It is almost time for Canadians to see who Ottawa has selected to build its new fleet of diesel-electric submarines. Having moved the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) to the front of the queue of Canada’s defence procurement, the Carney government is slated to announce whether South Korea’s Hanwha KSS-III or the German-Norwegian ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) Type 212CD submarine will be the newest addition to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), bringing profound changes to how Canada will utilize and leverage its naval power.
In acquiring 12 modern submarines to replace the outdated Victoria-class fleet, Ottawa aims to provide the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) with advanced platforms for better defence posturing to detect, deter, and engage adversarial forces in the Arctic, while also increasing Canada’s force projection in key maritime theatres in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
In recent months, there has been extensive spotlight on the CPSP, not solely because of its multigenerational impact on Canada’s undersea capabilities, but because of Ottawa’s push, following the release of its Defence Industrial Strategy, to pursue more direct industrial investment in Canada. Ottawa has gone so far as to communicate that its procurement decision on the CPSP will depend heavily on accompanying investments here at home.
Both companies have acknowledged this request and have put forward substantial streams of promises and memorandums of understanding with Canadian industry, academia, and small- and medium-sized enterprises relating to steel-manufacturing capacity, sovereign sustainment capabilities, satellite communications, advanced artificial intelligence technologies and software, sensors and data systems, armament co-production, or upskilling Canada’s shipbuilding workforce.
While the investment promises will have significant impacts for helping build up Canada’s defence industrial base, they have unfortunately created a bidding war environment where concerns over domestic industrial investments have taken over capability requirement discussions.
This shift in Canadian defence procurement is concerning because it risks prioritizing industrial returns over the operational capabilities that will ultimately define Canada’s naval power. This is best illustrated by the two submarines offering drastically different operational capabilities that will fundamentally reshape RCN undersea capabilities no matter the industrial investments.
Thus far, all we know about the procurement program is that Canada’s next submarine fleet must possess the capability requirements of stealth, lethality, persistence, and Arctic deployability.
On paper, both the KSS-III and Type 212CD fulfill the persistence and Arctic deployability requirement as both platforms use a hydrogen fuel-cell air-independent propulsion (AIP) system and lithium-ion batteries. In using this propulsion system, both submarines have the capacity to remain submerged for prolonged periods without snorkeling to recharge their batteries – this capability is vital for Arctic operations, where the RCN will need to conduct persistent under-ice operations year-round.
When it comes to submerged endurance, the KSS-III can remain submerged for 3 weeks, while the Type 212CD is stipulated to remain submerged for up to 41 days – the Type 212A, on which it is based, has a submerged capability of 3 weeks.
For surface range, the KSS-III can travel more than 7,000 nm, although the recent visit by the ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho travelled over 7,500 nm when it voyaged to CFB Esquimalt, British Columbia, this spring. Although there is no publicly available data on the Type 212CD’s surface range, the Type 212A has a range of 8,000 nm.
On stealth and lethality requirements, this is where the two submarines diverge.
On paper, the Type 212CD offers profound stealth capabilities, in part due to its unique diamond shape design, which stipulates a significant target echo strengthening (TES) reduction. In addition, the use of fully non-magnetic construction materials will further grant better resistance to magnetic anomaly detection (MAD). By contrast, the KSS-III offers a well-silenced conventional teardrop hull made of HY-100 steel with anechoic coatings.
For lethality, the KSS-III holds a qualitatively different strike capacity by having a 10-cell vertical-launch system (K-VLS) that is capable of deploying the Hyunmoo-4-4 land-attack cruise missile and Hyunmoo series submarine-launched ballistic missiles – a rare capability among non-nuclear submarines. In addition, the KSS-III also carries six 533-mm torpedo tubes for the Tiger Shark HWT and UGM-84 Harpoon.
In contrast, the Type 212CD has no VLS and instead has armament centres for four to eight 533-mm torpedo tubes. Currently, the only armament ready to be used on the Type 212CD is the DM2A4 heavyweight torpedo. With that said, TKMS is in the development phase on a SeaSpider hard-kill anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT), a sub-launched Joint Strike Missile, and a supersonic anti-ship/land-attack strike missile. Lastly, TKMS is also developing the IDAS missile system, which allows the submarine to engage airborne threats without surfacing.
This divergence brings to the fore an interesting doctrinal question for the RCN: should Canada’s next generation of submarines prioritize acoustic stealth or weapons payload capacity?
The argument for stealth-optimized conventional submarines rests on a paradox that the submarine that cannot be found is more strategically valuable than the submarine that carries more weapons. An unlocated submarine requires an adversary to divert anti-submarine warfare assets – surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, towed-array sonar systems – to the task of finding it. This diversion degrades the adversary’s capacity for offensive operations and forces a dispersal of effort that compounds over time.
The firepower argument, meanwhile, is reinforced by a more multilayered lethality prospect. A submarine capable of anti-submarine, anti-surface, and land warfare – equipped with VLS and tube-launched missiles – can impose multiple simultaneous threats that constrain and overwhelm an adversary’s defensive planning. Beyond sea control, this capability enables strategic strike options that can hold onshore command and control infrastructure, logistics nodes, airfields, and missile systems at risk. In combination with destroyers, corvettes, and fast-attack craft, such submarines can contribute to distributed lethality, increasing the navy’s overall stand-off striking power in ways that are difficult to neutralize.
The stealth versus firepower debate has profound implications for Canada’s decision on submarines because of the operational environment these platforms will be deployed in.
In the Arctic, intensifying state competition will see critical sea lanes contested for control, which will directly erode Canadian sovereignty – making anti-submarine and anti-surface capabilities not optional but essential. In the Indo-Pacific, China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities, backed by its militarized artificial islands, and a rapidly expanding submarine fleet, are aggressively contesting undersea dominance across the South China Sea. In Europe, Russian submarines and aerial drones threaten NATO’s alliance deterrence while its grey-zone operations undermine Europe’s undersea infrastructure and sea lanes.
Across all three theatres, Canada will need submarines that possess an extensive offensive firepower capability to credibly showcase deterrence, project power, and, if necessary, engage in stand-off combat operations at a scale that Canada has never fielded.
With these considerations in mind, Canada should proceed with Hanwha’s proposal and acquire the KSS-III submarine. The decision for selecting the KSS-III rests on the following conclusions.
First, with substantial offensive firepower capabilities combined with its persistence and deployability for operations in the Arctic, the KSS-III has the capacity to optimize forward deployable presence with critical stand-off capabilities that can assist the RCN to become a legitimate and competitive maritime force in home waters.
Second, these capabilities also offer Canada the ability to become a more critical partner by expanding the RCN’s blue-water operational reach and force projection to shape and, when necessary, restore order to the international system.
Lastly, and most importantly, the KSS-III is a completed and in-service platform, unlike the TKMS Type 212CD, which is not yet in active service. By contrast, the KSS-III has three submarines already in operation, along with tested weapons, combat systems, and a resilient supply chain capable of delivering the submarines Canada urgently needs now.
The CPSP has been a long-drawn-out process that has altered how Canadians see its submarine capability. Yet despite this, one constant remains: Canada requires submarines that can operate in a more competitive, contested, and increasingly turbulent period.
Not only does the KSS-III provide Canada with capabilities to meet the challenges of today and the future, but it also stands to fundamentally change the tone for how the RCN projects power, ensures deterrence, and, if necessary, credibly engages in combat.
Andrew Erskine is a Fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network, a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy, and a Nonresident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
