While the world is transfixed by war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East and the shifting sands of American politics, another crisis is brewing in the South China Sea — one that threatens not just regional security, but also global biodiversity, fish catches and the resilience of international supply chains. The toll of inaction in this critical body of water is rising, and tragically, the crisis remains largely neglected.
China’s aggressive territorial ambitions in the South China Sea are well-known. Beijing is consolidating its control over one of the world’s most important maritime arteries through its militarization of man-made islands, its dismissal of international legal findings and its intimidation of smaller claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam. Less visible but no less pernicious is the role of China’s maritime militia — seemingly civilian fishing fleets operating under the command of the People’s Liberation Army. Those vessels swarm disputed waters, tail foreign ships and serve as a forceful extension of Chinese power, asserting Beijing’s claims through brute force and numbers.
Vietnam and the Philippines have both suffered decades of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. In a notorious 1974 battle for the Paracel Islands, Chinese forces took the archipelago from Vietnam, killing dozens of Vietnamese troops. Since then, Beijing has been expanding its encroachment in the South China Sea into Vietnamese territory, repeatedly ramming Vietnamese fishing boats and sending survey vessels into Hanoi’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 2019, the Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship operated for weeks inside Vietnamese waters without Hanoi’s consent, provoking a standoff that highlighted Beijing’s willingness to assert its dominance through economic and military pressure. Vietnamese fishermen, who depend on these waters to feed their families, are often hunted by Chinese vessels.
Likewise, the Philippines has been receiving harsher hostilities from Beijing. The Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012 was a turning point, with China successfully taking control of the fertile fishing grounds despite the legal claims of Manila. Most recently, Chinese coast guard ships have unleashed water cannons and aggressive maneuvers against Philippine resupply missions to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, where Filipino forces keep a tenuous outpost. The winter harassment of Philippine fishing boats and coast guard vessels in their own Exclusive Economic Zone underscores the way in which Beijing has sought to use force and intimidation to claim control over disputed waters.
Both the geopolitical stakes and the environmental toll are alarming. The South China Sea is one of the most important fishing regions in the world, with millions of people across Southeast Asia depending on it for their livelihoods. But China’s illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is driving regional fish stocks to the edge of collapse. Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen, who have long relied on these waters, are now finding themselves in a vulnerable situation as Chinese trawlers, who operate without restraint, use destructive methods such as bottom trawling and cyanide fishing. The ramifications reach well beyond the region: collapsing fish stocks in the South China Sea put additional pressure on global food security, most acutely felt in poorer countries that depend on the fisheries.
Additionally, the South China Sea is a key node in global supply chains, with about one third of global shipping transiting through it. Chinese coercion in these waters threatens the stability of the trade routes, who knows what damage could ensue, what economic quake would reverberate around the countries of the world. The danger is not merely theoretical — recent close encounters between Chinese and Vietnamese and Philippine vessels in disputed waters have shown how quickly tensions can escalate. Unchecked by the United States, Beijing’s expansionism could ensure a future in which it determines the terms of commercial passage through one of the planet’s busiest trade corridors.
Time for Canada to Step Up
Although the United States has pursued an active policy of challenging China’s encroachments, through freedom-of-navigation operations, other middle powers, including Canada, must be more active. Ottawa is starting to appreciate the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region, but its response is cautious. It is time for Canada to step up and help support resilience in the region — especially where it’s best suited to do so.
One of those areas is fighting illegal fishing. Canada has excellent fisheries enforcement, satellite surveillance, and marine conservation capabilities, and can therefore be able to hold Southeast Asian countries’ hands in monitoring and intercepting illegal fishing operations. One notable example is Canada’s provision of dark vessel detection technology in the region — which assists countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines in tracking down unreported or subterfuge fishing vessels that are illegally using their waters. Meaningful steps in countering China’s maritime militia and protecting fish stocks would include strengthening intelligence-sharing agreements, providing technical training and supporting regional coast guards.
More broadly, Canada needs to step up its engagement on Vietnam and the Philippines, two frontline states that in many ways are taking the brunt of China’s maritime aggression. This might manifest as heightened naval cooperation, participation in joint patrols, and other strengthening of defence partnerships. The Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy rightly points to these countries as priority partners, but there needs to be action that matches the rhetoric. Such an approach could also consist of deploying more Royal Canadian Navy assets in the region and participating in multilateral maritime exercises in the region to send a strong message signalling a commitment to the four pillars of international law in the South China Sea.
Canada should also use the diplomatic side to advocate for more multilateral action against both security and environmental threats. Forums like the ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership allow for increased collaboration, but Ottawa must also be prepared to cooperate through informal coalitions to resist Beijing’s coercion. Canada should also push for tougher international rules to combat IUU fishing, encouraging enhanced monitoring of Chinese fishing fleets operating in contested waters.
In the end, the South China Sea crisis cannot simply be ignored. If Beijing is allowed to tighten its grip on this critical region, it will only encourage future coercion — whether in Taiwan, the Arctic or beyond. The time to act is now.
