



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

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Creating an Acquisition Model That Delivers

Higher Education and the Profession of Arms in Canada

Arctic Sovereignty and the New Government

The Difference Asian Multipolarity Makes



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<i>Our Cover</i>	<i>La couverture</i>
<p>Private Eric Hennie, a member from the Provincial Reconstruction Team Patrol Company, at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar, Afghanistan, checks the rear as his section proceeds on a foot patrol in Kandahar City through a rural area. The soldiers were on a presence patrol. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is composed of some 250 soldiers mainly from Land Force Western Area and 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. / Le soldat Eric Hennie, membre de la compagnie de patrouille de l'Équipe provinciale de reconstruction du camp Nathan Smith, à Kandahar (Afghanistan), surveille les arrières alors que sa section patrouille à pied une zone rurale de Kandahar. Il s'agit pour les soldats d'une patrouille de présence. L'Équipe provinciale de reconstruction (EPR) se compose d'environ 250 soldats. La plupart de ces derniers viennent du Secteur de l' 'Ouest de la Force terrestre et du 1er Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada.</p>	

The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

The views expressed in *ON TRACK* are those of the authors.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

This Spring edition of ON TRACK features articles of current significance in the areas of , among others, equipment acquisition for the military, defence and strategic concerns both at home and abroad, military education, Arctic sovereignty, Iraq, and the health of our troops. I write this, coming off the most successful seminar the CDA Institute has held, to date.

Our 22nd annual seminar, presented in collaboration with the Chair of Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, was held on the 23rd of February. Its theme, *NATO in Transition: Its Impact on Canada*, was a timely one, given the transformation of the Canadian Forces now underway. The Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to capacity. There was significant media interest in the seminar during which simultaneous translation was provided for the first time in a number of years. I am pleased to note the feedback we have received has been very positive.



MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

Le numéro du printemps de *ON TRACK* présente des articles qui ont une importance actuelle dans les domaines des préoccupations touchant, entre autres, l'acquisition des équipements militaires, la défense et la stratégie, ici-même et à l'étranger, de l'éducation militaire, de la souveraineté de l'Arctique, de l'Iraq et de la santé de nos militaires. J'écris ces lignes au sortir du séminaire le mieux réussi que l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense (ICAD) ait tenu jusqu'à ce jour.

Notre 22^e séminaire annuel, présenté en collaboration avec le président des Études en gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's et l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, a été tenu le 23 février. Son thème, "*L'otan en transition: l'impact sur le Canada*", arrivait à point nommé, étant donné la transformation des Forces canadiennes qui est présentement en cours. La salle de bal de l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier, dans laquelle le séminaire avait lieu, était remplie à capacité. Les médias ont manifesté un vif intérêt envers le séminaire, pendant lequel on offrait pour la première fois l'interprétation simultanée depuis un bon nombre d'années. Je suis heureux de noter que le retour d'information que nous avons reçu fut très positif.

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The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, senators and members of Parliament, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College, and members of the Canadian public. The day was filled with prominent speakers from across Canada and from the United States and Europe. Addresses included those of the Honourable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence; His Excellency Omar Samad, Afghan Ambassador to Canada; the Chief of the Defence Staff; the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

Copies of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2006/presentations06.htm>. Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh presents for the readers of *ON TRACK* a summary of the seminar and of the CDA annual general meeting which followed the seminar. Both the CDAI's 22nd annual seminar and the CDA's 69th annual general meeting were truly successful, reflecting the public's heightened interest in matters of security and national defence. Our challenge is for all of us to maintain the high level of professional interest in the Institute and its work.

The highlight of the seminar luncheon was the presentation by His Excellency Omar Samad of his address to the luncheon guests, during which he described the conditions in Afghanistan under which Coalition Forces are working to bring stability to his war-torn country. He emphasized that his countrymen are tired of war and want for peace so that they can live their lives in a secure and normal environment. He thanked Canada for the contribution and sacrifices that Canadians have made in helping the Afghan people take back their country from the Taliban fighters and Al Qaeda terrorists.

The presence of so many eminent speakers from around the world was made possible through the generous financial support of Boeing, Bombardier, Canadian Heritage, the Department of National Defence, Foreign Affairs Canada, General Dynamics, Magna, and NATO. Following the conclusion of the seminar was the reception, graciously hosted by General Dynamics.

The 69th AGM began with a meeting of the CDA Council on Wednesday, and carried on with the general meeting on Friday, following the seminar. Of particular interest was the very informative presentation by the former Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Mr. Jayson Spiegel. His address was followed by an outstanding presentation by the Chief of the Defence Staff,

Ont assisté au séminaire des membres des Forces canadiennes, des sénateurs et députés du Parlement, des attachés militaires, des élèves officiers du Collège militaire royal et des membres du public canadien. Toute la journée se sont suivis d'éminents conférenciers venant de tous les coins du Canada, ainsi que des États-Unis et de l'Europe. Parmi les allocutions, on compte celle de l'Honorable Gordon O'Connor, ministre de la Défense nationale, de Son Excellence Omar Samad, ambassadeur de l'Afghanistan au Canada, du Chef d'état-major de la Défense, du président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN, et du Commandant suprême allié - Transformation de l'OTAN.

On peut se procurer des copies des allocutions prononcées au séminaire à l'adresse <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2006/presentations06.htm>. Le Colonel (retraité) Howard Marsh présente aux lecteurs de *ON TRACK* un sommaire du séminaire et de l'assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD, qui s'enchaînait au séminaire. Le 22^e séminaire annuel de la CAD et sa 69^e assemblée générale annuelle ont été un franc succès, reflétant l'intérêt plus aigu du public envers les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Notre défi, à tous et chacun d'entre nous, c'est de maintenir le niveau élevé d'intérêt professionnel envers l'Institut et son travail.

Le point saillant du déjeuner du séminaire fut la présentation qu'adressait Son Excellence Omar Samad aux invités, dans laquelle il a décrit les conditions qui sévissent en Afghanistan sous lesquelles les Forces de coalition travaillent pour apporter la stabilité à ce pays ravagé par la guerre. Il a souligné que ses compatriotes sont fatigués de la guerre et qu'ils désirent la paix pour pouvoir vivre leur vie dans un environnement sécuritaire et normal. Il a remercié le Canada pour la contribution et les sacrifices que les Canadiennes et les Canadiens ont fait en aidant la population afghane à reprendre son pays des mains des combattants talibans et les terroristes d'Al Qaida.

La présence de si nombreux orateurs éminents venant de tous les coins du globe a été rendue possible grâce au généreux appui financier de Boeing, de Bombardier, de Patrimoine canadien, du ministère de la Défense nationale, d'Affaires étrangères Canada, de General Dynamics, de Magna et de l'OTAN. Suite à la conclusion du séminaire, il y eut une réception gracieusement offerte par General Dynamics.

La 69^e AGA a débuté par une réunion du conseil d'administration de la CAD, le mercredi, et s'enchaîna à la réunion de l'assemblée générale, le vendredi, après le séminaire. On a noté avec un intérêt particulier la présentation très instructive de l'ancien directeur général de la "Reserve Officers Association" des États-Unis, M. Jayson Spiegel. Son allocution fut suivie d'une présentation hors-pair par le Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le Général Rick Hillier.

General Rick Hillier. General Hillier's address was followed by a first rate panel, *CF Transformation*. The panel moderator was Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman CDA, who was ably assisted in the discussion by Major-General Walter Natynczyk, Chief Transformation, and Major-General Andrew Leslie, Director General Strategic Planning.

Later in the day, a second panel provided the audience with further insight in the ongoing transformation of the Canadian Forces. Panelists assisting the moderator, Lieutenant-General Evraire, were Major-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, Vice-Admiral "J-Y" Forcier, Commander Canada Command, and Major-General Herb Petras, Chief Reserves and Cadets.

I am very pleased to report that the newly enlarged Board of Directors of the CDA Institute held their first meeting, following the conclusion of the seminar. The Members of the Board represent a cross-section of outstanding Canadians. Please refer to page 2 of *ON TRACK* for a listing of the Board Members.

On Friday evening the Army Officers Mess was the scene for CDA's annual mess dinner. The dinner represented the largest gathering of supporters of CDA, as well as many who participated in the annual seminar and AGM. During the dinner CDA presented a magnificent sculpture by Colonel (Ret'd) André Gauthier to Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, who accepted *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* on behalf of the men and women serving in the Canadian Forces. The sculpture is a faithful representation of a combat soldier. *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* was presented in recognition of the significant and outstanding contribution of the members of the Canadian Forces to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The Warrior / Le Guerrier was presented by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, CDA Chairman, on behalf of the Associations. Along with General Hillier, guests of the CDA included the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Gordon O'Connor; former Minister of National Defence, the Honourable David Pratt; and former Chiefs of the Defence Staff General (Ret'd) Jean Boyle, General (Ret'd) John De Chastelain, Admiral (Ret'd) Robert Falls, General Ray Henault, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, General (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers, and former Acting Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray.

Celle-ci fut suivie par un panel de premier ordre intitulé "*La Transformation des FC*". L'animateur du panel était le Lieutenant-Général (retraité) Richard Evraire, président de la CAD, qui fut assisté dans la discussion par les compétences du Major-Général Walter Natynczyk, Chef - Transformation, et du Major-Général Andrew Leslie, Directeur général - Planification stratégique.

Plus tard dans la journée, un deuxième panel a donné à l'auditoire un aperçu de plus près de la transformation des Forces canadiennes présentement en cours. Les panélistes qui assistaient l'animateur, le Lieutenant-Général Evraire, étaient le Major-Général Michel Gauthier, Commandant du Commandement du Corps expéditionnaire canadien, le Vice-Amiral "J-Y" Forcier, Commandant du Commandement Canada et le Major-Général Herb Petras, Chef - Réserves et cadets.

J'ai le grand plaisir de rapporter que le conseil d'administration de l'ICAD, nouvellement élargi, a tenu sa première réunion suite à la conclusion du séminaire. Les membres du conseil constituent une coupe représentative de Canadiens exceptionnels. Vous pourrez consulter, à la page 2 de *ON TRACK*, une liste des membres du conseil d'administration.

Le vendredi soir, le mess des officiers de l'armée fut la scène du dîner annuel de la CAD. Le dîner représentait la plus importante réunion de supporters de la CAD, ainsi que de plusieurs de ceux qui avaient participé au séminaire annuel et à l'AGA. Pendant le dîner, la CAD a présenté une magnifique sculpture, exécutée par le Colonel (retraité) André Gauthier, au Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le Général Rick Hillier, qui a accepté *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* au nom des femmes et des hommes qui servent dans les Forces canadiennes. La sculpture est une représentation fidèle d'un soldat. *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* fut présenté en reconnaissance de la contribution significative et exceptionnelle des membres des Forces canadiennes à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

The Warrior / Le Guerrier fut présenté par le Lieutenant-Général (retraité) Richard Evraire, président de la CAD, au nom des Associations. Autour du Général Hillier, les invités de la CAD étaient le ministre de la Défense nationale, l'Honorable Gordon O'Connor, l'ancien ministre de la Défense nationale, l'Honorable David Pratt, et l'ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense (retraité) le Général Jean Boyle, le Général (retraité) John De Chastelain, l'Amiral (retraité) Robert Falls, le Général Ray Henault, le Général (retraité) Paul Manson, le Général (retraité) Ramsey Withers, et l'ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense par intérim, le Vice-Amiral (retraité) Larry Murray.

Our front cover for this edition of *ON TRACK* features a member of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Patrol Company at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PTR) brings together Canadian military personnel, civilian police, diplomats, and aid workers in an integrated effort to reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar, and to help stabilize the region.

The deployment of the PRT puts in place the policy of the three Ds of defence, diplomacy, and development that were spelled out, last year by Ottawa, in the government's International Policy Statement. Canadians serving in Afghanistan bring credibility to Canada's willingness to aid in the establishment of order in an unstable world. Canadians should be proud of the men and women in uniform who serve with honour. We are pleased that Stephen Harper honoured our Canadian Forces serving in Afghanistan with his first foreign visit as Prime Minister.

The Vimy Papers, a series of monographs each of which will offer expert opinion and factual commentary on a specific and important subject related to national defence, is an initiative of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. This inaugural Vimy Paper, entitled 'Creating an Acquisition Model That Delivers', lays out a concise yet comprehensive picture of the crisis that exists in Canada today in the realm of defence acquisition and, most importantly, as its title suggests, offers a way of resolving this crisis. We are pleased to include in *ON TRACK* a summary, by General Paul Manson, CDAI President, of the Vimy Paper.

In 'Higher Education and the Profession of Arms in Canada' Dr. Cowan provides us with an historical perspective of how valuable higher education was in the formation of our very successful military leaders. Dr. John Scott Cowan, Principal at Royal Military College, Vice-President of the CDA Institute and member of the Institute's Board of Directors, argues that higher education is an important asset for the men and women serving in the Canadian Forces.

Major-General (Ret'd) Terry Liston examines the challenges for the creation of an embryonic Canadian Special Operations Forces Command as a virtual fourth service. He argues in 'What Kind of Special Operations for Canada?' that our combat arms ethos is similar to that of the US Marines, and presents a workable plan. Major-General Liston was formerly Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development of the Canadian Forces and past Colonel of the Royal 22e Régiment.

Notre couverture de ce numéro de *ON TRACK* met en vedette un membre de la compagnie de patrouille de l'Équipe de reconstruction provinciale au camp Nathan Smith, à Kandahar (Afghanistan). L'Équipe de reconstruction provinciale (ÉRP) réunit du personnel militaire canadien, des policiers civils, des diplomates et des travailleurs de l'aide dans un effort intégré visant à renforcer l'autorité du gouvernement afghan dans Kandahar et aux alentours, et pour aider à stabiliser la région.

Le déploiement de l'ÉRP met en place la politique des trois D de défense, diplomatie et développement proposée l'an dernier par Ottawa, dans l'Énoncé de politique internationale du gouvernement. Les Canadiens qui servent en Afghanistan apportent une crédibilité à la volonté du Canada de contribuer à l'établissement de l'ordre dans un monde instable. Les Canadiens devraient être fiers des hommes et des femmes en uniforme qui servent avec honneur. Nous sommes heureux de voir que Stephen Harper a honoré nos Forces canadiennes servant en Afghanistan en faisant d'elles l'objet de son premier voyage à l'étranger en tant que Premier ministre.

Les Cahiers Vimy, série de monographies, dont chacune offrira une opinion d'expert et un commentaire factuel sur un sujet spécifique et important ayant trait à la défense nationale, est une initiative de l'ICAD. Ce Cahier Vimy inaugural, intitulé '*La Création d'un modèle d'acquisition qui donne des résultats*', expose une image concise mais complète de la crise qui sévit présentement au Canada dans le domaine des acquisitions de défense et, le plus important, comme le suggère son titre, c'est qu'il offre une façon de résoudre cette crise. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans *ON TRACK* un sommaire du Cahier par le Général Paul Manson, président de l'ICAD.

Dans l'article '*Higher Education and the Profession of Arms in Canada*', M. John Scott Cowan nous donne un aperçu historique de la valeur qu'ont eu les études supérieures dans la formation de nos chefs militaires émérites. M. Cowan, principal du Collège militaire royal, vice-président de l'ICAD et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut, fait valoir que les études supérieures sont un atout d'importance pour les hommes et les femmes qui servent dans les Forces canadiennes.

Le Major-Général (retraité) Terry Liston examine les défis soulevés par la création d'un embryon de Commandement des Forces d'opération spéciales du Canada comme quatrième service virtuel. Dans '*What Kind of Special Operations for Canada?*', il affirme que notre éthos d'armes de combat est semblable à celui des Marines américains, et il présente un plan réalisable. Le Major-Général Liston fut jadis chef - Planification opérationnelle et Développement des Forces

Dr. Rob Huebert has provided us with an informed perspective of the challenges the Federal Government faces in implementing its stated aims to invest in the defence and security of Canada's North. In 'Arctic Sovereignty and the New Government' he outlines the factors that will impact on success of the Government's northern intentions. Dr. Huebert, a specialist in sovereignty issues, teaches at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

Monsieur Louis Delvoie has provided for us a very informative examination of the roots of the current chaos that prevails, today, in Iraq. He writes, in 'Iraq: A Political-Military Quagmire', that the sources of opposition and violence in Iraq are varied and distinct, and fall broadly into six different categories. Monsieur Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.

Asia-watchers have noted the shift eastward of the world's strategic centre of gravity. This shift was heralded by the amazing rise of China. Meanwhile, developments in India, Thailand, Japan and even Russia from 1995 to 2005 proceeded apace but were not fully integrated into the image of tomorrow's Asia. Ms Kerry Lynn Nankivell examines this omission and the consideration of a regional structure of tomorrow's Asia in 'The Difference Asian Multipolarity Makes'. Ms Nankivell is an analyst with the Office of the Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific.

Given the public's interest in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, we are fortunate that Maître Sylvain Beauchamp has provided us with a timely explanation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which is aimed at the protection of persons taking no active part in hostilities, including armed forces members who have laid down their arms and those placed '*hors de combat*'.

In 'The Continuing Relevance of International Humanitarian Law' he notes the ongoing debate about whether IHL is adequate in providing the necessary level of humanitarian protection to the many victims of armed violence. Maître Beauchamp is Senior International Law Advisor to the Canadian Red Cross Society.

Brigadier-General Hilary Jaeger, the Canadian Forces' Surgeon General, has written in 'Mental Health Care in the Canadian Forces' that no mission can succeed without fit, healthy and ready personnel to carry it out. She has provided

canadiennes et ancien colonel du Royal 22e Régiment.

M. Rob Huebert nous offre un aperçu informé des défis que le gouvernement fédéral devra affronter dans l'implémentation de son objectif affirmé d'investir dans la défense et la sécurité du Nord canadien. Dans '*Arctic Sovereignty and the New Government*', il souligne les facteurs qui auront un impact sur le succès des intentions nordiques du gouvernement. M. Huebert, spécialiste des questions de souveraineté, enseigne au Centre d'études militaires et stratégiques de l'Université de Calgary.

Monsieur Louis Delvoie nous a fourni un examen très instructif des racines du chaos actuel qui prévaut aujourd'hui en Iraq. Il écrit, dans '*Iraq: A Political-Military Quagmire*', que les sources d'opposition et de violence en Iraq sont variées et distinctes, et qu'elles se divisent largement en six catégories différentes. Monsieur Delvoie est agrégé supérieur de recherche au Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's.

Les observateurs de l'Asie ont noté le déplacement vers l'est du centre de gravité stratégique du monde. Ce déplacement a été annoncé par l'étonnante montée de la Chine. Pendant ce temps, les développements qui se sont produits en Inde, en Thaïlande et au Japon, et même en Russie, de 1995 à 2005, ont emboîté le pas mais ils n'étaient pas complètement intégrés à l'image de l'Asie de demain. Mme Kerry Lynn Nankivell examine cette omission et la considération d'une structure régionale de l'Asie de demain dans '*The Difference Asian Multipolarity Makes*'. Mme Nankivell est analyste au Bureau du conseiller spécial (Politiques), Forces maritimes du Pacifique.

Étant donné l'intérêt du public dans la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, nous avons la bonne fortune que Maître Sylvain Beauchamp nous ait fourni une explication à point nommé du Droit international humanitaire (DIH), qui vise la protection des personnes qui ne prennent aucune part active à des hostilités, y compris les membres des forces armées qui ont déposé leurs armes et ceux qui sont mis '*hors de combat*'.

Dans '*The Continuing Relevance of International Humanitarian Law*', il note le débat en cours, à savoir si le DIH est adéquat pour accorder le niveau nécessaire de protection humanitaire aux nombreuses victimes de la violence armée. Maître Beauchamp est conseiller principal en droit international auprès de la Société canadienne de la Croix-Rouge.

Le Brigadier-Général Hilary Jaeger, Directrice des Services de santé des Forces canadiennes, a écrit dans '*Mental Health Care in the Canadian Forces*' qu'aucune mission ne peut

us with important information regarding psychological fitness, an area of fitness and well-being that has not always received the attention that it deserves.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of excellent submissions that were received by the Vimy Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the Award to Mr. G. Hamilton Southam by the Honourable Bill Graham.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on Friday, 17 November at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau, Québec. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for the Award's recipient. CDA member associations, as well as individuals, are encouraged to submit nominations to the Institute. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2005 was Mr. Bruce Champion-Smith, of the *Toronto Star*. This prestigious award, sponsored in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented to a Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the general public of Canada's defence and security issues. The Award will be accompanied by a \$2,500 cash prize. The notice of the call for nominations appears elsewhere in *ON TRACK*.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, a charitable institution, needs the financial support of the pro-defence community of Canadians to remain effective in the debate on issues of security and national defence. With your support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. Your continued financial support as donors to the Institute is vital to our continuing success. Please renew your annual donation when you are asked - and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

réussir sans un personnel en forme, en santé et prêt à exécuter cette mission. Elle nous a donné d'importantes informations concernant la forme psychologique, un domaine de santé et de bien-être qui n'a pas toujours reçu l'attention qu'il mérite.

Une des activités majeures du calendrier de l'ICAD, c'est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un/e Canadien/ne pour sa contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès retentissant, avec le grand nombre d'excellentes soumissions qui ont été reçues par le Comité de sélection des Prix Vimy, et a atteint son point culminant avec la présentation du prix à M. G. Hamilton Southam par l'Honorable Bill Graham.

La présentation du prix Vimy de cette année aura lieu le vendredi 17 novembre, lors d'un dîner de gala qui sera tenu dans le Grand Hall du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau (Québec). Pour donner un véritable sens au prix, l'Institut a besoin de votre mise en candidature pour le récipiendaire du prix. Les associations membres de la CAD, ainsi que les individus, sont encouragés à soumettre des candidatures à l'Institut. Veuillez consulter l'avis d'appel de mises en candidatures qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro.

Le prix Ross Munro Media Award sera également présenté lors du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix pour 2005 était M. Bruce Champion-Smith du *Toronto Star*. Ce prix prestigieux commandité en collaboration avec la Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, sera remis à un journaliste canadien qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le grand public des questions de défense et de sécurité du Canada. Le prix sera accompagné d'un montant en argent de 2 500 \$. L'avis d'appel de mises en candidatures paraît ailleurs dans *ON TRACK*.

L'ICAD, institution caritative, a besoin de l'appui financier de la communauté des Canadiens favorables à la défense pour rester efficace dans le débat sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Avec votre appui, nous pouvons promouvoir l'étude et la prise de conscience des affaires militaires du Canada. Votre appui financier continu en tant que donateurs à l'Institut est vital pour la poursuite de notre succès. Veuillez renouveler votre don annuel lorsqu'on vous le demandera et faire connaître l'Institut à un concitoyen canadien.

VIMY PAPER NO. 1

CREATING AN ACQUISITION MODEL THAT DELIVERS

by General Paul Manson

Vimy Papers

The **Vimy Papers**, a series of monographs each of which will offer expert opinion and factual commentary on a specific and important subject related to national defence, is an initiative of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI).

The inaugural **Vimy Paper**, entitled '**CREATING AN ACQUISITION MODEL THAT DELIVERS**', lays out a concise yet comprehensive picture of the crisis that exists in Canada today in the realm of defence acquisition, and, most importantly, as its title suggests, offers a way of resolving this crisis.

The launch of this publication on 6 April 2006, hot on the heels of the election of a new Conservative Government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, is not a coincidence. The Paper very deliberately highlights, in the view of the CDAI and the Paper's authors, the urgent need for the new government to initiate and execute, under the leadership of the Honourable

General Paul Manson is the President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. General Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. He is the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2003.

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Gordon O'Connor, the newly appointed Minister of National Defence, changes to an equipment acquisition system that over the years has become dysfunctional to the point where procurement cycles of fifteen years or more are common.

Introduction

In a November 2005 *ON TRACK* article entitled 'Procurement Deferred is Policy Denied: The Major Impediments to Defence Procurement', the CDAI introduced the premise that the greatest gains in reducing the lengthy delays inherent in Canada's military equipment procurement system could be made through an examination of national acquisition strategies. Choosing earlier this year to further explore that premise, the CDAI assembled a team of experts the results of whose deliberations are contained in this first **Vimy Paper**.

The opening chapter of the Paper, written by Howie Marsh and myself, points to the deterioration and obsolescence of a large number of categories of military equipment that have been allowed by successive governments to go unchecked or unresolved over many years, and that have brought Canada's military to a critical stage. Unless this equipment is replaced now, the authors affirm, ongoing and planned operations will be severely restricted.

The authors also point to the fact that the Government is in an unenviable position. Faced with a backlog of expensive equipment replacement decisions, it must contend with an old procurement dilemma: which player should the process favour - Canadian industry, the federal bureaucracy, politicians or the military. Designing a new process that satisfies the expectations of the first three of these players without negatively affecting those of the fourth requires strong and innovative leadership.

The second chapter begins with a listing of five core objectives that the author, Pierre Lagueux, believes all acquisition strategies must satisfy if they are to ensure a consistent and timely outcome. These core **objectives** are:

- Ensuring that the Armed Forces receive the equipment that meets their approved and defined operational requirements;
- Meeting these equipment requirements in a timely manner;
- Ensuring that in the process, value for money is, and is seen to be, obtained;
- Equitably managing risk with industry; and,
- Facilitating governments' ability to use defence procurements as a lever to achieving other worthwhile "wider" objectives (industrial benefits, technology transfer, regional development, and so on).

Not unique to Canada, these objectives tend to be universally accepted, if perhaps unevenly managed, in most western Defence Departments. The fifth objective, that of facilitating government's ability to use defence procurement as a lever to achieving other worthwhile wider objectives is, according to Lagueux, often the most controversial. It is no less necessary to procurement success, however.

The author then offers the following ten key Defence Acquisition Strategy **attributes** he believes will lead to the attainment of the core objectives and to the successful implementation of the Strategy:

- A clear definition of the capability deficiency that needs to be rectified, as well as a clear indication of what is NOT to be included;
- early communication with industry on capability deficiency solutions, and NOT, in the early stages of the process, on equipment discussions;
- integrated government project teams staffed by skilled, knowledgeable people;
- explicit recognition of risk through the selection of a procurement strategy that inherently minimizes risk;
- use of performance specifications, especially for service contracts;
- consideration of supplier past performance;
- early, consistent determination of procurement strategies;
- a link between acquisition strategy and industrial base strategy;
- positive incentives for contractors; and
- realistic cash flow, and timelines with gates, before initiating projects.

While many of Lagueux's recommendations focus on internal Department of National Defence processes, they also touch upon issues that cross-departmental boundaries and that have an impact on how industry responds to requirements. If they are successfully implemented, the author suggests, significant benefits in terms of timeliness and predictability will accrue to all parties involved in defence acquisition.

Mindful of Mr. Lagueux's ten attributes of a successful defence acquisition strategy, four authors then undertake, in Chapters three to six, a brief review of naval, air force, army, and joint equipment acquisition approaches. Their findings are that:

- The Navy requires vessels with global reach, capable of going in harm's way. The high degree of technical sophistication required here is within the capacity of Canada's small but very capable and innovative shipbuilding industry. Adopting a 'continuous build' strategy (e.g., one new vessel every one to two years) offers a number of positive outcomes for all stakeholders – the Navy, the Federal Government and industry. Within the world's major warship market, Canadian industry is seen as cost-competitive. Additionally, Canada is in the unique position of possessing a shipbuilding capacity and domestic shipbuilding requirements, both government and commercial, that almost perfectly match. Satisfying our Navy's shipbuilding, conversion, refit and repair requirements should therefore simply be a matter of applying the existing shipbuilding policy and smoothing out the procurement cycles in order to ensure the industry has the needed capacity.
- Over the last several years, the Army has adopted a doctrine of integration of combat activity, a doctrine that has facilitated the attainment of commonality in a variety of weapon and other platforms, Information Age technologies, software and hardware. Convinced of the importance of clearly defining its future, it has, for some time now, successfully identified and established links to national providers - a strategy that will support the procurement of army equipment well into the next decade. The Army currently needs few decisions to complete its acquisition plan.
- Air force acquisition is characterized by relatively high cost and very long life cycle systems. Canada does not attempt to maintain a full spectrum of airpower, but the current and longer term strategic scene dictates the need for maintaining certain core

capabilities, namely control of the air, strategic airlift, tactical airlift, helicopter battlefield mobility, shipborne helicopter operations, strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and tactical air reconnaissance. Although not critical to future operations, there are benefits also in maintaining the quasi-military roles of search and rescue, Snowbirds, humanitarian assistance and VIP transport. Delays in aircraft procurement, in large measure the result of a dysfunctional acquisition system, have led to serious aging and the urgent need for acquiring certain key fleets. Although offshore, off-the-shelf procurement is the norm, the federal government should make maximum use of Canada's substantial aerospace industry to participate in these programs, thereby ensuring a viable life cycle support base for the new fleets and a thriving industry. A national industrial strategy for aerospace procurement is essential.

- The author of the acquisition of joint capabilities was much concerned, as joint capabilities have few product champions, and it can be argued that joint capabilities are the most neglected. However, the departmental imperative for integrated effects demands that joint capabilities be addressed early. The author advocates alternative procurement mechanisms that include sole-

sourcing, possibly without competition, as well as examining the effectiveness of wartime procurement based on the "Department of Defence Production" experience.

Summary

The authors support the contention that the lack of a coherent, national military equipment acquisition strategy is the *Achilles Heel* of existing procurement procedures and the single most important impediment to transforming and modernizing the Canadian Forces. Politicians need a decision-making template without which efforts to balance Regional industrial aspirations and military requirements could result in denying Canada's military the capabilities they so desperately need, and burdening the country and the military with inefficient outcomes.

Waiting for decisions and paying too much for military equipment may well result in the Canadian Forces consisting of three relatively ineffective Services or foregoing one of their current three Services. Neither of these two results is acceptable to Canadians.

Fixing the system, although necessary, will not suffice. A 'fixed' system must quickly be put to work to resolve the distressing state of the Canadian Forces' equipment holdings, some of which are beyond the critical stage as a consequence, over the past decade or two, of acquisition system difficulties and political foot-dragging.

CDAI 22ND ANNUAL SEMINAR: 23 FEBRUARY 2006

"NATO in Transition: The impact on Canada"

CDA 69TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING: 24 FEBRUARY 2006

"CF Transformation"

by Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh

The 22nd Annual CDA Institute Seminar and the 69th Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations were held in the Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel, Ottawa, on the 23rd and 24th of February 2006. It was clear to those attending these events that a new dynamic was in place. The

usually moderately full Chateau Laurier Ballroom was full to capacity; electronic and print media were in attendance; and senior officers and officials, present in large numbers, stayed to hear all the presentations.

The participation, as Keynote Speaker for the Seminar, of the newly appointed Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Gordon O'Connor, as well as that of the Chief of the Defence

Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh is the former CDAI Senior Defence Analyst

Staff, General Rick Hillier during major portions of the Seminar and the AGM, drew a large group of attendees eager to know more about the Conservative Government's recent pronouncements on defence and security issues and on the standing up, on 1 February 2006, of four new Canadian Forces Commands.

NATO in Transition: The impact on Canada

Following the Minister of National Defence's Keynote presentation (his first public pronouncement on defence issues since the election, and a copy of which can be found at www.cda-cdai.ca under 'Seminar'), General Ray Henault, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, emphasized the importance of understanding global transformation as a precursor to understanding NATO transformation.

He described the global dynamic of increasing integration and terrorism; threats he suggested were blurring the distinction between homeland defence and forward defence. He also pointed out that the broadening of relationships with the European Union, the Organization of African Unity and a number of Asia-Pacific countries has pulled NATO onto the global stage, as does the presence of 30,000 NATO troops worldwide, from the Balkans to Darfur to Afghanistan.

General Henault outlined the following four principal elements of NATO transformation:

- The adoption of a capability-based approach and greater interoperability;
- Preparation for expeditionary operations;
- A NATO Response Force of 20,000 to 25,000 service members; and
- Transformation of the political decision-making process.

Dr. Alexander Moen, Simon Fraser University, spoke of what he termed the 'storms of change'. The first of these, he contends, occurred at the end of the Cold War with the end of superpower tension and the emergence of national aspirations; changes that drew NATO into Croatia and Bosnia. The second storm has its roots in 9/11 when the United States' unilateral action changed the strategic landscape.

Dr. Moen then went on to describe the effects of these two storms on European and American military capability. In his view, the American expeditionary capacity has grown and has created a wide Europe-America military capability divide. That few European countries have an expeditionary capability is particularly worrisome to him, given the approaching Middle East storm.

Mr. James Appathurai, NATO Spokesperson, spoke very eloquently and emphasized the value of the NATO military alliance. His focus on the benefits of shared lessons among nations was particularly germane to the interests of the Seminar audience, some of whom are involved in a 'lessons learned' process regarding recent and on-going Canadian Forces' operation.

General (Retired) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, spoke in less optimistic tones. He argued that Europe is far from holding a unified view on strategic assessments, and that the 1999 NATO strategic concept is not sufficient for this era. He offered a novel perspective on the American and European views regarding the cessation of Cold War 'hostilities', suggesting that the Europeans deduced success was the result of persistent and patient diplomacy, whereas the United States viewed it as a consequence of military and economic strength.

General Naumann concluded that the dichotomy between the arrogance of power and the arrogance of moral suasion will revisit NATO in the next crisis - Iran.

The views of other speakers ranged from the optimism of General Henault to the pessimism of General Naumann.

General Lance Smith, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation explained why NATO had embarked upon a transformation process, and explained what transformation meant, and how it was being achieved. His visual aids described transformation capabilities and objectives in terms of precision, mobility, decision superiority, coherent effects, etc. General Smith's concluding slide stressed interoperability, ownership of transformation, and the necessity to act.

Mr. Jason Spiegel, former Executive Director of the Reserve officers Association (U.S.A.), provided counter-points to General Smith's offering by illustrating some of the difficulties involved in transformation, while Brigadier-General Robin P. Swan, the director of Development and Concepts, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Futures Centre, described "modular capability" in future symmetrical warfare and added that the U.S. Army acknowledges that transformation is continuous and involves the Active and Reserve components of the US Army. He further pointed out that the US Army will transform from a division-based structure to that of Brigade combat teams; that both the Active and Reserve components will need to adopt to a cycle of managed readiness varying from three to six years; and that while future equipment will be designed for symmetrical warfare, asymmetrical combat will be the product of professional development.

CF Transformation

Presentations by the Minister of National Defence (MND), the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and by five senior officers left no doubt in anyone's mind that the CF are indeed being transformed.

The MND reviewed and emphasized the major planks of the Conservative Party defence platform, and illustrated that while priority was to be given to a Canada First approach, his Party's plans aimed at also ensuring Canada would not neglect its international security responsibilities. He clearly stated that Canada needs a 3-ocean navy, a robust Army, and a revitalized Air Force, and set the tone for the CDS speech by quoting Prime Minister Harper: "Our forces stand on guard for us. We must stand up for them."

The Chief of the Defence Staff shared with the audience his recent experiences with Canadians and the media, demonstrating, in the process, his excellence as a communicator and providing rare insight into his life and responsibilities as CDS. He then moved on to the essential theme of the CDA's AGM, CF Transformation, explaining that it was essential that transformation first deal with command and control issues. He told the audience that the breadth of operations had outgrown the Cold War command structure and that the new dynamic of simultaneously conducting national and international operations required a Canada command, an expeditionary command, a special operations command and a joint support command all of which he 'stood up' on the 1st of February 2006.

The CDS was clear about his priorities: acquisition (airlift, fixed wing search and rescue aircraft and heavy lift helicopters) and expanded recruiting and training. He also offered that the capital equipment acquisition process should be triggered from DND by statements of performance, and not by statements of requirements, advocating in favour of off-the-shelf solutions and against the military propensity for modifying an already 'good' design.

As an illustration of transparency and openness, two of his many qualities of leadership, the CDS explained that former government claw-backs had rendered increases to Budgets 2004 and 2005 insufficient and that as a result he was still managing a sustainment shortfall of \$750 million. He concluded this portion of his presentation by stating that the CF needs more money if current operations, transformation and expansion were to be sustained.

The CDS spoke at some length on the expansion challenge. Evidently, young Canadians are showing an interest in their

military. One hundred and fifteen thousand (115,000) of them visited recruiting centres in 2005. However a weakened training system does not yet have the capacity to generate the numbers of qualified personnel in a timely manner.

The CDS wants to make recruiting a task for every soldier and wishes to ensure that the Canadian Forces are present at several of Canada's national celebrations in order to achieve the maximum amount of visibility across the country. In anticipation of a training surge, he intends to adopt a mobilization approach to training by using 'offline' operational units as training units while leaving the responsibility for generating technically skilled personnel to the central training system and to community colleges. He closed his presentation by stating that "to recruit a soldier one has to recruit a family; to recruit a family one has to recruit a nation. Canadians need to discover their treasure—their military".

Major-General Andrew Leslie, Director General Strategic Plans, and Major General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of Transformation described the history of transformation by referring to the four teams and studies that were initiated by the CDS through to the 1 February 2006 "standing-up" of the new command structure.

They went on to outline the four-phase planning timeframe from 2006 to 2025, explaining that in the current phase they are focusing on the enablers of: the separation of policy and service delivery; personnel policies; Reserve initiatives; intelligence renewal; integrated managed readiness; joint training construct; and span of control of commanders. Their next published product should be the Defence Capability Plan.

Both senior officers gave frank assessments of the Navy, Army and Air Force. The Army is hollow; it has too few soldiers. They spoke highly of the Navy and its heritage of interoperability, but it needs new replenishment and support ships. The Air Force was "in a whole world of hurt"; many aircraft are at the end their service lives and in urgent need of replacement.

In the final panel presentation of the day, the commanders of the new Canada Command (Vice-Admiral "J-Y" Forcier) and of the Expeditionary Force Command (Major-General Michel Gauthier) provided briefings on their Commands, adding anecdotal insights that persuaded the audience that the transformation of command, one of the CDS's priorities, had been achieved.

To conclude the panel's presentations, Major-General Herb Petras, the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, spoke on the impact

Canadian Forces presented with the sculpture, *The Warrior / Le Guerrier*



General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, accepts The Warrior / Le Guerrier from Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman Conference of Defence Associations

Friday, 24 February 2006, the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) presented a magnificent sculpture by Colonel (Ret'd) André Gauthier to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, who accepted *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* on behalf of the men and women serving in the Canadian Forces. The sculpture is a faithful representation of a combat soldier. *The Warrior / Le Guerrier* was presented in recognition of the significant and outstanding contribution of the members of the Canadian Forces to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The Warrior / Le Guerrier was presented by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, CDA Chairman, on behalf of the Associations at their annual mess dinner. Along with General Hillier, guests of the CDA included the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Gordon O'Connor; former Minister of National Defence, the Honourable David Pratt; and former Chiefs of the Defence Staff General (Ret'd) Jean Boyle, General (Ret'd) John De Chastelain, Admiral (Ret'd) Robert Falls, General Ray Henault, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, General (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers, and former Acting Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray.

of transformation on the Reserve community, pointing out how it is felt as Reservists interface with the transforming Regular force.

He emphasized the valuable contribution of the Rangers and junior Rangers' in arctic sovereignty and brought to everyone's attention the fact that Canada is second only to the United

States of America in the employment of Reservists on operations (as a percentage of total strength). Approximately 3000 Reservists have been deployed on SFOR and ISAF in the last five years, for example.

Major-General Petras pointed out that many of the new enablers of transformation belong, or are found in the Reserves.

These include Canadian Civilian-military cooperation operations; psychological operations; chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological operations; geomatics; airfield engineers; information operations; maritime intelligence; health services; and military police. The audience was left to conclude that transformation from a Reserve perspective includes greater integration with the Regular Force.

Summary

By any measure, the 2006 CDAI Seminar and CDA Annual General Meeting were highly successful. Those who attended

were treated to world-class speakers and to a number of new insights on the themes of NATO and Canadian Forces transformation.

While it was clear that the United States and the Canadian Armed Forces are serious about transformation, it was less clear whether the majority of European nations would follow suit in an enthusiastic manner. Additionally, while some NATO nations are clearly comfortable with the Alliance's agreed strategy that entails both forward defence and regional security, others prefer to focus on and limit their military contributions to regional security.

HIGHER EDUCATION and the PROFESSION of ARMS in CANADA

by Dr. John Scott Cowan

Introduction

A truly effective armed force has always needed the most advanced knowledge of its day. This need has gradually become more critical over the past two centuries, as the rate of accretion of new knowledge has increased. While some military leaders have not always recognized this, a disproportionate fraction of the successful ones have. The ones who haven't are the generals and admirals we later accuse of having tried to fight the previous war.

Armed forces need advanced knowledge and the breadth of exposure which will get them leaders who are able to take full advantage of all opportunities. Sometimes Canada has been fortunate by accident in this regard.

My favourite historic example is the Canadian Corps, which finished the First World War as arguably the most successful and accomplished force that Canada has ever fielded, and possibly the most successful national expeditionary army of any of the Allies in that war. In the last 96 days of the war, starting at Amiens on August 8th, 1918, the four heavy divisions of the corps defeated 47 German divisions (compared to 46 by the Americans in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, with twice the casualties).

But earlier in the war, as the Corps was struggling towards maturity, and had not yet begun to assert any independence of approach from the British, what were the influences of breadth that gave it the innovative spirit and the extraordinary resolve to become what Shane Schreiber describes as the "shock army of the British Empire"? I would suggest that some of those influences came from the earlier lives and accomplishments of the leaders of the corps, things outside the normal military experience and preparation of the day.

In the early twentieth century, graduate study and advanced degrees were uncommon, and much of what we would now recognise with formal credentials was just done through experience.

But much of the Canadian leadership had been exposed to extraordinary learning opportunities. The general officers included one division commander and four brigade commanders who had been lawyers, one of whom had been mayor of Edmonton. Two major generals had been very prominent journalists. Most had been university educated. One had spent two long stints in the NWMP and one had been an industrialist. One general officer had been a scientist and a faculty member at McGill, while another became Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto in July 1919. The corps commander, a former teacher, became Principal of McGill University.

Dr. John Scott Cowan is Principal at the Royal Military College, Vice-President of the CDA Institute and member of the Institute's Board of Directors

Some of these men had multiple degrees, but what they all had was an extraordinary exposure to large parts of the knowledge base of their society, through studying it, writing about it, arguing its legal precedents, running its large enterprises, and sitting in its governing bodies. By the standards of the day, they had advanced knowledge, and it gave them wellsprings of ideas and the confidence to push them. During four years of intense technological and doctrinal change, it may have given them an edge over other armies.

Some would argue that the differences were not all to the good, or even that they were of no consequence. But clearly these men were winners. That is the fact. They overcame a vast enemy. They triumphed, where others equally professional but more narrow, did not.

Encouraging higher education for our military, past and present

The first steps towards an educated profession of arms in Canada began with the recognition in the early 1870's of the inadequacy of the three-month "short" course in the artillery schools, and the subsequent decision of the Mackenzie government in 1874 to found the Royal Military College of Canada. It opened in 1876 with a four-year post-secondary program which has proven hugely durable; in fact it was very much like a modern undergraduate degree. It was not, however, until the report of MGen Roger Rowley in 1969 that a clear public case was made for the systematic higher education of the entire officer corps.

The implementation of Rowley's vision was long delayed, but recent defence ministers and most of the senior leadership in the CF since the late 1990's have been strong supporters of education both for the officer corps and for Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs). The Withers Report on future directions for RMC in 1998 and two reports from the Special Advisor to the CDS (Officership 2020 and NCM 2020) all added momentum, and in 2002 the overall conduct of education and professional development for the CF was accorded to the newly created Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), 33 years after Rowley advocated such a structure.

Thus despite the best efforts of earlier champions, broad acceptance within the Canadian Forces of the critical role of education for the profession of arms is relatively recent. Indeed, one might argue that it is not yet here, as there is a good bit of lip service to the concept still, and there are persistent pockets of cynicism. But on the whole, there is an acceptance that effectiveness and good judgement requires plenty of education. And even prior to the creation of the CDA there were some tangible manifestations of this new view.

Amongst these were the decision to have a degreed officer corps, and a series of developments related to RMC. Starting from having no outreach programs eleven years ago, RMC now provides distance and part time education at the undergraduate or graduate level to about 6000 members of the CF who are not at its campus in Kingston. In collaboration with the Canadian Forces College (CFC), it built an accredited professional graduate degree, the Master of Defence Studies (MDS), on the platform of the Command and Staff Course (CSC) at CFC; about 40% of those completing the CSC since 2002 have also done the extra work to receive this RMC graduate degree.

The new undergraduate core curriculum at RMC recommended in the Withers Report was implemented in 1999; the first class on that curriculum graduated in 2003. Under that scheme, all undergraduates, whether their degree is in literature or mechanical engineering, or anything in between, must show a minimum competence in subjects deemed essential for modern officership, specifically: psychology, ethics, leadership, Canadian history, military history, political science, civics and law, international affairs, cross-cultural relations, logic, math, information technology, physics, chemistry, English and French.

Ironically, from time to time, RMC is criticized by the uninformed for not providing a liberal education.

RMC currently grants about 440 degrees a year, of which close to 140 are masters or PhD degrees, roughly one for every two undergrad degrees. The concept at RMC is that the undergraduate degree, with its core curriculum, is a suite of exposures calculated to be a foundation for good independent judgement in the 21st century, while advanced study for some provides the extra breadth that the CF needs to stay abreast of technological, social and geopolitical change.

Why attitudes have recently changed

Why is this awakening occurring now? The idea is not new. H. G. Wells described the history of humankind as "a race between education and catastrophe". Of late this has become especially vivid for the modern profession of arms, so the timing of the shift in attitude is not surprising.

On the one hand, the public in the developed world have come to view any significant failure of judgement within the profession of arms as a genuine catastrophe. We would be profoundly unwise to dismiss this as merely anti-military bias

(continued p. 16)

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
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and an appetite for scandal. While those factors may amplify that perception, the perception itself is inextricably tied to the rising attention to human rights issues in both foreign and domestic policy throughout the developed world.

On the other hand, the remarkable rate of technological change and the growth of knowledge have the potential to be a vast multiplier of the effectiveness of numerically small forces. But they also amplify the need for complexity of thought and maturity of judgement to avert catastrophe, and drive that requirement further down the chain of command than ever before.

Complexity of thought and maturity of judgement are the

product of strong education, and its application to the interpretation of experience. Indeed, while experience is important, experience without education is a form of tourism.

So coping with RMA, transformed forces and the “three block war” is almost impossible without advanced education.

Traditionally, of course, in the CF, some education was viewed as a “nice to have”, but training was viewed as the real antidote to catastrophe. Today, when an officer may be called upon to be a skilled leader, a technical expert, a diplomat, a warrior, and even an interpreter and an aid expert, all at once, there is no question that good training is not enough. Skills are not enough. The job calls for judgment, that odd distillate

of education, the thing which is left when the memorized facts have either fled or been smoothed into a point of view, the thing that cannot be taught directly, but which must be learned.

Without the mature judgment which flows from education, we fall back on reflexes, which are damned fine things for handling known challenges, but which are manifestly unreliable when faced with new ones. And there will be new ones.

The stereotype vs. the facts

In Canada, however, there is still an outdated but widespread stereotype of long standing which equates military service with lack of education.

On the whole, the general public is not much exposed to the CF, and hence few Canadians realize that military personnel learn in more breadth outside their first discipline than most others in society, hold more varied jobs, and change jobs and take courses more often. In fact, the educational programs designed for military personnel are predicated on the certainty that they will need to know more than others in society. Indeed, the knowledge base for the profession of arms spans most of human knowledge.

These facts would surprise much of the public, many of whom still think that military training is as portrayed traditionally in and an appetite for scandal. While those factors may amplify that perception, the perception itself is inextricably tied to film. They largely do not imagine that the preparation of an officer touches most of the disciplines found in a modern university, and that this preparation extends throughout the entire career.

But a unique and dangerous aspect of the anti-education myth and stereotype is that not only do many in the broader society believe it to be so, but some within the Canadian Forces still view too much education as an impediment.

During the interviews conducted for the Withers report of 1998 on the future directions of RMC, we heard some remarks from serving officers about too much education. Some argued for just-in-time education; they clearly misunderstood what education was for.

Even the comments from officers who were masters and doctoral students sometimes echo the established mythology that getting a graduate degree interrupted or slowed an officer's career, while getting a graduate degree and teaching in uniform at RMC derailed one's career completely.

Well, old biases die hard, but they are dying. RMC routinely has general and flag officers as graduate students. And in the recent past a number of officers have gotten high profile

command jobs after a stint as faculty. Even more surprisingly, a number have been promoted and left in their academic jobs. Conventionally, military faculty at RMC were junior academically (Lecturers or Assistant Professors) but these recent changes have meant that some middle rank faculty (Associate Professors) are also military.

This is evidence of a profound sea-change, and proof that learning, even at the master's or Ph.D level, is becoming accepted and valued in the Canadian Forces. That is by itself a sort of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). Some imagine that the RMA is purely a technological revolution, a revolution of devices. The real RMA is knowledge and ideas. And that is the RMA which will value education in the practitioner of the profession.

Education and the perception of professionalism

These changes will also have an impact on how the broader society sees the profession of arms. That is because the broader society links the concept of a profession with advanced education.

Within the defence community we speak easily of the profession of arms. But there are portions of Canadian society who find the term curious or pretentious, and have trouble accepting that it is a profession. What could possibly make them think it is not?

True professions, however, have three incontrovertible characteristics. First, a profession must be, at least to a degree, self-regulating. In addition, its existence must serve a higher public purpose. And, finally, its practitioners must know, use and codify a definable and substantial body of higher knowledge relevant to that profession.

I have written at length elsewhere about the first two criteria. On the question of self-regulation, the profession of arms probably does better than any other profession.

On the test of higher public purpose, the CF exists to protect national sovereignty, to maintain conditions for peace, order and good government and to make certain that the interests of Canada and of Canadians are not trampled upon by aggressors.

There are those who doubt the higher public purpose, but they are the portion of the public that is "whistling past the graveyard", which is to say those who are so naive or so terrified that they can't bring themselves to admit that the post Cold War world is not a safe place, and haven't realized that today, geography is no shield, and neutrality is no exemption.

That brings us to the last criterion. Since one of the measures of a profession is that its members must know, use and codify a definable and substantial body of higher knowledge relevant to that profession, the anti-education myth reinforces the reluctance of the broader public to accept the profession of arms as a true profession.

It is the new attitude to knowledge in the CF which will eventually erase all doubt in the public mind that there exists a definable and substantial body of higher knowledge relevant to the profession of arms. Of course the doubt shouldn't have been there anyhow. In no other profession do the members spend such a large fraction of their careers receiving professionally relevant education and training.

The existence of RMC, CFC, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, the published work in the Canadian Military Journal, the activities of the Canadian Defence Academy, the schools for the Military Occupational Categories, the very existence of the Officer General Specification, and all of the establishments working on doctrine or higher competences are all part of that effort. I suspect that even the severest critics of the Canadian Forces don't really doubt the existence of the relevant body of knowledge, because they're constantly going on about how they think we haven't disseminated it well enough.

So it may be that education and higher knowledge are the antidote to catastrophe, the soul of transformation, and the final confirmation to the Canadian public that there is a genuine profession of arms in Canada.

WHAT KIND OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FOR CANADA?

by Major-General (Ret'd) Terry Liston

NOTE. No classified sources have been consulted or used in the preparation of this article. It reflects solely the personal views of the author.

The creation, by the outgoing Liberal government, of an embryonic Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) as a virtual fourth service, adds considerably to the many challenges faced by the new minister, Gordon O'Connor.

This election-eve thrust undoubtedly sought to repair Canada's frayed relations with the US Republican administration. During the mandate of US ambassador Paul Cellucci, he did not miss any public opportunity to "respectfully suggest that Canada look at establishing Tier-2 special operations."

Special operations tasks range from counter-terrorism "direct action", through covert reconnaissance to the training and support of indigenous forces. This work is done by small, select teams in Tier-1 special operations units such as the US "Delta Force", the Green Berets, and the US Navy SEALs. The UK has its SAS and the Special Boat Service. Canada already has a well respected Tier-1 Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2).

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Tier-2 special operations units are rapidly-deployable "raiders" such as the US 75th Ranger Regiment, the Royal Marine Commandos, or the UK Parachute Regiment's new *Ranger*-type unit. On an even larger scale, the 82nd Airborne Division and the UK 16 Air Assault Brigade perform this function. Special operations also call for an array of other support units, including dedicated air and naval resources. Canada's CANSOFCOM will include, in addition to the existing JTF2, a new autonomous Tier-2 regiment, with a *Green Beret* type company to train indigenous forces, and several companies of light infantry *Rangers*, to protect and support Tier-1 activities.

Are Special Forces the wave of the future?

In the US, there were two main reasons for creating this enhanced special operations structure: first, unresponsive bureaucratic in-fighting within joint operations, highlighted by the failed US rescue mission in Iran in 1979; and, secondly, a focus on Cold War tasks by conventional forces. As a result, Congress adopted laws that created a new "service-like" Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with its own Assistant Secretary of Defense, and in 1988, its own budgetary authority. By 2005, boosted by initial success in the defeat of the Taliban, it had grown to become a "supported command", and the US's "lead command for planning and executing the Global War on Terror". *(continued p. 20)*

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2006 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Allan Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, and Mr. G. Hamilton Southam.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2006, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R6

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 17 November 2006, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



The Vimy Award / La Distinction honorifique Vimy

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2006.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'honorable John Allan Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, et M. G. Hamilton Southam.

Tout Canadien / Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen / citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359, RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R6

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présenté vendredi, le 17 novembre 2006, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour la dîner gala, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée, ou télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

(However, it is now becoming more apparent that special forces cannot replace, to the degree hoped by Secretary Rumsfeld, conventional “boots on the ground.”

Bin Ladin broke out of the trap at Tora Bora over four years ago, and is still “inspiring” world-wide Al Qaeda insurgencies. In Afghanistan, where the Taliban are resurgent, the coalition special forces have been reportedly grumbling that their special skills were being wasted on conventional soldiering. Several assaults involving half the SAS regiment, were said to be more properly the job of the Royal Marines. The French have hinted in public that they are really doing the job of their Chasseurs Alpins mountain infantry. The overwhelmed SOCOM has been examining how to share its tasks with the conventional forces it had sought to distance itself from.

A visibly unhappy Secretary Rumsfeld commissioned an outside assessment of SOCOM’s performance from its retired former commander. Gen. Downing identified a planning and leadership vacuum, recommending the appointment of a 3-star chief to command its Tier-1 forces (done), reporting personally to Rumsfeld (rejected). Although Rumsfeld’s just-published Quadrennial Review restates his personal faith in Special Forces, it also reiterates that U.S. conventional forces must adapt to the challenges of both insurgencies and homeland defence.

Does the SOCOM template fit Canada?

Clearly, Minister O’Connor should take heed of these warning flags. He must question whether the SOCOM template, and a new layer of autonomous Tier-2 *Green Berets* and *Rangers* address problems that are of any relevance to Canada.

The Canadian Forces (CF) do NOT face the challenges that led the United States Congress to create SOCOM and to promote it with its allies. Already unified for almost forty years, the CF does not need a fourth service to circumvent entrenched service chiefs, as in the US in 1979, or to get past US Regional Joint Commanders as at present. Nor are Canada’s forces so focused on Cold War tasks, that they are unable to deal with low-intensity operations. Nor does the CF have a rigid divisional structure to overcome, as in the US and former Warsaw Pact armies. Its building blocks have long been responsive battalion-size expeditionary battle groups.

Nor have the Canadian Forces ever required layers of *elites*, as in mass armies based on a culture of reluctant, short-term conscripts. Nor does the Canadian government need, as in the Third World, a loyal *elite* to ensure its grip on power. Nor

does Canada have colonies or occupied territory in which it needs an unseen *elite* to dispose discreetly of “trouble makers”.

Moreover, Canada’s mature and proud volunteer soldiers, sailors and air crews have never endured for long such *elites*. There is NO standards gap sufficient to allow a new artificial *elite* to credibly differentiate itself from them. Canada’s infantry career soldiers represent a standard of fitness, education and good judgement that mass armies are unable to replicate. When at full strength, and given time to train, they are comparable to the Tier-2 special operations infantry of our allies.

Indeed, our Combat Arms ethos is similar to that of the US Marines where every member of the Corps is an “*elite*”. The US Marines only agreed, grudgingly, in the past few months, to make a small symbolic commitment to Secretary Rumsfeld’s SOCOM.

4,000 Infantry Soldiers are too few to support the plan

The “show stopper” in Canada’s plan is the lack of soldiers in its 18,000-strong Army. It has less than 4,000 infantry soldiers in nine half-size battalions. Indeed, two or three such battalions must be temporarily merged to meet operational tasks such as in ex-Yugoslavia, Kabul or Kandahar.

If this scarce infantry is further compartmentalized into different specialized units, including Tier-1 JTF2, our version of *Green Berets* and *Rangers*, airborne, light, and mechanized units, it will be impossible for it to carry out subsequent rotations. After one or two deployments, or even periods of high readiness in Canada, there will be no replacements by similarly specialized units.

Moreover, a large increase in the size of the Special Operations *elite* cannot be sustained by such a small infantry base, its main source of recruits. If all currently serving infanteers volunteered *en masse* to serve in CANSOFCOM, a 10% acceptance rate would yield a one-time cohort of only 400 soldiers. It would as well, undermine much of the remaining infantry’s officer and NCO leadership.

The planning dilemma is evident in examining the multiplicity of tasks for Canada’s scarce infantry. The current policy statement calls for: a Standing Contingency Task Force (TF) for ship-borne deployment; four TF rotations per year to sustain two overseas missions; a smaller, one-time TF; a high-readiness commitment to a United Nations brigade (SHIRBRIG); a contribution to the NATO Response Force; and, finally the new layer of infantry-intensive special opera-

tions forces. Assistance would also be provided to foreign armies in peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

To this must be added the minister's northern-oriented electoral commitments, including an airborne battalion in Trenton, three rapid deployment battalions in northern bases and a number of regular/reserve battalions near Canada's major cities.

A Workable Plan

Even with a significant influx of new soldiers, it is clear that maximum FLEXIBILITY and INTERCHANGEABILITY must be built into the matrix of infantry units and their disparate range of commitments. Some suggestions follow.

1. All infantry battalions would be interchangeable for typical overseas missions, with minimal reinforcement and regrouping. First and foremost, all three or four (ideally) companies would be able to fight dismounted. However, even the lightest infantry requires protection, mobility and firepower. For example, the Royal Marine Commandos are receiving Viking armoured carriers while the US Rangers in Afghanistan get the Stryker. Therefore two companies of our standard battalion would be trained and equipped with Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV), to the extent permitted by our inventory and procurement.

2. Canada's "first responder" counterinsurgency and special operations posture would be based on task forces that are robust, usable, and sustainable by our Army. The US Marines offer a better model than SOCOM. Its Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), is a temporary rotating task, built around a conventional infantry battalion group, including an attached "direct action" parachute platoon, along with a composite aircraft squadron. Similar Canadian task forces would be far more useful, and much more appreciated, than the planned CANSOFCOM structure.

3. The US Marine concept of "distributed operations" suggests a doctrine whereby conventional battle groups, with appropriate fire support, would more effectively cover a territory similar to that of an equivalent Special Forces unit.

4. The task of providing Tier-2 support to our existing JTF2, should be rotated to an existing battalion that would restructure as required, train and be validated for this more specialized task. The duration of the commitment could be longer than normal, to ensure stability.

5. The concept of an expanding CANSOFCOM to deal with overseas coalition tasks should be set aside. JTF2 should, of course, remain focused on its specialized "black" mission that is its *raison d'être* and for which it is highly respected.

Arctic Sovereignty and Security and the New Government

by Dr. Rob Huebert

From a northern security perspective, one of the most remarkable aspects of the election campaign was the inclusion of northern security as an election issue!

Traditionally the major parties do not raise northern issues during their campaigns except in the context of answering questions. The Liberals have traditionally included some mention of the Arctic in their election Red Books but have not said much more during the actual elections. The Conservative policy statement of December 22, 2005 released in Winnipeg was a unique event.

The Conservatives promised the following:

- 1) the building and stationing of three new armed naval heavy icebreakers in the area of Iqaluit;
- 2) the building of a new military/civilian deep-water docking facility in the area of Iqaluit;
- 3) the establishment of a new Arctic National Sensor system for northern waters (including an underwater capability);
- 4) the building of a new Arctic army training centre in the area of Cambridge Bay;
- 5) the stationing of new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft in Yellowknife;
- 6) the provision of eastern and western Arctic air surveillance (using UAVs, Auroras, and satellites);
- 7) the revitalization of the Canadian Rangers; and
- 8) the provision of an army emergency response capability.

Dr. Rob Huebert is the Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

The closest that any government has come to providing a similar list of promises was in September 1985 when Brian Mulroney's Conservative government vowed to defend Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Unfortunately, very few of the promises that required resources were successfully achieved. An agreement was reached with the Americans whereby they would seek Canadian consent for American icebreakers (three of them at the time, very soon they will have only one) to enter Canadian waters. However the promised single big icebreaker (Polar 8) was not built.

Thus the question emerges- will the campaign promises of December 22, 2005 follow the promises of September 10, 1985 or will it be different this time?

Of the eight promises, the first two require the most resources and will make the biggest difference in protecting Canadian Arctic sovereignty. However, the commitments to build three icebreakers and a deepwater port are not as straightforward as one may assume.

The Harper government is absolutely correct that Canada needs new icebreakers. It needs them for two reasons - the increasing use of the Canadian Arctic because of resource development and greater accessibility being created by climate change. The second reason that these icebreakers are needed is because Canada's current ice-breaking fleet is small and aging.

To a certain degree, when Harper is talking about adding three new large icebreakers he is not talking about *increasing* Canadian capabilities but rather he is talking only about *maintaining* current capabilities.

Currently Canada has one large icebreaker, the *Louis St. Laurent* (10,908 tons), which was built in 1969 and was extensively re-built between 1988 and 1993. Canada also has four medium icebreakers: *Pierre Radisson* (built 1978; 5,910 tons), *Des Groseilliers* (built 1982; 5,910 tons), *Henry Larsen* (built 1987; 6,172 tons); and *Terry Fox* (built 1983; 4,234 tons).

A fifth icebreaker, the *Amundsen* (formerly *Sir John Franklin* and built in 1979), had been decommissioned but was brought back into service by a research consortium based at Laval University. A modern icebreaker should remain in service about forty years plus or minus ten years. Thus, some Canadian Coast Guard officials have suggested that the *Louis St. Laurent's* service can be extended to fifty years. But the American Coast Guard is about to retire its two *Polar Sea* class icebreakers that were built in 1976 and 1978. They will only be thirty years old.

Assuming that the five icebreakers in the Canadian fleet can be maintained until they reach forty years service, the result is that the one large icebreaker, *Louis St. Laurent*, will be retired in 2009, the *Pierre Radisson* in 2018, *Des Groseilliers* in 2022, *Henry Larsen* in 2027 and the *Terry Fox* in 2023. Thus, if the three large icebreakers are designed and built within ten years (i.e., 2016), they will be replacing only retiring vessels and within a few years will be the only ships in a shrinking ice-breaking fleet. Thus it is clear that in order for these three vessels to truly add to existing Canadian capabilities they need to be built as soon as possible. However, the problem is that Conservative promises contain several elements that may substantially slow the process.

First, the Conservative platform states that these icebreakers will be built in Canada. It is not at all clear that a Canadian shipyard currently has the expertise to do this. While the ability of the St. John's shipyard to build the City class frigates shows that Canadian shipyards can engage in complex tasks if given enough time and resources, it is uncertain as to how much it would cost any existing Canadian shipyard to gear up to build three icebreakers.

It is not at all certain how long it would take to gain the expertise that is needed. Furthermore, it is also difficult to see how Harper could avoid the political infighting that would occur when trying to decide where they are to be built. When the Polar 8 project was announced in 1985, the resulting battles between Quebec and B.C. shipyards delayed the project to the point that the project was ultimately cancelled. Harper may prove to be more decisive than Mulroney but given the minority position of his government, it is hard to say to whom he will be better able to say no - British Columbia, Quebec or the Maritime shipyards.

Rather than requiring that they be built in Canada, the government could choose to buy the hulls from the world leader in icebreaker construction - Finland. Throughout the Cold War even the USSR would buy their icebreaker hulls from Finland and then provide a Soviet power plant. There is nothing to stop Canada from acknowledging that the Finns are the world leaders and can build the hull. These could then be brought to Canada and fitted out by a Canadian company. This would save substantially in terms of costs and construction time.

The second problem created by the Conservative platform is that the icebreakers are to be crewed by regular naval personnel. The navy's only previous experience with operating an icebreaker was in the mid-1950s when it operated the HMCS *Labrador*. However, the senior leadership of the navy

(continued p. 24)

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2006 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, and Bruce Campion-Smith.

Any Canadian may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of reasons for the nomination. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2006, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R6

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 17 November 2006, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236 9903.



PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2006

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2 500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, et Bruce Campion-Smith.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivent votre nomination et d'une biographie du candidat. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2006, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
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soon made the decision that the Coast Guard had the better expertise. Thus in February 1958 she was transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy to the Department of Transport.

Given the current demands on the navy, it is difficult to see how it will be able to maintain its current operational tempo; adjust to the new demands being placed on it by the new direction required by the restructuring of the Forces initiated by General Hillier; *and* be able to develop the expertise to operate three large icebreakers. It seems that such demands could also substantially slow the deployment of these vessels.

A more obvious solution would be to continue to have the Coast Guard operate these vessels or, at a minimum, create a truly “joint” vessel that is operated by both the Coast Guard and the navy.

From a political perspective is it realistic to expect future naval leaders to choose maintaining the three ice-breakers over its future bluewater forces? Finally, it is not clear why there is any advantage in having the Canadian navy operate these vessels. From a national sovereignty perspective, international law does not draw a distinction between naval officials or coast guard. Both are state representatives. So the question is - why ignore the existing expertise?

Canada will need these icebreakers and it is important that their construction and crewing not be needlessly slowed.

The political question remains as to whether the government will remain committed

With respect to the issue of building new military/civilian deep-water docking facilities in the area of Iqaluit, this is another initiative that needs to be implemented. Canada was founded on the development of transport infrastructure (i.e., the National Dream). By improving on existing port facilities in Nunavut, the federal government will be giving the newest

territory the same treatment that all of the southern provinces have received.

Thus, the improvement of the existing facilities goes beyond concerns over Canadian Arctic sovereignty. They will provide the opportunity for the territory to expand its economic base.

The two challenges of this project will be ensuring that funds are made available. It is easy to see that the federal government may find other priorities taking over from the substantial expenses of this project. The political question remains as to whether the government will remain committed. Assuming that it does, a second challenge will occur. The overall improvements of the port probably will increase ship traffic to the region. The government must ensure that it is able to know what is happening in the region and is able to respond. This means that if the government follows through with the port but lags on its efforts to develop its other commitments it may have the paradoxical effect of increasing the threats to Canadian sovereignty. The port needs to be improved, but it must be done in conjunction with the other promises made on December 22, 2005.

The remaining six promises are important but will not need the same level of commitment as the first two. Many of the promises also follow on action already started by the previous Martin Government. The Rangers are being revitalized. Likewise, the Northern Strategy of the Martin Government also suggested that there would be an expansion of surveillance capabilities in the north as well as the deployment of more search and rescue capabilities in the north. The question here is the willingness of the Harper Government to continue policies that it cannot claim to have initiated.

There is no doubt that the Harper Government is correct that Canadian Arctic sovereignty is under threat. The Government is equally correct in its conclusion that action is needed now requiring substantial resources. However, it is equally important that it not mishandle its efforts to fulfil its election promises. This means that it needs to act soon, but in an intelligent, effective and decisive manner.

IRAQ: A POLITICO-MILITARY QUAGMIRE

by Monsieur Louis A. Delvoie

The news from Iraq continues to be dominated by reports of bombings, shootings and mass graves uncovered. It is disturbing and discouraging for all those interested in seeing both an end to the miseries endured by the long-suffering Iraqi people and a degree of stability in the Persian Gulf region. It is equally distressing for those who hope that the United States and its coalition partners can extricate themselves from this situation with a minimum of further casualties and damage to their political reputations.

Unfortunately these reports tend to engender pessimism on both scores, and would indeed produce even more pessimism if they examined the roots of the current chaos in a little more detail.

All too often media reports portray the current level of violence in Iraq as the product of conflict between the coalition forces and “the insurgency” or of attacks on Iraqi security forces by “the insurgents”. This way of describing events is singularly misleading in many, if not most, instances. It suggests that the opponents of the coalition and of the Iraqi government are essentially a monolith, comparable to the FLN which the French fought in Algeria or to the Viet Cong which the Americans fought in Vietnam.

Although the evocation of those comparisons is sufficient to inspire sober reflection, the situation in Iraq is far more complicated. In Iraq the sources of opposition and violence are much more varied and distinct. They fall broadly into six different categories.

First, there are the Islamist insurgents and terrorists, including many non-Iraqis. Much like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 served as a rallying cry to Islamists throughout the Muslim world to come to the aid of the Iraqi people in resisting a military occupation by non-believers. Their aim is not simply to liberate Iraq, but also to establish an Islamic state there.

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Second, there are the remnants of the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussain. Thrown out of power as a result of the American invasion, they are determined to re-coup their losses. Much like the Liberals in Canada, they regard themselves as the natural party of government and are not prepared to give up what proved to be a highly advantageous position without a fight.

Third, there are the remnants of the Iraqi armed forces. Following the disastrous decision of the American pro-consul, Paul Bremner, to disband the armed forces, they found themselves on the street, humiliated and unemployed in the midst of a steadily deteriorating law and order situation. Many still armed and reasonably well trained were intensely hostile to the Americans whom they held responsible for their plight.

Fourth, there are thousands of ordinary Iraqis who are also intensely hostile to the United States. Many of these have seen family and friends killed or wounded in the course of coalition military operations, both during and after the active phase of the war in the spring of 2003. Others have suffered great hardship as a result of the breakdown in law and order and of the erratic supply of food, water and electricity. Yet others have lost homes and jobs since the invasion.

Fifth, there are the zealots and the foot soldiers of the Sunni and Shia communities intent on taking advantage of the chaotic situation to pursue their age-old sectarian quarrels. In so doing they are not operating in direct opposition to the coalition forces or to the Iraqi government, but they are creating a security nightmare for the latter. Many of the most gruesome acts of violence reported in recent months are attributable to these sectarian divisions.

Finally, there are several irregular military forces which stand ready to enter the fray whenever the interests of their communities or their leaders demand it. These include the Peshmerga units of the Kurdish region, the so-called Badr brigades loyal to the mainstream Shia religious leadership and the Al Sadr militia, which owes allegiance to a radical young Shia leader. None of these are formidable military machines, but they do display enough weaponry, training and/or fervour to represent serious security concerns to the coalition forces and to the Iraqi government.

In short, the task confronting the American and Iraqi authorities is not simply one of defeating “the insurgency”, but rather of

coming to grips with a wide-ranging set of security challenges, which are a reflection both of the current politico-military situation and of the divisions inherent to the country. The relevance, significance and dimensions of the latter have been at least partially obscured in recent months by glowing reports about the participation of Iraqis in a series of national elections and referenda. What is all too often forgotten is that these elections were conducted on the basis of agreements hastily cobbled together to meet artificial deadlines, agreements which for the most part left fundamental questions unresolved and postponed their resolution to a later date. In fact, the political haggling which has followed each election has not only served to confirm the continued existence of fundamental divisions, but may well have served to intensify them.

All of these contemporary complexities are a reflection of some even more profound historical realities.

Iraq was in fact a totally artificial construct put together by the victors of the First World War out of three quite distinct remnants of the defeated, and soon to be defunct, Ottoman empire

Not only is Iraq a country without any well rooted institutions and civil society, it also lacks any natural cohesion or sense of

nationhood. Iraq was in fact a totally artificial construct put together by the victors of the First World War out of three quite distinct remnants of the defeated, and soon to be defunct, Ottoman empire. In her superb study, *Paris 1919*, Professor Margaret MacMillan very succinctly stated the problem that was to bedevil the future: “In 1919, there was no Iraqi people; history, religion and geography pulled the people apart, not together”. Much the same could be said today, while adding in the factor of ethnicity for good measure.

The fact is that Iraq was held together for 80 years by a succession of strongmen exercising power at the centre, whether Hashemite functionaries, army generals or Baathist dictators. Their rule had little to do with the will or consent of the people, but rather relied heavily on the routine use of an often brutal military, intelligence and security apparatus. In the course of those 80 years, those rulers managed to suppress the divisions inherent in the country; they certainly did not overcome or eliminate them.

To now believe that a democratically elected, but highly fractured, government and parliament will be able to do so in the foreseeable future has more to do with faith and ideology than with knowledge and experience. The history of Iraq, as well as current realities, offers few grounds for such hope. On the contrary, Iraq seems likely to remain a politico-military quagmire for some considerable time to come.

THE DIFFERENCE ASIAN MULTIPOLARITY MAKES

by Ms Kerry Lynn Nankivell

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Canadian Forces, the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Government.

The Asian landscape is not unfamiliar, especially to analysts of security issues. For more than a decade, Asia-watchers have noted the shift eastward of the world’s strategic centre of gravity. This shift was heralded by the amazing rise of China whose economic, military and diplomatic weight was gaining momentum. It portended profound permanent changes to the international scene.

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As a result, geo-strategic analysts seemed to fall rather comfortably and perhaps too quickly, into a familiar mindset of bipolarity, pitting a rising China against the *status quo* power of the United States. Analysts and scholars alike made a cliché of the defining assertion that the 21st century would be the emergence of a new and challenging rival to Washington.

Beijing’s transformation was so astonishing that meanwhile, developments in India, Thailand, Japan and even Russia from 1995 to 2005 proceeded apace but were not fully integrated into the image of tomorrow’s Asia. This omission and the consideration of a regional structure of tomorrow’s Asia will be considered here.

Tomorrow's Asia will likely have more multipolar than unipolar features. The result will be a continent of several ambitious, but wary competitors, and not a stable antagonism between two poles only. What difference will multipolarity make for powers lying offshore and around the Pacific Rim that want to engage and shape the continent?

Asian Wallflowers

The surreal explosion of China onto the international scene has made wallflowers of the very impressive indicators of the germination of major powers elsewhere on the continent. It is in economic terms that this appears most starkly. China's unbelievable double-digit growth sustained for 15 years, has overshadowed the achievements and potential re-emergence of its neighbors. For instance, the mantra "India Shining" aptly describes the country, which has averaged six per cent growth over the last three years, much higher than the average among G8 countries.

At the same time, Japan, still the world's second largest economy seems finally on track to emerge from a long recession, posting growth in most quarters throughout 2004 and 2005. Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, sub-regional countries are quickly recovering from the 1997 Financial Crisis that was the worst meltdown in history.

Through increased regional trade and by exporting to a growing China, Thailand and Malaysia in particular have accomplished impressive recoveries. The regional economic outlook is rounded out by robust post-9/11 figures out of the fully developed economies that anchor the region: Singapore, Australia and South Korea.

However, Asian nations are not only rising economically, the region's economic boom is like a midwife to the political and military rise of several states in the transformation of capability, doctrine and strategic aims. Japan, Russia, China, Australia and India, concurrent with junior players Malaysia and Thailand, are increasing in military power and their publics are responding by demonstrating ever-more insistent forms of national pride and sense of purpose.

This has not escaped Australia on the exposed south flank of the Pacific Rim. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is embarking on its biggest weapons buying spree since World War II, spending \$52 billion on new planes, ships and tanks. This massive expenditure will make Australia's navy, army and air force among the most powerful and high-tech militaries in the region well into the 21st century.

The Special Advisor to Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific¹

said: "Australia lives in a tough and problematic neighborhood, but it is more than that. They have full, bi-partisan political support for the Australian Defence Force and a much more muscular and informed public debate on defence issues than we do in Canada. It is perhaps no surprise that General Cosgrove, the veteran of East Timor, was the third most popular figure in Australia when he was the Chief of the Defence Staff."

Nothing New

The changes to the Asian landscape are nothing new to the seasoned Asia-watcher; in fact, they have been long underway and much debated. Nonetheless, considering the strategic future of Asia, analysts often seem to miss the forest for the trees. Few questions have been asked about the implications of this concurrent growth relative to the continent as a whole. What are the contours, shapes and vectors of the Asian forest into the next century?

For example, taken on its own, China's meteoric rise in economic, political and military terms seems almost boundless and its achievement of parity to the United States a certainty. But when we take note of economic changes in neighbouring India (that may limit China's entry into the service sector industries), as well as naval changes there and in Japan, South Korea and Australia, (which will put pressure on China's attempts to expand its sphere of influence away from its shores) we realize that there will surely be obstacles on China's road to parity with the U.S.A.

Chinese planners approach the region's multipolarity through modernization rather than planning for a single adversary, or single conflict. Recent Chinese military disclosures seem less concerned with identifying potential future enemies (besides the United States and Russia) than in detailing how China's military modernization plans will bridge the "era gap" in emerging weaponry. Modernization though is not simply aimed at reaching parity with powers across the Pacific, but also aimed at establishing China's regional position as a first-among-equals amid a variety of already-powerful Asian militaries.²

Most importantly for Asia-watchers located abroad, Asian multipolarity will also necessarily complicate approaches to the region. While a bipolar system such as a Cold War Europe, offered a comparatively simplistic balancing calculus, navigating relations across a multipolar region requires substantially more nuance and panache.

A multipolar system defies the logic of 'with us or against us' just as it defies any attempt to keep states 'down' or 'in' or 'out'. Instead, a multipolar Asia will be prone to unstable

relationships and periods of shifting allegiances without bedrock alliances, as competing powers, wary of one another, guard their sovereignty and act supremely in their national interest.

This will necessarily have important lessons for those approaching the region. For instance, if the coming years are to be characterized by a bi-polar confrontation between Beijing and Washington, then Washington's recent deals with New Delhi might be understood as a clever manoeuvre intended to balance China's growing military might. If, however, Asia is likely characterized by multipolarity rather than bipolarity, the move is a curious legitimization of India's rogue nuclear weapons program. As an aspiring regional power, India will not allow itself to be bound by this favour to aligning itself with Washington; more likely, it will reap rewards while maximizing its national power.

Nations on the Pacific Rim will be inexorably drawn into this geo-strategic vortex and will need to deploy all of their strategic savvy for successful navigation. The most prudent path remains unclear and hotly contested. Some argue that the most prudent path in this uncertain environment is to guard against all contingencies, perhaps through the development of an overarching defensive system like Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). It is not at all clear whether such an approach would mitigate threat, or inflame an already-competitive environment.

Canada's decision last year not to support BMD does not yet seem to have closed the debate, both technical and philosophical. Controversy persists, in part, because Canada's decision is at odds with the view of the United States, which maintains that the deployment of effective missile defences is an essential element of the broader defence of North America as a whole. Furthermore, missile defence systems are also endorsed by policy makers in Tokyo, Taipei and Canberra, all of whom plan to install or have stated their support in principle for a missile defence system in their home region. All of these states contend that the BMD system is a purely defensive capability designed to meet the uncertainty of the new century.

In North America, Washington has steamed ahead without Ottawa. The US Quadrennial Defense Review released in early February describes missile defense alongside 'steady-state' operations including "North American air defense, including air sovereignty operations".³ It is described as part of a "tailored defense" designed for a world populated with a diversity of threats and opportunities.

Canada has never been asked to participate directly in BMD – no Canadian radar station, nor Canadian territory on which to station interceptors. Nonetheless, Ottawa opted for non-participation in 2004. The cost of this position has been

accepting a place on the sidelines of an important facet of strategic planning with respect to the North American continent. Whether this will remain Canada's position, or whether Ottawa will devise some other strategy with which to approach the Asia of the twenty-first century remains to be seen.

Understanding Multipolarity

A multipolar Asia will not provide us with the same kind of certainty in the next century that a bipolar Europe offered in the preceding one. There are a range of policy approaches that may help nations on this side of the Pacific Rim better succeed in reaping the benefits of Asian dynamism while staving off threats associated with instability.

Determining which policy approaches will be the most successful in the Canadian case will be no easy task and will require that we understand issues in this new context. Understanding the implications of unstable multipolarity in Asia is all the more complex because it hasn't been an important structural feature of the international system for almost a full century. The last time policymakers on this side of the Pacific contended with a regional multipolar system was in the late 19th and early 20th century. European powers struggled to keep peace amongst each other.

This regional system was found particularly unappealing by US policymakers of the period, as it highlighted all the characteristics antithetical to the US national spirit: greed, self-interest, amorality, duplicity, elitism and, ultimately, betrayal. The reaction of the US Congress was a growing aloofness from European affairs.

Today, as the global hegemonic and leading power in Asia, Washington will not likely have the luxury of opting for retreat to the high ground. Canada will be similarly affected by Asia, as a nation on the Pacific Rim and boasting impressive Pacific-oriented economic growth and interests.

No doubt, the successful strategy to approaching the region in the coming decades will require skill and nuance, but first it will require recognition of the difference that multipolarity makes. ☺

FOOTNOTES

¹ Dr. Jim Boutilier, *MARPAC HQ*

² Mary C. FitzGerald, *Hudson Institute in Armed Forces Journal*, Nov. 2005

³ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, US Department of Defense, 2006. p. 37.

³ David J. Trachtenberg, *Armed Forces Journal*, Jan. 2006

The Continuing Relevance of International Humanitarian Law

by Maître Sylvain Beauchamp

This short text was inspired by a talk that the author gave to a meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute in Ottawa on December 15th, 2005.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the body of global written and customary rules and principles that apply in armed conflict. They are aimed at the protection of persons taking no active part in hostilities including armed forces members who have laid down their arms and those placed “*hors de combat*” (outside of combat) by wounds, sickness or detention. Historically, it has seldom received much public attention. When it has, it is often confused with international human rights law.

Until the end of the Cold War, IHL seemed to be the exclusive domain of university professors, military lawyers and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly referred to as *the guardian of IHL*.

Today, anyone turning on a television or picking up a newspaper can see that IHL and the issues it embraces are ubiquitous. And the more people hear about the Geneva Conventions, the greater the inclination to read and research this fascinating and voluminous area of public international law.

Equally unprecedented is the ongoing debate about whether IHL is adequate in providing the necessary level of “humanitarian” protection to the many victims of armed violence. Today’s “destructured conflicts” often referred to by the military as “Operations other than War” were very clearly not envisaged by the twelve States which signed the 1864 *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field* - considered as the starting point of modern IHL.

But is the issue really one of the adequacy of the law?

IHL was initially designed to bring humanity to situations traditionally referred to as “wars” - armed violence between two or more states. IHL has evolved considerably since then. While it still enjoys widespread use, the notion of “war” lost its legal significance with the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions on August 12th, 1949. IHL thus covers “armed conflicts” of two types: international and non-international

armed conflicts.

The development of IHL was a reflection of the facts on the ground. It was only in 1949 that the notion of “non-international armed conflict” emerged in treaty law. The specific protections afforded to victims of non-international armed conflicts expanded significantly with the adoption of the 1977 Second Additional Protocol, but IHL remains applicable today only in situations of armed conflicts. International human rights law by contrast is applicable at all times – in both war and peace - but must be read through the prism of IHL during armed conflicts.

Today, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 dedicate 526 articles to international armed conflicts, 28 articles to high intensity non-international armed conflicts and only one article to low-intensity non-international armed conflicts. No articles are dedicated to situations which do not reach the threshold of armed conflicts. These remain the preserve of international human rights law. The latter are internal disturbances and violence where the state is opposing a group or has within it groups opposing each other. However, neither is sufficiently organized to reach the legal threshold of an “armed conflict” under IHL.

In other words, the greater the scope and organisation of the armed violence, *the more specific* the protection afforded by IHL. This applies to persons who do not or no longer participate directly in hostilities.

But the *specificity* of protection afforded by IHL must not be confused with the *substance* – or quality – of the protection.

For example, the status of detainees – as well as their rights and protection – under IHL will depend on whether these persons have been captured in an international armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict or an “internal disturbance.”

Only the members of armed forces and other persons specifically designated by the Geneva Conventions who are captured within the context of an *international armed conflict* will be entitled to the status of Prisoner of War (POW). One of the main distinctions between POWs and the other detainees is that the former will not be prosecutable for having participated in the hostilities whereas the latter may be.

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But those who cannot be considered as POWs are not devoid of legal protection under IHL. On the contrary, the focus must be placed on the *quality* of the legal protection afforded to those persons rather than on the number of articles applicable to their situation.

Anyone captured within the context of an armed conflict, whether international or non-international, is entitled under IHL to be treated humanely. They must be protected against violence to life and person (including torture and ill-treatment) and outrages upon personal dignity such as acts which are particularly humiliating and degrading. They are also entitled to other fundamental rights consistent with elementary considerations of humanity.

This protection afforded by IHL extends to all armed forces who have surrendered or are “*hors de combat*” including all

civilians, whether or not deprived of liberty. Although reflected in a very limited number of articles, the substance of the protection is considerable. In those violent situations currently raging around the world where IHL is not applicable, international human rights law also guarantees the right to life and other basic protections.

While there is room for improvement, IHL does provide substantial safeguards in law to victims of international and non-international armed conflicts. The question is therefore not so much one of how many articles protect people during situations of violence, but how to increase the *observance* of IHL. Focussing too much attention on the adequacy of IHL is likely to disperse the efforts of the international community on a much more pressing matter: upholding the law that already exists.

Mental Health Care in the Canadian Forces

by Brigadier-General Hilary Jaeger

No mission can succeed without fit, healthy and ready personnel to carry it out. The CF has always invested significant time and money in training and equipping our personnel so they can accomplish their given tasks. *Physical fitness* as a personal and professional responsibility has recently been reconfirmed by the CDS. The **Canadian Forces Health Services (CFHS)** routinely checks to make sure CF members are in top physical health, or receive the treatment that will get them there.

Psychological fitness is also a key component of operational readiness, but one that has proven in the past to be more difficult to optimize. The problem is that Canadians, like citizens of many other societies, tend to stigmatize those suffering with mental illness. CF members are not immune to this attitude; the average CF member would rather not discuss any mental health concerns with their peers, or even with their health care providers for fear that a mental health diagnosis would bring their career to a grinding halt. Ironically, in reality it is the failure to address mental health concerns that allows them to become entrenched; it is the delay in dealing with the issue that is the biggest threat to a career.

To address this problem, the Mental Health Initiative of the CFHS renewal project ‘Rx2000’ has undertaken a number of activities. The first major undertaking was to find out exactly what was the size and shape of the mental health problem across the CF. Luckily Statistics Canada was in the process of developing a survey of mental illness in Canada. It was a relatively simple matter to ‘piggyback’ upon that survey, with some modifications to address specific issues of interest to the CF.

The results of the survey, officially known as the Canadian Community Health Survey Version 1.2 CF Supplement, showed that the prevalence of major depressive illness in the CF Regular Force was 80% higher than a similar population of Canadian civilians; and the rate for panic disorder was 60% higher. Other interesting findings included that the rates of other disorders, including *Post-traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD*, were very comparable with civilian Canadians; and rates of all illnesses for Reserve members very closely approximated rates for the civilian population.

The survey also found that CF members tend to make use of helping services at a rate higher than that of their civilian counterparts. But while this may tempt us to pat ourselves on the back, this must be tempered by the finding that many people did not have all of their needs met and one third of those

Brigadier General Hilary Jaeger is the Canadian Forces’ Surgeon General

whose responses on the survey indicated the presence of a mental health diagnosis did not seek care at all. This is just as concerning for the operational readiness of CF members as the elevated prevalence of depression and panic disorder.

The Mental Health Initiative

The Mental Health Initiative is in the process of addressing this situation. Resources for assessment and treatment are being markedly increased at bases across the country. The method of delivering care is being more carefully monitored to ensure consistency and to maximize the chances of successful treatment. Public relations and educational efforts are being undertaken to spread the message that the interests of both the CF member and the CF itself are best served when mental health concerns are addressed early, when treatment has a higher chance of success.

Do operational tempo and the nature of operations themselves have a toll on the psychological health of CF members? Most people's off-the-cuff reaction would say that it does, and the survey would agree in the specific instance of PTSD, as members who had deployed three or more times were found to have higher rates of PTSD than those with less deployment experience. Other mental health problems may also arise from or be worsened by operational deployment, although this was not demonstrated by the survey.

Returning from an operation represents an important opportunity to screen for operational stress injuries, thereby allowing the best possibility for early intervention. Until recently the CF depended on self-reporting during the post-deployment period to discover Operational Stress Injuries (OSIs), but this approach does not overcome the stigma or taboo against coming forward for help. In the last four years a rigorous system of questionnaires and interviews has been developed to enhance our ability to detect OSIs. This screening is performed on all CF members returning from deployment, normally four to six months after the end of the tour. This timing is specifically chosen to allow for resolution of self-limited problems on the one hand, and to allow the masking effect of the 'honeymoon' period of returning home to have faded.

Support Centres and Treatment Programs

As our understanding of OSIs, including PTSD, has evolved in the past decade, so have the measures put in place by the CF to help members, whether Regular or Reserve, who may be suffering their effects. Five **Operational Trauma and Stress Support Centres** have been established – one in each

of Halifax, Valcartier, Ottawa, Edmonton and Esquimalt. These programs are mandated to provide assessment, educational outreach, treatment, and research.

These programs employ an interdisciplinary treatment model with a mixed military and civilian staff including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurses and chaplains. In addition to providing direct service to CF members, staffs in these Centres are also involved in consultation with other treatment facilities around the world, and in reviewing the professional literature on traumatic stress and PTSD.

Another avenue for assistance is the **Canadian Forces Member Assistance Program (CFMAP)**. Established in 1999, this program is a voluntary and confidential service to help members and their families with personal concerns of any kind. A toll-free phone line is available 24 hours a day and is staffed by professional counsellors.

The CFHS' Mental Health staff is not the only group striving to improve psychological fitness. The Director of Force Health Protection has put into place programs to enhance the psychological self-help skills of our members. Stress management, anger management, and healthy lifestyle promotion are a few of these initiatives.

Nor is the CFHS alone in promoting mental health and supporting those in need. The **Operational Stress Injury Social Support programme (OSSIS)** under the direction of the Director of Casualty Support and Administration aims to provide peer support to OSI sufferers, and can serve to encourage them to seek professional care. OSSIS also works hard to reduce the stigma attached to those suffering an OSI through formal presentations and other communications tools, and has recently added peer support family counsellors to their services.

Finally, the CF is not the only government department interested in the issue. Veteran's Affairs Canada and the CF have been exploring ways to align programs and share best practices for some time, but have recently taken this to a new level with the **Joint Mental Health Care Programme (JMHCP)**. JMHCP also includes the RCMP as a partner, and aims to provide a Government of Canada solution to the care of OSI sufferers and to ease the transition that a veteran may have to make as they move from RCMP or CF membership to VAC care.

Conclusion

Operational readiness demands fit and healthy personnel, which in turn demands psychological fitness. The twin pillars of maximizing psychological fitness are quickly and effectively treating mental health problems and enhancing psychological resiliency. Leadership has a key role in both approaches; without the right leadership climate the stigma and taboo will

remain and care will be delayed. Further, leaders are the ones who promote resiliency training, who create a supportive esprit within the unit, and who oversee the reintegration into the unit of those who have sought care. Together we are strengthening the forces.

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