

ON TRACK

Conférence of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

SUMMER / ÉTÉ 2008

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2

War and National Interest

Afghanistan - plus que les 3D

Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction - Is There a Faster Way?

Capacity Building - A Myth in Afghanistan?

Canadian Forces Photo / Photo Forces canadiennes

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COVER PHOTO: HMCS St. John's passing the Angus L. MacDonald Bridge, Halifax Regional Municipality, Nova Scotia

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: NCSM St. John's passant sous le pont Angus L. MacDonald, la municipalité régionale de Halifax, Nouvelle-Ecosse

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

This summer edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of defence planning, development aid, Afghanistan, the Navy, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, Army personnel issues, a medical transitional service, and the Milton F. Gregg Centre.

The front cover of this edition of *ON TRACK* features HMCS St. John's, which sailed recently from New York City, via Halifax and Gaspé, to Québec City. HMCS St. John's sailed with HMCS Preserver and American, Irish and French warships to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the founding of Québec City. Dr. David Anido, a passenger on board HMCS St. John's, outlines for us in 'HMCS St. John's' the ship's features and a tribute to its crew. Dr. Anido is a Member of the Board of Directors of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute).

Dr. John Scott Cowan, CDA Institute President and Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), addressed the seventh RMC convocation at the Canadian Forces College on 26 June 2008. Dr. Cowan's remarks are worth sharing, and we are pleased to include the text of his address, 'War and National Interest', in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

This past February, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson passed the reins of the Presidency of the CDA Institute to Dr. John Scott Cowan. General (Ret'd) Manson looks back upon his three years as President and provides us with his views on the future of the organization, in 'Retrospect and Prospect'. He notes the many significant developments in the CDA Institute's structure and operations.

Earlier this year a group of military analysts, including your Executive Director, were in Afghanistan (see photo, page 17), courtesy of the Chief of the Defence Staff, to visit Canada's mission area and meet the major players there, both military and civilian. As a follow-up to their Afghan experience, we are pleased to include an article that reflects the impressions gained by co-authors Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Gaston Côté, Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA),



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Ce numéro d'été de *ON TRACK* compte des articles d'actualité dans les domaines de la planification de la défense, de l'aide au développement, sur l'Afghanistan, la marine, la stabilisation et la reconstruction en sortie de conflit, des questions de personnel au sein de l'armée, un service médical de transition, et sur le Centre Milton F. Gregg.

En page de couverture de cette édition de *ON TRACK* on peut voir le NCSM St. John's, qui a récemment vogué de New York à Québec en passant par Halifax et Gaspé. Le NCSM St. John's a vogué en compagnie du NCSM Preserver et des bateaux de guerre américains, irlandais et français pour célébrer le 400^{ème} anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Québec. Le Dr. David Anido, passager à bord du NCSM St. John's, nous décrit dans l'article 'HMCS St. John's' les caractéristiques du vaisseau tout en saluant son équipage. Le Dr. Anido est membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la défense (l'Institut de la CAD).

Le 26 juin 2008, le Dr. John Scott Cowan, Président de l'Institut de la CAD et recteur du Collège militaire royal du Canada (CMR), a prononcé un discours à l'occasion de la septième remise des diplômes du Collège des forces canadiennes. Les remarques du Dr. Cowan valent la peine d'être lues, aussi avons-nous le plaisir de vous livrer dans cette édition de *ON TRACK* le texte de son allocution sur «War and National Interest» (la guerre et l'intérêt national).

En février dernier, le Général à la retraite Paul Manson a transmis la présidence de l'Institut de la CAD au Dr. John Scott Cowan. Le Général Manson livre ses réflexions sur trois années à la présidence et nous donne ses perspectives sur l'avenir de notre organisation. Le titre de sa présentation est «Retrospect and Prospect» (Regard en arrière et vision d'avenir). Il souligne notamment les réalisations les plus significatives au niveau de la structure et du fonctionnement de l'Institut de la CAD.

Plus tôt cette année, un groupe d'analystes militaires, incluant votre directeur général, étaient en Afghanistan (voir photo, page 17) à l'invitation du Chef d'état-major de la Défense pour visiter le théâtre d'opération de la mission canadienne et rencontrer les principaux acteurs sur le terrain, tant civils que militaires. Nous avons le plaisir d'inclure un article reflétant les impressions dégagées de cette expérience afghane, sous la plume de deux auteurs, le brigadier général à la

and Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Raymond Taillefer, in 'Afghanistan – plus que les 3D' (Afghanistan - more than the 3Ds).

Democracy assumes the involvement of an informed public. However, as Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara notes, in 'What Canadians Should Know About Afghanistan', that what is actually going on 'on the ground', and what our people are doing differs significantly with media reporting. Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Macnamara recently returned to Canada, following a visit to Afghanistan. He is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors and is a past president of the Institute.

Professor Nipa Banerjee has written a critical analysis of capacity building measures that are underway in Afghanistan, in 'Capacity Building – A Myth in Afghanistan?'. She examines the effect of the influx of expatriate technical assistance on capacity building. Professor Banerjee teaches international development at the University of Ottawa and travels to Kabul frequently.

Keith Mines writes, in 'Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction – It There a Faster Way?', that as a first step in improving management of nation-building missions, the United States in 2004 formed the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the Secretary of State. He outlines for us the mandate of the S/CRS and the future of nation-building. Keith was, until recently, the Deputy Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy, Ottawa.

Recently the Chiefs of Staff for the Navy, the Army, and for the Air Force have each indicated that the lack of an adequate number of trained personnel is their top concern. The shortfall in meeting the required numbers of serving personnel was foreseen in the Claxton Paper study, 'Canada without Armed Forces?', published by Queen's University's School of Policy Studies in 2003 (<http://mqup.mcgill.ca/book.php?bookid=1734>). Today, Mr. Ernie Coombs examines the elements of the shortfall in personnel numbers, in 'Big League Problems: Recruiting and Retention Challenges in the CF Today', and outlines the tough choices that the Canadian Forces faces in addressing this challenge.

retraite Gaston Côté, vice-président de la Conférence des Association de la défense (CAD) et le lieutenant-colonel à la retraite Raymond Taillefer : « Afghanistan – plus que les 3D ».

La démocratie présuppose un engagement du public informé. Pourtant, comme le fait remarquer le brigadier général à la retraite Don Macnamara dans « What Canadians Should Know About Afghanistan » (Ce que les Canadiens devraient savoir sur l'Afghanistan) et ce que nos gens y font, diffèrent profondément par rapport à ce qu'en disent les médias. Le brigadier général à la retraite Don Macnamara vient aussi de revenir au Canada après une visite en Afghanistan. Il est membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD et est un ancien président de l'Institut.

Le professeur Nipa Banerjee nous livre une analyse critique des mesures de renforcement des capacités en cours en Afghanistan dans son texte « Capacity Building – A Myth in Afghanistan? » (le renforcement des capacités – un mythe en Afghanistan ?). Elle étudie l'impact de l'influx d'assistance technique en provenance de l'étranger sur le renforcement des capacités. Le professeur Banerjee enseigne le développement international à l'Université d'Ottawa et voyage fréquemment à Kaboul.

Keith Mines, dans "Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction – It There a Faster Way?" (Stabilisation et reconstruction en sortie de conflit – existe-t-il une voie plus rapide ?) écrit que les États-Unis avaient adopté une première mesure visant à améliorer la gestion des missions de consolidation de l'État par la création, en 2004, du bureau de reconstruction et stabilisation (Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) au Secrétariat d'État. L'auteur décrit le mandat du S/CRS et évoque l'avenir de la consolidation de l'État. Jusqu'à récemment, Keith était conseiller politique adjoint à l'ambassade américaine à Ottawa.

Récemment, les chefs d'état-major de la marine, de l'armée et de la force aérienne ont chacun indiqué que l'absence d'un nombre adéquat de personnel entraîné constituait leur préoccupation première. Ce déficit au titre du nombre requis de personnels d'active avait été prévu dans l'étude Claxton: 'Canada without Armed Forces?' (Un Canada sans forces armées ?), publiée par l'École d'études politiques de l'Université Queen's en 2003 (<http://mqup.mcgill.ca/book.php?bookid=1734>). Aujourd'hui, M. Ernie Coombs se concentre sur les éléments spécifiques du déficit en personnel dans « Big League Problems: Recruiting and Retention Challenges in the CF Today » (Problèmes de ligue majeure: les défis du recrutement et de la rétention dans les FC de nos jours). Il évoque les choix difficiles auxquels font face les Forces canadiennes pour relever ce défi.

In recent times the defence community has acquired a better understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As we become more aware of the incidence of PTSD, we should be better equipped to address those concerns. Lieutenant-Commander (Ret'd) Heather MacKinnon, in 'A Need For a Medical Transitional Service', outlines some of the steps that are taking place to serve the needs of former members of the Canadian Forces and RCMP in this important area of medical care.

The Gregg Centre of the University of New Brunswick was established in 2006 with the mandate to study war, conflict and society in the search for understanding and peace. In 'The Gregg Centre' Dr. Lee Windsor, a former Intern with the CDA Institute, outlines the Centre's objective and its programmes, and previews upcoming research projects.

Mr. Arnav Manchanda, the CDA Institute's Project Officer, has provided us with three book reviews. The subject matter of the three books provide background research that may contribute to a better understanding of events that shape the world in which we live. The first book is a compilation of essays by mid-career professionals that aims to move the study of the various components of counter-insurgency and democracy promotion from theory into practice. The topics discussed in the book, 'Countering Insurgency and Promoting Democracy', range from the uses of special forces, lessons learned, through to culture and society. The volume is edited by Manolis Priniotakis and published by the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs.

The second and third books, 'Ghost Wars' and 'The Bin Ladens', were written by Pulitzer Prize winner Steve Coll. Mr. Manchanda notes that 'Ghost Wars', despite being published in 2004, remains topical today. It details the nexus between Afghan mujahedeen, Pakistani military and intelligence, and international backers from the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 up until September 10, 2001. 'The Bin Ladens', published this year, chronicles the 20th Century rise of the Bin Laden family from humble beginnings in the deserts of Yemen to one of the wealthiest and most influential business families in Saudi Arabia. These two volumes, Mr. Manchanda notes, should be on the reading list of anyone who follows the war on terror and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Au cours des dernières années, la communauté de défense a acquis une meilleure connaissance du syndrome de stress post-traumatique (SSPT). À mesure que nous devenons plus conscients de l'incidence du SSPT, nous devrions être mieux en mesure de faire face à ses conséquences. Le lieutenant commandeur à la retraite Heather MacKinnon, dans "A Need For a Medical Transitional Service" (Le besoin d'un service médical de transition), souligne certaines des mesures prises pour venir en aide aux anciens membres des forces canadiennes et de la GRC dans ce domaine important du traitement médical.

Le Centre Gregg de l'Université du Nouveau Brunswick a été créé en 2006 et a pour but l'étude de la guerre, des conflits et de la société pour contribuer à la compréhension des phénomènes et à la paix. Dans son article sur le Centre, le Dr. Lee Windsor, ancien interne à l'Institut de la CAD, expose les objectifs et programmes du Centre et donne un aperçu des projets de recherche à venir au Centre

M. Arnav Manchanda, agent de projet à l'Institut de la CAD, nous offre trois recensions. La matière des trois ouvrages porte sur des recherches susceptibles de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des événements qui façonnent le monde dans lequel nous vivons. Le premier est une compilation d'articles de professionnels à mi-parcours dans leurs carrières, qui veulent faire progresser l'étude des différentes composantes de la contre insurrection et la promotion de la démocratie de la théorie à la pratique. Les sujets évoqués dans l'ouvrage 'Countering Insurgency and Promoting Democracy', vont du recours aux forces spéciales, aux leçons apprises, en passant par la culture et la société. L'ouvrage est publié sous la direction de Manolis Priniotakis par le Council for Emerging National Security Affairs.

Les second et troisième ouvrages, 'Ghost Wars' et 'The Bin Ladens', ont été écrits par le gagnant du prix Pulitzer, Steve Coll. M. Manchanda fait remarquer que même si 'Ghost Wars' a été publié en 2004, il demeure d'actualité. Il fait état des réseaux entre les mujahedeen afghans, les militaires et les services de renseignement pakistanais, et ceux qui les ont appuyé sur la scène internationale depuis l'époque de l'invasion soviétique en Afghanistan en 1979 jusqu'au 11 septembre 2011. Le livre 'The Bin Ladens', publié cette année, établit la chronologie de la montée de la famille Bin Laden au XX^{ème} siècle, des modestes débuts dans les déserts du Yémen pour aboutir à devenir l'une des familles du monde des affaires saoudiens les plus prospères et les plus influentes. M. Machanda fait remarquer que ces deux volumes devraient être sur la liste de lecture de toute personne qui suit la guerre contre le terrorisme et les conflits en Afghanistan, au Pakistan et en Irak.

ON TRACK

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to General Raymond Henault, Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Military Committee, by Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Patron of the CDA, before some 600 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 14 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go on line at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall08.htm.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2007 was Matthew Fisher of the National Post. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 by the CDA in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/munro_media_award_main.htm.

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

This autumn, on 31 October and 1 November, the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada, the CDFAI, Queen's University's Defence Management Studies Programme, General Dynamics Canada, the Department of National Defence's Security and Defence

L'un des grands moments dans le calendrier des manifestations de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un canadien ou une canadienne qui a apporté une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation ainsi qu'à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'année dernière a connu un succès retentissant. De nombreuses propositions de grande qualité ont été mises de l'avant à l'attention du comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a atteint son point culminant lors de la présentation du prix au général Raymond Hénault, président du Comité militaire de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) par Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, et patronne de la CAD, à l'occasion d'un dîner officiel de quelque 600 invités au musée canadien de la Guerre.

Cette année, la présentation du Prix Vimy aura lieu le 14 novembre, une fois de plus dans le cadre d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala au musée canadien de la Guerre. Pour faire de ce prix une occasion véritablement significative, l'Institut a besoin de propositions de votre part quant à la personne qui le mérite. Bien que nous ayons déjà reçu un certain nombre de mises en candidature, les Conférences des associations de la défense (CAD) membres et les personnes individuelles sont invitées à proposer leurs candidats. Veuillez vous référer à la notice de mise en candidatures qui se trouve ailleurs dans ce numéro et rendez-vous en ligne au site suivant : http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall08.htm.

Le prix Média Ross Munro sera également présenté lors du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire en 2007 avait été Matthew Fisher du National Post. Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 par la CAD avec la collaboration du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute offert à un ou une journaliste canadien qui aura apporté une contribution marquante à la contribution par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité affectant le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'un chèque de 2,500 \$. L'avis de mise en candidature paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro ainsi que sur notre site Web à http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/munro_media_award_main.htm.

Les deux programmes ont connu un grand succès l'année dernière. Je suis heureux de pouvoir indiquer que l'appui de l'industrie canadienne et de nombreuses personnes individuelles est très encourageant.

Cet automne, les 31 octobre et 1er novembre, l'Institut de la CAD, en collaboration avec le programme d'études sur la Guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, le CDFAI, le programme d'études en gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's, General Dynamics Canada, le Forum Sécurité et Défense du ministère

Forum, and NATO, will host the 11th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The keynote speakers for the two-day event will be Senator Hugh Segal and Mr. Mel Cappe, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totaling \$6,000, will be awarded for the three best papers presented. Included with the prizes is a trip to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, to be awarded to the top five scholars whose papers are presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Please note the call for papers which appears elsewhere in *ON TRACK* and on our website at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia.htm>.

The CDA Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose mandate is to undertake research, and to support and promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues. It is no secret that our mandate is not yet over and that the CF are deserving of the nation's support for their rejuvenation, especially now as they undertake hazardous missions.

There still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of domestic and international military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the CF, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

The CDA Institute, along with the donors to the Institute, extends condolences to the family of the late G. Hamilton Southam, OC, BA, LL D. Mr. Southam was a great Canadian whose significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values was recognized in 2005 with the presentation of the Vimy Award.

canadien de la Défense nationale, et l'OTAN, accueilleront les 11^{ème} symposium annuel des étudiants gradués. Les conférenciers principaux lors de cette manifestation de deux jours seront le sénateur Hugh Segal et M. Mel Cappe, président de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques. Le symposium mettra en exergue le travail d'étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise d'universités civiles et militaires au Canada et à l'étranger. Les recherches les plus avancées des jeunes professionnels seront soulignées et des prix seront décernés pour un montant total de 6,000\$ aux auteurs des trois meilleurs textes présentés. Les prix comportent aussi un voyage au Quartier général de l'OTAN à Bruxelles offert aux cinq meilleurs textes présentés par des chercheurs. Le but de ce symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'éducation civiles et militaires. Veuillez noter que l'invitation à présenter des contributions paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro de ON TRACK et sur notre site <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia.htm>.

L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme caritatif et non partisan qui a pour mandat de favoriser la recherche et d'encourager un débat public informé sur des questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Personne ne sera surpris d'apprendre que nous sommes loin d'avoir accompli notre mandat et que les FC méritent amplement l'appui de la nation envers son renouvellement, tout particulièrement de nos jours alors qu'elles entreprennent des missions hasardeuses.

Il y a encore des couches de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informées sur les questions majeures liées aux opérations militaires intérieures et internationales, à l'acquisition de matériel pour les FC, et aux insuffisances chroniques quant aux ressources nécessaires pour faire face aux impératifs de sécurité et de défense à long terme de notre pays.

L'Institut de la CAD n'en continuera pas moins de fournir aux Canadiens des analyses pertinentes des événements et questions qui ont un impact direct sur la défense et la sécurité de la nation.

L'institut de la CDA, de concert avec tous ses donateurs, adresse ses condoléances à la famille de feu G. Hamilton Southam, OC, BA, LL D. M. Southam était un grand Canadien dont la contribution exemplaire à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays, ainsi qu'à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques a été dûment reconnue par l'attribution du Prix Vimy en 2005.




Photo by/par: Wayne Cuddington, *The Ottawa Citizen*

G. Hamilton Southam

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute by which we are able to carry out our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one (and recruit a friend or colleague). Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available online at <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>. ©

En terminant, je souhaite remercier tous nos mécènes, patrons, compagnons et officiers donateurs pour l'appui financier qu'ils prodiguent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, grâce auquel nous pouvons continuer à réaliser notre mandat. Si vous n'êtes pas encore un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous invite à le devenir – et à recruter par la même occasion un ami ou un collègue. Les formulaires de contribution paraissent à la dernière page de ce numéro et sont disponible en ligne au site <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>. ©

HMCS St. John's

by Dr. David Anido

Canada has a blue water Navy of which we must be supremely proud. Our ships circle the world in support of allied carrier groups, and come to harbour for diplomatic flag raising reasons and shows of technology and seamanship. Thanks to Commander Larry Trim of the Navy, I had the opportunity to sail from New York City, via Halifax and Gaspé, to Quebec City on HMCS St. John's.

As a tall ship sailor and former fixed wing airman, I know the seas and skies, but I never knew how a Canadian Frigate could knife through weather, with a dry bridge, without huge steering wheels in the stern, compasses, sextants, and furling sails in gale force storms. My minder was a brilliant officer, Lt(N) Kimberly Dunn, who is the Above Water Warfare Officer, and she, with all her responsibilities for driving the ship, still had time to look after a civilian. The Captain, Commander Brian Santarpia, is cool both on the bridge and elsewhere in the ship, where he visited his crew frequently. The morale on St. John's is excellent due to the leadership of himself and other officers.

The St. John's went to Quebec City with HMCS Preserver and American, Irish and French warships to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Quebec City. The scenario was perfect diplomacy.

The St. John's is described by her Commander as one of the most combat-ready ships in the world. She

has Above Water Sea Sparrow and Harpoon missiles, controlled by Lt(N) Dunn, and torpedoes to protect Carrier Groups from submarines. I was particularly pleased to see that there are charts of sea mammals on the bridge (e.g. dolphins and whales) which the Canadian Navy protects by not using sonar sounds as the mammals circuit the ships. The sound of the propellers keeps the sea mammals away so there is no danger. That kind of caring is what our Navy is all about.

The St. John's is powered by a combined diesel and gas propulsion system (CODOG) comprised of a twenty cylinder Pielstick Cruise diesel and two General Electric LM gas turbines. When we went through fire control exercises and two man overboard exercises, I was very impressed. On the fire control the sailors were dressed in minutes to fight the fire with the reverse osmosis water control from the hoses. In man overboard the old practice of pointing to the subject was legion as the Frigate turned at high speed as her Zodiac was launched. A sailing ship would take much more time to turn to save the victim.

HMCS St. John's has state of the art communications, sensors, and weapons technology. She can engage hostile threats and protect her friendly ships with above water and underwater acoustic sensors. Her anti-Air Warfare systems consist of 57mm Bofor guns and the 20mm Vulcan Phalanx Close in Weapon System. She is a serious gun platform with radar and sensors including the Canadian Electronic Warfare System (CANews), RAMSES and Shield 11 Chaff Infrared System.

We replaced a Sea King helicopter at Shearwater for gearbox problems, and the new Sea King met us at sea

Dr. David Anido served for twenty years in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He was Director of Development at the Canadian War Museum from 1998-1999, and served as a member of the fund raising Passing the Torch campaign under the chairmanship of General (Ret'd) Paul Manson. Dr. Anido is a consultant and is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.



HMCS St. John's passes by Second World War coastal artillery installation, as she enters St. John's Harbour, NF. Photo by St. John's NF photographer Robert Young.

off Halifax. I flew in her, thanks to Commander Buchanan, over the Labrador coast and the other warships coming to Quebec City. The pilots were magnificent and confident as they navigated the sky, and I know they are waiting for the new Cyclones and Chinooks.

It is hard, if not impossible, to give the Navy the kind of room we have for old tanks at the War Museum and airplanes at the Aviation Museum, but we do have the Haida in Hamilton and ships on the East and West Coast that can be preserved. The story of Canada's Navy is legion and we must see it told as veterans and young sailors join the team. We must ensure that Canada's Navy is honoured in our institutions.

My mission after this excellent experience as a

citizen, sailor, and fixed-wing airman is to honour the women and men who sail in our Navy. They are truly superb people who guard our coasts and sail in blue waters without hesitation. I want our citizens to know why we need a Navy with the best technology and the best sailors behind our ships. Our Navy is important and we need the newest and best ships to house our sailors. I believe our Coast Guard should be armed because our Navy is around the world, and I believe we need new icebreakers with the best Finnish hulls full of Canadian technology. Our anti-terrorism tactics must be first class.

The Navy is a gem of Canada, and all the people I met aboard St. John's were excellent Canadians. I salute them and will do whatever I can politically to see that they receive the best equipment and recruits. ©

“War and National Interest”

by John Scott Cowan, President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute and Principal, Royal Military College of Canada



Monsieur le Vice-Chancelier, Major-général Daniel Goselin, Brigadier-général David Fraser, Brigadier-général Don (ret) Macnamara, tous nos invités de marque, et la grande famille de nos deux Collèges, avant de vous exposer les qualités remarquables de notre récipiendaire de grade honorifique, je veux parler aux classes sortantes. Je félicite tous nos 81 diplômés du deuxième cycle, et nos 15 diplômés du premier cycle sur leurs réussites. Les cérémonies d'aujourd'hui sont tellement différentes des événements d'autres universités canadiennes.

Par exemple, cet heureux événement a toujours un aspect plus sérieux que les collations des grades aux autres universités, à cause des responsabilités importantes assumées par les membres de la profession militaire après avoir terminé une période de formation.

Furthermore, the nature of those profound responsibilities is very far from the day-to-day consciousness of most other Canadians. This is surprising, since the tenor of world events, new security concerns, and the substantial and ongoing Canadian military commitments abroad ought to have provoked in the broader public an intense interest in what you do. At one point, I thought the so-called Afghanistan debate would trigger that, but there have been unexpected impediments to informed discourse.

For a democracy, there is no decision more important, more fundamental, or more difficult than the decision to make war.

And for a democracy, the reasons why and the process by which it decides to make war reflect, reveal and refine the interests, values and character of the nation and of those who govern it. This is a fundamental truth.

But these days in Canada, this fundamental truth is little illuminated by our chattering classes. Indeed, public discourse by the media, by some politicians and by some academics, on why we do anything, including why we fight, has become narrow, trivial, banal or even silly. The vast majority of those who report upon or analyze these great events and the decisions we take over them

have decided to discuss them from only one optic, votes and polls. And not only votes and polls, but votes and polls subdivided by riding, by region, by gender, by age, by economic class or by ethnicity. In the eyes of these commentators, it's all and only about the power of elected office, how to get it and how not to lose it. This is an evisceration of understanding. Well, here's an old thought come back to haunt us and taunt us: maybe we should be talking about what's right, or at least what's right for us, and also about what is possible.

But there are good reasons (or at least obvious reasons) why that's not happening now. Despite the communications revolution, in some ways the flow of real information in Canada on questions of public policy is drying up. This is a grave threat to any functioning democracy. And it's related to some disturbing trends in dissemination of news in Canada.

A generation or two ago, key debates in Canada were not perfect either, but they had vastly more substance than today. I remember well the public texture of the medicare, nuclear weapons and flag debates of the early sixties, as well as the early eighties constitutional one.

There are multiple causes for the remarkable dumbing-down of the media in Canada over the past 40 years. Some of the obvious reasons are the need to compress complex issues into 10-30 second sound bites and the narcissism of portions of the media who report incessantly on themselves. Increasingly, the print media imitate the electronic media, in a desperate defence of market share. Furthermore, unlike 40 years ago when journalists were amongst the best-educated and best-informed citizens, today many of them are neither literate nor numerate, and do us the huge discourtesy of assuming we aren't either.

Interestingly, one crucial flaw also relates to market size. As critical as we are of US media, one can find some thoroughly brainy specialized commentary in the US. This is because it is a huge market, so that through syndication a journalist actually can make a living understanding issues in military affairs, geopolitics, economics, or science. But not here: in Canada, you are the science reporter the week after you were the society reporter, and the week before you are the constitutional issues repor-

ter. Generalist journalists know that they haven't the time to learn enough to deal with the full complexity of the issues, so they fall back on the double-barrelled stock in trade of any articulate journeyman: human interest and scandal. Hence all Canadian news is covered as human interest or scandal.

The situation is exacerbated by a fad taught in our journalism schools, which I call the "interior decorator" style of journalism. Have you noticed of late that the key facts are not at the beginning of the article? You need to read at least two thirds through it to find out what has happened or who was charged with what. The first part of the article is all about the feelings of the reporter or the relatives or bystanders, or about the general setting of the story. This forces you to read the continuation, on page 11, so that you will appreciate the true effort of the writer, or at least see the advertisements on that page.

Or contrast the CBC television news with the BBC equivalent, which is full of hard news. The CBC version is half filled with the opinions of reporters and pollsters, which is the high point, because during the other half they show scenic postcard views or stick microphones under the noses of whatever slack-jawed gum-chewing vagrants they can find on the street to ask them what they think about oil prices or border security or equalization payments.

But if the media give new depth to the word "shallow," what about our leading politicians? Well, strange but true, there may be considerable hidden quality. I've known many of them, and certainly some are genuinely impressive.

Just imagine an election campaign debate in which unelected journalists didn't participate and didn't interrupt our representatives every 30 or 60 seconds. Imagine the people we might elect debating each other in long enough blocks to be coherent, and on subjects which they think we might wish to hear about before judging their fitness to govern. Contemplate the possibility of political discourse not pushed through microcephalic filter of some ill-educated but firm-jawed stage prop of a news-reader.

We might get political discourse appropriate for a free people making critical decisions about their national enterprise and its role in the world.

So, polls aside, what about Afghanistan? At the outset, our involvement in Afghanistan served our interests in two important ways. First, along with other nations, we were assisting an Afghan insurgency which overthrew one of the most toxic regimes the world has ever seen, a regime whose negative effects were not merely regional, in part because of the impact of the terrorists who were their honoured guests. Indeed, we had been touched directly, through the murder of Canadian civilians working

in the US, the disruption of our movements and our prosperity, and the climate of fear engendered by the rhetoric and actions of al-Qaeda.

Secondly, our interests were very much served by being seen to contribute in a substantial way. Over many years, and despite our participation in a variety of missions, including the Balkans and East Timor, the view of Canada held by many of our allies had been becoming more negative. There was an increasing temptation to view Canada as an insubstantial blowhard that was very free with advice, inclined to offer all assistance short of actual help. This was beginning to put Canada at a disadvantage not just in dealings with the US, but on the world stage as a whole.

The Taliban were overthrown quickly, shifting our activities to consolidation and then to operations against the expected insurgency mounted by the losers. That has led, quite naturally to nation building. It's clear that we didn't enter the fray in Afghanistan as a form of muscular foreign aid, despite the spin that the media and some politicians might now wish to apply. We followed our interests by removing a toxic regime. But international rule of thumb and our collective moral sense triggered a subsequent obligation to promote something better to replace it. It is our success in our first objective that gave rise to our new objectives to assist security, economic development, education and social progress in Afghanistan. They are a logical and normal concomitant of our initial actions, and reflect the application of our values to how we advance our interests.

So, while war and national interest are complicated, sometimes so much so that they confound the media and their pollsters, we continue to hope that the key leaders of the profession of arms would be well prepared for such complexity. They, after all, face challenges unlike any others within government.

On that central question of conflict, the democratic government makes any decision to fight. That entails a hugely intricate balancing of factors, but at least it yields a sort of binary outcome. Either we do or we don't. That then necessitates you and your colleagues answering an even trickier question: How? The Canadian Forces are a device, a machine of great complexity, designed unlike any other part of government to be capable of functioning in conditions of great stress and strain, of chaos and complexity. A properly designed armed force is optimized for robustness first, and economy only secondarily.

The Master of Defence Studies degree, built on the foundation of the constantly improved Command and Staff Program, is part of that drive for robustness, as are many of our advanced programs for the higher qualifications within the profession of arms. Unlike the rest of government, we send our best "executives" back to school

often, and for long periods. It does take considerable resources, but we know that ultimately the cost of not doing so is vastly higher.

When we heavily revised the Command and Staff Program and launched the related Master of Defence Studies degree in 2001, we did so in the face of more than a decade of naysayers claiming that it could not be done, or at least could not be done well. Brigadier-General Gagnon and I did not believe that, and so we proceeded, forcing the cooperation between our two colleges. But because the Canadian Defence Academy did not yet exist, and Canadian Forces Recruiting, Education and Training System was fairly passive on education questions, there was as yet no overarching policy drive to achieve these synergies, and only personal relationships made progress possible.

This is the seventh RMC convocation at CFC,


and my 25th and last RMC convocation address as Principal. I'm pleased that attitudes have changed so much since the stand-up of the Canadian Defence Academy. It's easier now to make the case for such synergies and for very advanced intellectual and professional development for senior officers.

But we didn't invent these ideas, nor can we boast of speed. Major-General Roger Rowley advocated almost all of them in his widely acclaimed 1969 report. After almost 40 years, we're almost there, but we stand on the shoulders of giants.

So don't imagine that receiving your degrees today is just another tick in the box. We need your new capabilities and new awareness, because, where the national interest is concerned, the world isn't getting less complicated. And in the battles to come, you are our sword and shield. ©

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT A Look at the State of the Institute

by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson



Having recently stepped down as president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute) at the conclusion of my three year term, I look back on the experience with great fondness and satisfaction. It is also an occasion to turn a critical eye on the future of the organization.

Through an accident of timing, I was in the chair during an important and exceptionally interesting period.

Since its creation in 1987, the Institute had grown and matured under the exceptional leadership of my predecessors. By the time I took over from Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara in March 2005, the organization had established itself as a leading source of informed commentary on defence and security matters in Canada, to the extent that it has genuinely earned the title "think tank." This tradition has continued throughout the past three years, stimulated, I believe, by the conjunction of several significant external developments, namely

the emergence of a minority government, Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan, and a remarkable growth in this country of public interest in foreign affairs, national security, and the Canadian Forces.

Against this external background, the Institute has grown in stature and gained recognition, to the point where its voice is heard nationally these days on just about every major question related to national security. Consider the fact, for example, that the Institute and its parent organization, the CDA, were involved in more than 1,000 media appearances (TV, radio and print) during the three-year period. It is fair to say that, together, we have become the point of first call by the media on emerging issues.

This is heady stuff, not just in terms of our own status, but in the respect that, after years of indifference by governments and citizens in this country, defence is now a matter of real interest and concern. It is gratifying to know that the CDA Institute has played an important part in bringing about this new focus.

Reflecting upon the continuing growth of the Institute during my tenure, I can point to many significant developments in its structure and operations. Here are some of the more important.

Board of Directors. This governing body has expanded

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff, and is a past president of the CDA Institute. He is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

greatly, to the point where it now comprises some 37 distinguished Canadians known for their interest and expertise in national defence. These are no figurehead directors; indeed, they are genuinely active in providing strategic guidance and oversight.

The Annual Seminar. This event, normally held in February, has become the largest of its kind in Canada today, with its topical themes and a sparkling array of eminent speakers, including this year the Prime Minister of Canada. Our audience of approximately 500 includes representation from the military, academic, industrial and political communities.

The Vimy Dinner. In November 2007 Her Excellency the Governor General graciously accepted our invitation to be Guest of Honour at this event, which was held for the first time in the new Canadian War Museum. It was a huge success, with some 650 attendees witnessing the presentation by Her Excellency of the Vimy Award to General Ray Henault and the Ross Munro Media Award to Matthew Fisher.

Roundtables. These sessions bring key experts to our table, where they lead freewheeling discussions on matters of current importance in defence, security and international affairs. The small audience (typically 30) and the invoking of the Chatham House Rule (i.e. no attribution) guarantee a stimulating exchange. Increasingly popular, the roundtables are held once or twice monthly.

ON TRACK Magazine. The Institute's quarterly periodical has evolved into a highly regarded review, presenting informative articles and commentary by a wide range of subject matter experts. Visual appearance has steadily improved under the editorship of Peter Forsberg.

The Vimy Papers. Here is an excellent example of the Institute's growing influence. Three of these annual monographs have now been published, on the subjects respectively of defence procurement (2006), the Arctic (2007) and Asia/Pacific (2008). Expertly edited by Brian MacDonald, these little volumes have won acclaim for their incisive analysis of major current issues by distinguished authors.

The Graduate Student Symposium. Held every October at the Royal Military College in Kingston, this symposium attracts young academics at the post-graduate student level from across Canada, some 35 of whom are invited annually to deliver 15-minute oral presentations on their research in the field of defence and security. Cash prizes

totaling \$6,000 are awarded for the top three presentations. As well, five paid trips to NATO Headquarters in Brussels will be awarded to the top presentations at the 2008 symposium.

“Dear Colleagues”. Executive Director Alain Pellerin, taking full advantage of the Internet, sends out a regular (almost daily) summary of media coverage on defence and related matters to a large list of addressees. In my estimation, this is the best thing that is done in the name of the CDA and its Institute. With Colonel Pellerin's concise summary of articles and electronic links to each, our audience is kept abreast of current thought and events in a most convenient way.

Québec Participation. In recent years we have brought considerable focus on French Canada in our day-to-day operations, in an effort to bring this segment of our population – especially Québec – into the mainstream of the Institute's study of our nation's security. To that end we have added several distinguished francophone members to the Board of Directors, and we have increased French language content in our publications. It is worth noting also that each year several papers at the Graduate Student Symposium are delivered in French and that the judges are all bilingual. Much more can and will be done in this important area.

Clearly, from the above, it can be seen that the CDA Institute is going through good times. But that is not to say that there are no challenges ahead. As with all dynamic organizations, important questions need to be considered and changes made if the momentum is to be sustained.

As I see it, the following issues must be faced as the CDA Institute makes its way into an interesting future.

Identity

Let's face it: the name is cumbersome and confusing, to the point where outsiders (especially the media) seem to get it wrong more often than they get it right. Although from the outset I was convinced that a more streamlined identifier than “The Conference of Defence Association Institute” was needed, I have reluctantly acceded to the strongly held view that this is not the time to rename ourselves to, for example, “The Vimy Institute.” I accept the arguments, chiefly historical, administrative and legal, that the change is not warranted at this time. Perhaps the time will come when this matter is reopened. I hope so. Meanwhile, let's refer to the “CDA Institute” or simply

DONATIONS

Conference of Defence Associations
Institute

A gift provided under your will means a great deal to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It perpetuates a commitment in support the mission of the Institute.

Making an outright or planned gift to a non-profit organization such as the CDA Institute is a private decision, and should fulfill philanthropic wishes while maximizing tax and other financial and personal benefits. Planned gifts are commonly referred to as deferred gifts, such as bequests, life insurance, charitable remainder trusts and similar undertakings, whereby the commitment is made now, but the funds do not become available to the Institute until a set time in the future.

Including a bequest to the CDA Institute in your will is one of the most popular and simplest ways to make a planned gift. It allows you to make thoughtful decisions regarding your family, other loved ones, and also organizations and charities you have supported throughout your lifetime.

By including the CDA Institute in your estate planning you will ensure a long-lasting legacy for the Institute.

For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

LES DONNS

L'institut de la conférence des associations de la
défense

Un don inscrit à votre testament revêt une grande importance pour l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense (l'ICAD). Il perpétue votre engagement envers l'Institut et assure le soutien continu à sa mission.

Faire un don immédiat, ou un don planifié à un organisme comme l'Institut de la CAD est un décision privée qui doit répondre aux désirs philanthropiques, tout en maximisant les avantages fiscaux, financiers et personnels. Les dons planifiés sont communément appelés dons différés. Ils incluent les legs, l'assurance-vie, les fiducies résiduelles de bienfaisance et toute entente similaire. La personne s'engage dès maintenant, mais les fonds ne sont versés à l'organisme qu'à une période déterminée dans le futur.

Un legs à l'Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié. Il vous permet de prendre des décisions réfléchies concernant votre famille, vos êtres chers et des organismes que vous avez appuyés tout au long de votre vie.

En incluant l'Institut de la CAD dans vos plans de succession, vous assurerez un héritage durable pour l'Institut.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour aviser l'Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. Toute demande d'information sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.

the "Institute," rather than the unappealing and confusing "CDAI."

Funding

There has been a recent flurry of media excitement,

prompted breathlessly by the usual anti-defence elements, about the fact that the CDA and its Institute receive a portion of their funding from the Department of National Defence. Apart from the fact that it has taken our detractors some 75 years to discover this longstanding practice, they argue, incorrectly, that we are beholden to DND in return for the funding, by having to exercise a favourable slant

in our activities. As any unbiased examination of the record would readily show, both the CDA and the Institute have never had any compunction about criticizing the department or the government of the day where criticism is warranted. This truth will not likely deter the left-wing critics, who are not driven by logic on this issue.

Why An Institute?

The issue over funding raises a fundamental question. Is there in fact a real need for the Institute? After all, there are several similar organizations in Canada these days. The answer, I believe, is simple, and it relates to our name. The CDA Institute is unique in this country, in that it is the research agency of the 50 associations that are the heart of the CDA itself. The Institute therefore brings a public focus to the experience-based strategic thinking that the whole broad CDA membership offers on

important defence questions of the day. Moreover, it has the infrastructure and staff expertise to present arguments clearly and effectively, using all of the mechanisms described above. The net result is a better informed public and decision-makers in the vital area of national defence and security. At a time when the anti-defence crowd is becoming increasingly vocal, after having been so badly discredited with the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War, Canadians need a balanced, rational and realistic expression of the need for effective defence in the face of serious new challenges to our nation's existence as a free and democratic society.

The CDA Institute provides just that. With the promise of strong leadership under my eminent successor, Dr. John Scott Cowan (a truly inspired choice), a continuation of dedicated service by our excellent staff, and an enviable reputation across Canada and beyond, the Institute can look forward to a productive and influential future. ©

AFGHANISTAN – PLUS QUE LES 3D

Par le Brigadier-général (ret.) Gaston Côté et le lieutenant-colonel (ret.) Raymond Taillefer

Suite à une invitation du Ministère de la Défense nationale, un groupe d'analystes militaires a pu se rendre en Afghanistan à la fin mars et prendre contact avec la réalité de terrain de cette mission qui enflamme les passions au Canada. Pour le Bgén (ret.) Côté il s'agissait d'un troisième voyage dans le pays alors que le Lcol (ret.) Taillefer en était à son premier voyage. Nous partageons tous deux l'opinion que cette prise de contact avec la réalité de terrain est absolument essentielle pour bien comprendre le contexte de cette mission, pour rencontrer les vrais acteurs tant militaires que civils et ainsi pouvoir présenter une image crédible et informée aux médias. Cette immersion afghane a permis d'établir plusieurs constats et de soulever quelques interrogations tel que repris au fil du texte suivant.

Kandahar

Un fait connu mais qui constitue néanmoins un choc formidable dès l'arrivée en théâtre : la géographie. La province de Kandahar couvre un espace de plus de

180,000km², un relief parfois très accidenté dans la partie Nord et surtout désertique dans le Sud, le tout couronné par l'absence d'une infrastructure routière convenable. Dans un tel milieu géographique, le manque de moyens de transport aériens (surtout des hélicoptères) et l'insuffisance des effectifs militaires déployés sur le terrain rendent ainsi difficile toute stratégie de sécurité axée sur un contrôle étroit du territoire de la province de Kandahar.

Devant une telle réalité, la force opérationnelle interarmées sous le commandement du brigadier-général Guy Laroche a réalisé que la partie sécurité de son action doit être axée sur la population afghane plutôt que sur la « domination du territoire ». Aussi, l'orientation stratégique de la mission s'est donc axée vers les zones les plus peuplées de la province, soit autour de la ville de Kandahar et dans les districts de Panjawai et Zhari. Le but ultime de cet axe stratégique est de rehausser la sécurité de manière tangible aux yeux de 75 pourcent de la population totale de la province de Kandahar qui s'y retrouve. Les actions militaires exécutées pour réaliser cet objectif ambitieux méritent un examen rétrospectif et constituent sans doute un modèle pour le futur. On peut presque qualifier ces actions d'une « approche par petits pas ».

En résumé, à compter du mois d'août 2007, les troupes de la force opérationnelle canadienne ont

Le Brigadier-général (ret.) Gaston Côté et le lieutenant-colonel (ret.) Raymond Taillefer, sont analystes militaires indépendants. Le Brigadier-général (Ret) Côté est aussi le Vice-Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense.



**Forward Operating Base Ma'sum Ghar,
Afghanistan, 27 March 2008**

L – R: Mr. Paul Turcotte, Director External Communications and Public Relations, DND; Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara; Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis Mackenzie; Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations; Dr. David Bercuson, University of Calgary; Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers; Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Raymond Taillefer; Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Gaston Côté, Vice-Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations

**La base d'opérations avancée, Ma'sum Ghar,
Afghanistan, 27 mars 2008**

G – D: Monsieur Paul Turcotte, Directeur Communications externes et relations publiques, MDN; le Brigadier-général (Ret) Don Macnamara; le Major-général (Ret) Lewis Mackenzie; le Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin, directeur général de la Conférence des associations de la défense; Monsieur David Bercuson, Ph.D, University of Calgary; le Contre-amiral (Ret) Ken Summers; le Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Raymond Taillefer ; et le Brigadier-général (Ret) Gaston Côté, vice-président, de la Conférence des associations de la défense

été utilisées comme fer de lance pour reconquérir une partie du terrain disputé par les rotations précédentes, à la suite de quoi, ont été installés des points d'ancrage sous la forme de nouvelles base d'opération avancées et de sept postes fortifiés de police hâtivement établis et dotés d'un effectif mixte (canadien et afghan) regroupant des fantassins des deux pays et des policiers militaires canadiens et afghans. L'établissement de ces postes de police revêt une importance particulière car elle visait à rapprocher la population de la Police nationale afghane et de mieux encadrer cette police. Il faut souligner que les policiers militaires et fantassins canadiens déployés

dans ces postes ont vécu des heures dangereuses dans des conditions très austères. À nos yeux, se sont des héros obscurs. Un autre élément important a été la mise sur pied de centres conjoints de coordination au niveau de la Province et des districts, ceci afin de mieux coordonner les moyens et les actions des forces de l'ISAF, des forces de sécurité afghanes et des autorités civiles et de créer des liens de gouvernance auprès les chefs de tribus et de villages.

Notre visite a aussi permis de constater que le processus visant à passer le flambeau vers l'administration et la population afghane comporte plusieurs facettes.

Certes, l'action militaire dite « cinétique » a souvent joui d'une grande visibilité; mais, cela ne doit pas occulter le fait que des efforts énormes sont faits dans des domaines tout aussi importants sur le plan de la gouvernance et du développement. Il faut absolument saluer le travail souvent ingrat et pas assez célébré des Canadiens provenant de divers ministères et organismes œuvrant à faciliter l'éclosion d'une démocratie et d'une administration centralisée, deux aspects totalement absents du paysage politique afghan depuis plusieurs décennies alors que cette société a été ballottée par une suite invraisemblable d'agressions dont la provenance était tout aussi interne qu'externe.

Il y a beaucoup plus que les départements canadiens de la tróika Défense-Diplomatie-Développement présents sur le terrain et d'autres agences et services tel que la GRC et les Services correctionnels du Canada tentent de donner vie à une administration centrale, provinciale et même de district et de l'amener aux normes du 21^{ème} siècle. Tous ces travailleurs, policiers, conseillers au développement et autres méritent tout autant notre admiration que nos militaires.

L'Équipe provinciale de reconstruction, mieux connue sous son acronyme anglophone PRT, donne vie quotidiennement au terme reconstruction. Cette équipe doit composer avec la réalité d'interagir avec une société traumatisée et disloquée par plus de trois décennies de conflits, suspicieuse face aux délais dans la réalisation de tant de promesses internationales et dont l'impact tarde à se concrétiser. Il est quand même incroyable que ces travailleurs canadiens fassent preuve d'une telle modestie lorsque nous les avons visités, alors que leurs réalisations et leur mode d'opération sont citées en exemple à travers tout l'Afghanistan! Il faut aussi souligner le fait que leurs projets sont issus des priorités dictées par les autorités afghanes locales, signifiant ainsi que ces projets sont une «propriété afghane» dont la pérennité sera sans doute assurée par un dialogue musclé entre les autorités locales et les talibans.

Somme toute, cette visite a permis de constater que les efforts canadiens dans la province de Kandahar sont remarquables, à la lumière des moyens modestes déployés. Elle a aussi permis de constater que l'attitude des soldats canadiens demeure professionnelle et mesurée face aux vicissitudes d'un théâtre d'opérations sans doute le plus complexe de tout l'Afghanistan; après tout, il faut garder en mémoire que Kandahar était le porte-étendard, la capitale de l'Afghanistan sous la gouverne des Talibans.

Dans une perspective de lutte contre une insurrection, le premier réflexe qui s'impose est l'évaluation de la réceptivité de la population locale à appuyer ou bien les insurgés ou les forces de sécurité de

l'ISAF et afghanes. Or, cette analyse s'est avérée difficile à faire lors de cette visite car le nombre de troupes et la géographie ne permettent pas d'isoler la population de la ville de Kandahar et ses districts limitrophes des influences extérieures.

À notre avis, un des principaux défis ou risques est le fait d'avoir au Sud une frontière trop poreuse et une population de combattants issus des Pashtouns du Pakistan, où les madrasas servent d'incubateurs pour les jeunes insurgés et où des éléments influents au Pakistan jouent un rôle d'appui important. Ce sanctuaire pakistanais offre aux insurgés une base arrière qui fera perdurer les actions contre les forces de la Coalition et du Gouvernement afghan. Ce problème en est un de niveau stratégique et rend incontournable un questionnement plus profond sur la nécessité de plancher sur une approche résolument régionale unissant l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan, un point soulevé par le rapport Manley mais dont la mise en œuvre semble tarder. Il faut bien dire cependant que ce problème en est un qui ne pourra être réglé qu'au niveau de la communauté internationale et des acteurs régionaux.

En résumé, le séjour à Kandahar a permis de constater que les Canadiens ont réalisé beaucoup plus que leurs maigres moyens leur permettaient et que leurs réalisations ont pris en compte les subtilités ethniques d'un peuple provincial. Le projet de construction de la route Foster-Brown, dans le district de Panjawai, près de la base opérationnelle avancée de Masum' Ghar constitue un autre exemple à présenter à la population canadienne alors que l'exécution du projet même table sur une implication maximale de la population locale en mettant un accent particulier sur le travail manuel contrairement à l'utilisation outrancière d'équipement lourd, une solution rapide mais peu mobilisatrice sur le plan humain. Les planificateurs canadiens tiennent même compte des changements de territoire ethnique en embauchant le personnel selon le tissu ethnique correspondant au tronçon de route à construire. Voilà un exemple probant du maillage entre développement, réalité ethnique et besoin de sécurité.

Autre exemple encore plus probant du relais de flambeau et de la volonté afghane de prendre en charge sa propre destinée est la mise sur pied de bataillons de l'Armée nationale afghane. Ce projet est sans aucun doute celui qui a connu le développement le plus accéléré à travers tout le pays, à telle enseigne que ces bataillons ou 'kandaks' sont maintenant capables d'action individuelle et peuvent même se voir confier une responsabilité de contrôle territorial sur une partie de la province de Kandahar. Une autre réalisation démontrant l'efficacité de l'approche canadienne, contredisant ainsi les paroles d'un certain responsable américain haut placé...

Kaboul

La portion de cette visite à Kaboul a permis une rencontre avec les ministres afghans de la Défense et de la Réhabilitation rurale et du développement. D'emblée, les deux ministres ont été fort élogieux face aux réalisations des Canadiens et nous ont exposé leur vision de l'avenir du pays. Inutile de dire que ces deux ministres, qui sont parmi les plus efficaces et les plus influents du Gouvernement afghan, doivent composer avec une réalité qui échappe à l'œil trop souvent, c'est-à-dire la fuite ou la destruction de l'intelligentsia afghane durant les décennies de conflits; une réalité qui érode régulièrement les efforts de solidarité nationale. Face à ses efforts pour éventuellement assurer une gouvernance efficace, l'Afghanistan a un manque criant de personnes compétentes. Cette situation rend essentielle la présence, sur la base d'une entente bilatérale entre le Canada et l'Afghanistan, d'un instrument comme l'Équipe consultative stratégique (acronyme anglophone SAT), composée majoritairement de militaires non pas seulement à cause de l'absence de sécurité mais plutôt à cause de la grande polyvalence de nos militaires et de leur excellent entraînement en matière de planification. Cette équipe joue un rôle de pompier dans certains ministères importants en attendant que se lève une génération d'administrateurs afghans.

Ce séjour à Kaboul invite aussi à une modeste réflexion sur ce qu'a subi toute la population afghane et d'éliminer certains préjugés quant à leur prétendue xénophobie. Tout peuple qui subit des combats quelquefois même incestueux mérite amplement l'étiquette d'un peuple atteint du syndrome de stress post-traumatique avec les mêmes séquelles identifiées sur un être humain, comme la méfiance par exemple. Ce mur sociétal est un autre des obstacles freinant indubitablement les efforts de développement et engendre aussi une méfiance envers un gouvernement central dont les réalisations ne rejoignent pas encore la population de l'arrière-pays et de la province de Kandahar en particulier.

Malgré ces aléas, le brigadier-général Côté, de retour à Kaboul pour la première fois depuis 2004, a été tout simplement estomaqué par les efforts de reconstruction du peuple afghan, une démonstration patente de la combinaison entre la résilience incroyable du peuple afghan et un climat de sécurité propice apporté par l'ISAF. Il est évident que l'activité économique est en forte reprise dans tout le secteur de Kaboul et que les attaques terroristes sporadiques ne semblent pas freiner cet élan. En dépit de cette note optimiste, les efforts d'amélioration de la sécurité doivent se poursuivre, un aspect où le Canada joue un rôle-phare par ses réalisations, selon le ministre Wardak (Défense) et le général

commandant l'ISAF, le général McNeill. D'ailleurs, les réalisations du Canada ont été citées à plusieurs reprises tant pour le sacrifice humain consenti jusqu'ici que pour la qualité de notre personnel tous grades et tous métiers confondus. En fait, les initiatives canadiennes sur le plan du mentorat de l'armée ou de la police afghane constituent un modèle à copier par les autres nations et organisations internationales.

Le ministre de la Réhabilitation rurale et du développement, le ministre Zia, a clairement énoncé les priorités de son ministère : la restauration des systèmes d'irrigation pour l'agriculture, le développement de barrages hydro-électriques et la remise à niveau de l'infrastructure de transport. En plus de partager cette vision, il a mentionné le besoin urgent de structurer la mise en marché des produits afghans et de substituer des cultures de rechange pour contrer la prolifération de la culture du pavot, une vision tout à fait limpide et nettement en opposition à une politique plus simpliste d'éradication.

Conclusion

Les nombreux défis posés dans la province de Kandahar contribuent à alimenter le débat sur la pertinence de l'intervention canadienne dans un secteur si éloigné. Force est d'admettre que trop souvent, dans plusieurs rapports et analyses, on ne relève pas assez l'importance géostratégique de l'Afghanistan, un pays charnière entre des puissances nucléaires confirmées ou en devenir. Historiquement pays de voies de communications, l'Afghanistan est appelé à devenir l'espace par où se développeront les liens entre les économies de l'Iran, les États de l'Asie centrale, le Chine, le Pakistan et l'Inde. Le transport du gaz naturel et l'accès plus direct aux eaux de l'Océan indien, pour la Chine et les États de l'Asie centrale, sont deux éléments qui illustrent bien le besoin aigu de stabilité régionale plus large que simplement nationale et limitée à l'Afghanistan. Ainsi, tôt ou tard, la Chine, le Pakistan, l'Iran et l'Inde devront devenir des acteurs importants dans les efforts de règlement de ce conflit.

D'autre part, le problème de sécurité existe et le débat demeure entier à savoir si les Talibans et autres groupes d'insurgés doivent ou non être inclus à la table de négociations dans une perspective de réconciliation nationale incontournable. L'identité purement talibane prête à confusion suite à son association passée avec Al-Qaïda, constituant ainsi un frein puissant à toute politique de la main tendue. Les deux doivent être séparés tant sur le plan théorique que sur le plan physique, c'est-à-dire que suffisamment de moyens militaires et diplomatiques

doivent être mis à contribution pour rendre la frontière afghano-pakistanaise moins poreuse; de même, le problème des renforts d'insurgés provenant du Pakistan

doit être solutionné à sa source dans une perspective régionale mieux coordonnée et articulée avec plus de vigueur. ©

What Canadians Should Know About Afghanistan

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara

The frequently asked question “What is Canada doing in Afghanistan?” can be, depending on which word is emphasized, as many as five questions, all of which need to be answered. There is, however, an equally commonly asked question among an interested public, “Where can I find out about the Afghanistan mission?”

As one who has been engaging interested public audiences and media on defence and security topics for over 20 years both formally and informally, poorly informed audiences are not surprising. However, what has been surprising over the last three years is a consistent lack of understanding of the Afghanistan mission, particularly among audiences normally well informed on such matters. After two visits to Afghanistan over the last twenty months, the last one being this past April, it is also clear that much of what is going on is not well understood or even heard by the public as it either does not get reported or is even misconstrued, leading to misinformation. Democracy assumes the involvement of an informed public - as a means to informing politicians on policy positions. In the absence of such an informed public - or worse, misinformed public- there could arise a conflict between public awareness and understanding and the realities that lead to Government's reactions to international conditions affecting the nation's interests.

Media coverage of the mission has placed great emphasis on combat and, in particular, the casualties and the circumstances surrounding their occurrence. Other commentary appears to concentrate on the negatives – things that are not going right or well, such as the recent prison break in Kandahar, or the lack of apparent progress in major areas such as how to handle the vexing problem of poppy cultivation. What appears to be lacking is an understanding within the media, in particular, but also in some parts of government, of a number of larger issues

that are interconnected and thus need to be addressed as a system of issues rather than simply a list of things to be done. So, what should Canadians know about Afghanistan?

First, anyone interested in Afghanistan should look at a world map. Afghanistan is a land-locked country roughly the size of Manitoba but with the population of Canada. It is situated in Southwest Asia – a region stretching from the Nile to the Indus that contains most of the world's petroleum resources and is an arc of instabilities to which Canada has deployed UN Observers, UN Peacekeeping forces and coalition intervention forces over 20 times since the end of the second World War. Afghanistan is bordered by Iran, China and Pakistan, including the contested state (with India) of Kashmir, plus three former Soviet states -Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. China, Pakistan and India are all nuclear states, Iran is expected to become so, and Israel, another regional power, is assumed to be so. Without a lot of explanation, it should be clear that Canada has and has had a significant interest in contributing to the stability of this region over the last 60 years – and we are doing so again.

Second, the devastation wrought on Afghanistan is unimaginable as the result of almost 30 years of war starting with the Soviet invasion and occupation of 1979, followed by a vicious civil war after the Soviet departure in 1989 and a resultant assumption of power in 1995 by a ruthless Islamist Taliban government. This government permitted the fostering of the jihadist terrorist organization – Al Qaeda – that undertook a number of major terrorist attacks against United States interests and assets, culminating in the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001, resulting in the death of thousands of American citizens and 23 Canadians. The United States led a UN- and NATO-sanctioned intervention to remove the Taliban from power. Not only was the country left as little more than a pile of rubble, it was effectively without any infrastructure or the normal institutions of government, education or commerce.

Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret'd) is a past president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and is a member of the Institute's Board of Directors.

The UN- directed Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy of 2005 to which Canada was a signatory – but three years ago – paved the way for elections and political, economic and social reconstruction in an environment of continuing insecurity. Expectations over the rate at which recovery, reconstitution of government, reconstruction of infrastructure and institutions, resettlement of millions of refugees - all within a complex multi-ethnic and traditional tribal society with widespread illiteracy and while continuing to deal with security issues - must be tempered by recognition and understanding of these realities. What has been accomplished over the last three years is truly amazing, and *that* is the story as opposed to criticism over lack of progress - continuing challenges and difficulties notwithstanding.

... the successes of the Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT) and the Kabul-based Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) are not as well reported or understood

The activities of Canada's contribution of a battle group, headquarters and various support elements has received coverage from embedded reporters, but the successes of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT) and the Kabul-based Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) are not as well reported or understood.

The conditions that will ultimately contribute to a free and independent Afghanistan go beyond simply military security – although that remains a necessary condition. A locally sustainable economy based in local resources will depend on certain infrastructure – mainly roads and transportation – to get marketable goods to a market site, in addition to the capability to produce those goods in the first place.

Attempting to supplant the illicit cash crop of poppies when there is no means to get an alternative crop to a market – indeed where maybe there is no market, assumes pre-conditions of not only the transportation infrastructure but also some education, seed supply, perhaps processing resources etc. So, the construction of an eight- kilometre paved road (Route Fosters –Brown) in Panjway-Zhari districts financed by the PRT and supervised by Canadian military engineers employs some 300-500 Afghans, who are paid \$6-10 per day and learn traditional Afghan road construction methods. The road provides additional security from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), a transit route to nearby towns and Kandahar and hence markets. Funding has been approved for a 14-kilometre extension. In addition, a new and nearby Canada-financed causeway provides a short-cut reducing

travel time to markets from other areas. The villages in the area now have active markets, some 10-15,000 refugees have returned and there is the semblance of an economy developing – also reflecting a perception of security and hope in the future. The road construction not only provides employment and income, but also represents an alternative to joining the Taliban for a night or two with an AK-47 to obtain some income for one's family.

These projects provide opportunities to consult with the people and elders to understand their needs and to identify other activities that Canadians may support. This is NOT negotiating with the Taliban - as it was represented in one report, reflecting a lack of understanding of the whole system served by these projects.

The support for the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police has been overshadowed by reports of corruption leading to unpaid and restive police men and women. At the PRT in Kandahar, RCMP and municipal police officers from Canada, including a woman from Corrections Canada, have established a police training centre which, among other professional policing subjects, addresses the matters of detainee treatment.

The issue of pay being siphoned off by senior officers has been resolved by depositing individual police officers' pay in a bank and a card being given to each officer coded for the amount of his or her pay. Further, Canadian Military Police – both men and women - mentor Afghan National Police in more remote, primitive and insecure police substations where they live for months at a time on 'hard rations' in very basic conditions. Here they set examples in both professional and social terms of Canadian values, including the attitudes toward and the capabilities of women in the Canadian Forces.

Similar mentoring of the Afghan National Army(ANA) has demonstrated the exceptional progress the ANA has made in the past 18 months and their rapidly increasing capability to assume more responsibility for local security. Although this has contributed to a substantial increase in local respect for the ANA, a recent news report concentrated on finding a local who would say that the ANA was weak and dependent on Canadians – their demonstrated capability and performance in combat notwithstanding. The Afghan National Army Academy will soon graduate its first class of officers following a rigorous three-year education on the US West Point military academy lines. The attitude toward this profession is reflected in the some 1700 qualified applicants for the 300 slots in the new class. Where are the articles on the role of Canadians and NATO troops in building an indigenous army, police and security capability? It appears that reporters do not understand the system at work in these cases.

This 19- member group of military officers and a few civilians have for over three one-year deployments provided a unique Canada-Afghanistan bilateral advisory capability

Finally, there is the Kabul-based Strategic Assistance Team. This 19-member group of military officers and a few civilians have for over three one-year deployments provided a unique Canada-Afghanistan bilateral advisory capability. They have served as senior advisors in various Afghan Government Ministries, educating new and inexperienced public servants on how to develop, plan and execute policies and programs; in other words, real capacity-building. The Ministers themselves have different and wide-ranging experience and skills, and starting a democratic government from ‘scratch’ has been challenging, to say the least. Inter-departmental jealousies in Canada appear to have led to the cancellation of this program. The Canadian Forces produces officers with strategic planning and program implementation skills as a matter of normal professional development – in contradistinction to the Federal Public

Service. Their utility and effectiveness has not been lost on President Karzai, but how and by whom this team will be replaced will be interesting to watch. However, over its three years, the work of this unique and effective team has been the subject of only a couple of small articles and one television news feature, which appeared to miss the point entirely!

These are but a few examples. There are others, including some involving the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Foreign Affairs Canada.

While some commentators continue to rail at Government because they claim it has failed to explain why Canada is in Afghanistan and what we are doing. The various departmental websites, however, are rich sources of information for those who know where and how to find them.

Perhaps the failure is within the media because very few appear to clearly understand the strategic context and operational interdependencies of Canadian activities in Afghanistan. Canadian media, reporters, journalists, editors and publishers should examine their own capacities and their responsibilities for a poorly informed or misinformed public. ©

Capacity Building – A Myth in Afghanistan?

by Nipa Banerjee

I am compelled to begin with an anecdote that typifies ‘capacity building’ in Afghanistan. In 2003 I met a woman in her mid-twenties in a Consultative Group Meeting. She introduced herself as an external advisor to the Minister of Justice – a pretty impressive title, I thought! I came across her after a year or so, when she gleefully announced that she was now advising the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Despite having initial difficulty reconciling the suitability of a justice advisor also advising on rural development, I assumed the young lawyer advised on legal issues. I had the good fortune of meeting her again after six months, when she presented herself as a Private Sector Development advisor. To clearly understand the logic of the trail of her advisory

roles, I asked her about her academic specialization and expertise. She enlightened me: she had a bachelor’s degree in a social science field and she had had the thrill of practicing skills in building ‘capacity’ for the first time in Kabul. Capacity building in *what* was not clear because I was afraid to pursue the matter further. She was thankful to the UN Development Programme for this.

With this backdrop, we may proceed to examine the concept of capacity building and its effectiveness in Afghanistan.

The essential ingredients for a durable and sustainable turnaround of a fragile state such as Afghanistan are economic growth that can support investment in poverty reduction and human development, social and political progress, and a state with efficient and effective institutions to serve as the custodian of such developments. Advances in these areas are essentially

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Dr. Nipa Banerjee headed Canada’s development and aid program in Kabul (2003-06). She currently teaches international development at the University of Ottawa. She travels to Kabul frequently.

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La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 14 novembre 2008, à un diner qui aura lieu dans le Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure général du Canada, a été invitée.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le diner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.

dependent on the capacity of the post-conflict government to address them. Unfortunately, almost without exception, post-conflict states are fragile and straddled with weak capacity to perform their primary tasks. Acknowledging this fact, fourteen post-conflict peace building and development operations undertaken in Afghanistan in the period 1989 to 2001 included massive technical assistance for state building, including capacity building.

Building an effective state that provides stability through the provision of security and delivery of essential services is central to the security, development and reconstruction agenda in Afghanistan. A newly born post-conflict state with extremely limited human resources capacity of its own cannot wait for an extended public administration building process for service delivery purposes. Urgent and essential services must be delivered immediately. Thus, to cover the first few years of the post-conflict period, service delivery needs externally funded technical assistance and expertise, along with a simultaneous capacity-building program.

Initially, the belief was that filling the gap with external expertise until civil servants were trained would last not more than two to three years if short term external consultants simultaneously trained Afghans to replace themselves. However, the reality today is that after seven years many functions that an effective state government should perform are being performed rather haphazardly by international experts or high salaried Afghans financed by the international community, without any retention of capacity and with no exit strategy in view. The capacity of the Afghan civil service has not been built simultaneously. Afghanistan remains a weak state, with inadequate capacity in its civil service to deliver public services without enormous imported expertise. This, of course, continues to undermine local ownership and leadership principles which are critical for making aid and development effective.

Research findings show that in the past, massive influxes of expatriate technical assistance (TA) to fragile states with weak capacity failed to produce the desired result of in-country capacity building. Instead of learning from the past, classic mistakes in TA supply were repeated in Afghanistan. The international community's financing of TA in Afghanistan reflects random and fragmented approaches. As a result, with an expenditure of over \$1.6 billion in seven years, little capacity building in government institutions is visible.

For security reasons, recruitment of quality TA for most conflict-ridden fragile states is difficult. The Afghanistan case is no different. Inexperienced and less qualified external consultants resulted in little capacity building. A slew of overpaid, inexperienced and untrained recent graduates from the northern countries have used

resources to develop their own capacity working in the ever expanding 'aid industry' that has engulfed Afghanistan. Moreover, much of the TA programs have turned into individual, donor-driven, high cost service provisions through temporary installation of expatriate personnel in line Ministry staff positions. Technical assistance, as narrated above, performs no capacity building tasks, nor can it transfer skills to locals.

The Afghan government also critiques the high salaries and benefits that expatriate advisors earn and the culturally insensitive operational styles of many such advisors that hamper amicable cooperation with Afghan staff. The Canadian experience is that the placement of Afghan expatriate TAs (presumably with no cultural baggage) with high salaries without a phase-out scheme does not necessarily serve the intended result of capacity building. The failure of the Canadian-financed TA program can be attributed to the wrong practise of TAs undertaking national staff jobs, with little attention to the transfer of skills and capacity building for locals.

The practice of supporting line Ministries in their hiring of comparatively better-trained and competent Afghans, at a higher-than-local but lesser-than-expatriate salary, was considered more effective because it was less costly. However, there is little indication that this practice helped extend and expand capacity in any Ministry in a sustainable fashion.

Another mechanism is donor funding of 'salary top-ups' for qualified civil servants. This has produced few results in terms of sustained capacity building. The practice of salary top-up has created the 'second civil service' which is directly paid for by donors, with officials' first accountability being to the donor. It is also being increasingly realized that the better paid Afghan staff would not continue to work for the Afghan government once the top-ups ended. Utilization of these Afghan nationals might be possible if and when the salary scales are raised in the Afghan civil service structure. However, improved public finance management prioritizes fiscal sustainability, which makes large salary increases in the Afghan civil service structure unjustifiable. Other than the disease of the second civil service, higher salaries paid to externally-funded non-civil servant Afghan consultants and advisers tends to foster unfair competition that is counterproductive to the creation of a well-motivated and qualified Afghan civil service cadre. The new pay grade structure planned for the civil service is considerably higher than the existing one; however, this will never match the pay offered by the international community.

To date, the enormous gaps between local public service salaries and donor-financed second civil service

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THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nominations are invited for the 2008 Ross Munro Media Award.

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2008.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, and Matthew Fisher.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, et Matthew Fisher.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2008, and should be addressed to:

Toute personne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres de soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des écrits du journaliste. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2008, et doivent être adressées au:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 SOMERSET STREET, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 14 November 2008, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has been invited to attend as the guest of honour.

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 14 novembre 2008, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, a été invitée.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.

Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.



salaries and expatriate advisors' salaries have generated disaffection in local public servants. Such salary differences undermine the Afghan civil service and the process of public service reform.

Linked to this is the issue of donor financing of staff (both external and local) of extra-governmental units (outside of line Ministries and the public service). It is a counterproductive practice as it separates the advisors from the Ministries whose capacity should be built as the first order of business. Such extra-governmental units, not functioning under government budgets and not nationally executed, severely undermine state ownership principles. A good instance is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Ideally, the ANDS Secretariat should have been placed under a line Ministry such as the Ministry of Finance, Economy or the President's Office; the wisdom of operating a project responsible for drafting the development strategy for the Afghan nation as an UN Directly Executed Project is questionable.

...recently announced 'signature projects' are signalling a shift away from the commendable practice of supporting Afghan state-led national programs.

Reflecting on Canada's role in capacity building, the results are mixed. While some technical assistance efforts by CIDA yielded little capacity enhancement results, CIDA can take pride in supporting programs that helped the government in successfully addressing capacity building through the National Area Based Development Program that strengthened the provincial directorates of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. CIDA supported an innovative capacity building program that financed the Ministry's staff placement in the provincial governors' offices across the nation and provided the opportunity for on-the-job training. In general, the national programs designed and led by the government of Afghanistan are the best instruments to engender government officials' capacity. Donor practices of designing and implementing projects and programs through private sector firms and organizations (profit and non-profit) undermine the capacity of state actors. CIDA's record of financing national programs and thus providing the space for government staff capacity building is one of the best amongst donors.

Unfortunately, however, the recently announced 'signature projects' are signalling a shift away from the commendable practice of supporting Afghan state-led national programs. While successful capacity building in

the Afghanistan National Army by the Canadian Forces (CF) appears to be a partial reality, as a results freak I need to be convinced that similar success is evident in enhancing the capacity of the Afghan National Police or in raising Afghan awareness of the spirit and principles of Corrections Services.

This section would be incomplete without mention of the contribution made by Canada through the work in Kabul of the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) from the Department of National Defence (DND). Members of this team were placed within operational program units of the Government of Afghanistan to provide very basic organizational, management, and planning advice on day-to-day activities at the working level. This enabled Afghan government officials at operational levels to learn by doing. Through the provision of demand-driven services and the adoption of a low-key approach, SAT had earned a fair amount of success.

Before SAT could prove if it would leave a permanent imprint on the building of sustainable capacity, its life was cut short as the Canadian government took the decision to replace the DND SAT with a civilian crew. While there is the potential of the inclusion of a few of our CF colleagues in the new team, the strength of a well-disciplined commander-led team will be missed. The value added of a DND team lay in the deployment of disciplined teams, well-trained and supervised to deliver at the operational levels. Based on my personal experience, such high standards are not expected from civil servants or contracted civilian personnel, and even less encouraged. In addition, the reality is that CF personnel, for obvious reasons, are less reticent to being deployed in posts with difficult security. It has not been easy for CIDA to recruit seasoned and experienced staff for Afghanistan. On the other hand, SAT has not had a dearth of experienced officers for placement.

While acknowledging the differences in cultures of the three departments – diplomacy, defence and development – and the difficulties of coordinating a single Canadian national mission that this might cause, in the interest of best impact, more time and effort could have been devoted to the provision of assistance at the working levels of the Afghan government through the SAT. When we work in the context of enormous and unprecedented constraints, only unprecedented efforts can help us to build on our successes, however limited they are.

To conclude, I leave the reader to consider some pointed questions: does the international community have concrete indicators to measure the capacity that it expects to build in the Afghan civil service through an estimated 2,500 civilian external advisors and TAs currently moving about in Afghanistan? Has an end state been planned? ©

Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction – Is There a Faster Way?

by Keith W. Mines

(The views expressed here are the author's and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Embassy or the Department of State. – ed.)

Nation-Building – The Comeback

After a brief hiatus prior to the 9/11 attacks, nation-building is back with a vengeance. In terms of complexity, the Iraq and Afghanistan operations are more difficult than the reconstruction of Japan and Germany following the Second World War, and nation-building is increasingly seen as one of the keys to global stability in a rapidly evolving international security environment. When mid-level foreign policy professionals, for example, were asked in a recent CENSA survey to select the contemporary thinker who most closely approximates a new “Mr. X” in articulating a galvanizing theme for international security policy,¹ the winner by a clear margin was Francis Fukuyama for his recent work on state building, with Thomas Barnett and Michael Ignatieff garnering honorable mention for similar work.²

The theme was succinctly articulated in recent remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who suggested that “our greatest foreign policy challenge, now and in decades to come. . . stems from the many states that are simply too weak, too corrupt, or too poorly governed to perform even basic sovereign responsibilities like policing their territory, governing justly, enabling the potential of their people, and preventing the threats that gather within their countries from destabilizing their neighbors and ultimately, the international system.”³ Defense Secretary Robert Gates similarly singled out “new manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world,” and “failed and failing states,” as among key global challenges.⁴ Secretaries Gates and Rice went on to suggest new architecture to manage these threats.

Keith Mines was Deputy Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa. He has served with the U.S. Foreign Service in Tel Aviv, San Salvador, Port-au-Prince, and Budapest, and done short tours in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur. Mr. Mines is a former Special Forces Officer and maintains a reserve commission in the Infantry.

New Architecture: Planning, Programs, and People

This architecture has evolved from an experimental stage in 2002 to 2003 to be increasingly institutionalized, as the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission becomes embedded in U.S. international security culture and doctrine. As a first step forward in improving management of nation-building missions, the United States in 2004 formed the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the Secretary of State. It was charged to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.” The Washington-based office is inter-agency in its composition, and has a mixture of operational and policy formulation responsibilities.

Since 2004 this office has guided the new architecture for post-conflict missions in the three key areas of planning, programs, and people. In a major breakthrough in the planning arena, the U.S. has created an Interagency Management System for crisis stabilization, a system that S/CRS Coordinator John Herbst recently described as ensuring that “all civilian agencies which have some role to play, participate in formulating a plan of operations. They have a single plan . . . taking into account all civilian assets.”⁵ This ensures unity of planning in a way that was not previously possible, and the synchronization of all components who will participate in post-conflict missions.

There has also been significant progress made in reforming and developing new programs in order to better meet the unique demands of the post-conflict environment. State Department security, communications, and administration officers have worked with immense creativity in places such as Darfur to ensure that field officers are comfortable enough, and safe enough, to do their jobs (“enough” being the operative word – they have focused on applying the spirit rather than the letter of the law to make it possible for officers to deploy and function in places that would have been prohibitive several years ago). Another programmatic enhancement is the

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CALL FOR PAPERS

**11th Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium
“Canada’s Security Interests”**

**Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario
October 31st – November 1st, 2008**

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute will be hosting its 11th annual Graduate Student Symposium on “Canada’s Security Interests” on 31 October and 1 November 2008 at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston.

The symposium is conducted in collaboration with the War Studies Programme at RMC, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Queen’s University’s Defence Management Studies Programme, General Dynamics Canada, the Department of National Defence’s Security and Defence Forum, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Individuals are invited to submit a **one-page (maximum)** proposal to the CDA Institute Project Officer via projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca no later than **25 September 2008**. Please include the title of your presentation, a brief summary/abstract, and your full name, institutional affiliation, program of study, and full contact information (telephone number, email address, and mailing address)

The acceptable range of presentation topics includes: national security and defence; security and defence alliances, peace enforcement, and peace support operations; conflict resolution; security and defence related economics; intra-state conflict issues; and terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security.

Cash prizes will be awarded to the top three papers. The winning paper will be awarded the General Dynamics Canada Prize, valued at **\$3000.00**. The second and third place prizes are valued at **\$2000.00** and **\$1000.00**.

(Please note that Canadian Forces members who receive a full-time salary are not eligible to receive a cash prize. Their work will, however, be recognized, and a non-cash prize will be awarded in lieu.)

In addition, the **top five winners** at the symposium will be invited to go on a tour of NATO Headquarters in Brussels and other NATO facilities in the Netherlands and Germany in May 2009. NATO will cover the costs of the flights and hotel rooms.

Funding for student presenters may be made available, upon request, to assist with travel costs.

Proceedings from previous years’ symposia can be found at:
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Commander's Emergency Response Fund, and parallel funding given to State Department officers in Provincial Reconstruction Teams. This funding stream, developed early on in Afghanistan and now regularized, is one of the most effective tools both for getting things done on the ground and building support for the larger political objectives that underpin stability.



Keith Mines meeting with Justice and Equality Movement rebels in Jebel Moon mountains, North Darfur

However, planning and programming are not going anywhere unless we have the right people on the ground. In nation-building, showing up with the right team really is 70% of the job. The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, working on an interagency basis, has developed a three-tiered proposal to get civilians on the ground quickly in a stabilization mission. The inner core of this initiative would be 250 full-time members of an Active Response Corps (ARC) – full-time U.S. Government employees with experience in complex environments – who are trained to operate as teams and are on a rotating stand-by to deploy within 48 hours to a crisis zone. There is currently an ARC embedded in S/CRS with approximately 10 members that has conducted deployments in the past year to Darfur, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Haiti.

The second tier is the Stand-by Response Corps, up to 2,000 individuals in federal government agencies with similar skill sets to the ARC. These officers would have regular “day jobs” but have agreed to make themselves available in a crisis and to train for several weeks a year. Current planning calls for 10-25% of these individuals to be available within 45-60 days of call up, adding another 200 to 500 individuals to the mix.

The third tier was referenced by President Bush in his 2007 State of the Union address, when he urged

the establishment of a civilian reserve, to function “much like our military reserve,” thus “easing the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.” This Civilian Reserve Corps of 2,000 individuals – policemen, judges, lawyers, engineers, economists, public administrators, public health officials – would come from the private sector and state and local government. These individuals would, like the SRC, train for several weeks a year and would have a commitment to deploy for up to one year during a four year period.

Taken together, these bodies would give us the ability to deploy between 900 and 1,200 trained and equipped individuals within two months of a crisis. The initiative has been briefed to Congress and is awaiting funding.

Looking Forward

A recent Rand study suggests a direct correlation between success in nation-building and the longevity of peacekeeping missions and size of the peacekeeping force.⁶ Based on a mix of successful and unsuccessful case studies (Germany, Japan, Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Somalia) the study suggests a minimum stay of five years is needed to compel a successful result. Critics have questioned this analysis, however, arguing that in three of the cases – Kosovo, Germany, and Japan – the countries faced an existential external threat that cast the nation-builders comfortably as protectors more than occupiers. But even if one accepts that long timelines and high troop levels would be optimal for producing the conditions that lead to stability, recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Western intervention feeds the Al Qaeda narrative and they who were welcomed or at least tolerated as liberators upon arrival are increasingly cast as occupiers over time, leads inevitably to the conclusion that faster is better when it comes to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. The question is, can we move faster, or is this simply the work of a generation?

While serving as part of a governing triumvirate in the al Anbar province of Iraq in 2003-2004 with MG Swannack of the 82d Airborne Division and our Iraqi counterpart Governor Burgis, we developed a template of economic progress, public administration, security force development, and political process to guide our efforts at establishing a stable and secure environment.

Economic Development: There has been a running argument among nation-builders about whether to focus on long-term infrastructure or short-term job creation in post-conflict societies. While both are necessary over

time, the consensus among those on the ground would probably lean heavily in the direction of job creation. Analyst Michael O’Hanlon suggested that there is a need in the early phase of a transition for a massive job creation program “to reduce the number of insurgents willing to fire grenades at passing police officers, plant explosives along the routes of troops convoys, or otherwise aid and abet the insurgency.”⁷ Clearer doctrine and established programs for job creation, something akin to the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps during the Great Depression, in which thousands of young men were given government funded jobs, would go far in improving our ability to manage the economic piece of a transition.

Security: On the security side, what has struck most observers in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the *ad hoc* effort to train and equip. This was simply not something we came to these post-war situations with, and it is not something that we have developed a solid doctrine and organizational responsibilities for since. In Afghanistan the training of the entire Afghan National Army was initially the responsibility of a Special Force B team, normally staffed to train and mentor a brigade-size unit, while the initial training of the Iraqi army was contracted out. Both relied on second-hand equipment, mostly from Eastern Europe. Police training was similarly *ad hoc*, slow, and under-equipped.

These early gaps have been aggressively corrected for Afghanistan and Iraq and are, from all indications, progressing steadily, if unevenly. But we still lack the institutional means to rapidly train, equip, and mentor the full gamut of security forces in post-conflict scenarios. Standing trainers and field mentors, standing regional facilities -- akin to the Marshall Center in Germany but for large numbers of officers, NCOs and a full array of security forces – and readily available equipment streams would go a long way toward improving this key aspect of post-conflict work.

Administration: Public administration is the least sexy of the key pillars, but it is fundamental for success. It is one of the more difficult pieces to work because each country is so different: some such as Germany and Japan had a very capable public sector that just needed to be put back to work; others such as Afghanistan and Somalia lost an entire generation of public administration and were starting from scratch; most such as Bosnia and Iraq lay somewhere in-between. As with security forces there is a need for trained, organized, and experienced international civil servants to deploy to provide a kind of “shadow government,” backing up and mentoring the

newly appointed civil service until they can stand on their own. This has, to date, been handled in a very ad hoc way, perhaps best exemplified by the fact that President Karzai requested a military team to shore up his bureaucracy in Kabul, and once embedded this team became essential to the smooth functioning of government. Also useful would be an “international public administration academy” where newly minted civil servants could go for off shore training (the off shore element is important to burnishing their credentials and provides for opportunities to see new ways to do things that are not available in the home country).

Political Process: The crown jewel in post-conflict management is the political process. One can make a host of mistakes in the economy, security forces, and public administration and still recover, but a political process that does not produce a stable and supported government will undermine and ultimately eliminate progress in all other areas. Here too we have been functioning in a very *ad hoc* way, with our professionals who work on political transitions spread between a half-dozen government agencies, democratization NGOs, and academia. Political processes are, by definition, messy, and it will never be possible to manage them as one would, for example, the construction of a mess hall. But developing inter-agency teams with expertise on, for example, managing federalism, which is the *sine qua non* in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, would be helpful. There is a need for more training in political transitions for nation-builders, and much of the emerging experience in managing local political processes, such as the Anbar Awakening, could probably be better captured and institutionalized. In short, support for political processes and conflict resolution probably needs to be managed in much the same way as attacking and defending are managed in the military -- with doctrine, training, and experience.

What started as an experiment in new architecture for managing post-conflict operations has, over the past five years, become increasingly institutionalized, as these missions become embedded in U.S. national security culture and doctrine. The U.S. remains committed to continuing to improve its post-conflict capacity, and will continue to reach out to other partners such as Canada, the United Nations and likeminded countries as we tackle these challenges together.

(Endnotes)

- 1 The Council for Emerging National Security Affairs. See www.censa.net for full results.
- 2 See Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Penguin, 2004); Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty First Century* (G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2004).
- 3 Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy, Gaston Hall, Georgetown University, February 12, 2004.
- 4 Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture (Kansas State University), Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007.
- 5 John E. Herbst, On the Record Briefing, February 14, 2008, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman.
- 6 James Dobbins, ed. *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*. Rand Corporation, 2003.
- 7 Michael O'Hanlon, "We Can't Stop Rebuilding Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 24, 2006, p. 17.

Big League Problems: Recruiting and Retention Challenges in the CF Today

by Ernie Coombs

Coaches focus on getting the most out of their players, pushing them to train hard and work harder. Good Coaches go further, developing winning plays and ensuring the right players are on the field at the right time. Excellent Coaches go further still, striving to take several talented individuals and forge them into a cohesive team, able to deliver excellent results, even under difficult circumstances. Excellent Coaches win games, and they might even win seasons, but they cannot ensure the long-term sustainability of a club. For that, you need an outstanding General Manager. The General Manager does not worry about line changes or penalty-killing tactics. She or he is focused on ensuring that the team has the right facilities and equipment and is able to attract and develop the right players, so that individual games and championship seasons turn into dynasties. The Canadian Forces (CF) right now has its share of great coaching, but it is lacking in a key area of General Management: the lack of an effective recruitment and retention strategy poses a significant risk to the CF's continued operational capability.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force have each indicated in their strategic assessments for this year that the lack of an adequate number of trained human resources (sailors, soldiers, and aircrew) is their top concern. VAdm Robertson claims to have lost the equivalent of a ship's company since 2004, and by 2011 could be short by as much as 1000 personnel.¹ Similarly, LGen Watt considers "the lack of an adequate number

of personnel with the required skill set is the AF's [Air Force's] most significant challenge and its greatest risk for the foreseeable future."² LGen Leslie puts it starkly when he states, "To maintain the current output for both domestic and international operations the Army does not have enough soldiers to do all that it has to do."³

Tough Choices

These are strong words and worrying claims from senior military professionals with tough jobs to do. In their assessments, they attribute the shortfalls to a number of factors. Chief amongst them are changing demographics within the Canadian labour pool and strong demand from – and attractive financial incentives in – the private sector. It is perhaps easy to identify, and even blame, reasons that are outside one's control,⁴ but in this case, the commanders also point out a disturbing contributing factor within the CF. Transformation itself has absorbed a great number of positions, effectively pulling soldiers out of field units and placing them into new operational headquarters (such as Canadian Expeditionary Command and Canada Command), new units (such as the Canadian Special Operations Regiment) or into new project teams (such as the acquisition teams for new aircraft or new ships). As LGen Leslie indicates, "Essentially the Army can either sustain the current operational output or continue to populate our current proportions of new CF units and headquarters, but we cannot do both in the short term."⁵ The choice is stark: run or build.

Having to choose between conducting operations today or developing a headquarters to better conduct

Mr. Ernie Coombs, a pseudonym, is a friend of the CDA Institute. He is a former serving officer of the Canadian Forces. He can be reached at coombs.ernie@gmail.com

operations tomorrow is a hard choice, but hard choices are what strategic level thinking is all about. Furthermore, these choices are hardly new. The Defence component of the International Policy Statement released in 2005 made clear the need for additional personnel; moreover, it admitted that the necessary force expansion was “a major undertaking.”⁶ Even earlier than that, in 2002, the Auditor General pointed out the need for the CF to get serious about retention and recruitment.⁷ Four years later in a follow up report, the Auditor General noted that while progress had been made in terms of recruitment, the CF strategic intake plan “barely meets the needs” of the military.⁸ It was not just planning that was identified as wanting; at the level of execution, there was room for improvement. The Auditor General’s report claimed that 28% of applicants either voluntarily withdrew from the recruitment process (due to such things as lengthy delays in processing times), or more embarrassingly perhaps, were “lost” to the system because of poor record keeping.⁹ To be fair, the Department of National Defence (DND) Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) for 2007/2008 identifies the development of performance measures for recruitment and the creation of an effective contact management system as areas for improvement.¹⁰

However, as is should be clearly be understood, there is more to human resource management than recruitment. In terms of the CF strategic process, planning the force (the final step in force development) and building the force (the first step in capability production) are both vital. Without them, it is impossible to have a force that is sustainable and suited to the needs of the kinds of operations envisaged to achieve the CF’s goals. Force planning and building mean more than just recruitment: they also mean, *inter alia*, retention: keeping the people you fought to recruit into the organization, *in* the organization. In its 2007/2008 RPP, DND noted that “intake assessments indicate the current recruiting programs will not be enough to bring many critical military occupations up to strength within two years. [As such] the Canadian Forces will not be able to conduct operations with optimum effectiveness.”¹¹ Sadly, though, in terms of retention, the Auditor General noted that the CF thinking was still focused on generalities, rather than concrete plans.¹² To make matters worse, according to the DND’s 2008/2009 RPP, attrition rates for the CF in 2007/2008 were between 123% and 127% of the historical average.¹³

Bad Results

The result? An off-balance organization with recruitment, training, and retention out of sync, where gains in one area are quickly erased by losses in another. As DND stated in this year’s RPP, “despite success in

recruiting over the past few years, higher attrition has hindered the CF growth.”¹⁴ Remarkably, in the four year period 2002 to 2006, over 20,000 Canadians were recruited into the CF. Yet, the Trained Effective Strength (TES) grew by only 700 over the same period. The front door was wide open, but so was the back door. Retention strategies – crudely put, attrition management – are not working, putting undue strain on the CF and, in the end, failing to support force expansion. As the Auditor General stated bluntly in 2006, “intake is barely replacing the number of members who are leaving.”¹⁵ Without this growth, the objectives set out for the CF – the tasks assigned to it everyday in Afghanistan, in North America, and elsewhere around the world – are at risk.

Looking at one Service in particular paints a vivid picture. Comparing the Army of January 2005 with the Army of January 2008, it is possible to see that 5,000 trained soldiers left, 4,000 taking the release from the CF, and an additional 1000 moving to other non-Army positions (operational headquarters, joint or Special Operations Command units, etc). Beyond those losses though, we see that while Total Authorized Strength (TAS) of the Regular Force Army increased by over 1,200, the deployable Army – the Field Force – grew by a paltry 51 soldiers. On top of that, just when it would make sense for training schools to grow in order to meet the demand of the influx of new recruits, full-time Regular Force posts decreased by over 150. One explanation for this is the dependence the Army has developed on the Reserves (to conduct training *and* operations), as well as the use of outsourced civilian contractors to provide basic training.

Next Steps

It was time to fix the recruiting and retention problem long ago. The errors have been obvious and well pointed out by several observers. But it is not too late. Here is what the CF has to do immediately:

- **Improve recruitment practices.** Long delays and missing telephone numbers are signs of a dilettante approach to recruitment. It is a war for talent out there and you may not get a second chance to make a first impression. This does not mean diluting standards – it means getting smarter about the processes used to attract and enroll Canadians.
- **Get serious about retention.** Do what it takes to help close the gap – intelligently. Retention bonuses, merit-based sabbatical programs (where people leave for a while to pursue other goals, but then *come back*), reductions in PERSTEMPO

and other improvements in quality of service have been proven to work. Punitive measures, such as extending pension thresholds, can actually cause people to leave earlier, rather than later. Learn from the best practices of our Allies, at a program and initiative level, such as those of the United States Marine Corps and the Australian Defence Force. The RAND Corporation has studied and identified key lesson in this area. Research them, hire them, learn them, apply them.

- **Protect The Investment.** Bad retention wastes money. An EME officer, with an average classification attrition rate of 6%, costs \$200,000 and 7 years to train. After 7 years, 35% of those officers leave the CF. Find out why and try and address it. There is no excuse for merely ‘thinking about’ exit surveys anymore.¹⁶
- **Focus on Individuals.** Like it or not, it is individuals who join, individuals who leave, and individuals who need to be convinced to stay. Be creative and do not take it personally when newer generations of soldiers, sailors, and aircrew have different priorities and values than senior and general officers. Do not measure a person’s curiosity about other opportunities outside the

CF as disloyalty. Investigate the issue and design a tailor-made program to fulfill that curiosity. Retention needs individual career management to be effective.

- **Build first, run second.** Prioritisation, Sequencing, and Preparing Conditions for Success: these are strategic skills. As difficult as it may seem, it is clearly not possible to create organizations, buy and train on new equipment, and conduct the largest military operation for over half a century *all at exactly the same time*. To do so would require a level of national mobilization – in all senses of that word – that is simply not realistic.

Perhaps it is possible to combine the intensity and drive of coaching with the wisdom and determination of managing. Tom Landry, the legendary coach of the Dallas Cowboys, displayed just that when he said, “Setting a goal is not the main thing. It is deciding how you will go about achieving it and staying with that plan.” So too did college basketball coaching sensation Bobby Knight: “The will to win is not nearly as important as the will to prepare to win.” Here’s hoping that those coaching and managing the CF can make those decisions and harness that will. ©

(Endnotes)

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A Need for a Medical Transitional Service

by Lieutenant-Commander (Ret'd) Heather MacKinnon

I am writing as a former medical officer who has served in both the Regular and Reserve Forces. I have a unique general practice in Halifax which is composed of former military and RCMP members and their spouses. I formed my practice in this way as I have discovered that there is a definite need for a medical transitional service for both Regular and Reserve Force personnel who have left or who are leaving the Canadian Forces.

The majority of these patients are from the local area but some live several hours away. I follow them by telephone and planned visits. Some have transferred from other provinces back to Nova Scotia. They come from all elements. It is important to note that not all released personnel qualify for Veterans Affairs pensions. These patients are referred to me from CFB Halifax, 12 Wing, 14 Wing, Veterans Affairs, by word of mouth or by other family physicians that need assistance in dealing with these unique people.

Many of these patients have multiple medical problems and were medically released. They take a lot of time. Former military patients, especially if medically released, come with a lot of paper baggage, that is, multiple forms to be completed. Family physicians just do not have time or expertise to fill out these forms. Often they are done in haste and not to the benefit of the member.

I see numerous patients with Occupational Stress Injuries (OSI). The majority of these patients were well looked after while in the CF but after time they no longer have communication with or receive treatment from military Occupational Trauma Support and Stress Centre (OTSSC) clinics. Some have been on the same medication for a very long time. The medication is no longer effective. There are no designated psychiatrists in Nova Scotia to care for these patients. There are, however, some very qualified psychologists that I do work with. Patients suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have other medical issues. There are side effects from

the medication that need to be monitored. These patients develop other medical problems such as hypertension, diabetes and obesity. They need regular health care follow up.

Patients leaving the military with other diagnoses also require regular follow up. I have seen patients who were released with enough medication for only one or two months. They were unable to find a family physician in time to refill their medications so just did without. This is not a good situation for someone with diabetes or heart disease. There are those that have served many years and reach retirement age. These people deserve the same good care that they received in the CF. A transitional service would allow them the type of medical care they need until a family physician could be found for them.

The situation regarding Reserve Forces is even more complex. They may or may not have a family physician. Often these young persons go to a walk-in clinic or go to university health services. If they are returning from a deployment such as Afghanistan they will lose their full time Class B status and be back in the provincial system. Upon return they will spend some time on leave and then go back to being part time Class A if they decide to stay with their previous units. They will have had a post-deployment medical but not all medical problems will have been recognized in the time allotted to follow them. Too many illnesses, whether physical or mental, are not recognized right away. These Reserve members need follow up for a minimum of five years.

My recommendation is to stand up medical transitional services across the country. These would be places or perhaps just recognized family physicians where released Regular members or Reserve members could go to in order to obtain direct and efficient medical care. Transitional services mean just that. It is a service supplied by designated physicians and staff that would allow members to continue with the same quality of medical care that they received in the CF. It would be only for a short time until they could be handed over to other civilian physicians who would be willing to take them on as patients.

With the support of RUSI NS I was able to present a letter with my recommendations to the Minister of Veterans Affairs in July 2007. I was invited to present my recommendations to the Liberal Caucus in August 2008. In February 2008, as a guest of Mr. Peter Stouffer, I presented to members representing the Standing Committee on

Lieutenant-Commander Heather MacKinnon has served in Somalia, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. She also served aboard HMCS Toronto in the Persian Gulf in 1998 and aboard HMCS Halifax in 2002 during Op Apollo. Lieutenant-Commander MacKinnon retired from the CF and currently operates a private practice specializing in treatment for retired military and RCMP personnel. Lieutenant-Commander Mackinnon is the Medical Officer and a Director of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

Veterans Affairs. Following that presentation my letter to the Minister of Veterans Affairs was circulated to the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs.

There have been some positive results. A

teleconference composed of members from Veterans Affairs and DND was held in April 2008. The idea of instituting medical transitional services was discussed. The group has agreed to look further into the matter and to look for solutions to this problem.

The Gregg Centre

by Dr. Lee Windsor

It's a centre of excellence that studies war, conflict and society in the search, ultimately, for understanding and – with luck – peace.

That's the mandate of *The Brigadier Milton F.*

The Gregg Connection

Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, personifies the goals of the University of New Brunswick's (UNB) Centre for the Study of War and Society.

Milton Gregg came from King's County, New Brunswick. He was decorated for courage and leadership under fire with the Military Cross and Bar while serving with the Royal Canadian Regiment during the First World War. On Sept. 28, 1918, in the midst of fierce fighting in the Marcoing Line during the final "100 Days Campaign," then Lieutenant Gregg won the Victoria Cross, the nation's highest award for valour. He returned to active service in 1939, where his abilities were applied by training infantry officers for combat duty in the Second World War.

Brigadier Gregg is best remembered at UNB as the institution's president, serving from 1944-47. He successfully accommodated the flood of demobilizing soldiers at the end of the Second World War. His administrative skill and reputation led to his election as Member of Parliament for York-Sunbury and appointment to federal cabinet, where he continued his service to the nation as Minister of Fisheries and then Veterans Affairs. His political career evolved into duty with the United Nations in Iraq, Indonesia and New York, and as Canadian high commissioner to British Guiana. Throughout his public service, the Honourable Milton Gregg remained a staunch protector of New Brunswick's environment and heritage sites.

Dr. Lee Windsor is a former Intern with the CDA Institute. He is Deputy Director, Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, University of New Brunswick

Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society on the Fredericton campus of the University of New Brunswick (UNB).

Officially established in 2006, The Gregg Centre, named in honour of New Brunswick's most distinguished soldier and a former president of UNB (see sidebar), builds on a program of excellence in teaching, publishing and public education that began at UNB in 1971.

Its objective is to increase awareness of the cause, course and consequence of armed conflict and how it shapes our world, as well as find ways to prevent conflict, and restore civil society in the aftermath of war. As the Canadian centre for the academic study of war as a broad and complex phenomenon, the centre aims to stimulate scholarly dialogue among academics, military personnel and civilian practitioners, and become a major contributor to informed public debate.

The Centre's strengths are manifold and diverse: internationally recognized undergraduate and graduate programs in military history; internationally recognized faculty specializing in peacekeeping, modern stability building, terrorism, intelligence, and military and naval history; a commitment to a broad-based interdisciplinary program; the Journal for Conflict Studies, a scholarly journal specializing in contemporary conflict; innovative teaching, including battlefield study tours, field trips and contact with modern armed forces; The Canadian Army Project, the only civilian academic research project focused on the modern Canadian Army; and The New Brunswick Military Heritage Project, a model for heritage preservation, outreach and publications on local history.

But all of this hasn't come out of nowhere, said Dr. Marc Milner, the centre's director.

"For nearly 40 years, UNB has been on the cutting edge of teaching, research and publishing on the complex and difficult subject of modern war," said Dr. Milner. "In 1971, UNB bucked the trend on Canadian campuses when Prof. Dominick Graham introduced the study of military history. In a time when anti-war sentiments dominated university life, UNB developed a modern and highly



Lieutenant Milton F. Gregg, VC (c. 1918)

sophisticated way of looking at the hard core of war, the combat operations of armed forces.”

From this foundation, UNB launched another bold initiative in 1980 with the establishment of the Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS), the first such centre in Canada devoted to the study of modern terrorism. As part of that initiative, the CCS established *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, specifically addressing the problems terrorism poses for liberal democratic societies.

All these threads were then brought together in 2006 under the umbrella of the Gregg Centre.

Teaching remains at the core of the centre’s activities. The Gregg Centre includes internationally-recognized strengths in military history, peacekeeping, terrorism, intelligence, and Canadian military and naval history applied at the undergraduate and graduate (masters and doctoral) levels. At the same time, the centre is committed to the development of a broader, interdisciplinary program.

Apart from excellence in the classroom, the Gregg Centre program is noted for putting students in contact with the modern Canadian Forces, and for a commitment to offsite activities, from research in distant archives, to conference participation, Model NATO and UN simulations, and battlefield study tours in Canada and abroad. The latter have included visits to Fort Beausejour near Sackville, N.B., for a closer look at the 1755 battle, the subsequent Acadian deportation, and the fort’s role in the infamous Eddy Rebellion, to tours of European historical sites ranging from Normandy to Italy. Some

of the European tours are open to the public as well as students.

The centre also engages the community outside UNB at all levels. This includes providing information to governments, the public and media, and an outreach program of public lectures, conferences, talks to schools and service clubs, consultations, the work of the New Brunswick Military Heritage Project (NBMHP) and the Annual Dominick Graham Lecture in War and Society. Interaction with the Canadian Forces is a strong component of the public education program.

The NBMHP offers a website (www.unb.ca/nbmhp) designed to inform the general public of the remarkable military heritage of New Brunswick, and to stimulate further research, education and publication in the field. Hand-in-hand with the website is the NBMHP’s book series, co-published with Goose Lane Editions, which covers topics about N.B.’s military heritage, ranging from the Fenians of the colonial era to the North Shore Regiment on D-Day and afterward.

Earlier this year, the Centre mounted on its website its latest initiative: a web portal to detailed information about Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sudan, each a focal point for Canadian and international assistance. Canada’s largest and most visible foreign and defence policy efforts in the past 20 years have been in providing security, governance and assistance to rebuild countries torn apart by war.

Canadian efforts in these countries are not well publicized or understood. This project will draw attention to the international assistance providers and international aid and development programs in selected troubled regions and it will also promote public discussion and awareness on these topics.

The website (www.unb.ca/greggcentre) was launched with a case study on Afghanistan, the Kosovo site is now up, and Sudan will soon follow. The information provided includes hotlinks to key sites, including a map of the country, a profile of the nation, background of the current conflict, agreements, stability operations, aid, Canada’s role, independent studies, media coverage and photos.

“Our desire is to inform,” said Dr. Milner. “The Gregg Centre does not endorse the views contained in any of these sources, but they have been selected for the range of views they represent or for the accuracy of their information. Together they provide a one-stop shopping approach for information on the history of conflict in these countries, and the efforts of the international community to help restore peace.”

Also on the horizon is the centre’s previously announced research Chair in Climate Change and Conflict (C3).

“This is a key component of the Gregg Centre’s plan to expand the disciplinary and methodological approach to the study of war,” said Dr. Milner. “It is also another milestone: the C3 Chair is the first of its kind in the world to deal with global warming and its relationship to conflict.”

And finally, the Centre will publish a major book later this year on the deployment of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, to Afghanistan in 2007. The book is based on extensive research, interviews and my observations during a trip to Afghanistan last year.

At times over the past 40 years, the military studies program has been the target of protest from those who believe it in some way glorifies war.

“The centre’s work in this sensitive and often controversial field of research has drawn its share of

critics, and it will continue to do so,” said Dr. Milner. “War is an unsettling subject. But it is also too important to leave unstudied.

“One of the centre’s core values is that we accept and support the basic values of a liberal democratic society, including the rule of law, the dominance of civil over military authority, the importance of a functioning civil society and the right to dissent.

“The Gregg Centre remains committed to excellence in graduate and undergraduate teaching, scholarship and public outreach established by its predecessors, and to fostering informed public debate on this complex and difficult subject.”

For more information about The Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society, please visit www.unb.ca/greggcentre. ©

Book reviews

by Arnav Manchanda




“Countering Insurgency and Promoting Democracy”

Edited by Manolis Priniotakis
Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2008.
www.censa.net
\$20
335 pages

This substantial volume from the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA) attempts to provide analysis of the various components of counter-insurgency and democracy promotion. It is a collection of essays by mid-career professionals that aims to move the study of these two phenomena out of the realm of theory and into practice.

The range of topics addressed by the volume is impressive. The military and security section focuses on the use of special operations forces, the lessons learned from US operations in Vietnam, the mistakes made in Iraq during the first two years of occupation, and the utility of civil affairs and private industry in such ventures. The volume then turns to politics and governance, emphasizing the necessity of the rule of law, the role of NGOs, and the place of the military in good governance. The section on economy and finance stresses the importance of economic



development, markets and the private sector, and a chapter on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) analyses the debate surrounding these new constructs. The final part addresses questions of culture and society by analyzing what true liberal democracy entails, provides a fascinating chapter on the use of tribes and kinship in

counter-insurgency in Iraq, and draws lessons from the current mission in Afghanistan and past intervention in El Salvador.

The volume does a commendable job in attempting to cover and provide insight into the complexities involved in countering insurgency and promoting democracy. Its strength lies in addressing the various facets and providing often-conflicting viewpoints on how to best manage work in those fields.

However, the volume fails to provide enough of a theoretical underpinning to bring some sense of order to the lessons provided by the various sections and individual authors. It does not create a framework to evaluate what different kinds of interventions in different contexts will entail. It does not define clear ‘end states’ and then work backwards from them to provide policy avenues to achieve those goals.

For a volume that promised to provide policy recommendations from the field, the majority of the

Arnav Manchanda is the Department of National Defence’s Security and Defence Forum intern with the CDA Institute for the year 2007-2008. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in political science from McGill University.

chapters tend to fall into timeworn accounts of democracy promotion and counter-insurgency in theory and history. Some of the chapters provide interesting meat while others provide only sparse tidbits. The volume provides no single chapter that provides a unique perspective that could only have been gleaned from time spent on the ground. It lacks the sort of narrative provided by, for example, Rory Stewart's *The Prince of the Marshes*, where the author details in vivid detail his activities as a provincial governor in Iraq.

Finally, the study lacks adequate discussion on the criticism that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not preceded by rigorous planning for the post-conflict situation, and does not put forth any lessons that could be learnt from those experiences. The volume's chapters and recommendations are almost entirely reactive and driven by situations on the ground, and do not provide long-term planning proposals to deal with the next intervention or to evaluate whether democracy promotion and counter-insurgency can, as the volume's title suggests, occur in tandem. More examination of the fundamental assumptions that are contained in the volume would have been of greater value.

“Ghost Wars”

By Steve Coll

Paperback, www.amazon.ca, \$14.60, Penguin Paperbacks, 2004



738 pages

“The Bin Ladens”

By Steve Coll

Hardcover, www.amazon.ca, \$24.26, Penguin Press, 2008

688 pages



Both *Ghost Wars* and *The Bin Ladens* by Pulitzer Prize winner Steve Coll prove to be lengthy but surprisingly clear and uncluttered tomes that should be on the reading list of anyone who follows the war on terror and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Despite both books clocking in at more than 600 pages each, they are fascinating page-turners that kept this reader up for many a late night.

Ghost Wars, despite being published in 2004,

remains topical today. It details the nexus between Afghan *mujahedeen*, Pakistani military and intelligence, and international backers such as the United States from the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 up until September 10, 2001. This provides a rich background to the current conflict in that country. It also details the difficulties faced by Western intelligence in facing its Taliban and Al Qaeda adversaries, with some of the most intriguing chapters detailing the tracking of Osama bin Laden and clandestine dealings between the intelligence services of the US and Pakistan with Afghan fighters.

The Bin Ladens, published this year, chronicles the 20th century rise of the Bin Laden family, from humble beginnings in the deserts of Yemen to one of the wealthiest and most influential business families in Saudi Arabia, and having one of their offspring become one of the world's most wanted fugitives. The book jumps between several key members of the Bin Laden family, starting with the family patriarch Mohammed Bin Laden and his son Salem, and other fascinating characters including Yeslam, Khalil, and, of course, Osama. What emerges is both the tight-knit nature of a sprawling clan – despite being full of half-siblings and multiple wives – and the disparate nature of their personalities and activities. While some were involved in various shades of business activity, others preferred lives of funding charities or *jihad* or a life of no work at all. Some flitted (and continue to flit, presumably) around the United States and Europe, living and spending lavishly. The book also describes the penchant for flying held by many Bin Ladens, with Mohammed and Salem both dying in plane crashes and Osama planning suicide attacks with airliners.

The book provides insight into some important questions, such as the actual extent of the fortune of the Bin Laden family and the links between Osama and his siblings, despite the latter having publicized their split from him. It also offers an intriguing look at the extensive patronage and personal links between the Saudi royal family and the Bin Ladens. Discussion of the spending and personal habits of the Saudi royals, the social mores and customs of high Saudi society, and the relationship between the Bin Ladens and their Western colleagues and friends are some of the more fascinating parts of the book.

In both monographs Coll manages to combine deep political analysis and research, anecdotes, readability and elements of thriller movies into what should be background reading for any analyst, government official or interested member of the public. They are highly recommended for bringing clarity to critical subjects in international affairs that are often riddled with hearsay, rumour and half-truths. ©



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