing dominance of specific scientific domains where military and genuine scientific research aims become indistinguishable. Moreover, recently exposed long-standing state funded political interference by China targeting Canadian universities has fostered increasingly unequal relationships between Chinese and Canadian researchers, facilitating the potential for intelligence gathering, talent recruitment, IP theft, spying, extortion, or other forms of coercion and influence operations. Finally, a China confident in its S&T dominance will prove a significantly more dangerous actor on the international scene, more capable of challenging the Western-led international order and the existing regional security architecture.
In conclusion, the PRC’s commitment to and investment in S&T preeminence requires critical evaluation, increased understanding, and should be framed in global terms. Chinese military doctrine and strategy emphasizes “winning without fighting.” In worst-case scenarios, the PRC’s scientific advances in critical technologies risk providing China with comparative advantage in areas such as sensing, targeting, space, cyber, AI, cognition, electronic warfare, and information operations that could be so decisive in the early stages of a conflict that Canada’s abilities to effectively defend our national self-interests are significantly degraded. This reality must be recognized and used to inform our current strategic planning efforts.
[1] OECD figures report that in 2023 China’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D was US$780.7 billion – 96% of U.S. spending (US$823.4 billion), and up from 72% 10 years before. https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20250404133241546
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s/authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
