For years, Canada and Japan have talked about being “natural” strategic partners. Both are advanced democracies, maritime nations, G7 members, and champions of a rules-based international order. Both countries are facing rising security threats in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. However, the ties between the two are no longer simply limited to multilateral groupings and are rightly evolving to address shared security challenges.
However, while they enjoy a robust political relationship, there has been little defence-industrial cooperation between them to match their broader strategic aspirations.
That is beginning to change.
This month, Defence Minister David McGuinty will lead a Team Canada trade mission to Japan aimed at expanding the countries’ defence-industrial and trade relationship.
In the last year, Ottawa and Tokyo have quietly laid the foundations for what may become one of the most consequential strategic alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. New agreements – along with significant reform to Japan’s defence export policies – have provided opportunities that were unlikely just a few short years ago.
The biggest news arrived in January 2026, when Canada and Japan inked an Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement (ETTA), providing a framework for defence technology transfer, industrial co-operation, and joint development projects. The ETTA followed Japan’s ratification of the Canada-Japan Security of Information Agreement (SIA), which established the necessary legal safeguards for exchanging classified information and sensitive defence technologies.
These two agreements – collectively representing far more than simply administrative milestones – provide the necessary basis for Canadian and Japanese companies to collaborate on cutting-edge defence technologies, secure and reliable supply chains, R&D initiatives, and future military capabilities.
And the timing could not be better.
The geopolitical environment surrounding both countries has dramatically deteriorated. Russia’s aggressive actions in Europe; the growing uncertainty in the Arctic; North Korea’s expanding missile arsenal; and China’s increasingly assertive military posture – all illustrate why trusted defence partners are essential. Moreover, both Canada and Japan are seeking to diversify their supply chains, and mitigate risks associated with their dependence upon a small number of suppliers.
The burgeoning defence-industrial relationship between the two countries received further reinforcement in March 2026 when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi formally introduced a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The CSP emphasizes defence-industrial cooperation in areas like artificial intelligence (AI); autonomous systems; cybersecurity; and space security. Furthermore, the CSP Roadmap outlines commitments by both governments to increase security and defence cooperation through increased interoperability and industrial cooperation.
Of perhaps greatest significance, however, is the dramatic change taking place inside Japan itself.
For decades, Japan maintained some of the world’s most restrictive defence export regulations. Those restrictions, rooted largely in Japan’s post-war experience, limited Japanese companies’ ability to compete globally and discouraged collaboration with foreign partners.
Japan is changing that landscape. In 2024, Tokyo began to implement a series of reforms to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, permitting greater flexibility regarding defence exports and international industrial cooperation. Japan’s decision to allow defence-related exports related to the Global Combat Air Program represented a major turning point in Japan’s defence policy. Subsequent reforms reflect a growing recognition in Tokyo that sustaining a viable defence-industrial base requires participating in global markets and partnerships.
Canada is well-positioned to step into that opening – across sectors from unmanned maritime systems to AI and cybersecurity to space security.
Among the most promising areas is unmanned maritime systems – especially unmanned underwater vehicles. Canada and Japan are both maritime states, responsible for a large portion of the world’s oceans. Japan faces escalating challenges related to monitoring activities near its southwest islands and vital sea-lanes. Simultaneously, Canada is encountering mounting security demands in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.
Each country needs improved maritime domain awareness. Each needs inexpensive means of monitoring vast underwater expanses. And both are becoming increasingly concerned about securing critical undersea infrastructure including submarine telecommunication cable, energy infrastructure, and newly-emerging seabed resources.
Canadian companies have developed expertise in underwater sensing, AI, ocean technology, and operating in Arctic regions. Japanese industry has demonstrated world-class abilities in robotics, advanced manufacturing, sensors, battery technology, and maritime engineering. Collaborating on unmanned underwater vehicle technology could lead to systems that operate effectively in contested maritime environments.
In fact, Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service has designated unmanned underwater vehicles, autonomous systems, maritime surveillance technologies, and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance capabilities as priority areas for Canada-Japan cooperation.
Opportunities exist well beyond underwater drones.
Another high-priority area includes AI-enabled command-and-control systems. As each military continues to confront exponentially growing amounts of sensor data from satellites, autonomous systems, and sensors, AI-driven decision-support tools will play a significantly enhanced role.
Cybersecurity represents yet another obvious area of potential. With growing threats confronting critical infrastructure, government networks, and defence systems, closer co-ordination among trusted partners is imperative. The recent information-sharing agreement provides an important foundation for expanded cyber-cooperation.
Similarly, space security deserves greater focus. Canada and Japan share common concerns about the vulnerability of space-based assets and the increasing militarization of the space domain. Joint development of satellite technologies, space-situational-awareness-capabilities, and resilient communication architectures can produce mutual advantages.
Finally, critical minerals, and defence-supply-chain resiliency present still additional opportunities. Canada is home to abundant reserves of strategically important minerals used in advanced batteries and defence technologies. Japan remains a leading manufacturer in the world today, as it relates to industrial innovation. A closer defence-industrial relationship can reinforce resilience on both sides of the Pacific.
All of this will not occur by accident. Governments will need to reduce regulatory obstacles and establish incentives for collaborative industrial engagement. Defence companies will need to gain familiarity with each other’s procurement processes and industrial ecosystems. Similarly, academic institutions, research organizations, and innovation centers will need to be included in conversations.
However, the trend-line is clear. The Canada-Japan relationship is no longer comprised solely of diplomatic discussions and military exercises. Rather, it is transforming into something more substantial: a partnership capable of developing and producing the technologies that will define future security.
When trusted partners are more valuable than ever before, Canada and Japan have an exceptional opportunity. The next stage is converting that potential into tangible cooperative efforts between industries to enhance security, create jobs, and improve resilience on both sides of the Pacific.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is principal and co-founder of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory. He is also a senior fellow on the Indo-Pacific for the Montreal Institute for Global Security, the Macdonald Laurier Institute and the Asian Forum Japan.
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its staff, or the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
