As NATO leaders gathered in Ankara this week for the Alliance’s 36th summit, the official agenda spoke of defence investment, industrial production, and support for Ukraine. The real agenda was different. Three alliance-wide issues shaped this Summit.
First, avoiding open confrontation. The Summit was designed to be short, heavy on announcements, and light on opportunities for public rupture. It is worth being candid about what these gatherings have become. Ever since Donald Trump returned to the White House, the primary purpose of any NATO Summit has been, first and foremost, to avoid a rupture with him. Everything else is secondary: the choreography, the list of deliverables, the carefully calibrated flattery–Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent catch phrase “The Trump Trillion” being the latest example.
This is not a criticism of Rutte, who faces a delicate balancing act. It is a recognition that alliance management now consumes diplomatic energy that should be spent on deterring Russia. Success in Ankara will be measured less by what is decided than by what is avoided.
The second issue is whether Allies can actually spend the money they committed to at the Hague last year; the much-vaunted 5 per cent of GDP pledge — 3.5 per cent on hard defence, 1.5 per cent on defence-adjacent spending. The debate now is about how fast that money will be spent, and, more importantly, what actual capabilities it will buy. Significant uncertainty remains, however, whether those commitments will be met in time.
Prime Minister Carney, for instance, claimed at CANSEC in May that Canada will reach 4 percent of GDP in total defence spending by the end of the decade. The details are sparse: the government has refused to release the data behind that claim. Europe, for its part, is running into serious problems rapidly expanding its defence industrial capacity, and its flagship programs keep stumbling. Last month, Germany and France finally pulled the plug on the fighter jet at the heart of their Future Combat Air System — Europe’s most ambitious defence project, estimated at €80-100 billion — after nearly a decade of industrial squabbling between Dassault and Airbus. Two weeks later, Berlin cancelled its roughly €10 billion F126 frigate program, the largest surface combatant project in postwar German naval history, after the shipbuilder admitted it could deliver neither on time nor on budget, with cost-to-complete estimates ballooning toward €18 billion.
Unfortunately, these are not isolated procurement mishaps but symptoms of a defence industrial base and a politico-strategic culture that atrophied over three decades of the peace dividend and cannot be rebuilt by communiqué.
The primary constraint is political. ECFR’s latest pan-European poll, conducted in May across 15 countries, found that while Europeans increasingly favour higher defence spending in the abstract, a plurality oppose prioritizing defence when forced to choose against other public spending — with outright majorities against in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Europeans want to be defended; they are far less enthusiastic about trading welfare, health, and education spending for it. It is reasonable to expect similar shifts in public opinion in Canada as the eventual trade-offs become clearer to the public. Any government that ignores this will find populists on both flanks ready to exploit the grievance.
The third issue follows from the second: how fast can European NATO develop the capabilities that reduce its reliance on the United States? The concern — rarely stated this bluntly in public — is that America’s slow conventional decoupling from European defence will create a vulnerability gap. Washington has already announced phased withdrawals of military assets from Europe. If the Americans withdraw faster than the Europeans can fill the gap, there will be a window — perhaps years long — in which Europe is neither defended by America nor able to defend itself against a reconstituting Russian threat.
Everyone in Ankara understands that the future of NATO will be more European — in fielded forces, in command and control, and in leadership. The question is not whether but how fast, and whether the timelines of American withdrawal and European capability development can be synchronized. This is also why non-EU allies, particularly the United Kingdom and Turkey, have become central to the equation. Turkey’s defence industry, manpower, and geography make it indispensable to any serious European defence architecture, whatever discomfort that causes in certain European capitals, and despite its budgetary challenges, the UK remains a key cornerstone of NATO, from deployments in the Eastern Flank to nuclear deterrence.
For the Carney government there is a strong role for Canada to play as the “other North American country” within a more European-led NATO. Canada as a founding member of a European-led capability coalition within NATO, with Canadian industrial content, is the story Carney wants to tell in Ankara.
For that purpose the most important announcement of the week came the day before the Summit, dockside in Halifax, when Prime Minister Carney named TKMS as the preferred supplier for up to 12 new submarines — the largest defence procurement in Canadian history. We can expect Carney to re-announce it in Ankara, and with good reason: choosing the German-Norwegian Type 212CD embeds Canada in a European production line and signals commitment to the defence of the Arctic and the North Atlantic, alongside NATO partners Germany and Norway.
This closer integration with the European defence ecosystem was reinforced on the Summit’s first day, when NATO announced it will negotiate to buy up to 10 Saab GlobalEye early warning aircraft, built on Bombardier jets manufactured in Toronto. This follows Canada’s decision in May to acquire six GlobalEye aircraft..
However, a note of caution is warranted. Both the submarines and the GlobalEye procurements have yet to reach contract negotiations. This process will take months, possibly longer, and there may yet be bumps in the road on price, workshare, technology transfer, and delivery schedules. Potential roadblocks also remain on the American side when it comes to incorporating GlobalEye to NORAD functions. Canada’s procurement history counsels humility. Preferred-supplier announcements are not contracts, and contracts are not capabilities.
The Hague announced commitments. Ankara was about finding ways to turn those commitments into actual policy and capability, all while keeping the president of the United States content. On that last count, at least, success can be declared. As for the rest, the jury will be out for years. That, in the end, was the theme of this entire Summit.
Dr. Balkan Devlen is a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the Montreal Institute for Global Security, and the co-founder of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory.
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
