



## DEDICATION

*Commander (Retd) John Robin Corneil, OMM, CD*

*1937 - 2000*

The profession of arms in Canada recently lost one of its most dedicated members and advocates. He will be remembered by his brother officers and fellow colleagues as an innovative thinker and outstanding scholar during his distinguished service in the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Armed Forces from 1954 until 1992.

He took pride in his appointment as Program Co-ordinator in the national office of Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He threw himself into his duties with gusto, despite failing health, and was working actively preparing the Institute's 16<sup>th</sup> annual seminar when he died. He brought to the Institute two indispensable qualities: knowledge of purpose and concern about the welfare of the individual service persons in the Canadian Armed Forces; and a fierce passion for the profession of arms.

He understood and appreciated the worth of the officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Armed Forces, and when denigrating the military was "in vogue" in the post-Somalia era he stood among his peers to defend them. Such was Robin Corneil's outspokenness, his respect for others, and his ability to make those with whom he came in contact aware of *their* importance to the task at hand.

Service, courage, dedication, and fair dealing. Robin Corneil personified these virtues to the highest degree, and set a standard for those to follow. Let his memory inspire all of us to pursue these ideals as we strive to make our profession, and our country, better.

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## HOMAGE

*Capitaine de frégate (ret)*  
*John Robin Corneil, OMM, CD*

*1937 - 2000*

La profession des armes au Canada a récemment perdu l'un de ses membres et défenseurs les plus dévoués. Ses compagnons d'armes et ses collègues se souviendront de lui comme d'un innovateur et d'un remarquable érudit qui a servi avec distinction dans la Marine royale du Canada et les Forces canadiennes, de 1954 à 1992.

Il était fier de sa nomination au poste de coordonnateur de programme au bureau national de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Malgré sa santé défaillante, il s'est attelé à la tâche avec enthousiasme et il travaillait activement à la préparation du 16<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel de l'Institut au moment de son décès. Il a apporté à l'Institut deux qualités indispensables : sa détermination et son souci du bien-être de chaque militaire au sein des Forces canadiennes, ainsi qu'une ardente passion pour la profession des armes.

Il comprenait et connaissait la valeur des officiers et des militaires du rang des Forces canadiennes et, lorsqu'il est devenu « à la mode » de dénigrer les Forces par suite des opérations en Somalie, il s'est montré solidaire de ses pairs et les a défendus. Tels étaient la franchise de Robin Corneil, son respect des autres et sa capacité de faire sentir à ceux avec qui il entrait en rapport leur propre importance relativement à la tâche à accomplir.

Service, courage, dévouement et équité. Robin Corneil était l'incarnation par excellence de ces vertus et il constitue un modèle pour ceux qui prendront la relève. Que son souvenir nous inspire tous à poursuivre ces idéaux tandis que nous nous efforçons d'améliorer notre profession et de faire de notre pays un meilleur endroit où vivre.

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## MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

### “THE WAY AHEAD”

*Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, CMM, CD*

As the new Chairman of CDA, I welcome this opportunity to communicate with CDA associations, individual members of the CDA Institute, and others in the pro-defence community who peruse *On Track*. At the recent CDA Annual General Meeting in Ottawa, I stated that I was delighted and honored to be elected to this position, and that I would continue the important work undertaken by my predecessors. I also reminded the audience that although CDA deals with matters of defence

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute, a self-supporting entity within CDA, is dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

Les questions de défense sont portées à l'attention du public par le truchement d'analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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#### *Officers - Institut de la CAD*

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Colonel (Retd) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD

## MESSAGE DU PRÉSIDENT

### « LA VOIE À SUIVRE »

*Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, CMM, CD*

En tant que nouveau président de la CAD, je suis heureux d'avoir l'occasion de communiquer avec les associations de la Conférence, les membres de l'Institut de la CAD et d'autres intervenants de la collectivité pro-défense qui sont de fidèles lecteurs de la revue *On Track*. Lors de la récente assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD, tenue à Ottawa, j'ai déclaré que j'étais enchanté et honoré d'avoir été élu à ce poste et que je poursuivrais les importants travaux entrepris par mes prédécesseurs. J'ai également rappelé à l'auditoire que, même si la CAD traite des questions de politique de défense au niveau national, nous ne devons jamais oublier que les éléments les plus importants de l'équation sont les hommes et les femmes qui servent dans les unités de la Force régulière et de la Réserve des Forces canadiennes. À tour de rôle, ils protègent et défendent les intérêts et le bien-être de leurs concitoyens canadiens. Afin de mener à bien cette mission, ils doivent disposer des outils nécessaires à leur travail, et il incombe au gouvernement de veiller à ce que ces outils leur soient remis. La CAD doit continuer sa campagne dans les domaines public et politique afin d'insister pour que le budget du MDN soit augmenté, ce qui permettra de revitaliser et de moderniser les FC.

Au-delà de la question financière, il sera également nécessaire de réparer les préjudices causés à la culture particulière des FC, qui est basée sur le sens du devoir et l'abnégation, principe essentiel d'une organisation militaire professionnelle. La CAD a agi en tant que chef de file dans la campagne visant à donner l'alarme au sujet du processus de la soi-disant « démilitarisation », et je suggère qu'elle poursuive cette mission, tout en fournissant des conseils sur des solutions. À cet égard, j'ai hâte de tenir des discussions et des échanges d'idées avec le ministre de la Défense nationale ainsi que des officiers et des cadres supérieurs du MDN. Je réitérerai notre appui, mais je parlerai aussi du rôle joué par la CAD au chapitre de la critique constructive au cours des 68 dernières années.

En d'autres termes, je crois que la CAD devrait garder le cap qu'elle a choisi au milieu des changements rapides survenus au cours de la dernière décennie. Le budget fédéral de l'an 2000 marquera un grand tournant pour l'avenir des Forces canadiennes. Si d'importants fonds supplémentaires sont réinvestis dans le MDN, comme la CAD l'a vivement conseillé dans des lettres envoyées au Premier ministre et à des députés ainsi que dans le cadre de comités parlementaires, le processus de reprise pourra alors commencer. Dans le cas contraire, les Forces canadiennes trouveront de plus en plus difficile d'être une organisation militaire viable et apte au combat. Dans les deux cas, le travail de la CAD sur les plans de l'information publique et de la prestation de conseils au gouvernement demeurera primordial.

Enfin, je dois rappeler à tous que la CAD et l'Institut de la CAD ne peuvent accomplir leur travail essentiel sans le solide appui financier de leurs membres. Je lance donc un défi aux associations et aux particuliers en vue d'élargir la base de financement de notre organisation de façon que les travaux indispensables puissent se poursuivre. Après tout, nous sommes « la voix de la défense », et beaucoup de personnes comptent sur nous pour défendre leurs intérêts et, en bout de ligne, ceux de tous les Canadiens. J'ai hâte de rencontrer un grand nombre d'entre vous au cours de l'année qui vient.

#### *Companions of CDAI*

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policy at the national level, we must never forget that the most important people in the equation are the men and women who serve in the units of the Canadian Armed Forces – both Regulars and Reserves. In turn, they guard and advance the interests and well being of their fellow citizens of Canada. To do this properly, they need the tools to do their job and it is incumbent on government to ensure that these tools are placed in their hands. Obviously this has not occurred over the past decade, and CDA must continue its campaign in the public and political domains to urge that the DND budget be increased, and subsequent action taken to rehabilitate the armed forces.

Beyond the question of money, it will also be necessary to repair the damage done to the unique ethos, based on duty and service before self, which is the essence of a professional military organization. CDA has been a leader in the campaign to sound a warning regarding this process of so-called “demilitarization,” and I propose that this continue, together with the presentation of advice regarding solutions. In this respect, I look forward to personal discussions and exchanges of ideas with the Minister of National Defence and senior officers and officials of DND. I shall reiterate our support, but also remark on the role of constructive criticism performed by CDA over the past sixty-eight years.

In other words, I believe that CDA should stay the course it has undertaken in the midst of rapid change in the past decade. The federal Budget for 2000 will mark a major watershed for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces. If significant additional funds are reinvested in DND, as was strongly advised by CDA in letters to the Prime Minister, Members of Parliament, and at parliamentary committees, then the recovery process can commence. If sufficient funding does not materialize, then the Canadian Armed Forces will cease to be a viable combat-capable military organization. In both cases, CDA’s work of public information and advice to government will continue to be crucial.

Finally, I must remind everyone that CDA and CDA Institute cannot perform their vital work without strong financial support from their members. I therefore issue a challenge to associations and individuals to broaden the base of funding within our organization so that the vital work may continue. After all, we are “The Voice of Defence,” and many people depend upon us to represent their interests, and ultimately the interests of all Canadians. I look forward to meeting many of you in the year ahead.

## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

*Colonel (Retd) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD*

We dedicate this edition of *ON TRACK* to the memory of a friend and colleague firmly committed to the profession of arms, Commander John Robin Corneil, OMM, CD, who passed away in January, shortly before CDA held its 16<sup>th</sup> annual seminar to which he contributed much energy in its preparation. Robin always carried out his duties as Program Co-ordinator with enthusiasm and encouraged others to contribute their talents to the successful efforts of the Institute in its quest to communicate with the defence community of this nation. His presence amongst us will be missed but his memory will be a treasure for us as we continue the work that he has done.

Our 16<sup>th</sup> annual seminar, which was held on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January, had as its theme *Parliament and the Military*, reflecting the democratic principle that national defence in Canada is tied firmly to political oversight. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Sean Henry, presents the readers of *ON TRACK* with a summary of the seminar which was very well attended. The day was filled with prominent speakers from a variety of backgrounds, both military and civilian, including the CDS, Général Maurice Baril, from the academic to the political. In his review, Sean brings out some important points for our readers to note - especially when they raise the subject of defence and national security with their member of Parliament. The feedback that we have received from the seminar, thus far, is very positive. The most consistent remark being that the seminar was the best in years. The challenge is there for us to maintain the level of professional interest in our work. We can do this but only with your support and continued membership in the CDA Institute.

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## DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

*Colonel A. Pellerin, OMM, CD*

Nous dédions le présent numéro de *ON TRACK* à la mémoire d’un ami et collègue fermement engagé envers la profession des armes, le capitaine de frégate John Robin Corneil, OMM, CD, qui est décédé en janvier, peu avant la tenue du 16<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel de la CAD, à la préparation duquel il a contribué très énergiquement. Robin a toujours rempli ses fonctions de coordonnateur de programme avec enthousiasme et il encourageait les autres à mettre leurs talents à contribution dans le cadre des efforts fructueux déployés par l’Institut pour communiquer avec la collectivité de défense du pays. Sa présence nous manquera, mais son souvenir demeurera bien vivant tandis que nous poursuivrons le travail qu’il a entrepris.

Notre 16<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel, qui a eu lieu le 27 janvier, avait pour thème *Le Parlement et les Forces*, qui reflétait le principe démocratique selon lequel la défense nationale au Canada est fermement liée à la surveillance politique. Notre analyste de défense principal, Sean Henry, présente aux lecteurs de *ON TRACK* un résumé du séminaire, qui a attiré un très grand nombre de participants. La journée a consisté en une suite d’exposés donnés par d’éminents conférenciers qui venaient de divers milieux, tant militaires que civils, et qui offraient une perspective aussi bien universitaire que politique. Soulignons entre autres la participation du CEMD, le général Maurice Baril. Dans son analyse, Sean met en évidence certains points importants dont nos lecteurs doivent tenir compte – en particulier lorsqu’ils abordent le sujet de la défense et de la sécurité nationale avec leur député. Jusqu’à maintenant, la rétroaction que nous avons reçue au sujet du séminaire

*(voir p. 4)*

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### **Donateurs de l’iCAD - niveau d’officier**

The annual CDAI seminar was held in conjunction with the 63<sup>rd</sup> Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations at the Château Laurier Hotel, 26 - 28 January, 2000. The AGM commenced with a meeting of the CDA Council Wednesday evening and carried on with the general meeting Friday. As Executive Director I congratulate the membership for its endorsement in the appointment of Lieutenant-Général Charles Belzile as the new chairman. The AGM concluded with a meeting of the council, followed by a mess dinner in the Army Officers Mess.

In addition to keeping the readers of *ON TRACK* informed as to the activities of CDA and CDA Institute it is important that we bring our readers articles that are topical and thought-provoking. Certainly a current topic is that of accountability. Here, Peter Kasurak takes a look at this year's report from the Auditor General in *Is the Defence Glass Half Empty or Half Full?* His article is very straight-forward, pulling no punches, but examines accountability within the Department of National Defence. Peter allows - in fact, forces - the reader to draw some sobering conclusions about where the Department is heading. Another area that deserves more attention these days is the revolution in military affairs (RMA) - a subject, I fear - about which very few Canadians are familiar. Sean Henry enlightens us with his perspective on RMA and where the Canadian Armed Forces may be heading with RMA. The consequences for the CF of being left behind in RMA are not a pleasant thought, but must be considered in the light of Sean's article, *The Canadian Armed Forces and the RMA*.

As a tribute to the fine writing that flowed from the pen of our late friend, Robin Corneil, we are pleased to repeat his very honest, pointed article, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: the Profession of Arms in Canada*. Robin's fine article appeared in an earlier edition of *ON TRACK*. His message merits another reading by those who have a sincere interest in recognizing and promoting the profession of arms in Canada. In another article we are pleased to include in this issue a review of the book *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power*, written by Joseph T. Jockel and reviewed by a friend of the Institute, Lieutenant-Général (Retd) R. J. Evraire. Général Evraire's account of Jockel's work provides our readers with good reasons why more Canadians should be concerned with how Government interacts with the military. Général Evraire's review of the book is timely, given the subject of our most recent seminar, *Parliament and the Military*. Finally, we have Captain Peter Forsberg's continuing memoir of his Bosnia-Herzegovina experience with the United Nations Protection Force. His article portrays the commencement of his second tour of duty, this time in Sector Southwest Headquarters.

One of the more significant events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. The presentation takes place in November at a gala dinner that will be held at the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa. To make the award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for the award's recipient. CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate to the Institute. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

#### ON TRACK

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In closing I wish to remind our readers that without your continued support the national office cannot carry on the important work of CDA and CDA Institute. Your support in the past is paying off -

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est très favorable, le commentaire le plus courant étant que ce séminaire s'est révélé le meilleur à avoir été tenu depuis des années. C'est à nous de maintenir le niveau d'intérêt professionnel pour notre travail. Nous ne pouvons le faire qu'avec votre soutien et votre adhésion continue à l'Institut de la CAD (ICAD).

Le séminaire annuel de l'ICAD a été tenu en même temps que la 63<sup>e</sup> assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense, qui a eu lieu à l'hôtel Château Laurier, du 26 au 28 janvier 2000. L'AGA a débuté par une réunion du Conseil de la CAD le mercredi soir et s'est poursuivie par l'assemblée générale le vendredi. En tant que directeur exécutif, je félicite les membres d'avoir approuvé la nomination du lieutenant-général Charles Belzile au poste de président. L'AGA s'est terminée par une réunion du Conseil, suivi d'un dîner militaire au mess des officiers de l'Armée.

En plus de tenir les lecteurs de *ON TRACK* au courant des activités de la CAD et de l'ICAD, il est important que nous leur présentions des articles d'actualité qui favorisent la réflexion. La reddition de comptes fait assurément partie de cette catégorie. Dans son article intitulé *Le verre de la Défense est-il à moitié vide ou à moitié plein?*, Peter Kasurak examine le rapport du vérificateur général de cette année. Cet article est très direct et sans complaisance, mais il examine la reddition de comptes au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale. Peter permet - en fait, oblige - le lecteur à tirer certaines conclusions qui donnent à réfléchir au sujet de la direction que prend le Ministère. Un autre domaine qui mérite davantage d'attention ces jours-ci est la révolution dans les affaires militaires (RAM), sujet que, je le crains, très peu de Canadiens connaissent bien. Sean Henry nous éclaire en nous donnant son point de vue sur la RAM et sur l'orientation éventuelle des Forces canadiennes à ce chapitre. Les conséquences pour les FC d'être laissées pour compte dans la RAM ne sont pas une perspective réjouissante, mais doivent être envisagées à la lumière de l'article de Sean, intitulé *The Canadian Armed Forces and the RMA*.

En hommage aux excellents écrits de feu notre ami, Robin Corneil, nous sommes heureux de republier son article très honnête et significatif, intitulé *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: the Profession of Arms in Canada*, qui avait déjà paru dans un numéro antérieur de *ON TRACK*. Son message mérite une seconde lecture de la part de ceux qui ont vraiment à cœur la reconnaissance et la promotion de la profession des armes au Canada. Vous trouverez aussi dans le présent numéro un article rédigé par un ami de l'Institut, le lieutenant-général (retraité) R.J. Evraire, dans lequel est présentée une critique du livre intitulé *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power*, de Joseph T. Jockel. Le compte rendu du général Evraire sur l'ouvrage de Jockel fait part à nos lecteurs de bonnes raisons pour lesquelles davantage de Canadiens devraient se préoccuper de la façon dont le gouvernement interagit avec les forces militaires. Cette critique tombe à point, étant donné le sujet de notre plus récent séminaire, *Le Parlement et les Forces*. Enfin, le capitaine Peter Forsberg nous présente la suite de ses mémoires sur son expérience en Bosnie-Herzégovine auprès de la Force de protection des Nations Unies. Son article décrit le début de sa deuxième affectation, cette fois au quartier général du secteur sud-ouest.

L'un des événements spéciaux à être inscrits au calendrier de l'ICAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien qui a contribué de façon significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. La remise du prix a lieu en novembre, lors d'un dîner de gala à l'hôtel Château Laurier, à Ottawa. Pour que ce prix prenne tout son sens, l'Institut a besoin de votre participation. Nous encourageons donc les associations et les particuliers qui sont membres de la CAD à présenter le candidat de leur choix à l'Institut. Veuillez vous reporter à l'avis d'appel de candidatures qui figure plus loin dans ce numéro.

(voir p. 5)

CDA is gaining recognition with Canadian decision-makers and CDA is becoming more relevant to the defence and national security constituency of Canada. We are winning - the momentum is there but **your continued financial support as members of the Institute is vital** to the success of the mission to speak as the Voice of Defence. Do not let the Voice of Defence become silent - please renew your membership when you are asked and better still, recruit a friend to the Institute.

En conclusion, j'aimerais rappeler à nos lecteurs que, sans leur appui continu, le bureau national ne peut poursuivre les importants travaux de la CAD et de l'ICAD. L'appui fourni par le passé porte ses fruits – la CAD est de plus en plus reconnue par les décideurs canadiens et elle revêt une importance grandissante pour le secteur et de la défense et de la sécurité nationale du Canada. Nous sommes en train de gagner la partie – l'impulsion est donnée, mais **votre soutien financier continu à titre de membres de l'Institut est indispensable** au succès de la mission visant à faire entendre la voix de la défense. Ne laissez pas cette voix s'éteindre – renouvez votre adhésion en temps utile et, mieux encore, recrutez un ami pour qu'il se joigne à l'Institut.

## BIOGRAPHY

### LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL C.H. BELZILE, CMM, CD

General Belzile was born in Trois-Pistoles, Quebec, in 1933. He followed an illustrious career in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces from 1951 to 1986, during which time he held command of the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment, the Combat Arms School in Gagetown, the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany, Canadian Forces Europe, Mobile Command, and served with both the United Nations and NATO. In 1986, France appointed him Commander of the Legion d'Honneur for enhancing military cooperation between France and Canada. In 1996, he was appointed Honorary Colonel of the Royal 22nd Regiment.

Since retiring from the Canadian Forces, General Belzile has continued his pace of activity. From 1987 to 1992, he was Vice-President, Business Development, for SNC Industrial Technologies, and since 1992 has been President of CH Belzile Consultants. He has carried on his service to Canada through his voluntary activities, which include serving as Member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, as Member of the Board of Governors of the Canadian Corps of Commissioners and as President of the Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation.

He has been directly involved in major activities aimed at the betterment of Canada's security and the preservation of her democratic values. In 1994, he was a member of the Committee of Thirteen, a group of high-placed volunteers who contributed a major part to the 1994 White Paper on Defence. From 1995 to 1997, he served as Commissioner in a Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserve Forces. In 1997, he was appointed one of three members of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigative Services, taking over the duties of Chairman on the death of the Right Honourable Brian Dickson in 1998.

General Belzile is married to the former Janet Scott of Braeside, Ontario. They have two children, Denise and Suzanne, and reside in Ottawa.

General Belzile was the winner of the 1999 Vimy Award.

## BIOGRAPHIE

### LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL C.H. BELZILE, CMM, CD

Le général Belzile est né à Trois-Pistoles, au Québec, en 1933. Il s'est illustré au sein de l'Armée et des Forces canadiennes de 1951 à 1986, période au cours de laquelle il a commandé le 2<sup>e</sup> Bataillon du Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment, l'École des armes de combat à Gagetown, le 4<sup>e</sup> Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada en Allemagne, les Forces canadiennes Europe, et la Force mobile, en plus de servir auprès des Nations Unies et de l'OTAN. En 1986, la France l'a nommé Commandant de la Légion d'honneur pour avoir amélioré la coopération militaire entre la France et le Canada. En 1996, il a été nommé colonel honoraire du Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment.

Depuis son retrait des Forces canadiennes, le général Belzile n'a cessé ses activités. De 1987 à 1992, il a été vice-président à l'expansion des entreprises pour les Technologies industrielles SNC Inc. Depuis 1992, il est président de CH Belzile Consultants. Il a continué son service à la patrie par le biais du bénévolat, incluant sa participation en qualité de membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut canadien des études stratégiques et membre de Conseil d'administration du Corps canadien des commissionnaires et président de la Fondation canadienne de la bataille de Normandie.

Il a pris une part très active à de grandes initiatives visant à améliorer la sécurité du Canada et à sauvegarder ses valeurs démocratiques. En 1994, il était membre du Comité des treize, groupe de volontaires haut placés qui ont joué un rôle déterminant dans la réalisation du Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994. Entre 1995 et 1997, il a siégé à la Commission spéciale sur la restructuration des réserves. En 1997, il était l'un des trois membres du Groupe consultatif spécial sur la justice militaire et les services d'enquête de la police militaire et il a assumé les fonctions de président à la mort du très honorable Brian Dickson en 1998.

Le général Belzile a épousé Janet Scott de Braeside, en Ontario. Ils ont deux enfants, Denise et Suzanne, et habitent à Ottawa.

Le Général a été le récipiendaire en 1999 de la Distinction honorifique Vimy

## PARLIAMENTARY AND THE MILITARY

(Summary - 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar - 27 January, 2000)

*Colonel (Retd) Sean Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst*

Parliamentarians should understand defence issues and requirements of modern military forces, so as to promote national security and well being. Events occurring over the past thirty years,

culminating in a series of crises in the last decade, suggest that parliamentarians, the military, and the public need to improve inter-communication. The aim of the seminar was,

therefore, to study this situation, including: whether there is a *communications gap* between

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political and military players in the formation of defence policy; if so, how does it affect the content of policy; and, are there structural or other problems which adversely affect the defence policy and, if so, how might they be corrected?

Mr. Pat O'Brien, MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, delivered the introductory address. In it he went to the heart of the matter and stated that communication was vital and his committee provided one of the essential links between parliament, the military and the public. His committee's revelations of quality of life problems in the armed forces, resulting in allocation of additional funds to DND to resolve them, is a good example of how information given to politicians can lead to positive action. In spite of this, and including the forthright testimony of the chief of the Defence Staff to the committee, there is still much room for improvement. Parliamentarians often perceive DND and the armed forces as a closed shop. To avoid this, DND, and pro-defence groups need to be more pro-active in their dealings with Senators and MPs.

The keynote address was given by Professor Douglas Bland, Chair of Defence Management, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University. His major thrust was that the defence of Canada is the responsibility of all Canadians. They determine, by casting their votes, how Canada shall be defended, how much money will be spent on defence, and what vulnerabilities will be accepted. As well, there must be an unbroken line of accountability from officers commanding units in the field, to the chief of the defence Staff, to Parliament, and finally to the people. In developing this theme, he quoted the report of the Somalia Inquiry: *the quintessential condition for civil control of the military and all aspects of national defence is a vigilant Parliament*. Thus, Parliament is the organization accountable to Canadians for every aspect of national defence. He also quoted from the report of the Special Joint Committee on defence of 1994, which emphasized the need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy.

Professor Bland noted that parliamentary committees are generally prisoners to a Minister's agenda, with little freedom to develop strong nonpartisan policy positions, and little likelihood of seeing their work transformed into effective policies. Committees also lack the resources in personnel to research deeply into the many issues they consider, and often are overly dependant on government experts. This correlates to the survey result showing *secrecy and executive control* were perceived as the biggest impediments to parliamentary surveillance of defence. In turn, this reflects lack of an ongoing and positive program of parliamentary liaison by DND (although such a program is reputed to be under

development).

Professor Bland's most constructive piece of advice to parliamentarians, to improve their knowledge and control of the armed forces, would be to build a nonpartisan consensus on the fundamentals of Canada's defence; that is to say, take the politics out of defence policy. As well, strong and well supported defence committees need to be maintained by both the House of Commons and the Senate, with the latter being especially suited as the repository of a *defence consensus*. Ultimately, a permanent Standing Joint committee of the Senate and the House would have much to offer. In this respect, the small nucleus of Senators and MPs who do in fact understand defence ought to be exploited.

There followed a discussion moderated by Me. Jason Moskowitz, senior political correspondent for the CBC, on the topic *What constitutes Effective Civilian-Military relations in Canada?* Speakers included Mr. Arthur Kroeger, Chancellor of Carleton University, and Professor Joel Sokolsky, Head of the department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada. Mr. Moskowitz reflected on the media perception of defence affairs, and noted that there is often inconsistency in the availability of information from DND – often it is given out in abundance, but at other times obtaining it is difficult, if not impossible. There is still much room for improvement in relations between the military and the media.

Professor Sokolsky explained that the nature of the present international environment places greater responsibilities on parliamentarians to provide oversight of Canadian military forces and their missions. This is because it may not be clear what is at stake, or how the situation may develop. These are difficult matters that call for expert interpretation and advice. Values have come to dominate the equation, as opposed to simple calculus of ideology and military power evident during the Cold War. International affairs and security issues today are both fragmented and complex. Somalia demonstrated the serious consequences of proceeding without proper knowledge and accountable authority in place. It showed the need for vigorous parliamentary oversight. The fact that 90 per cent of the public supports an operation is of no consequence, if the government is generally a discretionary decision on the part of government and thus must be examined, explained and approved by Parliament. Overall, there is a generational problem. Few parliamentarians have the experience necessary to provide leadership in defence matters.

Mr. Kroeger provided a masterful review of Canadian foreign and defence policy from World War II onwards. He noted that circumstances of the Cold War did not place emphasis on debating defence policy. The requirements for Canadian

military contributions were in general obvious and accepted by parliamentarians and the public. Over the past decade this has changed. There is no longer certainty over Canada's security interests, and what military resources ought to be assigned to them. This places the onus on professionals in the military and elsewhere to explain the details of defence policy to the government.. As well, Canada's armed forces have not engaged in combat operations for close to fifty years. Politics has a short horizon. The essentially non-combat missions of today make it difficult for people to understand why it is necessary to invest in submarines, fighter planes and similar expensive systems.

A panel, chaired by the Honourable John Fraser, PC, MP, former Speaker of the House of Commons, and Chairman of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in DND and the CF, added further comments from both the political and military points of view. Members of the panel included Honourable Senator William Rompkey, PC, former co-chairman of the Special Joint Committee on Defence; Mr. David Pratt, MP, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs; Lieutenant-General (Retd) Charles Belzile; and Major-General (Retd) Lewis MacKenzie.

It was noted that the communications gap between the military and parliamentarians was real. The question was, *where do we go from here?* One answer would be to improve public information of defence issues, since the public elects MPs. The severe and arbitrary cuts to defence have made this difficult. The public profile of the armed forces is low due to fewer people on fewer bases. The public is fed information by an equally poorly informed media. In these circumstances, the role of the reserves in local communities can be very important and should be exploited. Uninformed political intervention can be doubly counter-productive as it may focus solely on political ends, such as regional benefits. Only some 2 per cent of parliamentarians have military experience. Therefore, the military does nobody any favours by remaining silent. As well, pro-defence groups such as CDA must improve their capability for public and governmental education. The CDA recommendation for government to create a National Security Advisory Agency is especially valid.

The 1994 Joint Senate/House of Commons Committee on Defence was a particularly good example of how to improve parliamentary knowledge of defence by communicating with a diverse group of expert resources, both in and out of the military. Many of its recommendations were incorporated in the subsequent defence white paper of 1994; but many were not (including making the joint committee a

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permanent feature). Appointment of serving officers as researchers was of great value to the committee, as were its visits to military bases. It is also important to develop a competent defence lobby on Parliament Hill.

It was disappointing to note that very few parliamentarians were in attendance at the seminar, although many had been invited. This was contrasted to other nations, especially the United States, where members of Congress are knowledgeable of defence and speak out on defence issues, and perform valuable work in congressional committees.

The Chief of the defence Staff, General Maurice Baril, then commented on the role of the CDS in relations with Parliament and the Cabinet. He presented his views under three headings: the role and responsibilities of the CDS; the context in which the CDS gives his advice and recommendations to Cabinet; and, relations between the CDS and Parliament. Overall, the pace of change in the world, including a broader focus for national security, has produced a more complex environment. This puts a premium on consultation and discussion with the Canadian public and its elected representatives.

The existing relationship of the CDS with Parliament and the government as a whole is less formal and less institutionalized. However, it is important that Parliament and Canadians take part in debates on defence matters. The CDS must ensure that in this context, the Canadian Forces, their capabilities and shortfalls, are presented in the most transparent fashion. The CDS's annual report to Parliament fulfils a similar function. In general, the interaction between Parliament and the military has grown positively, but much more needs to be done.

The seminar topic was then expanded by Mr. Simon Lunn, Secretary of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, as he presented *the NATO View*. In his remarks he reinforced many of the points made in earlier presentations. Difficulties with the political/military interface are not unique to Canada. As well, the situation is becoming more difficult because the roles of the military are changing. Soldiers must be more aware of the new environments in which they serve, and

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politicians must understand this as well. The question boils down to how far Parliament should go in the implementation of defence policy, especially the degree to which it can or should intrude into armed forces' conduct of operations. There must be transparency, but in NATO the amount varies between nations. As well, there is the added problem of converting former Warsaw Pact members to the general tenets of democracy, particularly the accountability of armed forces to the civil authority.

In the United States there is much oversight, but it is costly in terms of expert staff. The military does not like it, but it is a fact of life and they conform. The United Kingdom would be at the other end of the spectrum, where the armed forces are often perceived as a closed shop. Nations such as Germany are in the middle. Parliamentary committees, in his view, have a vital role to play in keeping the public and parliamentarians informed of military matters. In the end, there should be no areas that are out of bounds to political scrutiny. There must be a division of power and responsibility and, above all, cooperation and

respect demonstrated by all parties.

The seminar proceedings were closed with a summary presented by the Honourable Jean-Jaques Blais, PC, former Minister of National Defence. He opened by stating that the seminar had been excellent, had achieved its aim, and was probably one of the best conducted by the CDA Institute. There had been emphasis on Parliament, and this was appropriate. Progress has been made in the last few years to improve the knowledge of parliamentarians on defence issues and the military, but many shortcomings still exist.

He then commented on how shortcomings could be addressed. He warned that when dealing with politicians there could be unanticipated consequences. This was not a negative comment, but merely reality. As well, politicians are highly sensitive to the media and to polls. He also advised spending as much time working on the process as on the message. Ultimately, MPs must face the public for re-election and therefore a well informed public can be an important factor.

He reiterated the comments of the panel regarding the functions of Parliament and especially how the caucus system works. In caucus all MPs and ministers engage in unrestricted debate. Caucus proceedings are secret, so there is an open exchange of ideas on significant issues such as defence. When he was Minister, he went further and organized briefing sessions on defence for his Cabinet colleagues. Today, there is emerging interest on the part of many parliamentarians regarding international relations and Canada's role. There is a realization that, because of its size and resources, Canada has an obligation to perform on the international stage. As well, emerging foreign policy, which stresses human security, is attractive to most parliamentarians. These factors could be utilized as points of departure for CDA and other members of the pro-defence community when devising ways and means to educate parliamentarians on national defence and the military.

The President of the CDA Institute, Colonel (Retd) Samuel Blakeley, closed the proceedings and paid homage to the late Commander (Retd) Robin Corneil, to whom the seminar was dedicated. His wise council and hard work organizing the event produced a major success.

## IS THE DEFENCE GLASS HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL?

### A Look at This Year's Report from the Auditor General

#### Peter Kasurak, Principal, Audit Operations, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

*Ed note: This article is based on the author's views and may not reflect those of the Office.*

An auditor always discusses his report with the auditee before publication. Once factual matters are out of the way, the balance of the discussion revolves around whether the "glass is half empty or half full." That is, whether the deficiencies found by the audit are evidence of breakdown and decline or are merely the tail end of reforms needed to bring the organization to full efficiency. While Defence officials perennially argue for the "half full" scenario, the auditors have rarely been convinced that this is the case. The question is, what did this year's report – tabled in Parliament in November 1999 – show? Is National Defence finally turning the corner?

#### *A Decade of "Half Empty"*

Audit reports over the last 10 years have developed a composite picture of the Department that indicates its management systems have not been up to the job. Audits have repeatedly demonstrated that National Defence has been getting no more than 66 cents worth of value for every dollar it has spent on support services. For example:

- in 1990 we found that the costs of Defence hospitals were 86 percent higher than similar civilian hospitals;
- in 1994 we reported that Base maintenance productivity was 33 percent below those in the private sector;
- in 1996 we found that vehicle maintenance costs were between 160 percent and almost double of those of other major public sector fleet managers in North America and the productivity at Canadian Forces Schools and the Supply System were declining.

Throughout the decade the Department has had inadequate cost management systems and little or no performance management to speak of. As management has become more decentralized, an increasing number of decision-makers have come to lack the tools they need to make important decisions.

Compounding these difficulties have been major planning problems, not the least of which has been affordability. Beginning in 1990 we found symptoms of a program that was not matched to its budget. This included a backlog of at least \$375 million in training equipment and \$1.7 billion in facilities maintenance that was indefinitely deferred. In 1994 we voiced concerns that the entire program was unaffordable. Last year our review of the overall capital budget found that capital requirements were almost double the projected available funding. In addition, equipment being purchased that "satisfied" requirements often fell far short of the stated specifications. Mine countermeasures vessels were purchased without MCM gear, commercial off-the-shelf helicopters lacked adequate lift and protection and the Leopard tank upgrade did not meet what the Army had called the "minimum viable" standard.

Finally, the level of staff analysis on which important and costly decisions

## LE VERRE DE LA DÉFENSE EST-IL À MOITIÉ VIDE OU À MOITIÉ PLEIN?

### Examen du rapport du vérificateur général de cette année

#### Peter Kasurak, Directeur Principal, Direction Générale des Operations du vérificateur

*Le présent article exprime les vues de M Kasurak et ne reflète pas nécessairement celles du Bureau.*

Le vérificateur discute toujours de son rapport avec l'entité vérifiée avant la publication de ce dernier. Après avoir discuté des faits, il ne reste qu'à déterminer si « le verre est à moitié vide ou à moitié plein ». C'est-à-dire, les lacunes signalées par la vérification témoignent-elles d'une défaillance ou d'un déclin ou ne constituent-elles qu'une indication des toutes dernières réformes qu'il faut apporter pour que l'organisation soit pleinement efficiente? Les fonctionnaires de la Défense optent depuis toujours pour le scénario « à moitié plein », mais les vérificateurs sont rarement convaincus que c'est le cas. En ce qui concerne le rapport de cette année, qui a été déposé au Parlement en novembre 1999, la question qui se pose est la suivante : Est-ce que la Défense nationale effectue enfin un virage?

#### *Le verre est « à moitié vide » depuis dix ans*

Les rapports de vérification des dix dernières années ont tracé une image composite du Ministère qui indique que ses systèmes de gestion ne sont pas à la hauteur de la tâche à accomplir. Les vérifications ont à maintes reprises démontré que la Défense nationale n'obtient pas plus que 66 cents de valeur sur chaque dollar qu'il dépense pour les services de soutien. Par exemple :

- en 1990, nous avons constaté que les hôpitaux de la Défense coûtaient 86 p. 100 de plus que les hôpitaux civils semblables;
- en 1994, nous avons indiqué que la productivité du personnel d'entretien des bases était inférieure de 33 p. 100 à celle du secteur privé;
- en 1996, nous avons constaté que les coûts d'entretien des véhicules représentaient entre 160 p. 100 et près du double des coûts signalés par les autres grands gestionnaires de parcs de véhicules du secteur public d'Amérique du Nord et que la productivité dans les écoles des Forces canadiennes et du Système d'approvisionnement marquait un recul.

Tout au long de cette décennie, le Ministère a utilisé des systèmes de gestion des coûts inadéquats et il n'a pas, ou pratiquement pas, géré le rendement. La gestion a été décentralisée graduellement et un nombre croissant de décideurs n'ont pas disposé des outils nécessaires pour prendre des décisions importantes.

À ces difficultés se sont ajoutés d'importants problèmes de planification, dont le moindre n'est pas la capacité financière. Au début de 1990, nous avons relevé des indices d'un programme qui ne correspondait pas à son budget et notamment un arriéré d'au moins 375 millions de dollars pour le matériel d'instruction et de 1,7 milliard de dollars pour l'entretien différé indéfiniment des installations. En 1994, nous nous sommes inquiétés du fait que le programme dans son ensemble était trop coûteux. L'année dernière, à l'issue de l'examen du budget global des immobilisations, nous avons constaté que les besoins en capital représentaient presque le double du financement disponible prévu. De plus, l'équipement acheté qui « répondait » aux besoins souvent ne satisfaisait pas aux caractéristiques énoncées dans le cahier des charges. Des navires de déminage non munis des dispositifs nécessaires avaient été achetés, des hélicoptères standard disponibles sur le marché ne pouvaient pas répondre aux exigences en ce qui concerne la capacité d'emport

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have been based has been poor. One need look no further than the audit of major capital projects in 1998 where 5 of the 6 projects totalling over \$3 billion did not carry out adequate requirements and options analysis.

While the Department has taken steps to address problems we identified, these have often been ineffective or did not deal with the overall problem.

#### *New Problems Emerge in 1999*

##### *A Culture of Expediency*

Our 1999 audits included reviews of the management of hazardous materials, steps taken to prevent fraud and abuse and to promote ethical conduct, the Alternative Service Delivery Program, the management of sole-sourced service contracts using Advance Contract Award Notices and audit notes on the use of the anti-malarial drug Mefloquine and on kick-backs received by employees purchasing diesel fuel.

A theme that runs through these diverse audit reports is that rules and regulations put in place to safeguard employee health, integrity, ethics and value for money had been widely disregarded. Expediency had become a characteristic of management.

At the top level of the organization we found that there was a lack of compliance with Government Contracting Regulations in letting the \$2.8 billion contract for the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NTFC) program. The Government of Canada contracting regulations are focussed on competition to secure the best value for money for the Crown and equitable treatment of Canadian businesses. There are only limited exceptions allowed. If a case does not fit within these defined exceptions, then the way officials can sole-source a contract is to seek an exemption through securing an Order-in-Council. In the case of the NTFC officials told us that the limited time available to them (once they thought about competition late in the day) precluded competition if they were to make a deal that they regarded as desirable. They told us that the contract was therefore "in the public interest." Unfortunately, the government's contracting policy does not define "public interest" in this manner, but links it to national security or regional disparity concerns.

We also rejected arguments made to us by the Department that because all qualified Canadian firms had joined the consortium awarded the contract that there was only a single source and that holding a competition would have been a waste of money. Of course, because there was no competition, we shall never know. However, in other large procurements, competition has had the effect of bringing into being consortia to meet the requirement.

At the middle management level, failure to follow rules was also widespread. For example, in the case of the use of Mefloquine to prevent malaria in troops deployed to Somalia in 1992-93, the Department did not follow procedures required when an unlicensed drug is used. It did not provide the manufacturer with records of the drug's distribution, nor did it obtain the consent of those receiving the drug. Even though all supplies of the drug were labelled "for investigation purposes only", the Department did not systematically monitor the effectiveness of the drug or adverse reactions for each person receiving it. Officials told us they did not follow procedures because they believed at the time they had authorization from Health Canada to follow other rules that did not require informed consent. However, no such authorization was obtained, nor were we provided with evidence that such authority had been sought or even discussed.

Similarly, regulations were often ignored in the management of hazardous materials. Departmental audits had found over 1,400 instances of non-compliance with regulations and policies between 1993 and 1998 at the ten

et de protection, et le char Leopard modernisé ne constituait pas ce que l'Armée appelle le « minimum acceptable ».

Enfin, le niveau de l'analyse du personnel, sur laquelle sont fondées d'importantes et coûteuses décisions, est médiocre. À cet égard, on n'a qu'à se reporter à la vérification de grands projets d'acquisition de biens d'équipement réalisée en 1998 qui a révélé l'absence d'analyse adéquate des besoins et d'options pour cinq projets des six projets d'une valeur de plus de trois milliards de dollars.

Le Ministère a pris des mesures pour régler les problèmes cernés, mais elles ont trop souvent été inefficaces ou n'ont pas réglé le problème global.

#### **De nombreux problèmes font surface en 1999**

##### *Une culture axée sur l'opportunisme*

Nos vérifications de 1999 comprenaient des examens de la gestion des matières dangereuses, des mesures prises pour lutter contre la fraude et l'abus et pour promouvoir une conduite appropriée, du Programme des différents modes de prestation des services, de la gestion des marchés conclus avec un fournisseur unique au moyen de préavis d'adjudication de contrat ainsi que des notes de vérification sur l'utilisation du médicament antipaludique méfloquine et les pots-de-vin reçus par des employés à l'achat de carburant diesel.

Le thème commun qui se dégage de ces divers rapports de vérification est le suivant : on a fait très peu de cas des règles et des règlements mis en place pour préserver la santé, l'intégrité et l'éthique et assurer l'optimisation des ressources. L'opportunisme est devenu une caractéristique de la direction.

Au niveau de la haute direction de l'organisation, nous avons constaté que les conditions du *Règlement sur les marchés de l'État* n'avaient pas été respectées lors de l'attribution d'un marché de 2,8 milliards de dollars pour le programme d'entraînement en vol de l'OTAN au Canada. La réglementation sur les marchés publics du gouvernement du Canada est centrée sur la concurrence afin d'assurer l'optimisation des ressources de l'État et un traitement équitable pour les entreprises canadiennes. Quelques exceptions seulement sont permises. Si un cas ne correspond pas à ces exceptions définies de façon précise, les fonctionnaires doivent pour accorder un marché à un fournisseur unique demander une exemption par décret. Dans le cas du programme d'entraînement en vol de l'OTAN au Canada, les fonctionnaires nous ont déclaré que le bref délai imposé pour conclure un marché jugé souhaitable (ils n'ont pensé à un appel d'offres que tard au cours du processus) ne leur avait pas permis de tenir un appel d'offres. Ils nous ont dit que le marché était donc dans l'« intérêt public ». Malheureusement, la politique en matière de marchés du gouvernement ne définit pas l'« intérêt public » de cette manière, mais établit un lien entre cet aspect et les préoccupations touchant la sécurité nationale ou les disparités régionales.

Nous avons aussi rejeté les arguments du Ministère selon lesquels toutes les entreprises canadiennes qualifiées faisaient partie du consortium qui a obtenu le contrat, il n'y avait donc qu'un fournisseur unique et la tenue d'un appel d'offres aurait été un gaspillage d'argent. Naturellement, parce qu'il n'y a pas eu d'appel d'offres, nous ne saurons jamais si cela eût été le cas. Cependant, pour d'autres marchés importants, l'appel d'offres a entraîné la formation de consortiums afin de satisfaire aux exigences.

Au niveau des cadres intermédiaires, le manquement aux règles était aussi largement répandu.

Par exemple, dans le cas de l'utilisation de la méfloquine pour prévenir la malaria au sein des troupes déployées en Somalie en 1992-1993, le Ministère n'a pas suivi les procédures s'appliquant à l'utilisation d'un médica

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bases we audited – a result that indicated the level of compliance had not improved during the five year period. Even “administrative” errors, such as mislabelling or improper storage, can result in severe injuries.

Contract managers also frequently broke the rules. We examined 50 sole-source service contracts over \$25,000, 20 of which belonged to National Defence. While our sample was not designed to draw conclusions about specific departments, National Defence’s performance was not exceptional. Overall, we found that only 11 percent of these contracts complied with government policy regarding the letting of sole-source contracts. Failure to compete contracts is not only inequitable to Canadian business, it also endangers value for money to the government. In this case, National Defence has responded by promising changes to some of its business practices.

When we looked at the implementation of the Defence Ethics Program we found that only parts of it had been put into place. The explanation we received from the military services was that they had never been ordered to implement the program, in spite of the approval of terms of reference by the Defence Management Committee obligating them to do so.

Rules requiring the approval of travel by the superiors of senior officials were still not being followed, one location gave employees a “holiday” from Treasury Board regulations requiring them to pay parking fees even though it had been directed to charge fees by a senior headquarters, and the Department’s internal auditors found there were few consequences for those who broke rules and guidances unless they crossed the boundary into criminal activity.

One could go on. The evidence indicates that – for one reason or another – the Department is gravitating towards a culture of expediency. Rules are often broken when they get in the way of what officials want to do or what they think is important at the moment. The danger here is that the door is being opened to abuses of all kinds.

#### *Human Resource Deficiencies*

The second emerging problem identified by this year’s audits is a lack of capacity in the Department’s human resources. At one level this is a qualitative problem: people lack the skills necessary to do their jobs. This emerged in our audit of the Alternative Service Delivery Program where business case analyses were poorly done. Two projects had no analysis backing them up whatsoever and four more had partial analyses done. Of the 12 that were assessable, 3 were deficient in almost every way. The Department recognized this problem in 1997 and concentrated its staff resources on fewer, but larger, projects.

In the hazardous materials audit, employee training was an issue. Forty-five percent of the employees in our sample who handle hazardous materials were not properly trained. The situation had not improved since the Department had conducted a similar audit in 1993.

In quantitative terms, the audit and review function has been reduced to a level that we believe to be imprudent. The military services have been unable to complete their financial inspection cycles and in some cases units are virtually exercising control over themselves. Internal audit has reported that management assistance visits and internal audits in the materiel management function have been substantially curtailed or eliminated altogether.

Downsizing and reorganization may have preserved the “sharp end”, but at least part of the cutting has degraded the effectiveness and integrity of the support services. This increases risk of mismanagement, abuse and injury to employees over the long run. The challenge here is to restore the balance.

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ment non homologué. Il n’a pas fourni au fabricant de registre de distribution du médicament, et il n’a pas obtenu non plus le consentement de ceux à qui il était administré. Même si tous les emballages du médicament portaient l’étiquette « à des fins de recherche seulement », le Ministère n’a pas contrôlé systématiquement l’efficacité ou les effets indésirables du médicament sur chaque personne à qui il avait été administré. Les représentants ont déclaré ne pas avoir suivi les procédures parce qu’ils croyaient alors être autorisés par Santé Canada à suivre d’autres règles qui ne nécessitaient pas de consentement éclairé. Cependant, ils n’ont pas obtenu une telle autorisation et il ne nous ont pas non plus prouvé qu’elle avait été demandée ou même qu’ils en avaient discuté.

De même, on n’a souvent pas tenu compte des règlements s’appliquant à la gestion des matières dangereuses. Nous avons recensé plus de 1 400 cas de manquement aux règlements et politiques entre 1993 et 1998 dans les dix bases que nous avons vérifiées, résultat qui indiquait une absence d’amélioration du niveau de conformité au cours de la période de cinq ans. Et même des erreurs « administratives », telles que les erreurs d’étiquetage ou un entreposage inadéquat, peuvent causer des blessures graves.

Les gestionnaires de marché ont eux aussi fréquemment enfreint les règles. Nous avons examiné 50 marchés de services de plus de 25 000 \$ de la Défense nationale attribués à un fournisseur unique. Notre échantillon n’avait pas pour objet de tirer des conclusions sur certains ministères, mais le rendement de la Défense nationale n’était pas exceptionnel. Dans l’ensemble, nous avons constaté que seulement onze pour cent de ces marchés étaient conformes à la politique gouvernementale concernant l’attribution de marchés à fournisseur unique. La décision de ne pas faire d’appel d’offres est non seulement inéquitable pour les entreprises canadiennes, mais elle nuit aussi à l’optimisation des ressources du gouvernement. Dans ce cas, la Défense nationale a réagi en promettant de changer quelques-unes de ses pratiques administratives.

Nous avons examiné la mise en œuvre du Programme d’éthique de la Défense et nous avons constaté que le Ministère n’avait exécuté que certaines parties de ce programme. En guise d’explication, les représentants des trois armées ont déclaré n’avoir jamais reçu l’ordre de mettre en œuvre le Programme; pourtant, le Comité de gestion de la Défense avait approuvé le mandat du programme d’éthique et ils étaient donc tenus de le mettre en œuvre.

Les règles exigeant l’approbation des voyages par les supérieurs des cadres supérieurs n’étaient pas encore observées. À un endroit, on n’a pas tenu compte des règlements du Conseil du Trésor sur les frais de stationnement et les employés ont été dispensés de les payer même si un cadre supérieur du Quartier général avait ordonné que le paiement de ces frais soit exigé. Les vérificateurs internes du Ministère ont déterminé qu’il n’y avait que peu de conséquences pour ceux qui enfreignaient les règles et les directives à moins qu’il s’agisse d’une activité criminelle.

On pourrait citer encore bien d’autres exemples. Mais nous constatons que, pour une raison ou une autre, le Ministère est imprégné d’une culture d’opportunisme. Les règles sont souvent contournées lorsqu’elles contredisent ce que les fonctionnaires veulent faire ou ce qu’ils croient être important à un moment donné. On risque ainsi de laisser libre cours à des abus de toutes sortes.

#### *Lacunes au niveau des ressources humaines*

Le deuxième problème qui a fait surface au cours des vérifications de cette année est le manque de capacité au niveau des ressources humaines. À un niveau, le problème est d’ordre qualitatif : les employés n’ont pas les compétences nécessaires pour faire leur travail. C’est ce qui ressort de notre vérification du Programme des différents modes de prestation des services

(voir p. 11)

### *Plugging the Holes and Refilling the Glass*

Although audits continue to point out serious problems in how the Department is managed, many of them are being addressed. One of the most encouraging achievements this year is the publication of *A Strategy for 2020* and the accompanying *Defence Planning Guidance 2000*. Together these planning documents show that the Department is making a determined effort to improve its planning processes by basing its plans on scenarios (as we recommended in 1994) and putting performance measures in place by early 2000. The two documents commit the Department to a design of a viable force structure supported by 20 to 23 percent of the total Defence budget. The documents also refer to experimentation with new doctrines, organizations and systems that will surely be required if force structure and funding is to be matched up.

Refilling the glass will be difficult. While the Department claims \$68 million in savings from its ASD program so far, we could not confirm these savings because neither service levels nor baseline costs had been established for many departmental operations prior to contracting out. Without a baseline, savings cannot be calculated. Foreign Defence ministries have made claims of large savings, but their legislative auditors have not confirmed them either.

Nevertheless, there is some reason for optimism. It now appears that management has a plan to address its problems, but it has to maintain momentum and move into implementation. Key milestones will be the implementation of cost and performance management systems, the development of a “right-sized” force structure consistent with policy and supported by doctrine and fulfillment of training and development plans for the Forces and the Department. Once these tasks are accomplished, the auditors will be able to agree with management that the glass is at least “half full.”

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## THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE RMA

*Colonel (Retd) Sean Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst*

References to the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) have proliferated in recent years so that it is difficult to avoid them in any modern treatise on security and defence. Often, however, the realities of the RMA are misunderstood. For example there is a mistaken perception that it will create an immediate changeover to video-game war. The truth is that there is going to be a period where low and high technology will have to co-exist, and this presents its own set of problems.

Over the past thirty years a succession of events have indicated real change in military operations for the first time in recorded history. It started with the sinking of an Israeli gunboat by a *Stryx* missile in 1967 and has continued, most recently, with the employment of cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons during NATO operations in the Balkans. The common thread in these events, and at the heart of the RMA, is the development of highly accurate surveillance capabilities and the concurrent utilization of precision guided munitions of all types. These factors are being applied across the conflict spectrum and involve systems ranging from strategic bombers to kit issued to individual infantry soldiers.

The seminal factors of surveillance and precision guidance are or will soon

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dans le cadre duquel les analyses de rentabilisation ont été mal effectuées. Deux projets ne comportaient aucune analyse à l'appui et quatre autres ne comportaient que des analyses partielles. Des 12 pouvant être évalués, trois comportaient des lacunes à presque tous les égards. Le Ministère a reconnu ce problème en 1997 et a affecté ses ressources humaines à un moins grand nombre de projets, mais à des projets plus importants.

Dans le cas de la vérification des matières dangereuses, la formation des employés était une source de préoccupation. Quarante-cinq pour cent des employés de notre échantillon qui manipulaient des matières dangereuses n'avaient pas reçu de formation adéquate. La situation ne s'est pas améliorée depuis que le Ministère a exécuté une vérification semblable en 1993.

Sur le plan quantitatif, la fonction de vérification et d'examen a été réduite à un niveau que nous estimons être imprudent. Les armées n'ont pas pu réaliser leurs cycles d'inspection financière et, dans certains cas, les unités se contrôlent pratiquement elles-mêmes. La vérification interne a indiqué que les visites d'aide à la direction et les vérifications internes de la fonction de gestion du matériel ont été en grande partie réduites ou éliminées.

La rationalisation des effectifs et la restructuration ont peut-être préservé « les troupes de combat », mais au moins une partie des compressions ont amoindri l'efficacité et l'intégrité des services de soutien. Cette situation accroît à long terme le risque de blessure pour les employés, de mauvaise gestion et d'abus. Le défi consiste ici à rétablir l'équilibre.

### *Colmater les brèches et remplir le verre*

Bien que les vérifications continuent de faire ressortir de graves problèmes de gestion, le Ministère s'efforce d'en régler un bon nombre. Parmi les réalisations les plus encourageantes cette année, mentionnons la publication de *Une stratégie pour 2020* et du document d'accompagnement *Guide de planification de la Défense 2000*. Dans l'ensemble, ces documents de planification montrent que le Ministère est déterminé à améliorer ses processus de planification par des plans qui reposent sur des scénarios (comme nous l'avons recommandé en 1994) et par la mise en place de mesures du rendement au début de l'an 2000. Dans ces deux documents, le Ministère s'engage à assurer la viabilité de la structure des Forces en y consacrant entre 20 à 23 p. 100 du budget total de la Défense. Ces documents font aussi état de l'essai de nouvelles théories, organisations et systèmes qui seront certainement requis pour appairer la structure des Forces et le financement.

Il sera difficile de remplir le verre. Le Ministère allègue que son Programme des différents modes de prestation des services lui a jusqu'ici permis de faire des économies de 68 millions de dollars, mais nous ne pourrions pas le confirmer parce qu'il n'a pas établi de niveaux de service ni de coûts de base pour de nombreuses opérations ministérielles avant de procéder à l'impartition. Sans coûts de base, on ne peut pas calculer les économies. Les ministères de la Défense dans d'autres pays ont affirmé qu'ils avaient réalisé d'importantes économies, mais leurs vérificateurs législatifs ne les ont pas non plus confirmées.

Néanmoins, nous avons des raisons d'être optimistes. Il semble maintenant que la direction ait un plan pour régler ses problèmes, mais elle doit poursuivre sur sa lancée et passer à la mise en œuvre. Les jalons clés consisteront à mettre en œuvre des systèmes de gestion des coûts et du rendement, à mettre en place une structure « de taille appropriée » pour les Forces qui correspond à la politique et qui est appuyée par la doctrine ainsi qu'à exécuter des plans de formation et de perfectionnement pour les Forces et le Ministère. Lorsque ces tâches auront été accomplies, les vérificateurs conviendront avec la direction que le verre est au moins « à moitié plein ».

be reinforced by a host of other technical innovations in military operations that are difficult to comprehend. They include genetic engineering, implanting chips in human brains, artificial intelligence, indestructible synthetic materials, robotics of every description, performance enhancing drugs, and so on. But as noted, it will not be possible to flick a switch and have everyone everywhere convert to high advanced technology all at once. Moreover, high technology often is not reliable, especially in its early stages of development, and enemies can shut it down in a variety of ways from counter-technology to unconventional warfare.

It is evident that even in nations with relatively healthy defence establishments, such as the U.S., force development in the new century is going to be both challenging and expensive. The process will be rendered complex by a diversity of threats combined with the gradual introduction of RMA systems, and evolving doctrine and tactics to support them. What then for Canada and a defence establishment in disarray and living on life support? The short answer is that unless significant additional funding is allocated to DND in federal Budget 00, the question is academic. If no new money appears, most of the so-called “desperation options” will be applied and the Canadian Armed Forces will be reduced to the status of a home defence force.

If, however, there is to be life after Budget 00 (and there probably will be) the Canadian Armed Forces are at least conducting planning to deal with the RMA and the new strategic situation. Since 1998, the Director General

Strategic Planning and the Chief of Research and Development have led the exploration of RMA issues from a Canadian perspective. They have sponsored various study sessions and symposia, and have published a concept paper, entitled *Canadian Defence Beyond 2010: The Way Ahead*. It is a product of DND/CF, academia and selected industry representatives. Its aim is to provide an initial signpost on the road of force development dominated by the RMA. DND has also published a second document, entitled *Strategy 2020*, which is a roadmap for the Canadian Armed Forces on the same route.

Finally, each of the services are conducting studies on RMA impacts in their particular areas of military expertise. For example, the army has recently created the Land Force Doctrine and Training System, based at the Land Force Command and Staff College in Kingston. It is sponsoring studies and symposia to plan the future Canadian Army. In comparison to previous exercises of this type, the present one shows promise. However, as well as money, progress will require some tough decisions to concentrate remaining strengths, rather than spreading weakness throughout the army - as is now the case.

As the Conference of Defence Associations recently briefed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, unless more money is forthcoming for DND “you won't get there from here” with respect to applying the RMA in the Canadian Armed Forces. To do so requires a firm base in the present, and right now that does not exist in the CF.

## BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN CANADA

*(The Late) Commander Robin Corneil, OMM, CD*

*The following article is a reprint of the article that appeared in an earlier edition of ON TRACK, in memory of Robin Corneil – ed.*

*We the willing, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much, with so little, for so long, that we are now expected to do everything, with nothing, forever. (Anon)*

Trite as it is, I would find it hard to blame Canada's military professionals for claiming this as their own special motto. One cannot pick up a paper these days without finding an article bashing some part, or all, of the profession of arms, often written by someone who wouldn't know a member of the profession if they tripped over one. While this sort of thing may seem to have begun with the Somalia affair, that is merely the latest in a nearly unbroken line of nonsense which is at least as old as Canada, and probably antedates Confederation by as long as Europeans have been living in this country. Canadians have never looked on “soldiering” as anything more than a gentleman's pastime, even during those rare periods when someone engaged in it would be called a gentleman in polite Canadian society.

Yet the “profession of arms” meets all the attributes of a *bona fide* profession. It has a unique body of knowledge and skills which can be, and usually are, passed on in writing; it has

unique corporate ethics which (critics to the contrary) are generally well understood within the profession; it is held to an appropriate standard by the society which it serves; and it most certainly does render those services whenever and wherever society demands it. Yet unlike other professions – medicine, law, teaching, science, theology, engineering – its society refuses to respect it as such, preferring any number of myths over historical fact to justify at best ignoring its advice, and at worst consigning its practitioners to a form of limbo in which they are expected to meet all demands made on them while receiving neither trust nor recognition in return.

That the profession of arms is held to a unique, and in many respects higher, standard than others is obvious from a review of the criticism leveled at it by its detractors – or more poignantly, by the criticism which is not leveled at other professionals. The Somalia Inquiry used one genuinely criminal act, and one other implied wrongdoing, to label the entire mission as “a failure” – a view not shared neither by the Somalis nor by Canada's allies in the mission – and proceeded to condemn the entire military hierarchy as having failed in their duty. When civil servants are convicted of downloading kiddie porn, there is no hue and cry to fire their deputy minister, nor to can the entire executive of the bar association when one of their lawyers is shown to have defrauded a client, nor to downgrade the officers of the Canadian Medical Association

when doctors abuse their position by sexually assaulting their patients. Fair enough, one might say – when I and my contemporaries joined the profession of arms, we were made aware early on in the game that our responsibility to and for our people was a “twenty-four-and-seven” proposition, and it seems reasonable to hold the profession to that standard now.

What is curious, however, is that the standard prescription to remedy any perceived military ill is to put “civilians” in charge – to grant overarching authority to hold the profession of arms to higher standards to someone who is not obliged to live up to these standards themselves. Two of our major national newspapers recently declared that “the military should not be allowed to investigate itself!” Quite apart from the fact that other professions have had this privilege for a long time, and there is no apparent pressure to change that situation, the military's detractors remain unwilling to grant this privilege to the one profession which has an established body of personnel dedicated to its policing.

I think that this is a result of one of our national myths, which is that “civil control of the military” means “control of the military by civil servants.” Having been both military and civilian myself, I have seen little virtue in the identification of

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“civilian.” Certainly the standards to which those who could affect my life in civilian occupations were held did not begin to measure up to those which I expected, and usually received, from my military superiors. But the military’s real civil masters in our democracy, the elected Members of Parliament, and particularly those who are members of the Privy Council, seem to be quite happy to allow this myth to persist, and reinforce it by enabling the hand of the civilian bureaucracy to continue to tighten its hold on the scruff of the military neck. It is probably no accident that the sweeping reforms which resulted in the present “civilian-military” bureaucracy of National Defence Headquarters were enacted under Donald Macdonald – a Minister of National Defence noted for despising the military professional more than any other minister since Sir Sam Hughes. And despite the almost universal recommendations of those experts asked to study the situation, there is no sign that any change in this arrangement is imminent.

And so the profession of arms is caught between the rock of a higher standard of personal responsibility than that to which the rest of the population is held, while being denied the ability to determine the extent to which these responsibilities are to be carried within the chain of command. And this is only the beginning.

“Cover-up” is a favourite word among conspiracy theorists, and has been the rallying cry of the military-bashers at least since the Somalia horror reared its ugly head. There seems little doubt that senior military officers were coopted into the protection of a vulnerable Minister at a time when it would have been better to acknowledge all the warts and bumps of the organization and get on with the corrective measures needed to put them right. I see this as a classic case of the clash between the military virtue of obedience and the military responsibility to keep their profession virtuous regardless of pressures from ephemeral political situations. It used to be said that National Defence was a good department to run, since no department went to such great lengths to prevent their political boss from being blindsided. Well and good – this surely is the responsibility of the junior to the senior in any “command” relationship; keep your boss informed of what is going on. Somehow, this got corrupted into keeping the boss out of the loop so he/she can claim that he/she didn’t know what was going on when the ordure hits the fan. This is the action of a modern bureaucracy, not that of a professional military organization.

On the other hand, the initial “cover-up” mudslinging really began when senior military management insisted on finding out from the man in the field what he considered had actually happened before joining in the condemnation of his actions, or sending out a police detachment to conduct an investigation (which to me, anyhow, is tantamount to saying to the field commander

that he was not trusted by those who had sent him there.) Were I the man in the field, this is what I would feel that I had a right to expect from my superiors. Unfortunately, the media (and others) seem bound and determined to condemn such practice, and woe betide the superior commander whose investigation cannot move as fast as the whistle-blower who wants *his* version to be reported to the folks back home. One more rock, one more hard place for the military professional to negotiate.

Even before Somalia, however, it was apparent that the profession of arms in Canada was unique in not being accorded the right to its own expertise. If a pipe springs a leak, Canadians are quite ready to consult a plumber; a medical problem is referred to a doctor; those with legal questions seek out a lawyer. However, if a question arises in the defence arena, Canadians will inevitably seek out a university professor, or perhaps a journalist! It is interesting to contrast the brouhaha which broke out in Ontario when its government had the audacity to challenge the wisdom of its teachers in ordering the province’s educational system, with the ease with which military unification and the ensuing unification of Canadian Forces Headquarters with the Deputy Minister’s organization were passed by the Canadian public. This cannot be explained away by pointing out that the military did not have a strong union with an enormous war chest, nor the right to strike (even if a strike by the military would have inconvenienced the average citizen). It was the reliance of the political authority on the wisdom of the Glassco Commission being self-apparent over that of the military that made the objections of the military practitioners irrelevant in the minds of Canadians. Canadian authorities have traditionally subordinated any considerations of military effectiveness to those of political comfort, without creating a murmur of dissent from any segment of the population except the white-haired old men in suits who mutter about the “good old days in the regiment” and then go out and vote as they always have in the next election.

Canadians willingly seize the advantage of newer nations (a “newness” constantly renewed by calls to multiculturalism) to label national habits as *traditions*. Hence, new age Canadian elites natter on about our “peacekeeping tradition” when, in fact, providing troops for UN peacekeeping missions was the product of two conditions unique to their time – first, the desire of the major protagonists of the Cold War to maintain a sort of rude stability in their bipolar world without becoming directly involved, and second, a certain amount of “spare” military capability which was not needed for protection of sovereignty at home or for collective defence. The “peacekeeping tradition” would have been terminated with dizzying speed had tensions risen swiftly in Europe, or the Government’s mandate been seriously challenged at home. But it is this “peacekeeping tradition” which enables Canadians to starve their military forces of the personnel and

equipment needed to cope with a changed world, to whose conflicts they are being increasingly committed with diminishing resources. Once again, the profession of arms is caught between a rock and a hard place. Their tradition demands that they carry out the will of the legally constituted authority of the state as directed and without complaint, yet common sense demands an end to this “can do” tradition and the serving up of a concentrated dose of military reality to dampen the adventurism of politicians and diplomats. In Canada, this is complicated by a healthy fear of a modern version of Morton’s Fork – “If we tell the Government that we can’t do the job because we don’t have the resources, then they will say that we are not worth the bother and therefore will be given even less resources than we have at the moment.” And history indicates that the political authority will always listen to the siren call of the beautiful people of the soft-power school, who insist that Canada can have real influence in world councils without any concrete military commitment – despite the fact that the same history constantly proves the beautiful people wrong.

Perhaps it is the structure of the profession of arms which lies at the heart of the problem.

Huntingdon’s notion that the “profession of arms” consists only of officers is probably more than a little outdated in the Canadian context, wherein the officers and men are drawn from the same segment of society, and in fact heavy reliance is placed on commissioning from the ranks as a source of officers. Popular culture – and the most virulent critics of the military – would treat the officer-man relationship as a “we-they” proposition, and the proponents of this approach are doing all they can to drive a wedge between the two. What the profession of arms must do to counter this harmful divide is to make plain that membership in the profession is dependent on a commitment to the idea of military service, which senior non-commissioned officers have made equally with their officers. Steps taken to reinforce this common membership can only benefit the profession of arms, enabling it to stand united when the honour of the profession is at stake.

Another “divide” which current Canadian military habits reinforce is that between the national headquarters and the field. The headquarters, like it or not, is and must remain the centre and the principal guardian of professionalism, but this requires a constant input from the field and, in turn, a constant output from the centre of leaders who embody both the ethos of the service and a knowledge of the realities of how it is run. Antony Jay, in *Management and Machiavelli*, points out that a successful army “. . . takes great pains to ensure that field commanders are really deeply ingrained with the thinking of the army as a whole; tours of duty abroad, spells at home, staff college, all to ensure that when they take decisions on their

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own, they take the right ones, or at least the best the army knows.”

There is an additional lesson to be taken from this if one focuses on the issue of ‘tours of duty abroad.’ Regardless of lack of current resources, the true professional is aware of the need to maintain the skills required so that, in times of trouble when resources are made available, the appropriate military grouping can be put together. What better way of doing it than placing the aspiring professional in an organization which is actively practicing these skills? It is unfortunate that in Canada, ‘tours of duty abroad’ are usually seen as ‘Subsidized Holidays At Public Expense’, the name colloquially given to SACEUR’s Headquarters in Belgium. Anyone who has experience on exchange, liaison or multinational staff duties knows that this is nonsense. Canadian military leaders should be actively seeking out all the positions they can find in the forces of their allies – and bear in mind that Canadian military professionals receive considerably more respect abroad than they do at home. Foreign postings can be an excellent source of appropriate self-esteem.

But both the necessary socialization and experiencing of future commanders in Canada often gets lost in the headlong rush to have an officer ready to be CDS before he reaches the age of fifty. The problem is about to be exacerbated by the upcoming orgy of “education” currently perceived as the panacea to lack of “professionalism” in the Canadian Forces. I would never argue that any amount of education would not benefit any officer – I hold a graduate degree myself in a non-technical field – but I would argue that the essential *experiencing* necessary to mold future commanders should not be jeopardized by the demands of higher education. Nor, incidentally, should the exchange of professional ideas be controlled by an academic elite – the incorporation of the anticipated Canadian military journal into the organization of the Royal Military College causes me some concern.

I feel that one solution lies in extending the careers of senior officers to ensure that they can experience all the facets of military life in addition to their essential education and formal training. Offer all officers on promotion to general or flag rank extension of service to age 60 or more as long as they can be usefully employed. This will probably offend the “too many generals” crowd, but we can no longer afford to risk the essential unity of the service by having general officers disappear into the maw of NDHQ, only to have them resurface again as CDS. Regardless of the truth or otherwise behind the perception, those who have spent too much of their time at the centre have little credibility in the field.

Military professionalism cannot be addressed

without reference to the Reserve. This is an extremely thorny subject in Canada, a country with a strong “militia tradition” which is the custodian of much of the honours won by Canadians in battle. Once again, I fear that Canada is confusing “tradition” with a habit which was justified only in a time when the world was not a global village, and Canadians could afford to indulge in an isolationist, or “fireproof house”, world view. We could rely on an essentially non-professional military force, as long as we had a cadre – and time – to professionalize them before engaging in any serious combat. The world just isn’t like that any more. While the necessary base for mobilizing the entire country’s resources is still necessary to prepare for the “worst case” which a dangerous world can still offer, of more immediate concern is the need to be able to contract and expand the available combat force as an unstable and potentially highly dangerous arrangement of international relations staggers into the twenty-first century from one temporary equilibrium to another. This, surely, is the point of the “total force” concept espoused, at least nominally, by Government and defence bureaucracy alike.

But the term “total force” when applied to our present regular-reserve structure is “total farce” to both regular and reserve. The regular officer or senior NCO, having devoted a good portion of his or her life to learning the essentials of the profession, can hardly look at someone who has spent about one-tenth the time at it and consider him or her an equal “professional”. The reservist, on the other hand, sees the devastation wrought by lack of funding on the equipment, facilities and numbers needed for his training and capability, and resents the “second-class status” which is all that the additional effort put into reserve service seems to earn him.

This issue, now a simmering political problem, is to a large extent the result of duplicity on the part of the Canadian political leadership. The Regular Force has been told that what was wanted was a “force in being” for a “come-as-you-are” war, in which Canadians would fight as part of a multinational force. With resources for this role being kept in a perpetual state of scarcity, keeping the “force in being” capable of carrying out its assigned role became not only the first priority, but also the only priority, of the regular force. At the same time, however, politicians celebrated the “militia tradition”, telling the reserves how important they were, and placing the onus on the regular force to see that their needs were met. While history screams that in the uncertainties of war, a professional force will always be more successful than a non-professional one, professional forces cost more money, and the Canadian political leadership has been unwilling to come to grips with the difference.

If a total force is what is demanded – and

international realities indicate that a force which can be expanded or contracted quickly is the most economically efficient form of military force today – then the whole force, not just the “regular” portion, needs to be imbued with the same professionalism, and this demands that advancement in any part of the force must be dependent only on the individual’s military virtues, acquired through a combination of experience and talent. While a prominent position in the community of a unit commander may be advantageous to a high “profile” of the military in that community, it would be far more professional to raise the profile of the commander through his military professionalism.

Also essential to a “total force” is protection of the non-military portion of its members’ careers. As I read the appropriate portion of the MND Monitoring Group’s most recent report, which decried the lack of mobilization planning and the failure to incorporate “formed reserve units” into expeditionary forces, I found myself searching in vain for any mention of *enabling legislation*. Planning for “reserve” units to be part of the total force requires a certain knowledge that the unit will be there when the Government calls it out, and that the civilian employers of the unit’s members will be required to hire them back when the contingency which required their presence no longer exists. Such legislation cannot be popular with the Government of a nation which traditionally (or habitually) abhors conscription, but without it planners cannot count on the “reserves” being there when required. We have been fortunate that there have been enough young reservists drawn either by employment or by a sense of adventure to provide sufficient numbers to meet our commitments abroad. These personnel, trained and experienced, are truly part of a “total force.” To go beyond this, Government will have to expend both political and financial capital. This is one issue, which CDA will address soon in its study of the benefits of defence spending.

So. Like all self-appointed critics, I have made my share of prescriptive suggestions, knowing that I am not going to be held responsible if any of these ideas which may be adopted don’t work out. However much one may decry the lack of respect given the profession of arms in Canada, it is only the serving professionals who can raise their profile through proving themselves worthy of respect in a milieu traditionally (or habitually) antipathetic to their cause. The rest of us can only warn and encourage. But we can at least do that, and bring to the attention of Government and other decision-makers as forcibly as possible the worth of the endeavour and their responsibilities to the profession of which we remain a part. The CDAI will explore the possibilities in our January 2000 Seminar, *Parliament and the Military*.

## THE CANADIAN FORCES: HARD CHOICES, SOFT POWER

by

Joseph T. Jockel

Reviewed by

Lieutenant-Général (Ret) R.J. Evraire

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Books on the Canadian Forces and on Canadian defence policy are few in number. Joseph Jockel's offering is therefore a very welcome event for those of us who have an interest in these subjects. Not a particularly long or exhaustive treatment of the problems that continue to plague the Canadian Forces, the book does provide a detached factual assessment of some of the events that, over the past decade, have left the Forces depleted in personnel and up-to-date equipment, with a widely accepted defence policy the government will not fund, and an uncertain future. More specifically, the author takes us through an examination of the CF's combat-capable forces; what is needed to keep them; and what hard choices must be made if the CF is to maintain its overseas combat capabilities.

What ails the Canadian Forces, according to Dr. Jockel, is a malady he defines as "stress of strategic dislocation". He suggests that the long standing military alliance orientation of the Navy, Army and the Air Force (organisation, equipment and training with a largely NATO, NORAD and UN focus) continues to make it difficult for the CF to re-orient itself to the 1994 White Paper provisions that call for them to be able to deploy Main Contingency Forces and Task Forces as contributions to international peace and security. Stating that "...Canadians have never been very interested in the military, largely allowing the government a free hand in setting defence policy...", he in effect suggests that a remedy for the aforementioned malady is not in the offing. In fact, his treatment of the DFAIT "Soft Power" approach to foreign and defence policy put forth by Minister Axworthy clearly points to his belief that it will exacerbate the difficulties the CF are currently experiencing.

The author's detailed review of the combat capabilities of the three services will enlighten most readers. It will also puzzle those who are not very familiar with military terminology. Talking at length about Battle Groups at the start of the chapter on the Army, and then defining the term near the end of the chapter, in one such example. Some readers might also fail to understand how it is that the Engineers are defined as a combat support arm and the communicators aren't. But these, and a few punctuation and sentence structure clangers, do not, in the final analysis, detract from the book's clear and accurate recounting of a tale of woe. The composition and missions of Main Contingency Forces, Naval and Air Task Forces, etc., are clearly explained in the context of the 1994 Defence White Paper. Jockel also provides considerable detail about the

numerous missions/deployments very successfully undertaken by the CF in the last decade. He does however leave us with a pessimistic view of the CF's ability to fulfil a number of the provisions of the White Paper.

In support of his pessimistic view, the author summons the comments of the Auditor General who, in a recent report, states that the money currently provided for the Canadian Forces is simply inadequate to fully modernise the Canadian Forces. What is available, he states, is \$6.5 billion in 5 years. What is needed is 11 billion in five years. According to Jockel, such a state of affairs leaves the government with only two choices - increasing the Defence budget or further cutting the Forces.

Public apathy, as previously noted, is one reason for the current state of disrepair of the Canadian Forces. Jockel further suggests that a weak government opposition, a ruthless Prime Minister, and the broad prerogatives of the Canadian Finance Minister in setting a budget also add to the difficulties. What then is there to do?

The author suggests that the assessment of the Kosovo War "...may turn out to be decisive". In putting forth his argument, he states that if it is judged that the use of military force (an air campaign alone, as we know) restored human security in Kosovo at an acceptable cost, the case for increasing defence spending and thereby saving the CF's overseas combat capability might be bolstered. It would therefore appear that the fate of the CF is sealed, since many currently share the view that the air campaign was very ineffective, human security was not restored (the presence of some 40,000 peacekeepers is required for an indefinite period), and the cost to the civilian population (in deaths, injuries, displacements and infrastructure devastation) was unimaginably high.

Jockel does not fail to mention the internal professional failings that led to the CF's tattered image in the 1990s, an image that, through recent and continuing serious and concerted efforts from within the Forces, has been greatly improved. He nevertheless does place the responsibility for the depleted state of the Canadian Forces (and any hope of an improvement) exactly where it belongs - at the feet of the Federal Government. Inadequate funding will allow the CF's capabilities to further dwindle, and more Defence White Paper promises to go unfulfilled.

The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power is an extremely worth-while read for anyone even moderately interested in defence policy, the Canadian Forces, and national sovereignty.

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## GUNNER'S REMEMBRANCES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

*Captain (Retd) Peter Forsberg, CD, Public Affairs Officer*

*The following article is the third in a series of Peter Forsberg's reminiscences of two tours of duty he completed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the first two articles Peter wrote of his deployment as one of the first 12 forward air controllers that*

*Canada sent to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as part of its contribution to the United Nations Protection Force.*

Prior to our departure from Bosnia-Herzegovina

our senior FAC approached a couple of us with a view to telling the story of our unique experience in our regimental publications - the annual

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*Gunner and Gunner's Quadrant.* But no one discussed the rendering of an after-action report to NDHQ. So, upon my return to duty I decided that I would write such a report. With the encouragement of my immediate superior, Lieutenant-Colonel Lew Evans, I eventually rendered a nine-page report. I discussed with Colonel Evans a distribution list which included Director-General Land Force Development and the management office of the Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems (TCCCS) Project.

For me the feedback was disappointing to say the least. The only acknowledgement I received was as an info addressee from TCCCS, when they castigated me for the inappropriate and hazardous use of communications equipment. I gather that the comment was based on my report of how we managed communications in Sebnica. Even though we could not exercise with aircraft over Sebnica, we still attempted daily communications checks with our AOCC back in Visoko or with the AOCC in Kiseljak. Our communications means was the HF set. Unfortunately we had no connector kit for our radio with the APC's electronics.

We approached OP "CHARLIE" one day shortly after our arrival in Sebnica to liaise with the section and to carry out a communications check. From the OP one could observe, at a distance of 2900 metres, a BSA M 48 artillery gun position that was occupied from time to time. There was no room for us inside the OP from which we could operate the HF set so I decided to set the radio up inside the APC since I did not think that we should expose ourselves unnecessarily to view by the BSA. I stuck the antenna up through the cargo hatch and carried on with the communications check. Under the circumstances we appreciated the hazard of operating an HF set with its own antenna inside the APC. Unfortunately TCCCS did not see it that way and did not wish to communicate directly with me their displeasure. It seems that the people in TCCCS forgot what life can be like in a war zone - or maybe they didn't know at all what it can be like.

I guess that I should have been more forward because the Director-General of Land Force Development didn't acknowledge my report; in fact, he couldn't even bother me with eye-contact when we passed each other frequently in the hallways of NDHQ. I write this knowing how few of us in number worked at the time on the 10<sup>th</sup> floor of Centre Block South at 101 Colonel By Drive and, therefore, should not be strangers as professionals. Later, PK 2, Lieutenant-Colonel Blanchette, advised me that my after-action report had been the subject of lengthy discussions. He mentioned that the staff of the Canadian contingent of UNPROFOR objected to my recommendations at first, but were coming around.

In my after-action report I included amongst my recommendations the immediate acquisition of the laser target designator (LTD) for our FACs in Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Later, in February, LTDs were delivered to our FACs in Bosnia-Herzegovina by one of the NDHQ artillery staff officers off an immediate operational requirement requisition. I do not know if my after-action report aided in the acquisition and delivery of the LTDs but I am glad that they got to where they were needed. I was chagrined to learn, though, that shortly after their delivery in theatre one of the LTDs was captured by the BSA.

Having had a taste of field operations I wanted one more tour with UNPROFOR before I would retire - I was 53 years old by now. In March, an opportunity came along to fill in for an artillery major who was a UN military observer (UNMO) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He had to return to Toronto early in his tour to tend to his wife who was very ill. I applied with the endorsement of the commander of the directorate in which I worked to succeed the artillery major and carried the paperwork over to my career-manager's office. Two days later Colonel Evans had to call me into his office and relay a message from my career-manager's boss: the commander of the Canadian contingent UNPROFOR says that we want only young dynamic captains over there. That really pissed me off - I wasn't apparently too old six months earlier to deploy as one of the first FACs to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I thought, however, that if I fought the assertion that was attributed to the contingent commander I wouldn't get back there before my time in uniform would be up. In the meantime, I kept in close touch with friends in the Directorate of Military Manpower Distribution (DMMD) in case another UNPROFOR opportunity arose.

In early July a friend in DMMD informed me that a watchkeeper's position in UNPROFOR's Sector South-West Headquarters, in Gornji Vakuf, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was opening up and that CANBAT 2 could not fill it. I applied and this time got accepted. In mid-August, 1994, I deployed to Gornji Vakuf on my second tour of duty with UNPROFOR.

Prior to my departure for FRY I tried without success at NDHQ to get a proper military address fro my new assignment. I was disappointed but not surprised that the postal section was unable to supply me with an address. In any case I had CANBAT 2 to fall back on, as Gornji Vakuf was about two hours by road West of Visoko.

My departure date for duty with UNPROFOR coincided with that of 2<sup>nd</sup> Service Battalion (2 Svc Bn) deploying out of Canadian Forces Bases (CFB) Petawawa to Primosten, Croatia, via chartered 747 out of Ottawa to Split. Denis Fortin, a military engineer, was also deploying to Sector South-West Headquarters on the same date; so, following an overnight stay with 2<sup>nd</sup>

Service Battalion in Primosten, we travelled together from Primosten to Gornji Vakuf. Other than the presence of the UN rear area facilities was not evident in Split. In fact, I saw some very beautiful villas along the sea coast from Primosten to Split. By now the Bosnian-Croat Federation had come about but I still wanted to conduct myself as I had the first time I deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina - always wear your helmet and your flak jacket.

In Gornji Vakuf I reported through the G2 Operations, a Spanish major, to the Chief G2G3, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Colonel) Walt Natynczyk, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He was one of the best Canadian officers I ever had the chance to work for. He certainly impressed the British officers who ran the headquarters, as well as all of the other nationalities who filled out the staff positions. Besides Colonel Natynczyk, Denis Fortin, and myself, the Canadian contingent in the headquarters included the camp administration officer and two clerks. I was very proud to be a member of this headquarters. The headquarters, on my arrival, was commanded by Commander 7<sup>th</sup> (British) Armoured Brigade (The Desert Rats), followed by Commander 14<sup>th</sup> (British) Mechanized Brigade. They were very professional and treated the staff with respect. There was also a detachment of Royal Marines Commando - a very professional and fine group of officers and men.

In addition to my watchkeeping duties I was appointed bar officer of the officers mess. My bar duties entailed ordering supplies through the (British) Navy Army Air Force Institutes as well as purchasing items on the local economy, such as wine from a nearby monastery and locally brewed beer. Being able to conduct a little bit of business on the local economy gave me some hope that life had a chance of returning to normal here.

I was pleased when Colonel Natynczyk detailed me to be liaison officer (LO) to CANBAT 2, then commanded by CO of the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians). Actually my duties in Gornji Vakuf precluded me from making too many trips to Visoko and CANBAT 2.

Gornji Vakuf was right on the line of confrontation between the Muslims and the Croats. The town was split down the middle. One could see that the Muslim part was destroyed while the Croat part was severely shot up. The headquarters was established in a factory that the UN had leased (lucky owner!). There was a three-story office building that served as the headquarters proper, a mess hall complete with a cement terrace, another office building that housed the officers mess and some of the officers' quarters, a few hangars, and ATCO-type cabins in which were quartered the remainder of the officers and the NCMs.

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Since I was a watchkeeper on shift, I could plan some of my activities, such as fitness training. The British troops had set up a bare-bones fitness training centre in one of the hangars and everyday one could see members of Royal Marines Commando working out. In any case I was able to maintain an element of physical fitness while in Gornji Vakuf - or so I thought. The cooks were British army and most of the meals were very delicious if not healthy! Fried Camembert with raspberry sauce and roast lamb were outstanding. On the other hand oatmeal porridge was pathetic and fried bread was not a favourite of mine. Fruits, vegetables, and salads were pretty sad. Otherwise, the Headquarters mess hall was second in the Sector only to the mess hall at CANBAT 2. In fact people throughout the Sector, as well as those outside, planned their travels to take advantage of stopping for a meal in Visoko. In the evenings if I left the operations centre in time, I would enjoy a can of Guinness stout at the mess before closing time. In the end I must admit that I gained 10 lbs while on duty in Gornji Vakuf.

I found my duties as watchkeeper exciting. It was challenging to understand the English that the different nationalities were speaking - the Malaysians and the Brits were the hardest to comprehend. And, besides the Canadians, there were the Spanish and the Turks. I enjoyed having to decide quickly how to handle a report as I received it via telephone or radio - to whom it must be passed and then follow it up to see what action was taken by whom. I have to admit, though, one Sunday in early December it was like a roller-coaster being there: in the morning we received a report that a little girl had been seriously injured by artillery fire and that a British medical team was doing all that they could to save her. In the early afternoon we received word that the 55 Canadians who were confined to their OP by the BSA had their freedom of movement

restored. And then, in the late afternoon, the medical team reported that the little girl had died.

For my seven-month tour of duty in Gornji Vakuf, I was allowed two 2 ½-day periods of leave and one 20-day leave. I decided to space out the periods as evenly as I could to gain the most benefit of their purpose of rest and relaxation from the daily stress of duty in this theatre of operations. For the first period, at the end of October, I went to a pension on the island of Hvar, a two-hour ferry ride in the Adriatic from Split. The pension had been recommended to me by other Canadian officers who were warmly received by the family that owned the pension. The journey to Hvar was interesting as well. I started out by getting a lift out of our camp by Royal Navy SEA KING helicopter to Split. During the flight I was invited by the pilot to observe from the cockpit. As we approached the boarder with Croatia, the SEA KING's sensors alerted the pilot that Croatian AAA were aimed at us. Once we received permission to land at Split the AAA threat ceased.

Our Canadian major at BH Command Rear Headquarters was kind enough to provide me with a car and driver to take me to his office where I could stow my personal weapon, helmet, and flak jacket before he took me down to the waterfront where I bought my passage for the ferry ride to Hvar. Upon leaving Split waterfront I saw a harbour that had a look of mystery and a hint of the exotic with a shoreline of centuries-old buildings and palm trees.

On arrival at the port of Hvar I was met by the son of the owner of the pension and was driven along the impossibly narrow streets to his family's pension which was located on the edge of this medieval town. The peacefulness and beauty of the place shocked my senses to the extent that I do not think that I could have withstood the environmental change I was experiencing had I

arrived here directly from Sebnica during my previous year's tour in FRY. The island is lush with palms, aloe vera plants, and gardens planted amongst the rock outcropping. My hosts were very generous, providing me with as much of their excellent cooking and locally produced wine as I desired. The Adriatic's water was crystal clear for swimming and for observing the beautiful woman swimming in her topless bikini.....

Autumn weather in Sector South-West was very pleasant that year - I could enjoy lunch in November, sitting out on the terrace of the mess hall, with the surreal experience of hearing artillery exchanges going on between the Croat-Bosnian Muslim Federation and the BSA. They were fighting near the confrontation line at Kupres, 15 km away as I recall. This was just like being on a live-firing exercise at lunchtime on a sunny day in CFB Shilo or CFB Gagetown except that, this time, this was not a training experience: this was for real!

For my three-week leave I decided that my wife would like to rendezvous with me in Milan, Italy in November. In arranging my travel to Milan I was amazed - and disappointed - to learn that my air ticket from Split to Milan and return was to cost as much as it did to fly my wife from and to Ottawa. In any case we were glad to make our rendezvous. With an interest in wine and fine art, not to mention the cuisine of Italy, we ventured from Milan to Florence (the New York of Italy, with the vitality of life in its streets), Siena, Montalcino, Rome, Venice, and Sondrio before returning to Milan. Throughout our travels my wife and I were always courteously received. At the end of a very romantic experience we said our good-byes before we flew off in separate directions from Milan. My wife is now an Italophile!

*To be continued....*

The following is a letter that CDA sent to the Prime Minister of Canada - Ed.

**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS**  
**CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE**  
Suite 502, 359 Kent Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0R7  
Tel: (613) 236-1252 Fax: (613) 236-8191 E-mail: cda@cda-cdai.ca URL: cda-cdai.ca

February 29, 2000

The Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, PC, MP  
Prime Minister of Canada  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6

Dear Prime Minister,

On behalf of all members of the Conference of Defence Associations, I wish to thank you and your government for the assistance rendered to the Department of National Defence (DND) in the federal budget, tabled yesterday.

Special credit is extended to the Honourable Art Eggleton for pleading a successful case on behalf of the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, on whom Canadians have placed such heavy responsibilities in recent times. As well, thanks are due to the Honourable Paul Martin for identifying new funding for defence in the midst of many other demands.

Although the allocation of new funds will bring stability to DND planning, and allow some critical problems to be addressed, more will be needed over the longer term to rehabilitate the armed forces. The challenges arising from increased missions in the face of a decade of reduced funding will persist. This will continue to impact negatively on Canadian national interests at home and abroad.

As an industrial trading nation, and advocate of human security, Canada needs to contribute to peace and stability in a fragmented and still dangerous world. Well established armed forces play a leading role in achieving national objectives related to these factors.

CDA will continue to support you and Minister Eggleton with advice and assistance regarding the development of beneficial defence policy, and effective armed forces to implement that policy.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Belzile  
Lieutenant-General (Retired)  
Chairman

cc:  
Minister of National Defence  
Minister of Finance

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