At first glance, U.S. foreign policy decisions since 2024 appear scattered: pressure on Venezuela, tensions with Panama, renewed interest in Greenland, a hard line on fentanyl, friction with Canada and allies, and escalation around Iran. For Canada, the temptation is to interpret these developments as episodic or as an extension of domestic U.S. politics.
Such a reading, however, underestimates the degree of strategic coherence that appears to be taking shape beneath the surface. Considered individually, these actions may seem reactive or disconnected; taken together, they suggest a broader reorientation of U.S. strategy in the context of intensifying great power competition. In that light, they point to a consistent logic: not a direct confrontation with China, but a deliberate effort to weaken the external networks—energy flows, trade corridors, logistical hubs, and financial linkages—that underpin its global reach.
If this interpretation holds, Canada is not simply a spectator to these developments. As part of North America’s economic, industrial, and geographic architecture, it constitutes one of the key operational spaces through which this strategy is being advanced—and, consequently, one of the environments most directly shaped by its effects.
From Great Power Competition to Systemic Disruption
Traditional great power competition has centred on military balance, deterrence, and direct economic confrontation. What is unfolding instead is a form of indirect competition aimed at reshaping the systemic environment in which China operates.
The emphasis is not on Beijing alone, but on the enabling structures of its power: energy dependencies, trade corridors, critical infrastructure, financial networks and, in some cases, illicit economic flows. This approach reflects a shift from confrontation to strategic disruption, targeting the connective tissue of China’s global reach.
In Latin America, U.S. actions—including pressure on Venezuela, scrutiny of Panama Canal infrastructure, and the securitization of transnational criminal networks—reflect an effort to reassert control over a hemisphere where Chinese economic and logistical influence has expanded under the Belt and Road Initiative. The canal itself represents a critical maritime chokepoint whose integration into Chinese-linked infrastructure networks would carry significant strategic implications for global trade and naval mobility.
In the Middle East, U.S. pressure on Iran’s oil exports—of which China absorbs roughly 85–90 percent—targets a key pillar of Beijing’s external energy security, anchored in the 2021 China–Iran partnership and reinforced by deepening cooperation since June 2025, thereby directly constraining one of China’s most reliable and politically insulated energy sources.
In the Arctic, renewed attention to Greenland underscores the strategic importance of critical minerals and emerging sea lanes. Control over these resources and routes is increasingly tied to technological competition and long-term defence industrial capacity—particularly in advanced manufacturing and energy transition systems—while intersecting with Beijing’s ambitions as a “near-Arctic” actor seeking access to resources, routes, and governance influence.
Even diplomatic signalling toward Russia, however inconsistent, can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the consolidation of a durable Sino-Russian strategic alignment. This logic rests on creating selective openings that may temper Moscow’s incentives to align too closely with Beijing—an approach that gains some plausibility in light of Moscow’s surprisingly cautious support for partners such as Iran and Venezuela. From a defence perspective, preventing such convergence would help avoid the emergence of a more coordinated Eurasian bloc.
Canada as Strategic Depth in Continental Defence
For Canada, these developments are not peripheral. They point to a gradual reconfiguration of North America as a consolidated strategic space, in which economic integration, defence cooperation, and supply chain security are increasingly intertwined.
This evolution implies that Canada is being treated less as an autonomous partner and more as a component of continental strategic depth. Pressure on supply chains, industrial policy, and border management reflects not only domestic U.S. priorities but also a broader effort to reduce systemic exposure to China within North America, by tightening control over critical inputs, limiting external dependencies, and aligning regulatory and industrial frameworks across the continent to support strategic resilience.
Canada’s resource base—particularly in critical minerals, energy, and advanced materials—places it at the centre of this transformation. These assets are no longer simply economic; they are integral to defence industrial resilience and technological sovereignty. As a result, Canadian policy choices in these domains are increasingly subject to strategic scrutiny.
At the same time, the instruments being deployed—tariffs, regulatory constraints, investment screening, and the securitization of trade—reflect a more coercive and transactional approach to alliance management. This introduces new asymmetries into the Canada–U.S. relationship, where access to markets and security cooperation may become more explicitly linked to strategic alignment.
The result is a more constrained operating environment for Ottawa. Decisions related to trade diversification, foreign investment, infrastructure, and resource development are increasingly entangled with broader questions of continental defence and geopolitical competition.
Strategic Adaptation: Sovereignty, Resilience and Defence Integration
If the United States is indeed pursuing a strategy of systemic disruption aimed at China, Canada must adapt accordingly—but not through passive alignment. The priority should be to mitigate the destabilizing effects of U.S.–China rivalry while reinforcing Canada’s own strategic autonomy.
First, Canada must strengthen its sovereign control over strategic sectors. This includes tightening investment screening in critical industries, enhancing regulatory oversight of infrastructure, and ensuring that key assets—particularly in energy and critical minerals—remain aligned with national, rather than external, priorities. In a context of intensifying competition, economic sovereignty is inseparable from national security.
Second, Canada should deepen its role within North American defence industrial integration, but on clearly defined terms. Participation in continental supply chains—particularly in areas such as rare earths, battery technologies, and defence manufacturing—should enhance Canadian capabilities rather than entrench structural dependence. This requires a more assertive industrial strategy aligned with long-term defence needs.
Third, Ottawa should invest in resilience across multiple domains, including cyber infrastructure, Arctic surveillance, maritime awareness, and critical supply chains. The Arctic, in particular, is emerging as a key strategic frontier where sovereignty, resource competition, and military presence intersect. Canada’s capacity to operate effectively in this environment will be central to its broader strategic posture.
Finally, Canada should work with like-minded partners to address structural imbalances within the global economic system that have enabled China to leverage openness for strategic gain. As recent scholarship shows, China has used its integration into Bretton Woods institutions not only to benefit from, but increasingly to reshape, the global economic order from within. This suggests the need to rethink aspects of the Bretton Woods framework and associated institutions to ensure that economic integration does not translate into strategic vulnerability.
Strategic Clarity in an Era of Fragmentation
None of this suggests that U.S. policy is fully coherent or consistently executed. Elements of improvisation remain, and some initiatives may generate unintended consequences. However, dismissing recent developments as erratic risks overlooking a more fundamental shift.
What is emerging is a form of competition that operates below the threshold of direct confrontation, targeting the systems and networks that enable state power in a globalized environment.
For Canada, the challenge is no longer simply how to respond to China as a rising power, but how to position itself within a strategic landscape increasingly shaped by indirect competition and systemic disruption. This will require not only policy adaptation, but a clearer articulation of Canada’s role as both a partner and a sovereign actor within an evolving continental and global order.
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s/authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
Pierre Pahlavi is a Full Professor at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and Deputy Head of the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the Royal Military College of Canada.
