



ON TRACK

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

This summer edition of ON TRACK features articles of current interest in the areas of defence procurement, NATO, NORAD, security, and Canada's interest in space.



MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

Cette édition d'été de *ON TRACK* contient des articles d'actualité dans les domaines des approvisionnements de défense, de l'OTAN, du NORAD, de la sécurité et de l'intérêt du Canada dans l'espace.

On 15 June, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) organized a very successful luncheon at the Canadian War Museum to host His Excellency Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, during his two-day visit to Canada in June. Some 180 invited guests were present to honour the Secretary General of NATO. The invited guests included representatives from the diplomatic service, the Canadian Forces, academia, and business. During the luncheon, His Excellency delivered an address which was well received by the assembled guests. The text of the NATO secretary General's address is available on line at: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CurriePapers/1506.Canada.War%20museum.%20BIL.24.pdf>.

The front cover of this edition of ON TRACK is dedicated to the memory of Captain Nichola Kathleen Sarah Goddard,

Le 15 juin, l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la défense (ICAD) a organisé un déjeuner très réussi au Musée canadien de la guerre pour recevoir Son Excellence Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, pendant sa visite de deux jours au Canada, en juin. Quelque 180 invités étaient présents pour honorer le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN. Parmi ces invités on retrouvait des représentants du service diplomatique, des Forces canadiennes, du monde universitaire et des affaires. Pendant le déjeuner, Son Excellence prononça une allocution qui fut bien reçue par les invités assemblés. Le texte de l'allocution du Secrétaire général de l'OTAN se trouve en ligne à l'adresse : <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CurriePapers/1506.Canada.War%20museum.%20BIL.24.pdf>.

La page couverture de cette édition de *ON TRACK* est consacrée à la mémoire du Capitaine Nichola Kathleen Sarah

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General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, welcomes some 180 guests at a luncheon that was held at the Canadian War Museum, 15 June, to honour His Excellency Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO. Photo by Stephen Darby, Canadian War Museum / Le général (ret) Paul Manson, Président de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense, souhaite la bienvenue à quelques 180 invités qui ont assisté au déjeuner au Musée canadien de la guerre, le 15 juin, à l'occasion de la visite de son Excellence Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secrétaire général de l'OTAN. Photo par Stephen Darby, Musée canadien de la guerre

member of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. She was killed in action, approximately 24 kilometres west of Kandahar, 17 May 2006. Captain Goddard was a forward observation officer serving with Task Force Afghanistan as part of the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group. Her service in the name of freedom and her sacrifice, along with that of her fellow soldiers, are deserving of the thanks, respect, and remembrance of the citizens of Canada. We extend our condolences to Captain Goddard's family for their loss.

With the recent announcements of the Federal government's investment in defence purchases, we have a timely article by our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, on the defence procurement process. In 'A

Goddard, membre du Régiment royal de l'Artillerie canadienne. Le Capitaine Goddard fut tuée au combat à environ 24 kilomètres à l'ouest de Kandahar, le 17 mai 2006. Elle était officier observateur avancé et était en service avec la Force d'intervention de l'Afghanistan comme membre du Groupe de combat du 1^{er} Batallion du Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Son service au nom de la liberté et son sacrifice, ainsi que celui de ses compatriotes militaires, méritent les remerciements, le respect et la mémoire des citoyens du Canada. Nous présentons nos condoléances à la famille éplorée du Capitaine Goddard.

Avec la récente annonce de l'investissement du gouvernement fédéral dans des achats de défense, nous avons un article qui tombe très à point, sous la plume de notre analyste principal de la défense, le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald,

Simple Decision Model for Fixing the Defence Procurement Process', Colonel MacDonald reminds us that the Government's decision in 1995 to adopt accrual based accounting has effectively removed much of the limitation of capital funding of new capital items. At the same time he has pointed out the willingness in the Canadian government procurement decision model to accept the operational risk that a critical capabilities platform will not be able to do its job because it is, among other things, too old physically or its technologies are too out of date. Colonel MacDonald explains the purpose of the National Security Exception, and recommends its use among his proposals.

We are pleased to include an update of the Australian Defence Strategic Plan, provided for us by Katherine Power. Ms Power also lists the capability decisions the Government of Australia has taken that increase the combat weight, mobility and sustainability of the Australian Defence Forces. She points out that globalization is a key theme of the update. The update recognizes that Australia's interest in strategic stability in North Asia is high, particularly in light of the changing relationships between the United States, China and Japan. See also 'The Difference Asian Multipolarity Makes' by Kerry Lynn Nankivell at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack11n1.pdf>.

Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve, Chief of Staff of NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), has written an outline of the transformation that has taken place in NATO over the past three years in 'A Permanent Multinational Coalition's Change Agent'. ACT was created by NATO Nations to be the organization solely designed to explore, develop, and implement military transformation for the Alliance. ACT is tasked with articulating the argument for new capability, and pushing to ensure that the new Alliance requirements are included in national defence plans. Lieutenant-General Maisonneuve points out that the need for individual military forces to work together and the requirement for these forces to be expeditionary mandate the Alliance to seek new capabilities. See also Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Mariano's article, 'NATO Command Structure: Rearranging Deck Chairs?', which appeared in the Winter 2005 edition of *ON TRACK*. Lieutenant-Colonel Mariano's article can be read on line at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack10n4.pdf>.

sur le processus d'approvisionnement de la défense. Dans son article intitulé 'A Simple Decision Model for Fixing the Defence Procurement Process', le Colonel MacDonald nous rappelle que la décision du gouvernement, en 1995, d'adopter une comptabilité d'exercice a effectivement supprimé beaucoup des limites de financement pour les dépenses d'investissement des nouveaux articles de capital. Au même moment, cette décision a souligné la volonté, dans le modèle de décisions d'approvisionnement du gouvernement canadien, d'accepter le risque opérationnel qu'une plate-forme de capacités critiques ne soit pas capable de faire son travail parce qu'elle est, entre autres choses, physiquement trop vieille ou que ses technologies sont désuètes. Le Colonel MacDonald explique le but de l'Exception au titre de sécurité nationale, et recommande son usage parmi ses propositions.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure une mise à jour du plan stratégique de la défense de l'Australie, que nous a procuré Katherine Power. Mme Power dresse aussi la liste des décisions de capacité que le gouvernement de l'Australie a prises, qui augmentent le poids de combat, la mobilité et la viabilité des Forces de défense australiennes. Elle souligne que la mondialisation est un thème essentiel de la mise à jour. La mise à jour reconnaît que l'intérêt de l'Australie dans la stabilité stratégique de l'Asie du Nord est élevé, particulièrement à la lumière des relations changeantes avec les États-Unis, la Chine et le Japon. Voyez également 'The Difference Asian Multipolarity Makes', par Kerry Lynn Nankivell, au <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack11n1.pdf>.

Le Lieutenant-général Michel Maisonneuve, Chef de l'État-major du Commandement allié Transformation (ACT) de l'OTAN, présente, dans 'A Permanent Multinational Coalitions's Change Agent', une description de la transformation qui a eu cours dans l'OTAN, ces trois dernières années. ACT fut créé par les nations de l'OTAN pour être l'organisation conçue à la seule fin d'explorer, de développer et de mettre en oeuvre la transformation militaire de l'Alliance. ACT est chargée d'articuler l'argument en faveur d'une nouvelle capacité, et de faire des pressions pour faire en sorte que les nouvelles exigences de l'Alliance soient incluses dans les plans de défense nationaux. Le Lieutenant-général Maisonneuve souligne que la nécessité, pour les forces militaires individuelles, de travailler ensemble et le besoin pour ces forces d'être expéditionnaires accorde à l'Alliance le mandat de chercher de nouvelles capacités. Voyez aussi l'article du Lieutenant-colonel Steve Mariano, 'NATO Command Structure : Rearranging Deck Chairs?', paru dans l'édition d'hiver de *ON TRACK*. On peut lire l'article du Lieutenant-colonel Mariano en ligne à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack10n4.pdf>.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) David O'Brien, a former Deputy Commander-in-Chief NORAD, has contributed an assessment of the recently renewed North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement and how, in his view, Canada's sovereignty has been lessened by Canada's decision not to participate in missile defence. He links the two issues in 'The 2006 NORAD Agreement: A Promising Start but Canada Needs More'. He points out that, while Canada's longstanding involvement in NORAD has provided Canada with political capital to leverage the wider Canada-U.S. relationship, in the current security environment south of the border that political capital is perishable.



His Excellency Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, addresses invited guests at a luncheon that was organized by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the Canadian War Museum, 15 June. Photo by Stephen Darby, Canadian War Museum / Son Excellence Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, à un déjeuner organisé par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense au Musée canadien de la guerre, le 15 juin. Photo par Stephen Darby, Musée canadien de la guerre

Le Lieutenant-général (ret.) David O'Brien, ancien vice commandant en chef du NORAD, a contribué une évaluation de l'entente, récemment renouvelée, du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD) et comment, à son point de vue, la souveraineté du Canada a été amoindrie par la décision du Canada de ne pas participer au bouclier antimissiles. Il relie les deux questions dans 'The 2006 NORAD Agreement: A Promising Start but Canada Needs More'. Il fait remarquer que, bien que l'implication de longue date du Canada dans le NORAD ait donné au Canada

un capital politique pouvant servir de levier à une relation élargie entre le Canada et les États-Unis, dans l'environnement de sécurité actuel chez nos voisins du sud, le capital politique est périssable.

The recent crisis in transatlantic relations has focused primarily on the policies of the George W. Bush administration, and particularly its choice to invade Iraq. Stanley R. Sloan has identified in 'The Transatlantic Link: building a New Foundation' a series of developments, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, that contributed to the transatlantic crisis. He outlines the lessons that should be learned from this crisis and provides an outline of key building blocks for re-constructing an effective transatlantic link. Stanley Sloan is founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative.

La récente crise dans les relations transatlantiques a porté en premier lieu sur les politiques de l'administration de George W. Bush, et particulièrement sur son choix d'envahir l'Iraq. Stanley R. Sloan a identifié, dans 'The Transatlantic Link: building a New Foundation', une série de développements, suite à la fin de la Guerre froide et à la chute de l'Union soviétique, qui ont contribué à la crise transatlantique. Il souligne les leçons qui devraient être tirées de cette crise et offre une description des principaux blocs de construction qui permettraient de reconstruire un lien transatlantique efficace. Stanley Sloan est le directeur fondateur de l'Atlantic Community Initiative.

The issue of providing the Canadian Forces (CF) with an amphibious operations capability has been the subject of discussion in recent years. Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice writes, in 'Making Amphibiosity a Reality', that the former Liberal government's Defence Policy Statement, which called for a battle group within a rapid reaction Standing Contingency Task Force, appeared to have envisaged an amphibious lift requirement. He outlines two decisions that have to be made before endorsing any future recommendation for the purchase of what Chief of the Defence Staff, General Hillier, referred to as "a big honking ship". Colonel (Ret'd) Rice has written more extensively on the subject of amphibious operations capability in 'Making Canadian Forces Amphibiosity a Reality',

La question de fournir aux Forces canadiennes (FC) une capacité d'opérations amphibies a été le sujet de discussions de ces dernières années. Le Colonel (ret.) Gary Rice écrit, dans 'Making Amphibiosity a Reality', que l'Énoncé de politique de défense de l'ancien gouvernement libéral, qui réclamait un groupe de combat au sein d'une Force opérationnelle permanente de contingence à réaction rapide, paraissait avoir envisagé un besoin de portance amphibie. Il souligne deux décisions qu'il faudra prendre avant d'endosser toute recommandation future pour l'achat de ce que le Chef de l'État-major de la Défense, le Général Hillier, a appelé un "gros bateau bruyant". Le Colonel (ret.) Rice a écrit davantage sur le sujet de la capacité d'opérations amphibies dans 'Making



Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J. Evraire, Chairman Conference of Defence Associations (R), thanks His Excellency Jakob Gijssbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO (L), following his address at the Canadian War Museum, 15 Jun. Photo by Stephen Darby, Canadian War Museum / Le lieutenant général (ret) Richard J. Evraire, Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense (D), remercie son Excellence Jakob Gijssbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN (G), suite à son allocution au Musée canadien de la guerre, le 15 juin. Photo par Stephen Darby, Musée canadien de la guerre

which can be seen at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/SCTFALR.pdf>.

A long-time contributor to *ON TRACK*, Major Eric Dion, has written an insightful appreciation of security and what it means. In 'e-Security' Major Dion explores the meaning of security, and how people apply security in dealing with the challenges of collaboration and cooperation. Major Dion works within the Directorate General of Strategic Planning at National Defence Headquarters.

Matthew Gillard presents a case for Canada to promote the formation of initiatives that will help facilitate strong antistellite (ASAT) arms control measures. Matthew has written in 'Safeguarding Canada's Interests in Space: The Merits of Antisatellite Weapon Arms Control' that Canada has three major interests in space. He examines three possible strategies

Canadian Forces Amphibiosity a Reality', qu'on peut lire à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/SCTFALR.pdf>.

Un collaborateur de longue date de *ON TRACK*, le Major Eric Dion a écrit une appréciation pénétrante de la sécurité et de ce que cela signifie. Dans 'e-Security' le Major Dion explore le sens de sécurité, et la façon dont les gens appliquent la sécurité lorsqu'ils font face aux défis de la collaboration et de la coopération. Le Major Dion travaille au sein de la Direction générale de la planification stratégique au Quartier général de la Défense nationale.

Matthew Gillard présente un cas pour inviter le Canada à promouvoir la formation d'initiatives qui aideront à faciliter de fortes mesures de contrôle des armes antisatellites (ASAT). Matthew a écrit dans 'Safeguarding Canada's Interests in Space: The Merits of Antisatellite Weapon Arms Control' que le Canada possède trois intérêts majeurs dans l'espace.

when confronting potential development and deployment of ASATs. Matthew has been the CDAI's intern for the past year. He has recently left us for NGO work in Southeast Asia.

We are very pleased to include as an important feature for *ON TRACK* of book reviews by Dr. Jack Granatstein. In this issue Dr Granatstein provides us with reviews of two books: *On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations*, edited by Colonel Bernd Horn, and *Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars*, written by Tim Cook. *On the Front Lines of Leadership* is the first volume in the series "In Harm's Way", part of the CF Leadership Institute's Strategic Leadership Writing Project. *Clio's Warriors* resulted from a doctoral dissertation of Cook's, and is published in the Canadian War Museum's "Studies in Canadian Military History" series. Dr. Granatstein is one of Canada's best-known military historians and is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of submissions that were received for the consideration of the Vimy Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the Award to Mr. G. Hamilton Southam by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place, on 17 November, at a gala reception and dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations, which appears elsewhere in this issue, and on line at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/vimycall06.htm.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2005 was the journalist for the *Toronto Star*, Bruce Champion-Smith. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be

Il examine trois stratégies possibles lorsqu'on fait face au développement et au déploiement possibles de ASATs. Matthew est en internat à l'ICAD depuis un an. Il nous a récemment quitté sous peu pour une ONG qui travaille dans le Sud-est asiatique.

Nous sommes très heureux d'inclure comme articles importants pour *ON TRACK* des revues de livres par Jack Granatstein. Dans ce numéro, M. Granatstein nous propose le compte-rendu de deux livres: *On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations*, dont l'éditeur est le Colonel Bernd Horn, et *Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars*, qui a pour auteur Tim Cook. *On the Front Lines of Leadership* est le premier volume de la série "In Harm's Way", qui fait partie du Projet d'écriture sur le leadership stratégique, de l'Institut de leadership des Forces canadiennes. *Clio's Warriors* est le résultat d'une thèse de doctorat de Cook et est publié dans la série "Études d'histoire militaire canadienne" du Musée canadien de la guerre. M. Granatstein est l'un des historiens militaires les plus connus du Canada et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

L'un des principaux événements du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an passé a eu un succès retentissant, avec le nombre élevé de soumissions que nous avons reçues pour considération par le Comité de sélection du prix Vimy, et avec, comme point culminant, la présentation du prix à M. G. Hamilton Southam par l'Honorable Bill Graham, ministre de la Défense nationale.

La présentation du prix Vimy aura lieu, cette année, le 17 novembre, dans le cadre d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui sera tenu dans le Grand Hall du Musée canadien de la civilisation, à Gatineau (Québec). Pour faire de la remise du prix un événement vraiment significatif, l'Institut a besoin de votre mise en candidature pour le récipiendaire de cette année. Les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus sont encouragés à soumettre des mises en candidature pour leur candidat. Veuillez consulter l'avis de l'appel de candidatures, qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro, et, en ligne, à http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/vimycall06.htm.

Le prix Ross Munro Media Award sera également présenté au Dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix pour 2005 était le journaliste du *Toronto Star*, Bruce Champion-Smith. Ce prestigieux prix, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, sera présenté au jour-

presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of the defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/submission_call_06.htm.

Both programmes, last year, were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

This Autumn, on 27-28 October 2006, the CDAI, in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada will host the 9th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totaling \$6,000, will be awarded for the best three papers presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Please note the call for papers, which appears elsewhere in ON TRACK, and on our website at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2006/call%20for%20papers.pdf>.

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naliste canadien qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui affectent le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'une bourse de 2 500 \$ en argent. L'avis d'appel pour les candidatures paraît aussi ailleurs dans ce numéro et sur notre site web à http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/submission_call_06.htm.

L'an passé, les deux programmes ont connu un succès retentissant. J'ai le plaisir de vous informer que l'appui que l'industrie canadienne et les individus accordent aux programmes est très encourageant.

Cet automne, les 27 et 28 octobre 2006, l'ICAD, en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, de l'Institut de recherches en politiques publiques, le Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's et le programme Études sur la guerre dispensé au Collège militaire royal du Canada, sera l'hôte du 9^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés. Le symposium soulignera le travail des étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise provenant d'universités civiles et militaires de partout au Canada et dans le monde. La recherche de pointe de jeunes chercheurs sera mise à l'honneur et des prix en argent, totalisant 6 000 \$, seront remis aux trois meilleurs mémoires présentés. Le but du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Veuillez noter l'appel de soumission de mémoires, publiée par ailleurs dans ON TRACK et sur notre site web, à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2006/call%20for%20papers.pdf>.

L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de défense est un organisme caritatif non partisan qui a pour mandat d'entreprendre un soutien à la recherche et de promouvoir un débat public informé sur les questions de sécurité nationale et de défense. Ce n'est pas un secret que notre mandat n'est pas encore rempli et que les FC méritent le soutien de la nation pour leur réjuvenation, plus que jamais, au moment où elles entreprennent des missions dangereuses.

En terminant, je souhaite remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs aux niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour le soutien financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD. Leur appui produit des dividendes par le biais d'une plus grande sensibilisation des Canadiens, y compris les médias, vis-à-vis le besoin d'une force militaire crédible. Nous ajoutons au débat sur les questions de défense et de sécurité nationale. L'appui financier que vous accordez au travail de l'Institut de la CAD qui est poursuivi en votre nom est critique, *maintenant* plus que jamais. Avec votre appui continu nous pouvons promouvoir l'étude et la

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose mandate is to undertake research support and promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues. It is no secret that our mandate is not yet over and that the CF are deserving of the nation's support for their rejuvenation, more than ever, as they undertake hazardous missions.

In closing I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute. Their support is reaping dividends through increased awareness by Canadians, including the media, of the need for a credible military. We add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. Your financial support of the work of the CDA Institute that is carried out on your behalf is critical, *now*, more than ever. With your continued support we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. As you be aware, convincing Government of the importance of the CF in our society is attainable.

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sensibilisation des affaires militaires canadiennes. Comme vous le savez, convaincre le gouvernement de l'importance des FC dans notre société est un objectif qu'il est possible d'atteindre.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimées sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut les obtenir en ligne à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDai/joincdai.htm>.

A SIMPLE DECISION MODEL FOR FIXING THE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PROCESS

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald



Introduction

By now the fundamental problems of re-capitalizing the Canadian Forces (CF) are well understood.

Too much of the existing equipment inventory is either past the end of its Treasury Board mandated life expectancy, or else perilously close to it. At the same time the ponderously slow procurement process, described by the Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency¹ as 15-16 years in length guarantees that life expired CF equipment must be maintained for long periods of time beyond the end of their life expectancy.

At one time the critical limiting factor was the amount of capital funding available to DND planners. The 1995² decision to adopt accrual based accounting (which is a fancy way of saying "the normal accounting system used in the real world of the private sector") has effectively removed much of this limitation in the short run by adopting the private sector accounting practice of amortizing the capital cost of an item over its full life expectancy, and only charging the annual depreciation amount to the current year's capital budget.

Thus, a capital item costing \$1 billion, with a life expectancy of 20 years, would result in a Vote 5 depreciation charge of 5% or \$50 million annually for each of twenty years, instead of a Vote 5 charge of \$1 billion in the year of purchase. The effect is a short run leveraging of the annual Vote 5 funds

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since only a small percentage of the total cost of new capital items need be incurred in the year of delivery, with the rest spread out over their useful life.

The Wrong Sort of Risk Aversion

The current Canadian government procurement decision model is intendedly risk averse. Unfortunately, the primary focus of risk management seems to focus on such as the financial risk of contract over-runs, or the contract risk involved in contractors not meeting contract specifications, and the legal risk of not observing the requirements for open, transparent, and fair competitive bidding processes mandated by our obligations with respect to the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and AIT agreements.

There is, as well, the problem of political risk within the Canadian context—of politicians imposing non-defence objectives on top of, and sometimes in place of legitimate defence objectives. This form of political risk can range from the very costly decision taken by Prime Minister Chrétien to cancel the EH-101 contract entered into by Prime Minister Mulroney's previous administration, and thereby set back the Maritime Helicopter replacement project by two decades, to political interventions into the Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) aspects of major equipment projects, which may be playing a role in the delay in getting out an RFP for the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue project, even though Treasury Board provided for an acceleration of the project in Budget 2004.

What seems less apparent, in the Canadian government procurement decision model, is a willingness to accept the existence of operational risk - the risk that a critical capabilities platform won't be able to do its job, especially under adverse conditions, because it is simply inappropriate for the circumstances, too old physically, and/or its critical technologies are too out of date, and therefore the platform becomes of greater danger to its crew than to any possible enemy.

Against this ponderous system we have the contrast of the procurement of critical equipments needed for the deployment in Afghanistan which bypass the cumbersome acquisition system through the invocation of procedures equivalent to the National Security Exception (NSE), which allows the provisions of WTO, NAFTA, and AIT to be set aside.

A case in point is the acquisition of the M-777 medium howitzers currently in action in Afghanistan. These were acquired from the US Marine Corps through the Foreign Military Sales programme to meet the very clear operational

necessity of providing effective and responsive indirect fire support to the Canadian force deployed in Afghanistan. From a defence policy viewpoint this was a most fortuitous development since it allowed the Canadian artillery to continue to use 155mm projectiles, the calibre for which there has been extensive research and development work done in terms of its capabilities as a precision guided projectile in the *Excalibur* programme.

We should be conscious, as well, of the fact that there may be significant supply constraints in the defence capital market in terms of the availability of 'slots' in planned production runs, particularly where defence suppliers are close to the end of scheduled production runs, and unwilling to keep lines open 'on spec' that new orders may appear, or where existing large order customers are unwilling to give up slots to accommodate newly appearing small order customers.

The National Security Exception

Government purchasing practices are subject to the limitations agreed upon in three critical trade agreements: those associated with the WTO, NAFTA, and the AIT. All three agreements compel signatories to treat suppliers located within the boundaries of the other signatories to the agreement in the same manner that they treat their own suppliers, and require the government contracting procedures to be open, competitive, and transparent.

However, all three agreements contain provisions which allow governments to exclude certain procurement decisions from the competitive procedures mandated by the agreements, if there are national security reasons to do so. In Canada, this process is covered by what is referred to as the National Security Exception (NSE).

The purpose of the NSE is identified by the Guidelines issued by Treasury Board to assist Departments in determining when to invoke the NSE:

“The NSE provided for in trade agreements allows Canada to remove a procurement from some or all of the obligations of the relevant trade agreement where Canada considers it necessary to do so in order to protect its national security or other related interests specified in the text of the national security exceptions.”³

The NSE, thus, provides for considerable flexibility in approach, and may even impact upon such perennial practices as the much loved IRBs:

“The term ‘NSE’ is self defining and as such, signatories to the trade agreements made a conscious decision to ensure considerable discretion in complying with the trade agreements in the context of their own domestic security requirements.”⁴

“In general, protecting national security is not meant to preclude work being performed by international firms. In this vein, invoking NSE does not mean that Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) are in or out of a procurement strategy. IRBs may or may not arise in the context of NSE. As well, invoking NSE is not meant by definition to restrict competition to Canadian suppliers unless for example, there is a legitimate need to maintain or establish a Canadian source of supply. Depending on what is being purchased, there may be situations where only foreign suppliers are able to bid on those goods and services deemed essential to Canada’s security interests.”⁵

A Simple Procurement Process Decision Model

A formal national policy acknowledgement of the primacy of operational risk as the primary factor in determining defence procurement, together with the use of the Treasury Board Capital Asset Amortization Guidelines as a key element in determining Operational Risk, may be the way of solving the Canadian Forces capital procurement dilemma by providing an operating heuristic as to when the NSE should be used to bypass the normal procurement process, or, alternatively, when the normal processes can be followed without operational risk to the Canadian Forces.

Put simply, we propose the following decision rules:

- If purchasing normal commodity goods and supplies to be consumed within one year, use the existing Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) acquisition process.
- For the acquisition of major equipments, compare the acquisition cycle length to the remaining years of life in the equipments to be replaced, according to Treasury Board guidelines. If the procurement cycle is less than the life remaining, use the normal competitive bidding process.

- If the major equipment service life remaining, according to Treasury Board guidelines, is less than the acquisition cycle length, invoke the National Security Exception, and bypass the normal acquisition process.
- Where new, rather than replacement, capabilities are required to eliminate operational risk, invoke the National Security Exception, and bypass the normal acquisition process.

The Decision Model and Current Defence Procurement Issues

Current mobility replacement projects being proposed to Cabinet (CC-130 medium airlifter, Joint Supply Ships, and Medium Logistics Trucks) all fall within the case of the remaining service life being less than the length of the normal procurement cycle. Accordingly the proposed decision model would determine it appropriate to invoke the National Security Exemption and move to single source procurement, if deemed appropriate.

Current new mobility replacement projects being proposed (strategic airlifters and medium/heavy helicopters) deal with legitimate CF operational risk requirements. Accordingly the proposed decision model would determine it appropriate to invoke the National Security Exemption and move to single source procurement, if deemed appropriate.

¹ *Minister’s Efficiency Study, Section 1 – Management Enhancements*, at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/report/toc_e.htm.

² Department of Finance Canada, *Backgrounder - Implementation of Full Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government’s Financial Statements (2004)*, at: http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2001/fullacc_e.html

³ Guidelines to Assist Departments in Invoking the National Security Exception (NSE) in Procurement Trade Agreements http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cmp/guide/nse-esn_e.asp

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

An Update of the Australian Defence Strategic Plan

by Ms. Katherine Power

Australia recently provided an update, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005*, to its 2000 White Paper. The Update identified that terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and state fragility and failure remain the most immediate strategic challenges. The Update also identifies the risk of convergence between these three challenges as a major and continuing threat to international security.

Launched in December 2005 by Prime Minister John Howard and then Minister for Defence Robert Hill (recently appointed as Australia's Ambassador to the United Nations), the Update is the second review of Australia's strategic outlook since the 2000 White Paper. It aims to ensure that the Australian Department of Defence maintains an appropriate mix of concepts, capabilities and forces to meet new security challenges and outlines the way Government continues to shape the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a highly capable and flexible military force able to meet a wide range of tasks.

Rather than representing a major change in policy, the document serves to clarify the principles of the 2000 White Paper and apply them to the circumstances of today. Outlined is the Government's shaping of the ADF to increase its capacity to meet the increasingly diverse demands of Australia's strategic environment, with particular emphasis on the measures being taken to ensure the ADF is a force capable of meeting future military challenges.

The trends and priorities identified in the Update can be expected to place high demands on the ADF, its preparedness and sustainability and require a strong focus on versatility and adaptability to unforeseen contingencies.

The current high demands placed on the ADF in responding to present threats and meeting other responsibilities are likely to continue, and Australia's military forces can expect to conduct concurrent deployments domestically, regionally and internationally in support of Australian interests. Given the experience of past years, with forces deployed to East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands while also maintaining strong commitments to United Nations activities around the world, it is likely that Australia will again find itself

facing challenges that it cannot anticipate or predict easily. To plan for such contingencies, focus has been placed on forces that are versatile, robust, joint and integrated.

Globalisation

Globalisation is a key theme of the Update. The erosion of national boundaries, the increase in asymmetrical threats and the movement of ideas and technologies have eroded the value of defences built on Australia's geographic location and traditional military practices.

Some of the key judgements in this area include:

- different levels and rates of economic growth and modernisation will change relationships between the major powers;
- new and advanced capabilities are entering the region as countries modernise their defence forces;
- United States engagement remains the foundation of Asia Pacific security for the foreseeable future;
- technology is proliferating, making increasingly potent capabilities more widely available to both state and non-state actors.

Many parts of Australia's region are characterised by porous borders, weak governance, inequities in the distribution of resources, problems of law enforcement, insurgencies, drug trafficking and transnational crime. Threats will be increasingly interrelated across both national and international environments and across organisational and jurisdictional boundaries. As a result, threats to Australia's neighbours are identified as threats to Australia. This means that the future contribution of the ADF to national security will extend beyond traditional warfighting against traditional adversaries.

Strong Security Relationships

The Update identifies the development of strong security relationships, both regionally and globally, as a key policy response to the strategic environment. While the Australia-US Alliance remains the cornerstone of Australian national security, the Update recognises that Australia's interest in strategic stability in North Asia is high, particularly in the light of the changing relationships between the United States, China

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and Japan. Also recognised is the importance of India as an emerging power. These four nations and their relationships are likely to define the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific well into the 21st century.

Australia's bilateral defence relationship with Japan has been enhanced by the positive experience of working together in Al Muthanna Province in Iraq, and opportunities for greater security cooperation are expected to increase as Japan continues to take a more active role in regional and global security.

Australia is also interested in enhancing its defence relationship with China, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding on security and defence issues. Australia views the relationship between China and the United States as a pivotal dynamic in the future security of the region.

In its nearer region, Australia will continue to work with regional governments to help shape an environment that promotes economic and political wellbeing. In particular, Australia will continue to place a high priority to working with Indonesia on shared security concerns, including terrorism and border security.

The Update also notes that Australia's robust democracy, strong economy and operational effectiveness means that regional states will continue to look to Australia for assistance.

Whole-of-Government Responses

The Update recognises that the threats facing Australia are multidimensional and require whole-of-government responses. It outlines the key contribution of the ADF to domestic security in areas such as counter-terrorism, fisheries and resource protection, counter-proliferation initiatives, bomb disposal and response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.

To further enable this contribution the Australian Parliament recently passed amendments to Part IIIAAA of the *Defence Act 1903* that enhances the ADF's capabilities to provide aid to the civil authorities in the event an incident proves beyond their capacity to resolve.

Capability and Resources

As the most potent of the range of instruments Australia employs to promote and support its security interests, Defence capability must allow the ADF to operate as a networked,

joint force in increasingly complex and ambiguous environments against adversaries armed with lethal capabilities.

The ADF will continue to be developed as a joint, balanced, networked force able to contribute with increasing effectiveness to global, regional and domestic security. The Update recognises that the ADF must have the capability to carry out Australia's particular responsibilities in the region, yet at the same time retain the capacity to contribute to coalition operations further afield.

To ensure that Australia is a credible contributor to global and regional security, the Government has taken capability decisions that increase the ADF's combat weight, mobility and sustainability including:

- hardening and networking the Army to provide it with mobility and fire support;
- increasing the size of the Army;
- new amphibious ships that will extend the reach of the ADF and allow for deployment of larger and heavier forces, as well as providing an additional capability for humanitarian assistance;
- new air warfare destroyers to protect deployed forces;
- new combat systems and heavy torpedoes for the Collins class submarines;
- enhanced border patrol capability with the new fleet of Armidale patrol boats;
- upgrades to the F/A-18 fleet prior to a transition to the Joint Strike Fighter;
- better situational awareness and command and control with the airborne early warning and control aircraft;
- increased reach and persistence of air combat capabilities with the new generation air-to-air refuellers; and
- the acquisition of a heavy airlift capability.

Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005 can be accessed online at:

<http://www.defence.gov.au/update2005/index.cfm>

NATO's Allied Command Transformation: A Permanent Multinational Coalition's Change Agent

by LGen J.O. Michel Maisonneuve

The Winter/Hiver 2005 issue of On Track featured an article by LCol Stephen Mariano entitled “NATO Command Structure: Rearranging Deck Chairs” that laid out some of the structural changes NATO has undergone in the last few years. By and large, the article was factual and informative, but its title raised a bit of my ire as it seemed to cast a negative shadow on the attempts by the most powerful political-military Alliance to update itself.

In my view, NATO has done well. As the CDS stated in the article immediately preceding Mariano's, it “has moved decisively to reduce... headquarters” and to consolidate operations under one strategic command. In addition, the creation of another strategic command solely focussed on transformation was an unprecedented effort to recognize the need for change. Reforming a twenty-six member Alliance of *sovereign* Nations, each with their own national interests is not a simple matter; using words well known by Canadians, one could say Nations need to focus on those values and interests that unite them.

Transformation in NATO is not as clear as it should be and the role of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the process is poorly understood. Even NATO heads of state and government at the summit in Prague in 2002 probably had no idea the impact of creating a permanent change agent such as ACT would have on NATO's capabilities.

Change management in the 1990s was leading us to an end-state, and was usually managed by temporary organizations that would disappear after reaching that end-state. Today, transformation sees no end-state – just a constant spiral to greater capabilities, so a permanent, line organization is needed to promote, encourage and manage change and innovation. Whilst ACT does not have a simple mission, NATO has been remiss at keeping different communities informed on the details of its business. There is a need to demystify transformation. One thing is clear; from ACT's point of view, what is going on in NATO is more than “rearranging deck chairs.”

The 26 Nations that have come together to transform NATO to meet their collective security in the future have ownership

of the process and it is broader than transformation of military capability alone.

First, the **Why**.

Several key factors converged to enable and necessitate the broad and sweeping transformation underway throughout NATO.

First the strategic environment; this is the most complex and unpredictable time in human history. We are witnessing increasing global instability and a broader range of threats. The world will not become less complex or more predictable. The only way for the Alliance to manage these new complexities, each seemingly more challenging than the preceding one, is to be better prepared to confront them.

Second, the rapid development of Information Technology seems to be the enabling force of the new strategic environment that has propelled us from the industrial age to the information age. This IT explosion not only increases the efficiency of delivering force, but also increases the efficiency of those that seek to do grave harm. Nations must therefore restructure their forces to capitalize on the new innovations, while preparing to counter the threats they pose.

The final two factors underpinning transformation within NATO are the fundamental need for individual military forces to work together as a coherent joint force and the requirement for these forces to be expeditionary. These two factors mandate the Alliance to seek new capabilities to improve, enhance, and broaden, *inter alia*, its connectivity, deployability, flexibility and usability.

ACT was created by NATO Nations to be the organization solely designed and permanently established to explore—develop—and implement—military transformation for the Alliance.

At the core of ACT's mission—its business—are three fundamental enablers of transformation: first, deployability and interoperability; second, NATO member Nations collectively own NATO Transformation; and finally, ACT's role as both an engine and manager of that change.

The movement toward deployability and interoperability arguably entails the most fundamental shift in NATO's mindset since its creation to fight a static foe in a regional setting.

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Alliance nations must now seek new capabilities in order to be prepared to send their forces wherever and whenever required and to be able to work together—as one force—fully joint and completely interoperable.

The perception that ACT is ‘going it alone’ is unfounded; member nations own NATO’s transformation. ACT can focus and drive this process—but ultimately—it is the nations who provide strategic direction.

Change is never easy and as a “forcing agent for change”, ACT is tasked with articulating the argument for new capability, and pushing to ensure that the new Alliance requirements are included in national defence plans. At this time, no other organization has created such a permanent promoter and manager of change. As illustrated below, it is more than structural change alone.

Transformation is not about doing the same things better, it is about doing better things...

What does transformation mean in terms of deliverables?

Transformation is not about doing the same things better, it is about doing better things; it is about change that seeks to adapt to and master unexpected challenges in a dynamic and shifting environment. The biggest challenge is changing the cultural mindset and adopting an innovative and experimental attitude – an attitude to seek what capabilities are required and develop them quickly – an attitude that encourages and rewards risk taking.

Presently NATO forces *coordinate* operations with jointness merely at the elemental level. They communicate with each other, participate together in some operations, have combined staffs at some locations, but in the end are only stitched loosely together with their own legacy equipment, logistics, communications system and culture.

The NATO Response Force provides the best mechanism for participating nations to improve interoperability and integration of service components and national cultures.

The beacon for the future, however, is to achieve a *coherent* force; an interdependent, collaborative, network-enabled force that employs an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), to include non-military elements.

An EBAO encourages networked solutions that employ integrated joint military capability in coherence with the other non-military means available to the commander in the conduct operations. To develop the required capabilities, ACT uses three

transformational goals which are critical to the successful accomplishment of all future operations – decision superiority, coherent effects, and joint deployment and sustainment. It is capability improvements within each of these focus areas that will ultimately achieve transformed Alliance forces ready to defeat the threats of today and the future.

But **how** is ACT doing business to meet these requirements?

For transformation through capability improvement to be advanced, a number of complex processes must work together in a coherent way. First, the Defence Planning process must provide harmonization across the nations and NATO to ensure Alliance commanders have the right mix of forces and capabilities now and in the future. ACT must identify what capabilities the Alliance has now, and what capabilities it will need to effectively meet future requirements. Nations and the Alliance must then procure new capabilities or agree new operational concepts and doctrines.

To achieve this, ACT has now set up a Capability Development Process to capture requirements, identify shortfalls and monitor progress. This includes the need to support the quest for innovative solutions through research and technology (R&T), concept development & experimentation (CD&E), and education and training. These provide input to the doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability (DOTMLPFI) enablers that underpin each and every capability needed.

Determining what future capabilities are needed requires aggressive engagement with all aspects of research and technology to provide close links to breaking science and technology as well as a structured means to analyse developing technologies and ideas. Concept development and experimentation (CD&E) is used to introduce these technologies and ideas as potential solutions and then to test them.

The CD&E process is a real measure of ACT’s transformational agenda, and by extension, that of NATO. Through it, innovative solutions and capability needs are explored. CD&E seeks to leverage modern technology as swiftly as possible to realise new ways of delivering capability. Experiments in live scenarios test findings and create the evidence upon which to base future procurement and concept development decisions. Experiments may not come out as expected but will help guide the direction of future capability development; without CD&E, NATO would simply have a change rather than a transformational agenda.

Exercises are conducted to test solutions, and once approved, ensure solutions are implemented directly within the Alli

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ance Nations or through NATO common funding – in fact becoming employable capabilities for tomorrow. The process is further supported by a comprehensive education and training network to train forces, staffs, and commanders in the latest concepts and agreed doctrine. Finally, through the NATO Lessons Learned program, results are evaluated and analysed, and fed back into the capabilities development process and education and training system as swiftly as possible.

All these processes form the basis of ACT's capability development process. It is much like a highway – a well-defined origin, destination, and route, but with several on and off ramps permitting free entrance and exit to the flow of ideas at any stage.

NATO has undertaken to manage – indeed promote and encourage – transformation of its capabilities through the set up of a line organization focussed solely on this mission. There are indeed advantages to ACT being located in Norfolk, alongside the similar U.S. agency, Joint Forces Command. But the benefits do not only fall to NATO. The U.S. has recognized the advantages of having a ready-made portal to 26 NATO nations available next door to enhance interoperability and to find solutions developed in some niche areas even it has not considered. It is a truly symbiotic relationship. Canada participates fully in this change management organization, with more than 35 staff officers, CF members and civilians serving in the Command, including my position within the Command Group of ACT.

So besides the structural changes, how has NATO changed in the last three years since ACT has existed? The list of accom-

plishment is long, but I will use only three examples. First, in the realm of training; in the old NATO, HQs undertaking missions would do so without coordinated prior training, in an ad hoc fashion, where staffs would often meet for the first time on arrival in the mission theatre. Today, successive rotations of HQs such as ISAF deploy only after having completed a four-phased training programme culminating in a Mission-Rehearsal Exercise at ACT's Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway; employing the latest theatre-based scenarios, mentors from the mission itself, and lessons fresh from the theatre.

Second, the current process of CD&E has allowed the rapid development of solutions to support the operators. Indeed, an operational experiment with a friendly force tracking system in ISAF provided the necessary justification for the current ongoing procurement of a system to support KFOR. The same experiment results were rolled into the criteria required for successive rotations of the NATO Response Force. Third, the improvements in the NATO defence planning process driven by ACT will ensure the provision of fully expeditionary forces for NATO operations in the future.

Although ACT's mission of transforming NATO is now much clearer, it can only offer recommendations to the Alliance and member nations. Agreement and implementation is a function of the will of nations to do so. But for NATO, there is no going back; transformation must continue. The changes in NATO's command structure are pervasive; they need to continue, but as far as ACT's mission is concerned, it is clear and fully understood. All members of the Command, including Canadians, intend to fuel and drive the process to the full extent of their capabilities.

The 2006 NORAD Agreement: A Promising Start but Canada Needs More

by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) David O'Brien

Introduction

The recently renewed North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement provides a helpful reminder of the role bi-national continental defence and security can play in strengthening Canada-United States relations, improving

Canadian security and enhancing Canadian sovereignty. The theme of this article is that while the mission expansion proposed in the new agreement provides a positive opportunity, Canada must now step forward aggressively to reverse the decline in Canada's involvement in the core missions of missile warning and space surveillance that have provided the foundation for NORAD's success over the decades.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) David O'Brien served over 35 years in the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Forces. He retired as Deputy Commander-in-Chief NORAD in 1995. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) O'Brien is currently Chairman Raytheon Canada Limited.

Pragmatic, rational, national self-interest should define and lead Canadian behavior in its relations with the United States on defence and security cooperation, and the NORAD framework offers Canada a unique platform for furthering national interests. Canadian objectives will be more favourably received by the United States once Canada addresses the national security concerns that currently drive U.S. domestic politics, including U.S. defence of North America from attack by ballistic missiles.

BACKGROUND: What is NORAD? How is it Unique? What does it do?

Since its inception in 1958 NORAD has been the centerpiece for continental security relations between Canada and the U.S. As a mutual security arrangement it is virtually unique in the world; it is not an alliance, and it is not a coalition. It is an enduring agreement between two nations to share resources and authority to defend our common aerospace, while respecting each nation's sovereignty. This unique NORAD framework has served Canada exceptionally well, and has provided this country with a privileged position that the U.S. has not entered into with any other of its allies.

The Commander of NORAD is appointed by, and is responsible to, both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. Traditionally, the Commander of NORAD is American, and the Deputy Commander, Canadian. NORAD Headquarters is located at Colorado Springs, Colorado, from where NORAD monitors and tracks man-made objects in space and detects, validates and warns of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles or 'space vehicles' (e.g. satellites and space debris). NORAD also provides surveillance and control of Canadian and U.S. airspace.

NORAD has enjoyed a political dimension at least as important as its core mandate of defence of the homelands. As a result, Canada's longstanding direct and active involvement in NORAD has provided Canada with political capital to leverage the wider Canada-U.S. relationship. However, in the current security environment south of the border, that political capital is perishable, and slipping. Canada is losing its privileged position and must do something significant to earn it back in the interests of its own long-term security and sovereignty.

NORAD and Canadian Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty is founded on the notion that a sovereign nation possesses the means to impose, by rightful governance, its will over its territory. Critical elements in the exercise of sovereignty include the ability to detect and assess territorial incursions, the ability to make that information available to the sovereign in a timely and understandable

format that will enable decision making, and finally the ability to execute an appropriate response. In this context NORAD has served Canada extremely well.

By combining efforts with the U.S. Canada has received information about what is happening around and above Canada that would otherwise have been unavailable, thus providing the first critical element required to exercise sovereignty.

To illustrate this value to Canada's sovereignty one needs only examine the NORAD missile warning and space surveillance missions. These missions have been NORAD's highest priority for more than 30 years. Execution of these missions by Canadians in NORAD has provided Canada with its best and often only source of information on what is happening in space above Canada. However, Canada has contributed no sensors or systems in support of these missions.

To be more specific from a command and control perspective, because the NORAD bi-national command relationship makes a major U.S. military commander subordinate to Canada it "breaks through" the U.S. Unified Command and Control Structure (UCCS). Otherwise, under the UCCS Canada would be viewed, and dealt with, by US Northern Command like US Pacific Command views South Korea, which is just one country in their region of responsibility.

The unique NORAD bi-national command arrangement has provided Canada with access and insights on threat intelligence, involvement in U.S. plans for North American defence, and real time access to evolving threats and the U.S. response, that would not have been available through standard command and control arrangements. NORAD also provided Canada an equal seat at the table when these issues were discussed. This unique NORAD framework was put in place when Canada's contribution had a high level of strategic importance to the U.S.

Canada's robust participation in NORAD has therefore facilitated a level of Canadian sovereignty that would have been otherwise unattainable. While the level of importance of Canada's contribution to NORAD has declined markedly since the end of the Cold War the value of the framework to Canada remains high.

CANADA OPTING OUT of BMD: A Key Factor in Canada's Weaker Position in Continental Defence and Security

In 2004 the NORAD agreement was amended to recognize that to execute the new U.S. homeland defence against ballistic missile attack mission NORAD missile warning data would

be required. Accordingly NORAD was authorized to provide warning and assessment data to U.S. Northern Command who would use the data to execute the BMD mission. The expectation was that Canada would join the BMD mission, since it was well recognized that technically and practically, the ballistic missile warning, space surveillance, and ballistic missile defence missions are difficult to separate. Canada's subsequent decision in 2005 not to participate in missile defence has significantly eroded the U.S. perception of the value of Canadian participation in the command and control of the NORAD space surveillance and missile warning missions.

While at first glance it appears that the recent NORAD renewal strengthens the security relationship between Canada and the U.S. to the benefit of Canada, the reality is quite different. Canada has been losing access and influence in the NORAD relationship for several years, and the new Agreement, by itself, will not stop or reverse that erosion which is already leading to NORAD atrophy. The most significant issue contributing to this situation, other than lack of Canadian investment in continental defence since the end of the Cold War, stems from the Canadian Government's 2005 BMD decision. This decision represents the first time in 60 years that Canada has quite publicly not supported a US initiative to defend North America. This decision also stands out in that all the other US allies that were asked for support in the missile defence initiative gave their support.

Given this developing situation, Canadian academic and security specialist, Dr Elinor Sloan in her recent book ('Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era', McGill-Queens University Press 2005), asserts that "Canada could have no role in determining the nature of the response to an incoming missile, but could also create a situation where Canada has limited or no knowledge of the missile threat in the first place". The assessment of many Canadians who have been involved or have studied the evolving situation is that is that Canada's security and ultimately Canadian sovereignty are becoming more at risk.

Despite the NORAD Agreement Renewal, NORAD atrophy continues

The 2005 BMD decision by Canada has stimulated U.S. Strategic Command and Northern Command to move unilaterally in ensuring effective execution of their ballistic missile defence mandates. Missile attack warning data now comes to Northern Command from NORAD and more importantly from US Strategic Command, who now oversees all of the missile warning and BMD sensors. I say more importantly because the reality is that the data flowing from Strategic Command to Northern Command contains inputs from BMD sensors not available to NORAD.

The timeline for BMD execution is much faster than the NORAD assessment timeline, and the new data processors at Strategic Command and Northern Command are faster than the NORAD processor. The result is that US Northern Command can initiate an active missile engagement (BMD launch) before NORAD completes its missile warning assessment. This reality begs the question "Will NORAD warning data continue to be necessary, or indeed, of any real future relevance to Northern Command in the execution of the BMD mission?" It appears that for all practical purposes the answer is, or soon will be, "no". This suggests that NORAD is or soon will be militarily irrelevant in two of its core defence missions.

Canada's decision on BMD may be the straw that breaks the camel's back, but there have been other factors at play in the post 9/11 environment in the U.S. that are contributing to NORAD atrophy. Some of these include:

- *US Assessment of Diminishing Canadian Contribution*

Clearly the U.S. recognizes Canada's historic "free ride" in space surveillance and missile warning. In the post Cold War environment the changed emphasis in the Air Sovereignty/Air Defence mission to internal threats reduces the importance of Canadian airspace to the U.S. Additionally, the U.S. obviously sees the attempt to separate space surveillance and missile warning from active defence as "unnatural" and cumbersome and is developing workarounds that make redundant the NORAD missile warning data requirement.

- *Canadian Reticence to Embrace an Expanded Bi-National NORAD*

Negative Canadian political reaction to initiatives to broaden the bi-national NORAD relationship to more effectively deal with the new terrorist threat has mystified many on both sides of the border, and led some Americans to conclude that going it alone is easier and more effective.

- *New Commands in Canada and the US with Mandates Overlapping NORAD Mission Areas*

In the post 9/11 military restructure, the U.S. is now quite prepared to defend itself without NORAD. From the perspective of the U.S. military, NORAD is an anomaly to an efficient US command structure. U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command, now integrated into the post 9/11 new U.S. Homeland Defence strategy, have overlapping mandates to the NORAD missile warning and space surveillance missions. The U.S. sees the recently stood up Canada Command as an opportunity to consolidate a bilateral relationship that better fits their command structure, in place of the bi-national NORAD structure.

(continued p. 20)

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2006 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Allan Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, and Mr. G. Hamilton Southam.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2006, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R6

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 17 November 2006, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



The Vimy Award / La Distinction honorifique Vimy

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2006.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'honorable John Allan Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, et M. G. Hamilton Southam.

Tout Canadien / Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen / citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359, RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R6

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présenté vendredi, le 17 novembre 2006, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour la dîner gala, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée, ou télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

- *Separation of Command of Warning Sensors and Systems from NORAD*

Since 2002 NORAD no longer retains a direct relationship with U.S. Strategic Command, the Command that oversees the missile warning and space surveillance assets. Moreover, because U.S. Northern Command executes the active missile engagement mission (BMD), NORAD and Canadians are being further marginalized. NORAD Canadians are experiencing reduced access to information on, and participation in, the defence of Canada and USA.

Dr Sloan, concludes that with these circumstances "Canada could ultimately have limited or no knowledge of a missile coming at its territory, and it could be progressively cut out of access to information from America's Space Surveillance network, inseparable as it is from the ballistic missile warning function." It is worth noting that she also concludes "Canada's decision not to participate in America's BMD system represents a decline in Canadian sovereignty."

Canada's Options: The Bi-National Planning Group Report

Following 9/11, discussions began on the issue of improving Canada-U.S. security, the result of which was to establish a Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) in Colorado Springs under the leadership of the Canadian Deputy Commander NORAD. The objectives included the conduct of reviews of all existing Canada-U.S. defense plans, and the preparation of a bi-national contingency plan to respond to threats, attacks and other major emergencies.

The BPG published its final report in May 2006 which recommended that Canada and the US enter into a "Comprehensive Defence and Security Agreement" that would provide the political vision, legal authority and overarching guidance for increased cooperation. The BPG offered four concepts for future relationships among Canada-US defence and security organizations. Each of the concepts reportedly flows from the principles that emanate from the success of NORAD over the past 48 years: flexibility, a continental approach to mutual defence, and Canadians working side by side with US personnel. The report stresses the need for a bi-national organization responsible for all-domain warning for the defence of both nations as a key building block of each of the concepts.

Detailed examination of the four options is beyond the scope of this article, but clearly Canada needs to review the options to consider the broader impact on Canada-U.S. relations and Canada's self-interest. Without detailed study, but based on

the forgoing information contained in this article, "Concept 2: Single Command for Continental Defence" would appear to be the most straightforward, operationally effective and most in Canada's interest. Not surprisingly this option appears to be an updated version of the historic NORAD arrangement.

Conclusion

While the renewed NORAD agreement may be viewed as a positive step in enhancing Canada-U.S. security relations it does not mark the end of the need for Canada to vigorously pursue further strategic defence and security discussions with the U.S. In fact, it appears that the reality on the ground in Colorado Springs is that from a Canadian self-interest perspective NORAD relevance is already in decline with concomitant negative implications for Canadian sovereignty, security and our overall relationship with the U.S.

At this juncture Canada must take the initiative to assess what is in its strategic long-term security and broad national interests and engage the U.S. in meaningful high level political and military discussions focused on the very real defence and security needs of each nation. Canada needs to get beyond the general language contained in the NORAD renewal documents and propose specific approaches and make meaningful commitments to ensure that the U.S. takes Canada seriously.

Canada needs to rectify a longstanding deficiency and find a way to make significant contributions to the missile warning and space surveillance missions. Because of the impracticality of separating missile warning, space surveillance and active missile defence it is evident that Canada must commit to contribute to missile defence in a more substantive way. This strategic lever will make a major difference for the US, and ultimately for Canada.

In-depth analyses of the BPG report and bi-national discussions are needed to determine the best mutual arrangement. It is not in Canada's interest to do nothing. A failure to act to transform the NORAD relationship will result in an accelerated loss of Canada's relevance, and further erosion of our fragile strategic position. There is too much to lose.

As a starting point for examination and discussions, the NORAD framework has proved effective and potentially provides a unique model on which to construct an enduring and politically advantageous Canada-U.S. relationship. Where appropriate, this icon of Canada-U.S. security relations, and lessons learned therein, should be referenced in these discussions, but the perspective must be forward looking and recognize the real future security and sovereignty concerns of each nation.

The Transatlantic Link: Building a New Foundation

by Stanley R. Sloan

The Recent Crisis

The recent crisis in transatlantic relations focused primarily on the policies of the George W. Bush administration, and particularly its choice to invade Iraq. But it did not come completely out of the blue. It was built on a series of developments that followed the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.

The United States emerged from these happy but destabilizing events as the world's only true global power – without a clear ‘enemy’ to focus its policies or to guide its alliance policies. The new position of the United States in the international system created a tendency toward unilateralism and hegemonic behavior in US policy. This was observable during the Presidency of Bill Clinton, but emerged full blown in the first George W. Bush administration.

The other part of the challenge was to be found in Europe's response. Facing an American ally that had been ‘liberated’ by its power position, with a government in the hands of neo-conservative officials in Washington who believed in using that position, there was a tendency in Europe to abandon the idea of transatlantic partnership.

Some Europeans advocated embracing ‘autonomy’ and a clear distancing from the policies and inclinations of the now not-so-friendly giant. Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and Europe were facing a new crisis in their relationship. But the problems for the transatlantic link were just beginning.

On top of the US hegemony and European autonomy tendencies, on top of the growing gap between US and European military capabilities, a new challenge exploded on the alliance on September 11, 2001. The events of September 11 and their aftermath radically transformed American perceptions of the world. No longer was the continental United States invulnerable. Fear and anger drove American politics. We became a nation at war.

Europeans, for the most part, not only sympathized with the

United States but also offered assistance. The NATO allies almost immediately invoked Article 5, for the first time in NATO's history.

Nevertheless, a threat gap had opened up across the Atlantic, on top of the capabilities gap. The United States poured salt in this transatlantic wound by virtually ignoring initial European offers of assistance. US officials gratuitously observed that, from their point of view, the “mission determines the coalition,” giving the impression that NATO's Article 5 initiative was not highly valued in Washington. Late in 2001, the Bush administration started accepting European offers of assistance in Afghanistan. But the decision by the Bush administration early in 2002 to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq added more fuel to the transatlantic fire.

As a consequence of the Iraq War, the image of and respect for the United States suffered in Europe and around the world. Many Europeans came to view the United States as the biggest threat to international security. The transatlantic link was seriously damaged.

Lessons That Should Be Learned

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this crisis is that the United States has to learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one. The United States will, by definition, hold a hegemonic position in the international system for some time to come. We simply have to learn how to use our power in ways that leave room for cooperation with allied and friendly powers.

That is important because, even with the current power of the United States, Iraq has made it clear that we may be able to ‘win’ most foreseeable conventional military conflicts. But we certainly need the help of allies and international institutions to apply diplomacy and soft power resources to try to avoid having to use force, to legitimize the use of force should the use of force be unavoidable, and to help cope with all the challenges found in a post-conflict environment.

It may, from time to time, be necessary for the United States and other powers to rely on ad-hoc coalitions to deal with future security contingencies. However, it will always be better if the United States can work through NATO. And,

Stanley R. Sloan is founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative. His most recent book is *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged* (2005).

the simple fact is that NATO's existence and its preservation of habits of political and military cooperation will underpin the capabilities of any future US- or European-led ad hoc military coalitions.

It is also undeniably true that better European military capabilities will enhance Europe's voice in the alliance. The same is true for Canada: to the extent that Canada can make relevant hard and soft power contributions to international security its voice will be heard more clearly in Washington and in Brussels, around the NATO table.

Finally, both the United States and Europe will have to base their future security cooperation on a sophisticated mix of hard and soft power instruments. The United States, Canada and the European allies must bring assets from both categories to the transatlantic cooperation table. Dividing up responsibilities would only increase the divide between hard power America and soft power Europe.

Rebuilding the Foundation for Transatlantic Relations

What might be the key building blocks for re-constructing an effective transatlantic link?

Keeping United Against Terrorism

This first critical block of the foundation is quite obvious. The main sources of international terrorism today and in the foreseeable future are intent on undermining our values, destabilizing our societies, and ultimately destroying our culture and way of life. No country among us that treasures the values enunciated in the North Atlantic Treaty and the freedoms that we all hold dear is immune from attack. That has been amply demonstrated by the recent "cartoon crisis."

The response needs to be a coordinated one, based on Western democratic values and utilizing the necessary policy tools – soft and hard – required to defend our interests. Moreover, the foothold that international terrorists have obtained in post-Saddam Iraq cannot be allowed to become the launching pad for future attacks against US and allied territory, citizens and interests.

Continued Commitment in Afghanistan

The US and NATO missions in Afghanistan are critical parts of the fight against international terrorism. The Western role there is also a test of whether or not we can help failed states regain stable footing. The United States and its NATO allies may need to stay in Afghanistan for many years to ensure such stability.

And then, as we have seen in the recent Palestinian elections, and as we may also discover in Iraq, there is no guarantee that democratic selection of governments will necessarily ensure that peaceful and democratic regimes take root.

Strategic Convergence on Iraq, Iran, Middle East Peace

Given the history of US-European differences over how to deal with Middle Eastern issues, cooperation in the region may seem an unlikely building block for the future of the relationship. US and European differences not only are based on very different and sometimes conflicted histories in the region, but also by different contemporary approaches. While Europe prefers to influence problematic regimes by engaging *with them*, the United States prefers to try to isolate them. And, with regard to regime change, the United States has been much more willing to resort to force to remove Middle Eastern despots.

However, it is clear that if the United States and Europe do not work together effectively in this region, the interests of both will suffer. In these times, following the electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine and the anti-Western political cartoon furor, the United States and Europe have even more reason to work together, finding their way around old differences, initial instincts that may differ, and pride of authorship.

Ensuring NATO/EU Synergy

In some ways, the most difficult challenge of all may be overcoming the inherent tension between transatlantic cooperation and European integration, a tension that has been with us for decades and, sorry to say, is alive and well today.

Progress has been made in at least ensuring that representatives of the two organizations regularly talk to one another. The handoff of responsibilities from NATO to the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a good sign.

We will need a much more positive synergy between the two organizations and their members to deal with terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian equation.

Broadening the base for the transatlantic link

In my judgment, contemporary security requirements suggest that NATO remains absolutely necessary, but not sufficient, for the security needs of the United States, Canada and Europe.

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ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2006 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, and Bruce Campion-Smith.

Any Canadian may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of reasons for the nomination. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2006, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P0R6

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 17 November 2006, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236 9903.



PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nour invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2006

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2 500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, et Bruce Campion-Smith.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivent votre nomination et d'une biographie du candidat. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2006, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P0R7

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 17 novembre 2006, au dîner gala Vimy qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus informations, incluent la demande de billets pour le dîner gala, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée, ou télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.



*The Ross Munro Media Award/
Prix Média Ross Munro*

Politically, I believe we will need a major initiative to help restore mutual confidence in the transatlantic link.

Functionally, I believe that we need a broader cooperative framework for security, one that includes all NATO and EU members and which concentrates on all areas of non-military cooperation. To this end, I believe the United States (or perhaps better, Canada) should propose a New Atlantic Community Treaty to be signed by all NATO and EU members. The treaty would create an Atlantic Community Treaty Organization for non-military cooperation that would complement, not compete with or replace, NATO and the EU.

The Bottom Line

To sum up: our transatlantic alliance has suffered, and survived, another crisis. We should take away some lessons

from the experience. The United States must learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one. Europe will need to put aside power balancing concepts and work to become an even more effective and influential partner for the United States.

We need to build a new foundation for the alliance, based on: some new structures to facilitate non-military security cooperation; a renewed political commitment to cooperation; a strategic consensus on the issues in the Middle East; hard work to stabilize Afghanistan; and continued cooperation against international terrorism.

The challenges are clear. Meeting them will require a united transatlantic front.

MAKING AMPHIBIOSITY A REALITY

by Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Harold Rice

The complete version of this article, including the detailed estimate referred to in the text may be found on the CDA/CDAI's website at http://www.cda_cdai.ca/pdf/SCTFALR.pdf.

There are two fundamental questions that Mr. Harper and members of his Cabinet must have answered before deciding to endorse any future recommendation to give the green light to the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to purchase what General Hillier reportedly referred to as “a big honking ship”. The first is: What is the CF's Concept of Amphibious Warfare/Operations? The second: What is the Canadian Forces' amphibious lift requirement (ALR)?

While no set of military requirements and capabilities is sacred, prudence calls for Government leaders to think long and hard about the consequences, intended and unintended, of a decision that would ultimately lead to the large expenditure of tax dollars that would be involved. Equally important, members of Cabinet need to acknowledge that their decision will imply much more than money. By giving the Defence Department

a ‘green light’ they will also be signaling to the Canadian people, as well as to our friends and allies, that we as a nation have decided to embark on a course that will see nothing less than a revolutionary change in pre-existing Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine and the supporting force structure.

There should be no question in anyone's mind that a decision by Cabinet to proceed with the acquisition of the large, purpose built vessel called for by the CDS will mark the launch of the CF on a long and historic journey that will ultimately culminate in the development and fielding of Canada's first ever amphibious, expeditionary, war fighting capability.

With these implications in mind it becomes of the utmost importance that individual members of Cabinet have a clear understanding of the CF's contemplated concept of operations (CONOP) for the conduct of amphibious warfare and other related amphibious operations. This should be regarded as a fundamental requirement because it is the CONOP that will ultimately drive future doctrine, organization and training and

Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Harold Rice served in the Canadian Army and in the Canadian Forces.

identify the required joint¹ force capabilities such as: maritime platforms, air and sea connectors, weaponry, materiel, leadership, personnel, infrastructures and physical plant. In addition, and well before engaging in any discussions focused on particular platforms or capabilities, they must also be fully conversant with the details of the amphibious lift that will be needed to satisfy the CONOP.

With regard to the latter question relating to the amphibious lift requirement, an understanding of the ALR is also considered to be singularly important because it is what enables CF planners to objectively determine how many and what class of ship, associated platforms, systems and infrastructures will be needed to fill the bill called up in the CONOP and, in turn, to determine what their estimated cost to the taxpayer will be. The remainder of this paper will, therefore, examine in more detail the question of the ALR.

The CF... currently possesses no amphibious lift capability at all

The importance of establishing the ALR may be better understood by comparing a notional future CF requirement with that of the United States Navy (USN) and Marine Corps (USMC), the world's acknowledged leaders in the conduct of amphibious operations. In 2004, amphibious ships made up 12 percent of the USN's fleet. These vessels - referred to collectively as L-class ships - included 12 large amphibious assault ships (known as LHAs or LHDs), 11 amphibious transport docks (LPDs), and 12 dock landing ships (LSDs). All three types of ships carry marines, vehicles, and the landing craft that are used to ferry troops and equipment to shore; some also carry helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Together, L-class ships provided the amphibious lift (transport capacity) to carry 1.9 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), or about 27,000 troops and their equipment - less than the Navy's then stated ALR of 2.5 MEBs.²

The CF, on the other hand, currently possesses no amphibious lift capability at all. Hypothetically, a realistic and militarily credible CF ALR might range from, say, a single army light infantry unit of about 7-800, to a medium weight wheeled brigade of, say, about 3-5,000. The former appears to be what may have been envisaged in the former Liberal government's Defence Policy Statement calling for a battle group (BG) within a rapid reaction Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF). Each of these notional CF options would generate a different qualitative and quantitative ALR. These, in turn, would afford various cost options for consideration by CF

planners and government decision makers.

Knowing this, it would not be considered acceptable, therefore, for anyone either in the federal bureaucracy or within the CF, to not be first required to answer the fundamental question, what is the ALR? before contemplating the purchase of any particular vessel, or vessels.

At this time members of the Canadian public, and presumably members of the federal Cabinet as well, do not have an answer to the all important question of the CF ALR that could involve one of the largest single expenditures of defence dollars in our recent history. But, whatever the ALR may ultimately turn out to be, it would appear logical to assume that it must minimally support Canada's future defence policy and its future military strategy for the remainder of the first half of this century. The upshot of this conclusion is that whatever class and number of vessels may eventually be selected and purchased they collectively must meet a predetermined and government endorsed ALR that will fully satisfy our anticipated future combat demands as well as meet the unforeseen domestic and international contingency commitments that will inevitably arise at home and abroad in the years that lie ahead.

Fortunately, the required ALR for any military group may be readily calculated using an internationally accepted formula that involves an evaluation and aggregation of the necessary transport capacity, or "fingerprints of lift," in five basic categories: (1) number of troops to be transported; (2) vehicle square footage required; (3) cargo cubic footage required; (4) vertical take off and landing aircraft and/or medium/heavy helicopter deck space required; and (5) air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) or other landing craft well-deck space required, e.g., LCM-8 (Landing Craft Mechanised Type 8), LCM-6 and/or LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked).

As noted previously, today's Navy possesses no true amphibious lift capability. This situation will not change when its planned new Joint Support Ships join the fleet. Intended primarily for the at sea sustainment of the fleet, and with each ship's planned troop capacity of about 210, for example, one JSS could accommodate for short periods only the personnel of, say, one austere light infantry company group with minimal war fighting capability. A robust and militarily credible battalion size battle group (7-800), on the other hand, would require significantly more accommodation space, as well as the prerequisite capabilities afforded by the remaining four "fingerprints of lift." In short, these necessities point up a requirement for altogether different and unique purpose-built vessels, i.e., amphibious ships, or in USN parlance, "L-class ships."

It is vital that the required ship(s) capabilities (“fingerprints of lift”) first be established. With this chore accomplished, and only then, should any of the available “off-the-shelf” foreign ship designs be examined with a view to deciding which of them, if any, might satisfy Canada’s future needs. Fortunately, there are many possibilities to consider. Among these are Great Britain’s “Albion” Class; Italy’s “San Giorgio;” the Netherlands’ “Rotterdam;” the United States’ LHAs, LHDs, LSDs, and LPDs such as the LPD-17 “San Antonio;” France’s “Foudre and “Mistral,” and Spain’s “Galicia” and “Navantia BPE” Class

But what might be the actual CF ALR? An answer to this all important question may be determined by consulting official government sources and employing proven methodologies such as those to be found in the US Navy’s Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool(ASSET) family of ship design programmes for naval combatants, auxiliaries, amphibious ships, and aircraft carriers.

Even without access to these restricted access resources it is still possible to produce a reasonably accurate preliminary estimate for discussion purposes and to further stimulate serious debate on this important topic. This paper includes only a summary of the conclusions in the estimate/appreciation that was conducted to establish an ALR for an hypothetical Battle Group in a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF). This estimate was guided by the assumption that the real determination of the SCTF’s shipping requirements cannot be undertaken until ‘hard’ information is made available as to the actual number of personnel and the quantities and types of the various weapons, vehicles, equipment and supplies that must be embarked; and details of the landing force means (sea and air connectors) required to execute the envisaged landing plan.

For estimation purposes it was also judged that combat unit loading would be the type of loading used as the basis for the estimate; i.e., the SCTF Battle Group Headquarters and the Battle Group would be completely loaded in the SCTF’s principal amphibious ship along with its essential combat equipment and supplies. Based on these assumptions the estimated ALR (Fingerprints of lift) for an hypothetical Standing Contingency Task Force Battle Group and its Headquarters is judged to be as follows:

- Accommodation is required for 777 officers and other ranks.
- The vehicle space required for the BG’s vehicles and guns is 28,353 square feet.
- The cargo space required for the BG’s ammunition, POL, stores and equipment is 59, 911.48 cubic feet.
- Four CH-47 helicopter spots are required.
- Well-deck space to accommodate six LCM 8 is required.

FOOTNOTES

¹ “*Joint*,” in this paper, is defined as activities, operations, rganizations, etc., in which CF sea, land and air elements participate. “*Jointness*” is considered to be essential for military success. History attests to the importance of being able to integrate the capabilities of different armed services. From the Peloponnesian War to this day, success in war has been contingent on the common-sense idea of jointness as seamless integration.

² Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, November 2004.
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6003&sequence=0>

e-Security

by Major Eric Dion

An article with a title like this, one thinks, will surely address issues and challenges related to electronic-security, or something similar, like: Air transport e-Security, Intelligent

Major Eric Dion works within the Directorate General of Strategic Planning at NDHQ. He has deployed on four International operations, served on four Domestic operations and graduated from the Army Command and Staff College. He served on unit exchanges with US Special Forces and French Commandos, holds an MBA and works on a PhD in Strategic Management/Public Policy.

Border e-Security, Maritime e-Security, or maybe Cyber Security, or Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)? Well Yes - And No. Consider e-Security as a metaphor; as a way of saying that there is much more to Security than what one can see...

A recent issue of Frontline Magazine stated that: Security in Canada in the 21st Century will be more about collaboration and cooperation. This is true of course, and has always been especially true with regards to our military. How then will this

collaborative security environment culture be fostered? It is a little known secret that, even within the military, team members don't always play along well together, perhaps because of interests, culture, or both. However, history tells us that integration - the product of collaboration and co-operation - becomes quintessential to our successful security. And fundamental integration must be achieved at all organisational levels: culturally, structurally and systematically, within all agencies and partners dealing in security.

The idea behind integration is quite simply, to dismantle the speed bumps, roadblocks and barriers that exist at every road juncture, in order to facilitate a free flow of good intentions, ideas and innovation. That sounds a lot like knowledge management theory: sic; that knowledge is built from data, turned into information, turned into understanding, which arises in People (human capital), Culture (social capital), Structure and Systems (structural capital), and that knowledge is shared. Strategically, if we consider that the human mind is the primary creator of value, managing knowledge and enabling networks then becomes vital to *e*-Security. Or does it?

Security is of its own a metaphor, in this case, a traditional way of saying that we think people feel they are safe and secure, however that might happen. Indeed, security can be about eating three meals a day, or having 20 bucks in your pockets, or having a cell phone. Human security can be about not being afraid of taking the bus, feeling free to voice your own opinion, thinking everything is all right or that water is safe to drink. As a matter of over-simplification, security is a psychological and physiological state, where people perceive safety for their person and their cherished ones. Security also happens in a shared psychological state; we collectively feel it. In essence, security is much more about psychology and people, than about technology and tools.

Security is also very much about communicating key information and intelligence. Indeed, both information and intelligence play crucial roles in identifying threats, communicating amongst partners and agencies, and in assisting with our decision-making. Conversely, information and intelligence can also be 'chatter and background noise', adding to the confusion and helping to create a state of paralysis by analysis, actually reinforcing chaos. Hence, lifting the fog of war, as Clausewitz referred to it, has always been of great concern in warfare. And creating this fog of war is certainly one of the hidden faces of asymmetric warfare; fostering chaos in our minds. Hence and again, security information and intelligence are more about what happens in people.

Einstein said that imagination is more important than knowledge. When we consider the future security environment, I consider that indeed, this will prove quite true. September 11 was a tactical and technical success of course, but its real impact was not with the buildings that were destroyed. Rather, 9/11's strategic surprise and impact was in the minds and imagination of people all around the world. It was the climax of intentions, ideas, innovation, information, intelligence and also, imagination. It sent a shock wave across our national interests, our institutions, our investments and our individualism, and shattered our sense of security.

One can argue, on the other hand, that the effects of this shock since 9/11, have been mostly positive, from a pure security perspective. Indeed, it did make us face what had been the most formidable challenges of collaboration and cooperation; what were considered major issues suddenly melted away in our collective interest. One may disagree with some of the reactions that ensued, but one cannot discount the fact that everybody felt the shock wave.

However, 9/11 was ordinary in nature; carried out by ordinary men, in ordinary clothes, in ordinary planes on an otherwise, ordinary day. What was extraordinary was what happened in the minds of these men that imagined, planned and carried it out...not once, but thrice. This brings me to conclude.

Security happens in our minds, and we - the people - literally embody security. This might seem an odd conclusion to an article titled *e*-Security, but that's because Security is not in the *e*! It's in people; ordinary people: soldiers, police and intelligence officers, firefighters, immigration and border agents, pilots, ship Captains, bus drivers, food & safety inspectors, managers and leaders.

The key to successful security lies in their collaboration and cooperation. And fundamentally, this lies in peoples' minds. Hence, to create a culture of collaboration and cooperation based on shared values and common national interests become both the vital ground and centre of gravity of *e*-Security, beyond knowledge and networks. This collaborative culture -will enable knowledge to ride unimpeded on networks and in turn, empower Security with knowledge. Fundamentally, "Information does not exist in a vacuum, however. It has no value unless it is analysed, evaluated and judged for usability, then applied in the appropriate manner; this is competitive advantage".

Paradoxically, though many engage in knowledge and network talk, the key to the success of digitisation does not rest solely with technology. Rather it rests with the intelligent, imaginative

and well-intended use of technology by people. More fundamentally, it rests with establishing a collaborative culture, based on common interests. And this has more to do with people's minds. Rightly, DND's new knowledge management paradigm is that the intellectual capacity/abilities of CF members, is one of the most effective means Canada has to meet the security challenges.

And fundamentally: The operational capability of the CF is ultimately derived from its People.

Hence, security is also ultimately derived from its people. A collaborative culture becomes key.

As such, actually building a Team Canada approach becomes the quintessential security enabler. Furthermore, strategic openness becomes the required prerequisite to enhanced national security.



Photo Courtesy of Combat Camera
(www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca)

Endnotes

¹ Frontline Defence, *Security is Teamwork*: http://www.frontline-canada.com/Defence/pdfs/05_6_Addy.pdf

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Safeguarding Canada's Interests in Space: The Merits of Antisatellite Weapon Arms Control

by Matthew Gillard



The significance of space for military purposes has been a subject of much discussion in Canada lately, largely because of the debate concerning Canadian participation in the US anti-ballistic missile program. However, the importance of satellites still receives

relatively little attention in our country. This is unfortunate, since the military value of satellites has major implications for Canadian interests in space. Safeguarding these interests requires pursuit of antisatellite (ASAT) arms control measures.

Canadian Interests in Space

Canada has three major interests in space. First, Canada must attempt to limit destabilizing arms races. Second, Canada needs to protect satellites it uses for military purposes. Third, Canada must act to preserve American military preponderance.

Canada must endeavor to postpone, limit, or nullify unnecessary arms races. Arms races are expensive. While military spending is necessary, spending above and beyond what is required for security is wasteful. More important, arms races can raise tensions and exacerbate fear, ultimately making states less secure.

Canada needs to protect satellites it uses for military purposes because they provide exceptional advantages for modern militaries. Satellites facilitate troop communication, continually observe the battlespace, direct bombs to targets, assist in navigation, detect enemy missile launches, and enable weather forecasting. Without satellites, managing the large amounts of information required for technologically advanced warfare is much more difficult.

In the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial satellites provided 80 percent of satellite communication bandwidth used by American troops

Canada does not possess any military satellites. Our country nonetheless leases commercial satellites to provide vital capabilities when needed. Canadian troops also use data from the US Global Positioning System (GPS) to assist in navigation. Furthermore, the Canadian Forces benefits greatly from reconnaissance data provided by the US.

Besides being important for Canada, satellites help maintain US military preponderance. The US depends more on military satellites than any other country in the world. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, the US has about 190 active military satellites, while the rest of the world has 103. The US military also depends quite heavily on commercial satellites. In the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial satellites provided 80 percent of satellite communication bandwidth used by American troops.

Canada benefits immensely from American military preponderance. As liberal democracies with shared borders and similar values, both Canada and the US are natural allies when confronted with a serious military threat. During the Cold War, Canada and the US joined forces to protect North

America against the Soviet Union. Canada and the US are currently working closely together to protect North America from terrorist threats.

The next major challenge confronting Canada and the US may be another cold war. The course of human history is riddled with instances in which states (or their predecessors) have risen to threaten the dominant power. As other states increase in power relative to the US, the pattern may recur, particularly if the potential challengers have fundamentally different ideologies compared to the US. In this unhappy circumstance, American military power could help preserve a mutually stabilizing balance of power.

In the event war did break out, nuclear weapons could cause a horrible and catastrophic loss of life, both in Canada and elsewhere. Even assuming that rebuilding a shattered world was possible after such a scenario, the US would likely be in no position to offer Canada the same protection it has long enjoyed. In the current international order, no threat is equal to this. Canada should thus work to preserve and extend American military preponderance in an effort to prolong unipolarity.

Given the importance of satellites for American military might, Canadians should be extremely concerned about the possible development and deployment of weapons that could target US satellites. For the time being, satellites face few threats.

There is little evidence to suggest that countries have currently deployed dedicated anti-satellite systems designed to damage or destroy satellites. The only exception is Russia, which may still have a Cold-War era ASAT system that has not been tested since 1982. Additionally, satellite jammers (which temporarily disrupt satellite transmissions without damaging or destroying satellites) have rarely been used. However, the exceptional importance of satellites for US military operations suggests that the threat environment for satellites will become more dangerous in the future.

Strategies for Protecting Satellites

When confronting potential development and deployment of ASATs, the US and its allies could adopt several possible strategies. They could do nothing, attempt to deter adversaries through vigorous ASAT development and deployment, or promote strong arms control measures.

A strategy of inaction is not appropriate. Although doing nothing can be reasonable when potential development and

deployment of a given type of weapon appears technologically unfeasible, this is not the case for ASATs. From 1963 to 1975, the US deployed ASAT systems designed to destroy satellites using nuclear warheads. Soviet non-nuclear ASAT missiles become operational in 1971. Since most satellite systems are highly sensitive, even simpler weapons (like dispensing rocks or sand in satellite flight paths) could be used to target satellites.

Attempting to deter adversaries is very useful in many circumstances. For example, the terrifying prospect of mutual nuclear annihilation during the Cold War helped avert open warfare between the US and Soviet Union. That being said, US development and deployment of ASAT weapons will not prevent US adversaries from reciprocating. The primary reason for this is asymmetrical dependence on satellites.

US reliance on satellites for military operations provides an attractive target for countries that want to degrade superior US military capabilities. Reports suggest that Chinese defence analysts have already started to consider the merits of targeting US satellites if armed conflict should erupt (perhaps over a dispute concerning Taiwan).

Given asymmetrical US dependence on satellites, Canadian and American interests are best served through application of ASAT arms control. At the very least, the goal of such a strategy would be to develop effective global norms (i.e. “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”) against harmful interference with satellites. At best, arms control agreements would also place restrictions on testing, development, and deployment of ASATs.

The establishment of ASAT arms control measures is a strategy that is far from perfect. Given the incentive for other countries to develop ASAT weapons as a means of countering US military might, it would be wise to restrict arms control agreements to technologies that could be carefully monitored. Unfortunately, as is the case with most arms control agreements, verification is a difficult issue.

There are few studies concerning verification of potential ASAT arms control agreements. While verification of ASAT arms control is in need of further analysis, preliminary evidence suggests that placing limitations on certain technologies is possible. For example, from 1968 to 1982, the US was able to detect twenty Soviet ASAT satellite intercept tests. This suggests that banning tests of ASAT missiles is possible. Banning ASAT missile tests is useful since it would help prohibit development of effective ASATs.

The US has a major technical advantage in terms of verifying compliance with ASAT arms control agreements. The US Space Surveillance Network, consisting of ground-based radars and telescopes, is the largest detection and tracking system for space objects in the world. The US could further enhance the capabilities of this system by increasing sharing of space surveillance and tracking information with allies (such as Canada and the European Union).

While the US has considerable space detection and tracking assets, it may not be feasible to place restrictions on all ASAT weapons. In particular, monitoring restrictions on satellite jammers would be extremely difficult, since they can be very small. Even a one-watt jammer the size of a cigarette pack could deny access to GPS signals out to 80 kilometers. It may nonetheless be possible to detect larger, more powerful jammers, although concealment measures could conceivably be a problem.

Despite the potential difficulties associated with ASAT arms control, the issue is in need of further consideration and study. Since doing nothing and deterrence will not protect American satellites, the US should attempt to implement ASAT arms control measures to the full extent that it can reasonably allow existing verification capabilities. Even if this strategy may not prevent full-blown development of ASATs, it could slow the advance of such a phenomenon.

While it is in America’s best interests to further examine ASAT arms control, the US has been very reluctant to do so. This is extremely unfortunate. Both the Chinese and Russian governments have called for ASAT talks, likely out of a desire to avoid a costly ASAT arms race. Many other countries would also be receptive to ASAT negotiations.

If norms regarding ASATs are not formed and strengthened, political actors in foreign countries calling for robust ASAT development and deployment will find it easier to promote their cause. Unchecked development and deployment of ASATs could spiral into an arms race.

An ASAT arms race would be exceptionally damaging. Besides being costly, it would threaten satellites used by Canada. These satellites could be commercial satellites leased by Canada or American satellites assisting Canadian operations. An ASAT arms race would also pose a significant challenge to American military preponderance.

To help avoid an ASAT arms race, Canada must constructively engage the US to persuade them to consider ASAT limitations. Government-sponsored studies of verification measures, private discussions with the US, and calls for international arrangements should all be considered. For the time being, given the Bush administration's general hostility to arms control, it would be better for Canada to focus on international arrangements that could be useful for future arms management initiatives, such as increasing sharing of space tracking data.

Matthew Gillard has been the CDAI's intern for the past year. He will be leaving shortly for NGO work in Southeast Asia

Conclusion

Canada has significant interests in space. In order to safeguard these interests, strong ASAT arms control is needed. While promoting arms control is not a perfect approach, it is the best strategy available. Doing nothing and deterrence will not compel states to forego developing and deploying ASATs to undermine American military power. Regrettably, the current US government does not recognize the benefit of ASAT arms control. The Bush administration will nonetheless not govern America forever. To help prepare for potential negotiations with other US administrations, Canada should encourage the formation of initiatives that will help facilitate future arms control efforts.

Book Reviews

ON THE FRONT LINES OF LEADERSHIP: Sub-Unit Command on Operations

Edited by Colonel Bernd Horn

Reviewed by Dr. Jack L. Granatstein

The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), based on the grounds of the Royal Military College at Kingston, is a relatively new organization, established only in 2002. Its concern is the professional development of the Canadian Forces, and it includes RMC, the CF Leadership Institute, the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, the CF Language School, and the NCM Professional Development Centre and the Management Development School at Fort St Jean (the old campus of Collège Militaire Royal de St-Jean). As this bevy of institutions suggests, the CDA is concerned with the life-long learning of members of the forces.

One part of CDA's goal is the publication of books, and the CF Leadership Institute, headed by the Canadian Force's major publishing scholar, Colonel Bernd Horn, has created a series called "In Harm's Way." The first volume in the series, part of the Institute's Strategic Leadership Writing Project, is a book for majors, the first one I have ever seen.

Historian Dr. Jack L. Granatstein writes Canadian military history. He was chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century and Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. He is also a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute

On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations, edited by Horn (and published by CDA, PO Box 17000, Station Forces, Kingston, ON K7K 7B4), is a collection of essays by officers who served in Former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, at sea during Operation Apollo, and with DART in Honduras. Each story is different, but the lessons for leadership are much the same. The key lessons to me are those on dealing with other nation's forces and with the United Nations political and military bureaucracies.

Colonel Horn's own paper treats his experiences in trying to escort a relief supplies convoy into Srebrenica in 1992. Horn had to deal with the French Lieutenant-General Morillon, an officer he has no hesitation in describing as operating with "no plan and no clear direction," in effect, a showboater. He had to contend with NGOs, "civilians who felt they were immune from direction or oversight, but expected protection and rescue when they got in over their heads because of inexperience or arrogance." And he had to deal with troops from other contingents, such as the Belgian convoy commander who told Horn that his orders made clear that "at the first sign of danger or potential violence, he was to abandon the mission...."

As these blunt comments suggest, Horn lets down his hair, and the lessons he paints are ones that every officer needs to learn. If Canadians are going to be operating in coalitions, and we are, similar problems will arise on a daily basis.

There are further useful lessons in the article by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard Coombs, who was operating in Drvar, Bosnia in 1998 with 1 RCR. Coombs had the misfortune of dealing with Jacques-Paul Klein, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Bosnia. Klein blew in, fired Croatian

officials in Drvar “in a very melodramatic fashion...while standing over the corpses” of murdered civilians. That escalated tensions, naturally enough, as did Klein’s attempt to order Coombs to transport the bodies to Sarajevo. Coombs knew there was no clearance to do so, knew he couldn’t spare the vehicle and crew, and knew one vehicle wasn’t sufficient to do the job. Klein persisted, calling in the media, and actually telephoning the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, to get SACEUR to order Coombs to comply. To his great credit, Clark said he had confidence in Coombs’ soldiers and would not order him to do what Klein wanted. Dealing with the UN and its jumped-up representatives clearly is not much fun for soldiers in the field.

On the other hand, Coombs provides ample evidence that Canadians—much like the Belgians in 1992—will put national interests first. With his area of operation in a riotous state, Major Coombs met with the just arrived commander of the Multinational Division (Southwest), Major-General Cedric Delves. The general ordered Coombs to send troops into the town ‘to keep the crowd moving.’ Coombs explained why this was a mistake, and the general repeated the order. “I politely declined. A long pause ensued with both of us staring into each other’s eyes. I then promised to send troops downtown once reinforcements arrived....After a few moments Delves reiterated his direction and departed....”

As Coombs concludes, the incident “speaks volumes about the nature of command in multinational environments.” The general had the right to direct tactical operations of his subordinate units, but Coombs had “an obligation to act in a manner commensurate with the intent” of Canadian national authorities. Coombs does note that General Delves may have forgiven him in months ahead, “but he did not forget. Our exchanges were unctuously correct but no more....”

On the Front Lines of Leadership is a first-rate collection of articles, a highly useful training manual for all officers. Unfortunately, it is a badly-written volume, replete with run-on sentences and grammatical errors. Coombs’ UN rep, for example, is always spelled “Kline” and his first name is given wrongly, to boot. Books published by the Canadian Forces must meet professional standards, and competent editing is a requisite.

CLIO’S WARRIORS: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars

Tim Cook

Reviewed by Dr. Jack L. Granatstein

Finally, I want to mention the best book on the writing of Canadian military history. Tim Cook is a historian employed at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, and he has turned his doctoral dissertation into an excellent book, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006, \$26.95 paper). The book is published in the Canadian War Museum’s genuinely excellent “Studies in Canadian Military History” series (and I say that not simply because the series was conceived during my time at the Museum).

Cook looks at who wrote the official histories of the Great War and World War II, he examines the pressures on them, and their successes and failures. Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, the historian of Canada’s Great War, was no speed merchant—his first volume took two decades to appear—and he was no professionally trained scholar. Cook, nonetheless, is sympathetic to Duguid and notes that his careful collection of data and documents has underpinned everything written on the Canadian Expeditionary Force ever since.

More professional was Colonel Charles Stacey, the fine historian whose army and policy official histories were recognized as great books at the time of publication and since. But Stacey’s interpretations—the Germans were better soldiers than our boys and the key failings of First Canadian Army lay in the weaknesses of regimental officers, not generals—have fed the present generation of military historians with debates enough for a generation. Cook also writes about the naval and air historians and the current generation of university and non-academic scholars.

If readers of Canadian military history want to know where the authors of yesterday’s and today’s books are coming from, this is a very good place to begin.

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