


**Synergistic thoughts for Canada’s Defence Policy Review –  
Originally submitted to the DPR Committee on 3 June 2016.**

In this submission, I would like to offer a new integrated synergistic approach for analysing *Global Defence Canada’s* issues, in the interest of Canada and of Canadians. Within DND’s Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016<sup>1</sup>, there are several questions asked relating to the Security Environment, to Defending Canada and North America, to Contributing to Global Peace and Security, even to Canada’s Defence Capabilities and Future Force, and finally, to Contributing to the Defence Budget. Hence, I intend to answer each question, however, shifting paradigms for a more synergistic one.

Starting with the analysis for each of these dimensions according to an integrated synergistic framework based on my research of the *Comprehensive Approach*, or the CA (also known as *Canada’s Approach*), I will thus offer answers to the ten main questions posed in the DPR’s Public Consultation Document. As this is an integrated submission, you will find that it will develop through these six fundamental dimensions, which are crucial for a more synergistic Global Defence decision-making: The situational context, socio-culture, the organisational structure, the strategic policies, the systemic processes and last but not least, the synergy dynamics of these dimensions as a system-of-systems. The simple idea is thus to make decisions and act principally where synergy can be achieved:

**Synergy – A theoretical model**



From the outset, I would further like to outline the three fundamental assumptions that will guide this submission namely: That Canada will remain a “united” country in the future; that Canada will maintain a “professional” Armed Force to ensure its Defence and that Canada will also remain “engaged” with the World because of its interdependencies. As such, throughout this submission, I will strive to propose synergistic decisions with regards to Canada’s Global Defence Policy. Hence, it would make sense to first establish a new Canadian Global Engagement Policy providing the Government’s “intent”, from which a new Canadian “Global” Defence Policy would ensue. In the same vein, for the domestic roles, establishing a new National Security Policy beforehand would be crucial.

<sup>1</sup> <http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf>

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As such I understand this is part MND's mandate<sup>2</sup>, assisting Canada in reaping the benefits of a *Whole-of-Government* and moreover those of a *Comprehensive Approach*<sup>3</sup>. It would make sense for the National Security and Global Defence departments to work together on defining the overarching Policy to lay out in effective terms Canada's intent. Nonetheless, this submission will focus specifically on Canada's Global Defence Policy in the hopes that further policy reviews will somehow be more integrated as team effort. For example, the Minister of Public Safety will review Canada's Cyber Security Policy and all related policy reviews should eventually, at some point, come together comprehensively.

**Situational Context**

Geographically, Canada is uniquely positioned to make great strategic leverage of its North American situation, maintaining and further developing friendship with the US. Because of this unique situation, Canada can thus focus its Global Defence on other more international threats, remaining aware we do not need to attend to more existential threats at home. As such, Canada has the "luxury of choice" when it comes to its Global Affairs and its Global Defence "engagements", such as in Afghanistan, which was discretionary.



This perspective is based on the more fundamental understanding that Canada's sovereignty and also its territorial integrity as it stands in 2016 will not change within the next 30 to 50 years, and so our National Security team needs to pursue this work of maintaining Canada's National sovereign-integrity. From a Canadian Global Defence perspective, this then leaves essentially very few existential threats. That Canada sees itself as an Arctic country is key but moreover is the yet unexploited potential of the Arctic region for Canada in geo-economic terms. Henceforth, Canada's Arctic Sovereignty appears as a fundamental situational context consideration<sup>4</sup>.

Another perspective offered by such a Canadian focused map, which ironically seems to represent Canada as an island, is precisely that Canada, although largely secure globally, is not immune from existential threats in new and emerging domains of Cyber and Space. There has long been a recognition of Canada's necessity to guard three Oceans: Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic (in order), but Cyber and Space are literally new domains which are opening up, and which will require Canada to refocus elements for a true Global Defence. Geo-strategically Canada could be threatened by the latest generation of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear payloads coming from across the Pacific, the Arctic and/or the Atlantic. Canada is also regularly and systematically threatened by cyberwarfare capabilities and both of these new domains must be addressed at home through National Security Policy and more externally, through a new Global Affairs and the new "Global Defence Policy".

<sup>2</sup> Minister of National Defence mandate letter: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>


<sup>3</sup> For Canada's Comprehensive Approach Definition see Canadian Force Land Operations Manual, p. 5-14.

<sup>4</sup> Map courtesy of Canadian Geographic, available for download at <http://worldmap.canadiangeographic.ca/>

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Aside from these existential threats to Canada which could challenge our Arctic Sovereignty, perhaps coming from some of our friends and neighbours, as well as from Russia or China; for which Canada has to devise capabilities to operate and assume its sovereignty in the Arctic, such as nuclear submarines, arctic underwater and/or airborne drones; and apart from Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Cyber Defence, it can be said with relative confidence there are no other existential threats to Canada. As such, Canada's Global Defence has the luxury of choice for its engagements and it is hereby proposed to refocus Canada's Defence Capabilities on five (5) main areas for our own global defence:

## **Canada's Five (5) Areas of Global Defence**



Canada should focus its Global Defence efforts on “Canada first” of course, then in order on North-America among NORAD, on North-Atlantic among NATO, on North-Pacific, on the Arctic and Central Latin-America in these five areas of Global Defence. In a more discretionary way, Canada could engage within the UN while remaining within its own areas of interests and of influence, meaning limited engagements further abroad. The Ukraine, the Middle-East and the North-West Africa are areas that appear of interest as they impact directly on our NATO Allies. Similarly, defending our Allies in the Pacific against the threats posed by North Korea and China also appear of great interest for Canada. And ensuring Canada's sovereignty regarding the Arctic area of defence is fundamental while engaging in key partnerships within Central Latin America is important for Defence.

Considering Canada's privileged North American location it clearly appears that our relationship with the United States must first and foremost be carefully nurtured. As Canadians after all we are also (North) Americans as well as members of NORAD. Our Foreign Defence is integral to that of the North American continent and we should thus be



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part of the Cyber, Aerospace, Maritime, Land and Special efforts at a ratio of 1 for 9 US<sup>5</sup>. Currently Canada only has 666 Regular Force Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) in NORAD and it would be crucial for Canada to reconsider its decision on Ballistic Missile Defence, ensuring Canadians actually have a say in the decision-making in time of eventual crisis. Moreover and particularly for the Arctic, Canada should train specialised ground forces, ready for rapid deployment based on a Company-Group from the three Brigade-Groups (perhaps even wearing white berets); this is our first area of defence from foreign threats.

Considering Canada's privileged location among the North-Occidental Nations, it also appears clearly that our relationships amongst NATO are crucial for our second area of defence from foreign threats, including conventional (for example Russia's aggression in Crimea), unconventional (for example Cyber, Economic Warfare) and the asymmetric threats (for example Terrorism). Thus, Canada should also be an integral part of NATO's efforts at a ratio of 1 for 26 NATO<sup>6</sup>. Henceforth, considering pre-deploying the CAF in Europe is an integral effort that would see a rotating Joint-Integrated element positioned for example in the East, ensuring that Russia's traditional military power is kept in check.

Lacking, is a North Pacific Alliance<sup>7</sup> that would include Japan and South Korea and in which Canada could play a leading role in order to secure these essential trading partners. Starting with multinational North-Pacific training exercises would be essential, eventually positioning the CAF within the region. Ensuring international passages do remain open for all trading partners, as in the South-China Sea, is also a key strategic interest for Canada.

Also lacking is an Arctic Alliance that would include the US, Canada, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Norway and Sweden and within which NORAD would be a crucial partner. These would thus establish Canada's geographic situational context and determine our order of global defence priorities, i.e.: North-America, Europe, North-Pacific, Arctic and Central Latin-America. Canada's engagements in other regions can thus be said to be discretionary and not fundamental to our interests in a Global Defence perspective, as was Afghanistan for example, although it might make sense strategically. The question is whether Canada truly gained lasting synergy from such an engagement?

**1. Are there threats to Canada's security that are not being addressed adequately?**

In an integrated global perspective, Cyber, Space & Economic Warfare are fundamental; important threats to Canada's Defence. *Global Defence Canada* thus has a crucial role to play furthering Cyber and Aerospace capabilities, as well as ensuring for example that the international passages including in the Arctic, remain open for all global trading partners. Considering that most of the international trade navigates on water, maintaining a "Blue Navy" as well as an Armed Coast Guard for offshore operations is of critical importance. In organisational terms, Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) should become a major military Command, while NORAD should ensure North-America's Defence in Cyber, Aerospace, Maritime, Land & Special domains of war, pre-empting another 9/11.

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<sup>5</sup> This ratio is based on the 2014 Canadian population of 35M for the 2014 US population of 317M.

<sup>6</sup> This ratio is based on the 2014 Canadian population of 35M for the 2014 NATO population of 906M.

<sup>7</sup> See [http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/pacific\\_alliance\\_pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/pacific_alliance_pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng)

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As such, Canada should be sitting at the strategic table and should be an integral part of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), having its say not only daily but also in times of crisis. Systematically, this means NORAD must become a true binational command, defending the North American continent, and perhaps even developing more northern partnerships. Threats are not just geostrategic but also socio-cultural, structural, systemic and dynamic.

**Socio-Culture**

Canada should be playing a more active role within NATO, not necessarily only in the core military competencies offered by the Navy, Army, Air and Special Forces, but also with innovative “units” such as deploying elements of JTFX (wearing purple berets). These innovative units, such as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) teams, Intelligence-Surveillance-Targeting-Acquisition and Recon (ISTAR) and the like, prove essential for Canada to better understand global tensions. It is important for Canada to have an integrated understanding of all conflicts before we engage and thus pre-empting engagements by developing better situational awareness is crucial.

Whenever Canada decides to engage within its five areas of Global Defence with NORAD, NATO, North-Pacific, Arctic and/or perhaps Central Latin American countries, Canada should literally engage in a whole-of-government, comprehensive team Canada. Along with our Global Defence capabilities, civilian expertise, mobilised through Global Affairs Canada Stabilisation Reconstruction Task Force (START) should be integrated<sup>8</sup> and trained along our military at the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) in Kingston<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, Canada has developed a crucial expertise in Afghanistan, namely through our Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), which has been lauded by Manley<sup>10</sup>. Indeed: “Canada’s civilian and military efforts in Kandahar, after just two years of close collaboration, were now starting to achieve some real operational synergy that would be difficult to replicate quickly with the forces of another country (Manley (2008), p. 31)”. This Canadian experience and momentum must be maintained throughout engagements.

This uniquely Canadian distinctive competency should be leveraged and exploited in other theaters of operations, for example deploying a first PRT, in Erbil province, Iraq. Canadian Armed Force personnel are in better position to appraise of the socio-cultural dimension within military operations than many of our Allied militaries; the US and UK. This is a significant Canadian advantage which could also be deployed pre-emptively, as in the case of Libya in North-Africa, part of Canada’s second area of Global Defence and in NATO’s backyard, preventing the potential emergence of new disorder in the country. As such, once a new unity government is formed and under a mandate by the UN, NATO Allies under a multinational leadership should thus intervene with Canada’s engagement. Indeed, securing “*Hearts & Minds*” of the entire population is fundamental, and the way in which Canada’s Armed Force has intervened in UN mandated, and NATO supported, missions is of great significance to further help prevent and even pre-empt new conflicts.

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<sup>8</sup> See START Website: <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx?lang=eng>

<sup>9</sup> See PSTC Website: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-establishments/peace-support-index.page>

<sup>10</sup> “Manley (2008) Report”, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan: [http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\\_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf](http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf)

**4. What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take? Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?** Currently, there are 19 UN peacekeeping operations worldwide<sup>11</sup> and Canada should have a least situational awareness on each of these missions, deploying a minimum contingent of key observers. In some other missions, Canada could be training, advising as well as mentoring the UN contingents on a more comprehensive approach towards conflict resolution and prevention. Within Canada's five areas of Global Defence, there are 10 UN peacekeeping operations within which Canada could be playing a discretionary, but significant value-adding role.

Within the UNMIK in Kosovo and UNFYCIP in Cyprus, Canada could assume leading roles, deploying Command & Staff capabilities, eventually closing down these missions. Within the Middle-East, the CAF could deploy more observers and humanitarian relief capabilities under the UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNTSO in the Middle-East and UNDOF in Syria. As well, in Africa, Canada could deploy more trainers under the MINURSO in Western Sahara, MUNIL in Liberia, ONUCI in Côte d'Ivoire and MINUSMA in Mali, principally in assisting the new generation of UN peacekeepers. Most of these missions should involve the higher-end of Canadian military capabilities, whether assuming the Command & Staff responsibilities, advising and mentoring other Peacekeeping forces, training and assisting with our leading edge military engineers and medical capabilities. In any case, Canada should intervene only when UN resolutions are voted and enacted, ensuring there is a minimum stakeholder buy-in to build a sustainable peace and stability.

Canada is an important contributor to UNPKOps funding and should seek to leverage this by deploying higher-end value-adding and synergistic military capabilities in all domains. For example, Canada along with France could be more engaged in French-speaking Mali. Canada should however leave peacekeeping operations when these conditions are not met such as in South-Sudan and the Congo where Canada has limited impact in the dynamics, only maintaining minimal personnel to ensure that we keep our "Situational Awareness". Moreover, within Canada's fifth area of interest stands the MINUSTAH in Haïti, a long standing UN mission in which the CAF could be deployed and assume command of the entire force, replacing the Brazilian contingent. However, there are little prospects for Canada to have a significant impact and thus Canada should stand clear from engaging. Hence, maintaining a core contingent of civilian and possibly as well of military Police, could prove to be an interesting value-added way of maintaining Canada's engagement. If Canada was to play a role for Haïti, it should be in training the next peacekeeping force, such as training, assisting and advising the Mexican military with "*Hearts and Minds*".

Beyond Canada's five areas of Global Defence, our engagements should be limited and Canada should ensure situational awareness through finely tuned peacekeeping observers. In fact, Canada should have observers in all UN missions, worldwide, as well as Canada should reinforce its Defence Attaché program in all Embassies, augmenting our military police presence as well as deploying personnel from our Joint Task Force-X as required. In essence, Canada should be a force multiplier for all the UN peacekeeping operations, and through its Defence Attachés program also be actively engaged in better understanding.

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<sup>11</sup> Current UN Peacekeeping Operations: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>

**6. How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members? In what areas should more be done?** Obviously, mental health has to be improved from the outset, training CAF members in resilience. As much as physical training (PT) is involved in the military regimen, so should mental stamina. Indeed, as with the physical injuries, “real” mental injuries should be considered as an occupational hazard, and treated as such. Moreover, family support appears to be a victim of the CAF member’s career and family members should be considered as integral support, providing families access to federal resources, for example from Health Canada. Comprehensive medical and dental first line services must be maintained for the Regular Force and deployed Reserve Force as this is integral part of the military’s social contract. Statutory requirements, such as pensions, should be re-allocated to the Veteran’s Affairs and as such freeing up the Defence Budget for the purpose of ensuring a Global Defence. All-in-all however, military health care is still much better off than most other in Canada and CAF members dispose of a wide-ranging program for wellness through the CFMWS. However, more attention needs to be given through Op HONOUR to the integration of women within the CAF, as well as to ensuring Canada’s socio-ethnic representation. In fact, this national identity representation should be considered as a competitive advantage.

### **Structural Organisation**

The most fundamental organisational question of all relates to the very notion of “National Defence” as opposed to “National Security”. Today, it is almost impossible to dissociate the two as the faces of the same coin. However, such notion of differentiation should be maintained as long as the former relates to “Foreign Global Defence” and the latter relates to “Home Security”. In Canada, this is instituted and organised along two Departments: National Defence (which should adequately be renamed *Global Defence Canada*), as well as Public Safety (which should be renamed *National Security Canada*). *A contrario* a more integrated National Security & Defence portfolio could be envisioned to the extent there can be organisational and structural efficiency gained in the long term. Nonetheless, in the case of Canada, it still makes sense to structure different instruments with different purposes in mind, National Security for home and Global Defence abroad. This is not semantics as a crucial refocus of Canada’s Global Defence Department is key. Indeed, *Global Defence Canada* should principally focus efforts on our foreign security, while *National Security Canada* should principally focus efforts on our domestic security.

From an organisational structure perspective the Defence Department has seen its scope creep throughout the years, to include funded programs that are not core business, but which Treasury Board still maintains under the program activities architecture (PAA). For example: Youth programs should be immediately removed from our Defence Budget. It is unimaginable that Canada’s Global Defence financially supports the youth programs for those aged under 18. The Cadet Organisation could become an auto-financing program. The Junior Rangers program should be correctly relocated to Aboriginal Affairs Canada. For those willing to try a military lifestyle, Canada’s Reserve Force should be expanded, not in terms of the number of units that are at an average strength of about 150 personnel, but in terms of their strength and in terms of their outreach to all Canadian communities. Reserve companies or even platoons should be organised in colleges across the country, providing a larger pool of personnel to augment our Regular Force in basic capabilities.

**2. What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in support of civilian authorities?** At home, the CAF should play highly specialised roles mostly in indirect support of Canada, the Province's and Territories' civilian authorities. As such, the CAF should structure a joint integrated scalable force with ready deployable Headquarters and support elements for emergency response, such as a JTF-HQ and JTF-Sup component. Depending on the civilian authority's request, the Joint Task Force could see elements of the Navy, Army, Aerospace, Special and/or Cyber forces integrate in this standing structure. For example, the Army maintains the 1<sup>st</sup> Division Headquarters on the ready, which should be leveraged pre-emptively to form the basis of a Domestic JTF-HQ. The Signals, or Cyber Defence Regiment, should constitute a core element of a JTF-HQ. Such standing structure should be formalised under the Canadian Joint Ops Command<sup>12</sup>, thus having a JTF-HQ and its support elements ready to deploy in the six regional JTFs. Such domestic capability should be activated for forest fires, floods, earthquakes and etc. but only as a last resort that is when all possible civilian resources have been exhausted. To put it another way, the CAF should focus on Global Defence not on National Security.

Standing missions, such as Op DRIFTNET, Op PALACI, Op SABOT and other known domestic operations, should be recovered on a cost by cost basis from OGDs/OGAs thus leaving Canada's Defence Budget as whole for Global Defence operations and missions. In essence, although responding to emergency and crisis at home is an important mission, it is known as a contingency. A scalable JTF-HQ of ready deployable elements is crucial. Moreover, Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team<sup>13</sup> should be domestically ready and interoperable, for Emergency Preparedness, with the Department of Public Safety<sup>14</sup>. Elements under the command of CJOC, such as JTF-HQ, JTF-X, JTF-DART and others, could wear purple berets, identifying "operational readiness" as a crucial characteristic<sup>15</sup>. In essence, the CAF should stand ready to support OGDs/OGAs but not be counted on as service provider, nonetheless remaining our "last line" for National and Global Defence. The status of Canada's Rangers should thus be formalised as an integral Reserve Force and moreover, Canada's Coast Guard should be an integral component of our Armed Force.

**5. Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Force(s) change from what they are today?** A more integrated, not to say "unified<sup>16</sup>", CAF is required to address the multidimensional and complex threats to our National Defence<sup>17</sup>. The CAF should structure along its value chain, from Force Recruitment and Training, to Force Generation onward to Force Employment, along with Force Support. If the size of the CAF may not be increased and stays at 65 000 Regular Force providing very limited operators within the Navy, Army, Aerospace, Cyber and Special Forces, internal reductions and offsets can be found, making focused decisions along the idea of a Global Defence. As such, the military value chain should be prioritised over all institutional support programs.

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<sup>12</sup> CJOC: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/canadian-joint-operations-command.page>

<sup>13</sup> DART: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-recurring/dart.page>

<sup>14</sup> Preparedness: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/mrgnc-prprdncss/index-en.aspx>

<sup>15</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniforms\\_of\\_the\\_Canadian\\_Armed\\_Forces#Berets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniforms_of_the_Canadian_Armed_Forces#Berets)

<sup>16</sup> Unification of the CAF: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification\\_of\\_the\\_Canadian\\_Armed\\_Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_the_Canadian_Armed_Forces)

<sup>17</sup> See FSE 2008-2030: [http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\\_2011/dn-nd/D4-8-1-2010-eng.pdf](http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D4-8-1-2010-eng.pdf)



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Indeed, the very purpose of being in uniform is to serve Canada under its Armed Force and so if a task can be accomplished without the need for an armed uniformed member, consideration should be given to replacing the Regular Force member by Civilian ones. For example, tasks such as maintaining numerous supply depots should be civilianized. Tasks such as Military Heritage Outreach, namely musicians, should become reservists, thereby freeing important establishment positions for re-allocation to the Regular Force. And on the contrary, highly specialised tasks such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, HUMINT and ISTAR, should be converted from their current Reserve Force into the Regular Force. Indeed, Class Bs should become a full-time contract with equivalent pay and pension, resembling something of a limited FTE like Regular Force employment opportunities. Moreover, and in effect, Canada's Reserve Force should be considerably expended and refocused on basic capabilities within the Navy, Army, Aerospace & Cyber Forces, thus augmenting the available pool of personnel in support of our higher end Regular Force. Training the Reserve Force should be of critical importance for Canada's Regular Force and an integrated training "regimen", not based on old Regiments, should be envisioned. In many ways, this would help with retention of highly trained and specialised personnel.

As I have recommended before, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) organisation and structure would provide a more integrated and unified Armed Force for Canada<sup>18</sup>. Literally then we should be talking of one Force and not of multiple Canadian Force(s). Indeed, it appears unconceivable that the "Force Generation" is accomplished separately by the Navy, Army, Aerospace and Special Forces, after a unified recruiting and basic training scheme, only to dismantle and reconstitute into joint units for their "Force Employment". These organisational inefficiencies date back to the traditional Napoleonic structure and we can no longer always afford the luxury of taking so much time before a deployment. Serious consideration should be given to adopting such a unified and integrated military that in many ways would pre-empt some of the more fundamental organisational issues. Henceforth, organisational and structural integration appears necessary for more synergy.

**Strategic Policy**

Strategically, Canada should not consider trade with the US as defence / national security "peace dividend" with our American siblings. In other words, the safety and the stability of our commercial relationship and friendship with the US is interdependent on our reciprocal and proportional engagement. Henceforth, Canada should have no qualms about contributing to NORAD at a ratio of 1 to 9 US, in personnel and in financial terms. Moreover, Canada should have no hesitation committing to the aspiration of 2% of GDP, according to our NATO engagement while in the interim, refocusing its National Defence on a clear Global Defence doctrine. This new doctrine for Canada would mean that all of Canada's National Defence should be focused and invested defending our key interests, while in terms of National Security, Public Safety Canada should maintain that mandate. This would provide an immediate value-adding strategy toward Canada's Global Defence.

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<sup>18</sup> See: [http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/CDA/Commentary/Other/Force\\_Integration\\_-\\_April\\_2006.pdf](http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/CDA/Commentary/Other/Force_Integration_-_April_2006.pdf) & <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-11-7-3-4E.pdf>

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So by now, Canadians should understand that we do not “live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material (Dandurand (1924))” and so like our brave firefighters, we need the best military willing to answer the call to action in response to our Government. Considering Canada has limited existential threats which could be addressed through new Cyber, Space and Arctic capabilities Canada has many options to exercise Global Defence. Focusing our limited, but highly valuable military is quintessential to generate best value and as such, selecting operations according to the total effect in all dimensions is crucial. Canada's strategic posture should seek to leverage synergistic operations in very specific situational contexts according to our socio-cultural values and attributes such as in French speaking Mali, along an organisational structure such as an Integrated Joint Task Force of military and civilian systemic functions and capabilities, in order to achieve more synergy. In Canada, calling the military into action should rest with a non-partisan parliamentary vote; ensuring democracy is a fundamental part of National Security and Global Defence. Indeed, “reinforcing Democracy” should be a fundamental tenet of both of these policies, whether at home, through National Security, or abroad, through *Global Defence Canada*.

Strategically also, CFINTCOM should establish a new global military intelligence capability, filling an important gap in our Global Defence and thus working in very close collaboration with CSIS. As well, CSEC should develop a Cyber Defence capability, not only for the Government of Canada<sup>19</sup> but for Canada's critical infrastructure. This Cyber Defence should go much beyond “daily” Cyber Security and be pre-emptive. These new and emerging capabilities should be focused first and foremost on our Global Defence, i.e. on defending Canadian interests on a daily basis from international threats, whether conventional (from a Nation-State) or unconventional (from Organised Groups), working in very close collaboration with Global Affairs Canada & RCMP. Alongside the Defence Policy Review, should take place our Global Affairs Review to enlarge and to enrich the National Security and the Global Defence debate as to what should be the way ahead for Canada? This would include the inevitable discussion and definition of national interests as we have proposed, in five areas of Global Defence and setting a clear order of priority. Indeed, it is easier to go shopping for military hardware once a clear definition of tasks and of key missions is established beforehand by government as in this Defence Policy Review.

**3. How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve in the coming years?** Canada's daily participation within NORAD needs to be maintained at a ratio of 1 to 9 US, both in terms of personnel and in terms of our financial investment. While enlarging the scope of Canada's Air Force to include the Space domain and thus to become our Aerospace Force, consideration should also be given anew for Canada's very crucial participation in the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in light of increased threats, from North Korea, Russia & China. Moreover, NORAD should also enlarge its scope to include Cyber defence from foreign conventional and unconventional threats, such as Nation-States and/or Organised Groups. The Arctic should also become a NORAD focus, integrating the efforts of USNORTHCOM's with that of the Alaska region and of Canada.

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<sup>19</sup> See the CCIRC Website: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrct/cbr-scrct/ccirc-ccirc-eng.aspx>

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However, fundamental care should be given not to undertake essential National Security tasks (like daily Cyber Security) with the somewhat relatively limited resources for Canada's Global and Forward Defence. Moreover, a USA-Canada Special Service Force should be maintained. Global Defence resources should presumably be employed in a more pre-emptive way, in essence, countering offensive Cyber, Aerospace, Maritime, Land and Special threats<sup>20</sup>. What's more, NORAD should include Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defence in an integrated fashion.

**Systemic Processes**

Systematically, Canada maintains a relatively high GPD and good defence budget, ninth amongst NATO Allies in actual dollars for 2015-2016, the issue being efficiency<sup>21</sup>. As with the structural organisation of the Canadian Armed Force(s), which could easily resemble a unified Marine Corps construct, there are systematic inefficiencies within the Defence procurement process which contribute in large to major lost opportunities. If it is enviable for Canada to maintain an independent military-industrial complex in case of a global emergency, or of "war measures", it also appears to be an ideal with high costs and with many lost opportunities for more efficiency-based decisions, optimising our budget.

Canada is an integral part of North-America, for good and bad, an interdependent actor on the Global integrated political-economic stage. As such, Canada needs to accept a mentality that seeks to achieve more efficiency, optimisation, more "bang for the buck" approach to defence procurement. Industrial Regional Benefits (IRBs) can be maximised when the conditions are right, on some projects with a significant Canadian added-value. However, for most these procurements, an off-the-shelf approach may be the best value. What's more, such decisions should be based on whole-of-government approach (WGA), for example, integrating the role of the Coast Guard with that of the Royal Canadian Navy.

What's more, internal efficiencies can and must be found within Canada's Global Defence portfolio. Challenging traditional "military" assumptions should be a crucial role for the Minister, looking at options in all domains for more synergistic and value added capabilities. Canada should dispose of a higher-end military which is highly capable and very efficient, while not focusing on any specific niche area, which would be a great risk. The tables below present areas where offsets can be found for Regular Force Full Time Equivalents (FTE) thereby providing a greater "teeth to tail ratio" refocusing key positions. We have found that up to 7 472 Regular Force positions could be converted as civilians thereby perhaps not reducing the Defence budget, but providing more capabilities focus. Moreover according to our own estimates, close to 1,5B\$ could be freed-up from within, reallocating non-essential PAA activities to other more suitable budgeted Departments. As such reallocations in Global Defence Program Activity Architecture should be made for example allocating Heritage & Outreach activities to the Department of Heritage and to the Veteran's Affairs, namely for the organisation of the 2017 Vimy commemorations. Although of great symbolic value to the Defence Department, this is not its core business and both Veteran's Affairs and Heritage Canada should take upon themselves to support.

<sup>20</sup> Special threats include: Global Terrorism, Global Weapons Proliferation as well as Global NBCD.

<sup>21</sup> The crucial distinction between efficiency and effectiveness is very important, and here especially.

**8. What type of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with key allies in these domains?** Canada's military should be focused on the higher-end of capabilities for its Maritime, Aerospace, Cyber, Land and Special Regular Force. As such, it is easier to generate personnel from the Reserve Force than to specialise the Regular Force in all domains. The definition of Regular Force should also be expanded to Military Full-Time Equivalents (FTE), integrating the B & C classes like contracted Regular Force. Moreover, it appears obvious that Canada should leverage its technological research and development economy to the benefit of our Global Defence, working ever more closely with the DRDCs in developing the next military and defence generation of capabilities<sup>22</sup>. New investments should be made in the Cyber Defence and Space Defence capabilities, while unmanned systems should be considered as an integral part of Canada's military. These higher-end capabilities should be employed and deployed in our Global Defence and used only as a last resort for National Security, thereby focusing Canada's military. For example, Canada's Cyber Security should be established under our Public Safety Department while Canada's Cyber Defence (and Offence) should become CSEC's main focus. Otherwise, an integrated National Security and Defence portfolio can be envisioned.

**9. What additional measures could DND undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement?** One of the fundamental issues with defence procurement is the inherent political nature of the discussion, namely regarding Canada's Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRB). As far as this Policy is concerned, it should be granted that Canada ought to be prime contractor, and major subcontractor, for some if not all of its defence acquisitions. However as mentioned, this has a higher cost in financial terms and in lost opportunities. Moreover, Canada's military is very adept at strategic planning for the future, but Canada's military may not be the best institutional organisation as to manage these projects. Because of the important value of these strategic projects, a medium to long term (5 to 20 year) recapitalisation program for all military hardware must be established, which should be part of our military social contract in which the Government can ask for any operation and mission within our five areas of Defence, but for which in return there is a clear commitment on the part of Government for an equipment baseline. This crucial baseline should be established according to proposed tasks to be accomplished by the military, and not set by military itself as a vested interest. As such, it is important that a new DPR define these tasks the government wants covered and that subsequently capabilities be defined by the military and then hardware proposed. This should be the case for example with covering Canada's Aerospace which could see the use of manned and unmanned capabilities that would turn into a multipurpose plane requirement capable of being ISTAR platform, weapons platform and airspace platform. The Defence Acquisition Guide (DAG) should rightly become systematic procurement<sup>23</sup> and moreover should be integrated within a Quadrennial Defense Review ongoing process. Treasury Board thus has a crucial role to play ensuring a baseline military is maintained. Moreover, all military procurement as well as acquisitions should be attributed to PSPC, mostly in civilian positions, by the same token freeing the Regular Force for operations.

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/en/>

<sup>23</sup> See DAG (2015): <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/index.page>



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The Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) managed by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC, formerly PWGSC) should be led by Global Affairs and Defence Canada. Innovative defence capabilities should also be developed within Canada, such as Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), which should be optimised in terms of its personnel, capabilities and technology to provide a smaller, but a more versatile maritime platform. As such, an important part of this Defence Policy Review (DPR) should be concerned with setting conditions for Canadian industries to be able to develop some solutions and bring them to market, such as in the case of Canadian LAV-III sales to Saudi Arabia Kingdom. Canada also has distinctive competencies to be leveraged such as in the Aerospace sector. When procuring off-the-shelf, versatility and interoperability should be leading criteria's.

**Synergy Dynamics**

Sophisticated intelligence is key to understanding threats and gaining knowledge of dynamics on the ground before any type of action is thus undertaken (DPR (2016), p. 21). This approach is not unique to Canada, but Canada brings a distinctive approach overall. Starting with the *Whole-of-Government* (WOG), or the *Team Canada* concept, Canada's Global Defence military capabilities should be integrated within Global Affairs Canada own capabilities in terms of military diplomacy, of foreign military assistance and so on. Leveraging the work of START and integrating within Canada's own military missions was a competitive advantage for Canada found namely within the Kandahar PRT. Hence, Canada could be the first to deploy a PRT in Erbil, Iraq in order to secure reconstruction. More conventional force advisors and trainers could be deployed for example in Mali as mentioned previously leveraging Canada's linguistic capabilities for "*Hearts and Minds*" missions vetted by the UN. Libya could also prove a significant mission to secure peace and there again, a first Canadian-led PRT could prove distinctive and very value-adding.

From a synergistic perspective, Canada should expect higher return on investment (ROI) of its current 95 000 total Force strength, which currently only deploys 1 345 pers. Moreover, Canada's deployment ROI on operations worldwide is about 2%<sup>24</sup>, of which in effect only 763 personnel or 0.80% are deployed on International Operations. Essentially, Canada's deployment ROI is approximatively 2%, compared to 5.26%<sup>25</sup> at the height of the Afghanistan campaign in 2010. The deployment ratio could reach at least 3.5%, meaning Canada could deploy up to 3 325, an additional 1 980 troops toward our Global Defence. In other words again, the point of being in uniform is for deployment. Tasks such as base and garrison support, unless they are integral to training and preparation, should be civilianised and/or transferred into reserve force positions thus providing more operators. From an infrastructure perspective, divestment might also generate renewed efficiencies. Indeed, an optimal Global Defence of Canada would maximise operational deployment ratios while minimising the non-operational and the non-core activities within the portfolio.

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<sup>24</sup> This ratio is obtained by calculating CAF deployed personnel of 1 902 over available personnel 95 000: [http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES\\_Internet/docs/en/dnd-rpp-2015-16\\_eng.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/dnd-rpp-2015-16_eng.pdf) (DND, pp. 31 & 26).

<sup>25</sup> This ratio is obtained by calculating CAF deployed personnel of 5 000 over available personnel 95 000: (DND RPP // TBS 2010-2011, p. 39): <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2010-2011/inst/dnd/dnd-eng.pdf>

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In essence, beyond refocusing National Defence on a Global Defence doctrine, and beyond gaining internal efficiencies, Canada's military should bring its higher-end capabilities to the table in an interdependent world. This means synergistic capabilities which are well situated in context, socio-culturally connected, structurally optimised, strategically aligned, systematically efficient and which provide value-added synergy to Allies. It should be expected that Canada will continue to “engage” but according to its own interests within five areas of Global Defence, and that Canada can be counted on as a reliable and a respected member of the International Community in its Global Defence. However, Canada should only engage when the key demonstration of significant synergy and value-added can be made to Parliament, which should then hold a non-partisan vote. The DPR should set conditions for the democratic accountability of our military as much as it should provide the focus to our Global Defence doctrine by defining its key missions.

**7. Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?** In general Canada should maintain a LEAN, i.e. highly focused, efficient and versatile Regular Force in the Maritime, Land, Aerospace, Cyber and Special domains of war. Canada's Regular Force should be capable of integrating rapidly the Reserve Force as well as the Rangers in times of crisis. A “75 000 strong” Regular Force should dispose of the latest “sharpest” equipment in all domains, thus bringing added value and synergy. Hence, Canada's specialty should be in bringing the “high-end” military capabilities to our Allies under NORAD, NATO and the UN. For example Canada should be able and ready to provide value-adding capabilities such as CIMIC, ISTAR, HUMINT and other teams, to UN mandated and/or NATO supported missions, even mentoring other military forces. In particular, Canada could leverage its high-end capabilities in engineering and medicine deploying teams and/or trainers in support of coalition operations in our areas of Defence.

Under NATO, Canada should maintain three Joint Task Forces based on a Battle-Group as well as Command & Staff from the Brigade-Groups, perhaps even prepositioning one in Eastern-Europe on a rotational basis, training NATO's other member and partner forces. Another Joint Task Force could also be rotated in the Pacific, in South Korea or in Japan. An integrated Cyber, Maritime, Land, Air and Special Task Force based on the United States Marine Corps (USMC) concept should also be ready-deployable under NATO. In essence, a higher ratio of deployable forces should be maintained and offset by non-core activities such as managing the supply depots, managing projects and managing people. Indeed, the purpose of being in uniform is to serve Canada under its Armed Force and so if a task can be accomplished by a Defence civilian, offsets should be operations focused.

However, Canada should steer away from “niche” specialisation, instead reorganising its Canadian Armed Regular Force for the “higher-end” and higher-intensity of capabilities. The Reserve Force should be significantly increased while offering more opportunities for transfer from the Reserve Force into the Regular Force and even into the Ranger Force. What's more, Canada should be a primary Arctic operating country with three (3) Arctic Warfare Company Groups (wearing white berets) from the three (3) Brigade-Groups and with affiliated Reserve Force, as well as Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), a few

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nuclear submarines, long range manned and/or unmanned patrol aircrafts, all integrated as one team for ensuring Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and in the North-West passage.

**10. What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?**

Aside from the supplemental budget allocations for specific operations, as well as for our military engagements when they are mission tasked, such as a training and assist mission, Canada’s baseline defence budget should steer toward our NATO aspiration of 2% GDP. However, considering the current budget, which in absolute comparable dollars is still about ninth in the line of our NATO Allies, Canada must ensure more bang for its buck. It is critical that offsets be found within the current Defence Budget to achieve a higher “teeth to tail ratio”, or in other words, to achieve more synergistic efficiencies in DND. For example, the Defence Services, Military Heritage and Outreach, and Youth Program should be transferred to respective Departments and Agencies, such as Heritage Canada, while the Cadet program should be autonomous of the Defence Budget for those under 18 and the Junior Rangers program should also be transferred to Aboriginal Affairs Canada. Statutory payments to Vets for pensions should be transferred back to Veteran’s Affairs, thereby essentially focusing Canada’s Global Defence budget on core mission activities. Doing so, Canada’s Global Defence could thus recapture part of its core Defence budget.

Refocusing Canada’s National Defence budget on Global Defence is quite fundamental, and all activities which do not serve to meet this core mandate should be offset, internally reduced and refocused. For example, the Regular Force Portfolio Management, Military Personnel and Organization, Materiel – Portfolio Management, Equipment Upgrade and Insertion, Inventory Management and Distribution, its Strategic Coord, Development and Control, as well as Real Property Ops, Maintenance and Repair, System Management and User Support and finally, Internal Defence Services must be civilianised thereby freeing approximately 7 472 Regular Force positions to achieve more operational capabilities. In fact, a new Veteran’s employment scheme could be established by Veteran’s Affairs for placement specifically within the Global Defence Department and/or National Security. Furthermore, recruitment and retention would need to be expedited and expanded overall. Moreover, systemic efficiencies could be found within the functioning of our military, reducing postings from 2-3 years to 4-5 years and limiting them for selected positions. Many such efficiency decisions should be recommended through an audit of the DND which could thus provide the catalyst for the refocus of our Global Defence capabilities. The following tables represent potential offsets and internal reductions to the Defence Budget, which should all be re-allocated for the Regular Force’s operational capabilities:

**Potential Offsets**

<b>Program Description</b>	<b>Full Time Equivalents (FTE)</b>	<b>Budget Estimate 2015-2016</b>
2.2.5: Defence Services OGDs/OGAs	18 Reg Force (Civilianise)	1,526,810\$ (Recuperate on a cost-basis from OGD/OGAs)
2.3: Military Heritage and Outreach	580 Reg Force (Transfer to Heritage Canada and to VAC)	290,736,940\$ (Transfer the credits outside of Defence)
2.3.2: Youth Program	152 Reg Force (Autonomise)	223,640,390\$ (Auto-finance)
<b>Total Potential Offsets</b>	<b>750 Reg Force freed</b>	<b>515,904,140 \$ in potential efficiencies to be gained.</b>

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**Potential Refocus**

<b>Program Description</b>	<b>Full Time Equivalents (FTE)</b>	<b>Budget Estimate 2015-2016</b>
4.1.1: Military Personnel – Regular Force Portfolio Management	202 Reg Force (HR-Mil Management should be civilianised, only leaving the command responsibilities)	335,705,157\$
4.1.10: Military Personnel and Organization	954 Reg Force (HR-Mil Management should be civilianised, only leaving the command responsibilities)	201,468,045\$
4.2.1: Materiel – Portfolio Management	33 Reg Force (Material Management should be civilianised under Defence)	No change
4.2.3: Materiel – Equipment Upgrade and Insertion	1 088 Reg Force (Equipment Management should also be civilianised under Defence)	No change
4.2.6: Materiel – Inventory Management and Distribution	2 580 Reg Force (The three CAF Supply Depots should be civilianised only leaving the command responsibilities)	No change
4.2.7: Materiel – Strategic Coord, Development and Control	223 Reg Force (Project Management should be civilianised under Defence)	No change
4.3.4: Real Property – Ops, Maintenance and Repair	1 465 Reg Force (Garrison and Base O&M should be civilianised under Defence)	No change
4.4.3: Info Systems – System Management and User Support	927 Reg Force (Systems and User Support should be civilianised under Defence)	No change
6.0: Internal Services	Effective strength is baseline for DND internal management	453,116,285\$
<b>For Potential Refocus</b>	<b>7 472 Reg Force converted into Department Civilians</b>	<b>990,289,487 \$ in potential efficiencies to be gained.</b>

**Conclusion**

It thus appears that *Global Defence Canada's* priorities should rest on five areas: Canada and North-America (NORAD), the North-Atlantic (NATO), the North-Pacific, the Arctic and Central Latin-America. Canada should continue contributing to a wide spectrum of operations globally (DPR (2016), p. 26) however focusing on the higher-end capabilities, creating significant value-added synergy for Canada, in our own key interests. “Defending Canada and protecting Canadians is the Government’s most fundamental responsibility. The CAF play a vital role in advancing Canada’s interests and promoting Canadian values abroad (DPR (2016), p.1)”. But tough decisions will need to be made... Each of these decisions should account for the situational context, the socio-culture, the organisational structure, the strategic policies, systemic functions and synergy dynamics.



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This more integrated decision-support model would ensure not only that a comprehensive approach is maintained, in essence along the lines of a global “Team Canada” approach, but also that operational and managerial decisions are more efficient, and value-adding. Indeed, *Global Defence Canada* should refocus on significant and measurable synergies.

// Original signed //

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