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PATRON
HER EXCELLENCY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
ADRIENNE CLARKSON, CC, CMM, CD
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CANADA

Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, Chairman, is pleased to announce that Her Excellency the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson has accepted our invitation to become Patron of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA).

From Rideau Hall we are advised that Her Excellency extends her very best wishes for the continued success of the Conference of Defence Associations.

PRÉSIDENTE D'HONNEUR
SON EXCELLENCE
LA TRÈS HONORABLE
ADRIENNE CLARKSON, CC, CMM, CD
GOUVERNEURE GÉNÉRALE DU
CANADA

Le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, Président, est heureux d'annoncer que Son Excellence la Très Honorable Adrienne Clarkson a accepté notre invitation de devenir Présidente d'honneur de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense (CAD).

Rideau Hall nous a avisé que son Excellence communique à la CAD ses meilleurs souhaits de succès pour l'avenir.

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD

This special edition of *ON TRACK* features analyses of Canadian defence policies from the main political parties. The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Art Eggleton, shares his views on the present and future direction of the Canadian Armed Forces. In *The Defence Policy of the Canadian Alliance* Art Hanger, Official Opposition Defence Critic, presents a summary of the Canadian Alliance's defence policy position paper, *Canada Strong and Free*. The paper views the Canadian Armed Forces as in a state of crisis and outlines the main problems and suggested solutions. Senator the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall and David Price, MP, Progressive Conservative Party of Canada have coauthored *Views on the Future of Canadian Defence Policy*. Their paper articulates their views on aspects of Canadian defence policy, including national security objectives and strategy, force requirements, and a plan of action. These articles present us with a very important debate, particularly in a pre-electoral period, on national security and defence issues. I do hope that these articles generate responses from our readers.

One of the most significant elements of defence policy is, of course, the budget. Funding of the Department of National Defence has

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DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Ce numéro spécial du bulletin *ON TRACK* comprend des analyses des principaux partis portant sur les politiques de défense du Canada. En tant que ministre de la Défense nationale, l'honorable Art Eggleton, formule des points de vue sur la situation actuelle et les perspectives d'avenir des Forces canadiennes. Dans l'article intitulé *The Defence Policy of the Canadian Alliance*, Art Hanger, critique officiel en matière de défense de l'opposition, présente un résumé de l'exposé de principe de l'Alliance canadienne dans le domaine de la défense (*Canada Strong and Free*). Dans sa déclaration de principe, l'Alliance canadienne précise que les Forces canadiennes sont en crise; elle donne un aperçu des principaux problèmes cernés et elle propose des solutions. Le Sénateur l'honorable J. Michael Forrestall et David Price, député du Parti progressiste-conservateur du Canada, signent tous deux *View on the Future of Canadian Defence Policy*. Ils y présentent leurs opinions sur certains aspects de la politique de défense canadienne, y compris les objectifs et la stratégie de sécurité nationale, les exigences des forces et un plan d'action. Les

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute, a self-supporting entity within CDA, is dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

Les questions de défense sont portées à l'attention du public par le truchement d'analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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trois articles en question offrent à nos membres un débat sur la sécurité nationale et les questions de défense qui revêt une grande importance, particulièrement en cette période pré-électorale. J'espère que nos lecteurs nous feront savoir ce qu'ils pensent de ces articles.

L'un des principaux éléments de la politique de défense est, bien entendu, le budget. Le financement du ministère de la Défense nationale fait continuellement l'objet d'examen et de débats à l'échelle de l'organisation de la Défense. Le colonel (à la retraite) Sean Henry, notre analyste principal en matière de défense, a entrepris une étude poussée sur les dépenses liées à la défense. La phase initiale de l'étude comprend une analyse du *Budget 2000* et du *Guide de planification de la Défense 2001*. Le présent numéro comprend un résumé de cet examen préliminaire.

Nous invitons toujours les lecteurs du bulletin *ON TRACK* à rédiger des articles. Nous sommes particulièrement heureux d'inclure dans ce numéro l'article *Fuller Than You Think*, rédigé par le vice-amiral Gary Garnett, Vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense. Dans un numéro antérieur d'*ON TRACK*, Peter Kasurak, du bureau du vérificateur général du Canada, s'est penché sur le rapport de cette année du vérificateur général ainsi que sur la reddition de comptes au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale. Le vice-amiral Garnett formule une réponse où il fournit des éclaircissements concernant certaines des questions soulevées par Peter Kasurak.

C'est avec grand plaisir que nous publions l'article intitulé *Forces armées « misant sur une seule option »...Un pari prudent? Une nouvelle politique de défense adoptée sans débat?*, rédigé par le major-général (à la retraite) Clive John Addy, président national de la Fédération des instituts militaires et interarmées du Canada. Le major-général Addy examine les répercussions que la *Stratégie de défense 2020* et la Révolution dans les affaires militaires pourraient avoir sur les capacités de défense du Canada.

Un sujet d'intérêt courant est la restructuration des Forces de réserves de l'armée de terre. Dans le but de continuer à informer nos lecteurs, nous vous communiquons les détails des responsabilités de Lieutenant-général Mike Jeffery, récemment nommé Adjoint spécial de Chef d'état-major de la Défense.

Finalement, vous êtes invités à lire le récit du capitaine (à la retraite) Peter Forsberg sur son affectation en Bosnie-Herzégovine au sein de la Force de protection des Nations Unies. Dans cet article, il décrit la fin de sa deuxième période de service auprès des Nations Unies. Il s'agit de la quatrième et dernière partie des mémoires du capt Forsberg sur les deux années les plus palpitantes de sa carrière dans les Forces canadiennes.

J'espère que nos lecteurs se demanderont à qui devrait être attribué le prix Vimy cette année et qu'ils enverront leurs mises

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been an intense, ongoing subject of scrutiny and debate throughout the defence establishment. Colonel (Retd) Sean Henry, our Senior Defence Analyst, has undertaken an extensive study of defence spending. An initial phase of that study comprises an analysis of *Budget 2000 and Defence Planning Guidance 2001*. A summary of this preliminary review is included in this edition.

Contributions to *ON TRACK* from our readers are always welcome. We are particularly pleased to include in this issue *Fuller Than You Think*, by Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. In an earlier edition of *ON TRACK*, Peter Kasurak, from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, looked at this year's report from the Auditor General and examined accountability within the Department of National Defence. Vice-Admiral Garnett presents us with a response in which he clarifies some of the issues raised by Peter Kasurak.

We are very pleased to include *One Spot, One Shot Armed Forces...Or Not?*, by Major-General (Retd) Clive John Addy, National Chairman, The Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada. In his article Major-General Addy examines the impact *Defence Strategy 2020* and the Revolution in Military Affairs may have on Canada's defence capabilities.

With restructuring of the Land Force Reserves being a very current topic we present for our readers an announcement from the office of Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery of his selection by the Minister of National Defence as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Defence Staff for Land Force Reserve Restructure.

Finally we have Captain (Retd) Peter Forsberg's memoir of his Bosnia-Herzegovina experience with the United Nations Protection Force. His article describes the conclusion of his second tour of duty with the United Nations. This is the fourth and final part of Captain Forsberg's reminiscences of the most exciting two years of his former career in the Canadian Armed Forces.

I hope that our readers will search their thoughts on whom they think should be the recipient of this year's Vimy Award and forward their nomination to the CDA Institute. This prestigious award is important to the defence community in that it recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations as it appears elsewhere in this issue.

In closing I again remind our readers that without your continued support the national office cannot carry out the work of the CDA and the CDA Institute. Your support in the past **is** paying off. We are making progress: witness the increased defence budget where CDA played an important role. The momentum is there but **your continued financial support as members of the Institute is vital** to our success. Please renew your membership when you are asked. Better still - recruit a friend to the Institute.

en candidature à l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Ce prestigieux prix occupe une grande place aux yeux des membres de la communauté de la défense, puisqu'il permet de reconnaître un Canadien qui a contribué de façon exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays, de même qu'à la protection de nos valeurs démocratiques. Veuillez consulter l'avis sur l'appel de candidatures qui est publié dans le présent numéro.

Enfin, je tiens à rappeler à nos lecteurs que, sans leur appui continu, le bureau national ne pourrait s'acquitter de toutes les tâches de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD. Le soutien que vous nous avez apporté par le passé a porté ses fruits. Nous réalisons des progrès, comme en témoigne l'augmentation du budget de la Défense, qui est attribuable en partie aux efforts déployés par la CAD. Nous sommes très dynamiques, mais **votre appui financier continu en tant que membres de l'Institut est essentiel** à notre succès. Veuillez renouveler votre carte de membre au moment voulu et n'hésitez pas à demander à un ami de devenir membre de l'Institut.

LES FORCES CANADIENNES: UN INSTRUMENT ESSENTIEL DE NOTRE POLITIQUE NATIONALE ET ÉTRANGÈRE

L'honorable Art Eggleton, CP, MP, Ministre de la Défense nationale

Le Budget 2000 a démontré l'engagement du gouvernement à l'égard d'une des plus importantes institutions nationales du Canada – la Défense. Il s'agit d'une institution nationale qui contribue grandement à la sécurité et au bien-être des Canadiens, ainsi que des peuples et des communautés à l'échelle mondiale.

Le gouvernement a augmenté le budget de la Défense deux années de suite. C'est donc dire que les Forces canadiennes recevront 2,3 milliards de dollars de plus sur une période de quatre ans. Les nombreux défenseurs des forces armées du Canada se réjouissent du fait que des ressources supplémentaires ont été accordées. Certains d'entre eux, par exemple l'exécutif de la Conférence des associations de la défense, sont d'avis qu'une somme deux fois plus grande devrait être affectée aux forces.

Ces personnes comptent parmi celles qui ont souligné le risque que les biens d'équipement des FC se détériorent progressivement s'ils ne sont pas remplacés et modernisés rapidement. D'autres ont précisé que le Canada doit

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THE CANADIAN FORCES: A VITAL INSTRUMENT OF OUR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Honourable Art Eggleton, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence

Budget 2000 demonstrated the Government's commitment to one of Canada's most important national institutions – Defence. A national institution that contributes greatly to the safety, security and well-being of Canadians, as well as to peoples and communities around the world.

For the second consecutive year, the Government has increased the defence budget. The Canadian Forces are seeing an additional \$2.3 billion over four years. For many supporters of Canada's military, the added resources are most welcome. Some, such as those representing the executive of the Conference of Defence Associations, have argued for twice as much to be given to the Forces.

They and others have drawn particular attention to the dangers of "rust-out" if the CF's capital equipment is not replaced and updated quickly. Others point to the need for Canada to get in on the so-called revolution in military affairs if we are to have state-of-the-art capabilities to meet future challenges.

All of these arguments are cogent. But to them I would add a broader, political perspective – one that presents the Canadian Forces to the Canadian people in terms of an investment. A vital investment that brings together Canadian traditions, interests and values as a nation.

Canadians have always been prepared to fight to protect what we value. We fought in the First World War, in the Second World War, and in Korea. We have shown ourselves willing and able to help others make the transition from conflict to peace. Canada has been a world leader in peacekeeping from the Suez and the Congo to Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.

As we look to the future, we must remember these contributions and traditions. They bear real and significant costs. And they remind us that Canada's stake in the world is both moral and economic. And it is also based on national interest.

We are a nation relying heavily on international trade. Our integration into the global economy means that we are affected by what goes on in the wider world. At the same time, we require a stable and rules-based system for trade. And for Canada it must also be an international system in which democracy, tolerance and human rights are promoted and defended.

ON TRACK

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Finally, a realistic appraisal of our interests tells us that conflict among nations and within nations can produce instabilities that can spread to other parts of the globe. We cannot pretend that

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participer à ce qu'on appelle la révolution dans les affaires militaires pour disposer de capacités de pointe et relever les défis du futur.

Tous ces arguments sont pertinents. J'ajouterais cependant une perspective politique plus vaste. Il s'agit de faire voir à la population que les Forces canadiennes sont un investissement essentiel et qu'elles s'appuient sur les traditions, les intérêts et les valeurs de la nation canadienne.

Les Canadiens ont toujours été prêts à se battre pour défendre ce qu'ils valorisaient. Nous avons participé à la Première Guerre mondiale, à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et à la guerre de Corée. Nous avons démontré notre volonté et notre capacité d'aider les autres à passer d'une situation de conflit à une situation de paix. Le Canada est un chef de file dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, comme en témoignent les missions menées notamment à Suez, au Congo, en Bosnie, au Kosovo et au Timor-Oriental.

Lorsque nous envisageons l'avenir, nous devons tenir compte de ces contributions et traditions. Des coûts réels et importants y sont rattachés. Ces coûts nous rappellent que le Canada joue dans le monde un rôle à la fois moral et économique, qui est fondé sur l'intérêt national.

À titre de pays, nous dépendons grandement du commerce international. Étant donné notre intégration à l'économie mondiale, nous sommes touchés par ce qui se passe sur le plan international. Au même moment, nous avons besoin d'un système commercial à la fois stable et fondé sur des règles. Aux yeux des Canadiens, il doit s'agir d'un système international qui assure la promotion et la défense de la démocratie, de la tolérance et des droits de la personne.

Finalement, une évaluation réaliste de nos intérêts révèle que les conflits entre pays et les conflits à l'intérieur même des pays risquent d'entraîner une instabilité qui finit par s'étendre à d'autres parties du globe. Nous ne pouvons faire semblant que le Canada est une maison à l'épreuve du feu. L'isolement n'est pas possible.

Un simple tour d'horizon nous permet de constater que la fin de la guerre froide n'a pas été synonyme de paix et de prospérité à l'échelle de la planète. Dans de nombreuses régions, les conflits entre peuples d'un même pays sont malheureusement plus fréquents qu'avant et ils provoquent des catastrophes humanitaires, des campagnes d'«épuration ethnique» et le non-respect systématique des droits de la personne.

De nouvelles demandes d'aide nous proviennent donc de l'étranger. Comme l'a confirmé le récent Discours du Trône, nous continuerons d'acquiescer à de telles demandes.

Le nombre de différends localisés et violents a augmenté, et le Canada compte parmi les pays qui ont déployé le plus d'efforts pour favoriser la paix. De 1948 à 1989, les Forces canadiennes ont pris part à 25 opérations de maintien de la paix ; depuis 1989, le nombre d'opérations de paix auxquelles les Forces canadiennes ont participé a presque triplé, puisqu'il est supérieur à 65.

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Canada is a fireproof house far from flammable materials. Isolation is thus not feasible.

A simple tour d'horizon tells us that the end of the Cold War did not bring peace and prosperity to all parts of the world. In many regions, conflict between peoples within a country has unfortunately become more prevalent, bringing with it humanitarian catastrophes, "ethnic cleansing" and the systematic abuse of human rights.

So we are faced with new demands for assistance overseas. And as the recent Speech from the Throne confirmed, we will continue to respond.

As the number of localized, violent disputes has increased, Canada has been among the most active nations in making a difference. From 1948 to 1989, the Canadian Forces were involved in 25 peacekeeping operations; since 1989, the Canadian Forces have been involved almost triple that — more than 65 peace-support operations.

All three branches of our armed forces have contributed their share. Canadian army units have kept the peace and protected civilians in dozens of countries. Our navy has supported United Nations-sanctioned activities in the Gulf War and in the enforcement of embargoes on Yugoslavia. Our air force made a significant combat contribution in the NATO-led air campaign over Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such a high operational tempo means that more troops serve abroad more frequently.

Nor is it just the number of operations - their nature is also changing. Situations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor or the Central African Republic require delicate handling, far removed from the traditional military rules of engagement. Our forces often find themselves at the centre of a vast network of players - local authorities, police, aid groups, volunteer organizations - all trying to maintain law and order, preserve the peace and provide emergency relief. They often operate in areas where many combatants are still intent on war. And they are deployed in areas far removed geographically - which demands greater logistical support to sustain them.

These are the demands we are making of our forces abroad. Meanwhile, here at home, we ask them to patrol our airspace and 240,000 kilometres of coastline; help secure our borders against illegal activities; help protect Canada's fisheries from illegal and highly damaging exploitation; undertake thousands of search-and-rescue missions; and provide assistance during emergencies and natural disasters.

As demands rise, the Canadian Forces are stretched. In recent years, we've asked them to do more with much less. Since 1994, the defence budget has been cut by about \$2-billion, the regular forces by 20 per cent and the civilian workforce by almost 40 per cent.

Les trois services de nos forces armées ont fait leur part. Des unités de l'Armée de terre du Canada ont maintenu la paix et protégé des civils dans des douzaines de pays. Notre Marine a appuyé des activités sanctionnées par les Nations Unies lors de la guerre du Golfe et elle a veillé à la mise en application des embargos imposés contre la Yougoslavie. Notre Force aérienne a grandement contribué aux opérations de combat exécutées durant la campagne aérienne menée par l'OTAN au Kosovo et en République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Quand le rythme opérationnel est aussi élevé, un plus grand nombre de militaires servent à l'étranger plus fréquemment.

Or, les opérations ne font pas qu'augmenter en nombre, puisque leur nature se transforme aussi. Dans des régions où la situation est très délicate, comme la Bosnie, le Kosovo, le Timor-Oriental et la République centrafricaine, il faut aborder les choses autrement, puisque les règles d'engagements militaires habituelles ne s'appliquent pas. Nos forces se trouvent souvent au milieu d'un vaste réseau d'intervenants - autorités locales, police, groupes d'aide, organisations de bénévoles - qui tentent tous d'assurer l'ordre, de maintenir la paix et de fournir des secours d'urgence. Nos forces mènent souvent des opérations à des endroits où de nombreux combattants veulent poursuivre la guerre. De plus, elles sont déployées dans des régions très éloignées, ce qui exige un important soutien logistique.

Voilà les exigences que nous imposons à nos forces à l'étranger. En même temps, au Canada, nous leur demandons d'effectuer des patrouilles dans notre espace aérien et le long de nos côtes, qui s'étendent sur 240 000 kilomètres; nous leur demandons aussi de protéger nos frontières contre les activités illégales et d'empêcher que nos bancs de poissons ne soient la cible d'activités illégales et d'actes d'exploitation qui ont des effets très néfastes; nos forces sont également appelées à effectuer des milliers de missions de recherche et sauvetage et à fournir de l'aide lors de situations d'urgence et à la suite de catastrophes naturelles.

Au fur et à mesure que la demande augmente, des pressions de plus en plus grandes sont exercées sur les Forces canadiennes. Au cours des dernières années, nous leur avons demandé de fournir un meilleur rendement malgré la forte diminution des ressources. Depuis 1994, le budget de la Défense a été réduit d'environ 2 milliards de dollars, la Force régulière, de 20 pour 100, et le personnel civil, de près de 40 pour 100.

Il s'agissait là d'une partie du sacrifice imposé à tous les Canadiens et tous les ministères. Il n'était pas question de s'objecter à la guerre contre le déficit. Tout le monde devait participer, et personne n'a manqué à son devoir.

Cependant, le défi auquel nous sommes actuellement confrontés n'a pas trait seulement aux ressources, mais également à la formation au commandement, à l'éducation militaire et à la pensée de niveau stratégique. Le défi consiste également à s'adapter à un monde en mutation qui est caractérisé par des exigences économiques strictes et des contraintes budgétaires. Les Canadiens veulent tirer le maximum de leurs investissements dans le domaine de la défense. Toutefois, nous devons veiller à ce que ces

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This was part of the collective sacrifice that all Canadians and government departments had to make. There could be no conscientious objectors in the war against the deficit. Everyone had to contribute, and everyone did.

However, the challenge we face today is not just about resources. It is about leadership training, military education and strategic-level thinking. It is also about adapting to a changing world driven by strict economies and budgetary constraints. Canadians want to get the most out of the defence investments they make. But we must ensure that such investments enable the armed forces to be ready and equipped for the tasks ahead - and in an ever more complex world.

We are making progress. Major acquisitions in recent years include new submarines, new frigates, coastal-patrol vessels and light armoured vehicles as well as search-and-rescue helicopters that will soon come into service. This state-of-the-art equipment will serve us well. A number of other areas, however, remain to be modernized.

The real issue is what to invest in for the future. In planning for the Canadian Forces, we have made several key assumptions. One is that Canada will continue to need combat-capable forces. It is an essential fact of the modern world that we must be ready to match our fine words with firm action. In Kosovo, for example, our speeches condemned Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic, but it was our military force that helped to stop him.

We must continue to work seamlessly with our allies. As the nature of modern warfare and crisis-response becomes increasingly high-tech, we must ensure that our forces are compatible with those of our allies with whom we have collective defence arrangements such as NATO and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Our forces should be globally and rapidly deployable. As we saw in Kosovo, and after the earthquake in Turkey, time is of the essence when people are in trouble. We must improve our ability to get the Canadian Forces where they are needed and to get them there fast.

At the same time, we must ensure that the men and women who wear our uniform and carry our cause have a reasonable quality of life. We must give them a decent standard of living. We must continue to re-invest in the men and women who are the lifeblood of the Canadian Forces. We cannot ask them to go into dangerous situations if we are not prepared to back them.

The bottom line is that the Canadian Forces do not have to participate in every international operation. Nor do they have to try to be all things to all people. We do not need to invest everywhere and in everything.

But let us be clear. We cannot avoid making hard choices and tough trade-offs. And whatever choices we make now will have an impact on operational readiness, on our equipment (do we buy, upgrade or simply reduce it?), on the kind of training we conduct, and on the number of personnel in our armed forces.

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investissements permettent aux forces armées de disposer du matériel nécessaire et d'être prêtes à remplir les tâches qui les attendent dans un monde de plus en plus complexe.

Nous réalisons des progrès. Depuis quelques années, nous avons fait l'acquisition, entre autres, de nouveaux sous-marins, de frégates, de navires de défense côtière, de véhicules blindés légers, ainsi que d'hélicoptères de recherche et sauvetage qui seront bientôt mis en service. Cet équipement de pointe nous sera des plus utiles. Dans d'autres domaines, cependant, nous devons nous moderniser.

La vraie question consiste à déterminer dans quels secteurs nous allons investir à l'avenir. En établissant des plans pour les Forces canadiennes, nous avons dressé plusieurs hypothèses clés.

Selon l'une de celles-ci, le Canada continuera d'avoir besoin de forces aptes au combat. Dans le monde moderne, nous devons être capables de prendre des mesures qui reflètent fidèlement nos paroles. Dans le cas du Kosovo, par exemple, nous avons condamné par le discours le président de la Yougoslavie, Slobodan Milosevic, mais c'est notre force militaire qui a permis de mettre un frein à ses actions.

Nous devons continuer de travailler de façon ininterrompue avec nos alliés. Puisque la guerre moderne et les interventions effectuées lors des situations de crise font de plus en plus appel à la haute technologie, nous devons faire en sorte que nos forces soient compatibles avec celles des alliés avec lesquels nous avons conclu des accords de défense collective, par exemple, l'OTAN et le Commandement de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD).

Il faut que nos forces puissent être déployées rapidement à l'échelle mondiale. Comme nous l'avons vu au Kosovo et après le tremblement de terre survenu en Turquie, le délai d'intervention revêt une importance capitale lorsqu'il se produit une situation de crise. Nous devons prendre des mesures pour permettre aux Forces canadiennes d'être déployées rapidement, là où on a besoin d'elles.

Il faut également veiller à ce que les hommes et les femmes qui portent l'uniforme et qui défendent nos intérêts jouissent d'une qualité de vie raisonnable. Nous devons leur garantir un niveau de vie acceptable. Nous devons continuer de réinvestir dans les hommes et les femmes qui constituent l'élément essentiel des Forces canadiennes. Nous ne pouvons leur demander de mettre leur vie en péril si nous ne sommes pas prêts à les appuyer.

En bout de ligne, les Forces canadiennes ne sont pas obligées de participer à toutes les opérations internationales. Elles n'ont pas besoin non plus de défendre toutes les causes. Nous ne sommes pas tenus d'investir partout et dans tous les domaines.

Soyons clairs. Nous ne pouvons éviter de faire des choix et des compromis difficiles. Les choix que nous faisons actuellement auront des répercussions sur l'état de préparation opérationnelle, notre équipement (acheter, moderniser ou tout simplement réduire l'équipement ?), le type d'instruction que nous donnons et le nombre de militaires dont nous disposons.

(voir p. 7)

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2000 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 to recognize one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous winners of the Award are the Right Honourable Joe Clark, General John deChastelain, Majors-General Lewis MacKenzie, Bill Howard, and Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, and Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the Award. Nominations must be in writing, and be accompanied by a summary of your reasons for your nomination and a short biography of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2000, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD JURY
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Vimy Award will be presented at a mixed dinner on Friday, 17 November, at the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa.

For more information, including ticket orders for the award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address or telephone (613) 236-9903.

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2000.

La distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 dans le but de reconnaître un Canadien ou une Canadienne ayant apporté une contribution extraordinaire à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre nation et à la préservation de notre démocratie.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont le Très honorable Joe Clark, le Général John deChastelain, les Major-généraux Lewis MacKenzie, Bill Howard et Roméo Dallaire, le Dr. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, et le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut soumettre le nom d'un citoyen/citoyenne pour la distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et être accompagnées d'un sommaire de vos raisons motivant la nomination et une courte biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2000, et doivent être adressées au:

JURY DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIA-
TIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359, RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

La distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée à un dîner mixte, vendredi le 17 novembre 2000, à l' Hôtel Château Laurier à Ottawa.

Pour de plus amples renseignements, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l' Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense à l' adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou au numéro de téléphone (613) 236-9903.

I believe that Canadians want our country to remain an agent for good in a world of change. I believe they want us to advance human security and build the foundations for stability and peace. And I believe they want us to ensure that our forces are able to get the job done with the right tools and the right capabilities.

Budget 2000 was a significant step in the right direction. The Canadian Forces of today are building on a much stronger foundation than even a few short years ago. Major institutional reforms are taking root. And the Government has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that the Canadian Forces have the capacity they need to help build a more secure world.

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Je crois que les Canadiens veulent que notre pays continue de faire le bien dans le monde, qui est en évolution constante. Je pense qu'ils souhaitent que nous fassions progresser le dossier de la sécurité humaine et que nous bâtissons les fondations de la stabilité et de la paix. À mon avis, les Canadiens veulent que nous fassions en sorte que nos forces possèdent les outils et les capacités nécessaires à l'exécution de leurs fonctions.

Le Budget 2000 est un grand pas dans la bonne direction. Les Forces canadiennes d'aujourd'hui s'appuient sur une fondation beaucoup plus solide qu'il y a quelques années. Des réformes

(voir p. 8)

The Canadian Forces provide Canada with vital national capabilities that cannot be replaced by any other means. The CF is, and will remain, a vital instrument of our domestic and foreign policy. The commitment made by the Government in the Throne Speech is a serious one. I intend to continue along the path that we have charted. A path of adaptation, reform and re-capitalization, so that we will have the right military forces for Canada to help build a more secure world – now and in the future.

institutionnelles d'envergure sont en cours. De plus, le gouvernement a démontré qu'il tenait à ce que les Forces canadiennes disposent des capacités dont elles ont besoin pour contribuer à bâtir un monde plus stable.

Les Forces canadiennes procurent au Canada des capacités nationales vitales qui ne peuvent être fournies autrement. Les FC constituent, et demeureront, un instrument essentiel de notre politique nationale et étrangère. Dans le cadre du Discours du Trône, le gouvernement a pris un véritable engagement. J'ai l'intention de poursuivre dans la même voie, c'est-à-dire une voie caractérisée par l'adaptation, la réforme et l'investissement en matière d'immobilisations. Ainsi, le Canada sera doté de forces militaires qui bâtiront un monde plus sûr, à court et à long terme.

THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE CANADIAN ALLIANCE

Art Hanger, MP, Official Opposition Defence Critic

This month, the Canadian Alliance parliamentary caucus approved a defence policy position paper entitled *Canada Strong and Free*. The Alliance hopes that the paper will help to widen debate on defence policy. This article summarizes some of the most important aspects.

The Canadian Armed Forces today are clearly in a state of crisis that is the result of more than thirty years of neglect by both Liberal and Tory governments. The most alarming problems are:

- Manpower in the regular forces is steadily falling - now down to less than 59,000 troops. Over the past seven years some 25 percent of the Forces have been cut, making it increasingly difficult to meet commitments.
- Morale and esprit de corps has been seriously undermined by ill-considered and politically-driven policies which have nothing to do with operational requirements. This is contributing to a steady flow of our best personnel out of the Forces.
- Major items of equipment are obsolescent or obsolete. Tanks are twenty years old with the prospect of only limited modernization. Most artillery is thirty to forty years old. Many of our transport aircraft entered service in the 1960s. Naval helicopters are more than thirty years old. Sealift capacity has been reduced to just two ships, both of which entered service thirty years ago.
- Badly needed replacement programs have been repeatedly delayed, causing the Auditor General to warn last year that capital equipment requirements face a shortfall of up to \$30 billion by 2012.¹

If these problems are to be addressed seriously, then it is necessary for government to take a radically new approach to defence policy. Tinkering and blindly throwing a little more money at the defence establishment will not resolve the present crisis.

While the government recently announced that an extra \$1.9 billion would be provided to DND over four years, this is not sufficient. Indeed, the Conference of Defence Associations estimates that it is: "less than 50 percent of what would be needed to address the broader base of the crisis in the Canadian Forces".² Indeed, most of the new money will go simply to make up for

existing shortfalls in the operations budget and the Estimates indicate that only \$55 million in new dollars will be devoted to capital equipment in 2000-01.³

Why is it imperative to address this crisis?

- 1) **Moral obligation to Canadian Soldiers:** The Government and Parliament of Canada have a moral obligation to the serving men and women we send overseas. It is imperative to ensure that our soldiers are properly trained, equipped and supported. Since the end of the Cold War, Canadian troops have been ordered to serve in dangerous theatres of operation including: the Gulf War, Somalia, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia (where 17 have been killed), Haiti, Rwanda/Zaire, Kosovo and East Timor. They have performed extremely well, but they have done so in spite of inadequate resources. We cannot continue to ask Canadian soldiers to risk their lives overseas, if we are not going to provide them with the tools they need to do the job we ask of them.
- 2) **Protect Canadian Sovereignty and Independence:** Canada is a G-7 country, yet we have problems protecting our own territory. During the ice storm in 1998, for instance, Canada had to borrow American heavy-lift aircraft to deploy troops and equipment to the affected region. Our Militia is less than 12,000 strong and most units cannot even put a trained platoon (32 men) in the field. There are serious gaps in our offshore patrol capability for the protection of our territorial seas. Although we claim sovereignty over waters in the Arctic, we have no capability to actually operate effectively in the waters of that region.

It is an abdication of responsibility to allow these shortcomings to remain unaddressed. Should challenges to our security arise in the future, it will not be possible to create a credible capability out of thin air. It is essential that we commit ourselves to maintaining an effective and adequate core capability now. Preparation in advance is the only possible insurance to avoid unnecessary and possibly drastic loss of life in an unforeseen crisis.

- 3) **Restore Canadian Influence:** Effective military capability is an important aspect of diplomatic credibility. Thirty years

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of continuous cutbacks have undermined our influence with our allies and our ability to help shape allied policy. It has also lowered our profile with allied countries and made it more difficult to bring high level attention to political, or even economic, issues of concern to Canada. Enhancing our military capabilities to meet agreed upon commitments will strengthen Canada's standing, credibility and influence internationally.

4) How should the Crisis be Addressed?

a) Identify Key Defence Priorities: The Canadian Alliance suggests that a defence consensus can best be forged by focusing on those military priorities that are vital to our national interests and have consistently had the support of most Canadians. These are to:

- i) Defend Canada and protect Canadian sovereignty;
- ii) Defend vital Canadian interests and contribute to collective defence in NATO and NORAD; and,
- iii) Support Canadian diplomacy as required.

The Official Opposition's foreign policy paper, *Canada and the Millennium*, released in November 1999, argued that the priority focus for Canada must be on those regions in which we have the most direct stake. Presently, more than 95 percent of Canadian trade is conducted with the United States and North America, Europe, the Pacific Rim and Russia and the circumpolar region. It is from these regions that direct threats to Canada can emanate. This is where we must focus our defence priorities. Canadian Military commitments in other regions should, in most circumstances, be limited to playing a supporting role in allied operations. The reality of limited resources makes this the only viable policy approach.

b) Forge a Defence Policy Consensus: Defence is an area where every effort should be made to formulate a non-partisan national consensus. Defence programs are often pursued over many years, and even decades, making a consensus an important prerequisite for policy consistency. It is the view of the Canadian Alliance that Parliament must play a leading role in forging a national consensus.

Presently, the Standing House of Commons Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is largely ineffective. Due to the enforcement of Party discipline it never seriously questions the government's spending proposals or priorities and the Committee's reports are purely advisory. The Department of National Defence may occasionally draw an isolated quotation from a particular report, but generally such documents are most often quick to gather dust.

To change this, we are committed to fundamentally reforming Parliament. Committees must be strengthened to enable them to hold government accountable and to exercise effective policy oversight. Ordinary Members of Parliament could then participate in forging the needed defence policy consensus.

We believe that the basis for a defence policy consensus already exists among backbench MPs. For instance, in its November 1999 report, the House Defence Committee recommended that defence spending be significantly enhanced to move Canada toward the NATO average in spending as a percentage of the Gross Domestic

Product (GDP).⁴ Under the present system, the government is free to ignore the Committee. Were Parliament to be fundamentally reformed, it would be unable to do so.

Creating Operationally Credible Forces

Once defence priorities are identified, the Canadian Armed Forces must be given the tools required to implement policy objectives. The leadership of the Armed Forces must advise Government and Parliament on the capabilities they require to fulfil the tasks set by political decision-makers. To a large extent, the military has already done this.

In publications such as *Defence 2020*, the Forces have identified some of the capabilities required to protect Canadian sovereignty and deploy our forces overseas. Previous defence white papers have also identified certain constant capability requirements for a country of Canada's size and geographic position. The 1994 Defence White Paper, for instance, placed a high emphasis on rapidly deployable ground forces and on effective air and sea transport. Unfortunately, these provisions were never fully implemented.

Some of the most immediate capability requirements include:

- replacement of obsolescent and obsolete equipment, particularly in the Army, in order to ensure that our forces can operate in all combat environments.
- acquisition of heavy-lift transport aircraft for the Air Force and improvement of Navy sealift capabilities.
- expansion of personnel levels in both the regular and reserve forces to meet commitments effectively. The reserve forces can often do many jobs (particularly those within Canada) more cost-effectively than the regular forces. We therefore propose that Primary Reserves (land, naval and air) be gradually increased to about 60,000 troops. This would both restore the effectiveness of the Reserves and also help to re-establish essential links between the Canadian Armed Forces and the civilian population.

Once projects have been initiated to address immediate priorities, longer-term projects should proceed to improve on present capabilities. This would include measures to:

- improve the capabilities of the Navy to protect Canadian waters and the approaches to Canadian territory, especially in the Pacific and in the Arctic where an under-ice capability is required; and,
- examine the option of establishing a forward operating facility in Europe (possibly co-located on an existing allied base) in order to meet our major NATO commitments more rapidly and effectively.

Resources Required

It is obvious that the crisis in defence is now so acute that no government can pretend to be able to reverse the decline during a single term in office. The solution will necessarily be a long one potentially involving successive governments headed by possibly

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different political parties. The short-term priority must be to stop the bleeding of capability and morale. The Canadian Alliance supports the position of the Conference of Defence Associations that about \$2 billion in new money is required over the next two years. This is about double what the present government is committed to investing.

In keeping with the consensus expressed by the House of Commons Defence Committee in 1999, the longer-term, goal of defence policy should be to bring spending up to the NATO average as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That is, to raise it to between 1.7 and 2.1 percent of GDP, (up from 1.1 percent at present).

We believe that such a goal is achievable by the 2010 to 2015 period. Funds would not be taken from the existing budgetary surplus or from resources presently transferred to the provinces for health and education. Rather, government spending in other areas, such as wasteful grants and contributions, would be reviewed and monies reallocated to higher priority areas like defence.

While additional resources are clearly important, more money is not a solution in and of itself. Putting operational requirements first requires that the entire organization and activities of the Department of National Defence (DND) be reviewed. The continued necessity of all bases and facilities should also be put under the microscope. Those bases found to be surplus to operational requirements should be closed and DND should be given an opportunity to share in any revenues raised through the sale of military assets.

It will also be essential to reform the existing procurement process, which is often too slow and cumbersome, in order to make it more efficient and cost-effective. Again, operational requirements will be made the overarching priority. Where it is necessary to purchase equipment “off the shelf” in order to reduce costs, that should be done.

Esprit de Corps and Morale

Before concluding, I must say a word about esprit de corps and morale in the Canadian Armed Forces. Over the last several years government boards and human rights tribunals have actively sought to socially-engineer the military. In doing so they have lost sight of the fact that the primary, overriding purpose of the military is to prepare to fight and win wars, and in doing so, to deter them. That goal should supersede all other considerations. Social Engineering policies, which include the establishment of recruitment quotas (referred to as “targets” by the government) for “designated groups”, have nothing to do with operational requirements. In order to meet these quotas, training standards have been progressively reduced.⁵

It must be said that this process is spiralling out of control with the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration and Employment Equity now recommending that persons from designated groups be “fast-tracked” for promotion.

Even worse, the Canadian Forces ombudsman is seeking the authority to investigate a “systemic” bias against women in the military that even encourages spousal abuse. Having identified a problem that doesn’t exist he will certainly produce remedies that are not required.

These policies are not only inherently discriminatory, they undermine morale and compromise operational effectiveness. The end result can only be a military that is no longer a military. We are firmly convinced that these policies must be terminated immediately and that Parliament must be prepared to use all necessary means to ensure that the highest possible standards are maintained in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need to restore focus and clarity of purpose to Canada’s defence policy. This is based, in part, on two fundamental moral obligations with respect to the Canadian Armed Forces. The first is to support our serving men and women. Secondly, we have to manage the resources provided by Canadian taxpayers in order to promote our national interests effectively and to re-create a credible and professional military. This is not being done at present.

It is time to end the practice of “muddling through” and move toward a solution. I believe that the Canadian Alliance, alone among Canada’s political parties, has the will to undertake this task seriously and with the dedication required to follow it through.

¹ House of Commons, *Standing Committee on National Defence*, February 11, 1999.

² Conference of Defence Associations, *Analysis of the 2000 Budget*, February 29, 2000.

³ Department of National Defence. *2000-2001 Estimates, Part III*, p. 33.

⁴ Canada presently spends about 1.1 percent of its GDP on defence (lower than any other ally save Luxembourg and Iceland) vs. a NATO average of about 2.1 percent. First Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence “Revitalization and Modernization of the Canadian Forces”, November 25, 1999

⁵ To cite just one example: In comparing performance requirements in the “Basic Infantry course” in 1986 with that in 1996, standards for certain tasks (such as firing the 50 lbs. Carl Gustav anti-tank rocket and throwing hand grenades) have been lowered. Under the 1996 manual, the ability to meet performance objectives is not judged on a pass or fail basis. This new approach is outlined in a December 1996 memo from Lt. General Bill Leach, Chief of the Land Staff, which states that: “*All areas of Land Force Command responsibility, from concepts to equipment to personnel policies must be scrutinized to ensure they are compatible with unrestricted participation of members of designated groups. Doctrine or practices that are incompatible with unrestricted participation will be changed.*”

VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

*Senator The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall and David Price, MP
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada*

National Security Objectives and Strategy

With the end of the Cold War, Canada finds itself entangled in an uncertain, unstable and rapidly changing international system. To meet the broad challenges of the next millennium, Canada must maintain properly equipped and operationally effective military forces to safeguard Canadian sovereignty and to protect Canadian interests around the globe. Isolation is not a possibility when Canada is a member of NATO, NORAD, the UN and intermingled in the global economy. Canada's national security objectives must reflect Canadian security requirements. Canada's national security objectives are as follows: to preserve Canadian national security and thus sovereignty; to deter aggression through participation in collective security organizations such as NORAD and NATO and; to promote international security and stability through the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping operations on a priority basis. By attaining its national security objectives, Canada will prosper, and enter the next millennium as a world leader in the promotion of international security, democratic development, environmental protection, and international trade, rather than as a 'bit player' on the world stage.

Force Requirements

The Canadian Forces is the main element in achieving Canada's national security objectives and ensuring national survival in an uncertain and rapidly changing world. To attain our national security objectives and protect Canadian interests and lives, the Canadian Forces must be properly structured, trained, equipped, and led. To this end, Canada's military must be prepared for a wide variety of activities from all across the spectrum of conflict ranging from low to high intensity operations. The Canadian Forces must be fully inter-operable with the military forces of our allies, and friends. To be operationally effective military forces must be capable of surviving and sustaining operations in a multi-threat environment around the globe.

Unfortunately, there is strong reason today to doubt that Canada can field and sustain an effective contribution to world security. Recent deployments have essentially been tokens and have not always met the expectations of our partners. These are not idle remarks. They reflect the fact that we have allowed the capability of our forces to decline to the point where longer-term effectiveness has been put in jeopardy. For a country so deeply integrated into the global economy and so dependent on global trade for its high standard of living, this surely is wrong.

What should be done?

First, without question the most pressing need is for the forces to be structured to meet the demands and challenges of the present unstable world situation by having an effective rapid crisis response capability — rapid in being able to be deployed in days rather than weeks. This will almost certainly require changes in force structure and command concepts, changes in the number of personnel dedicated to operations with appropriate training

allocations, and that new equipment be purchased. There is a need for new and more dynamic leadership. As well the Canadian Forces must be fully interoperable not just within themselves, as "joint forces" (air sea and land) but also with the forces of our partners.

Second, the present force command structure must be changed and oriented towards operational concerns. The new command structure will separate the military and civilian functions to establish a streamlined effective National Defence headquarters organization. The new command structure must emphasize operational effectiveness, efficient resource management, clearly defined roles, and accountability. The Ombudsman's position must be entrenched through legislation to maintain its independence and to clearly define its authority. Additionally, an Inspector General and supporting staff should be established to maintain the operational effectiveness and ensure the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces prior to overseas deployment.

Third, while the Canadian Navy and Air Force are at the moment prepared to operate in this challenging milieu, it has been obvious for some time that the Canadian Army is seriously under-equipped, and poorly organized for the Revolution in Military Affairs. This situation cannot continue to effect our security and the safety of our dedicated soldiers and multilateral partners in military operations abroad. We must stop thinking in "penny packages" of troops and return to the concept of committing useful and self-sufficient combat formations. It may well be that after a sound plan for mobilization is developed and tested, that our Militia may be able to take on an even more advanced augmentation role. But first and foremost the Militia must provide a basis for mobilization.

Lastly, several major re-equipping programs must be implemented to enable the Canadian Forces to effectively protect Canadian national interests. For instance:

- An immediate and suitable replacement must be found for the unreliable Sea King maritime patrol helicopter.
- The Canadian Army must acquire a rapidly deployable, direct fire support vehicle.
- The Canadian Navy and Air Force require strategic sea and airlift assets.
- The CP 140 maritime patrol aircraft must receive an update so that Canada can maintain its only strategic airborne surveillance platform.

Budget Management, and Capital Expenditure

Canada's defence budget must reflect its national security objectives, strategy, and force structure requirements within the confines of the current fiscal environment. This can only be achieved by maintaining defence spending at responsible levels, and must be based on long term capital acquisition plans. The operations and maintenance budget must be separated from the capital ex

(continued p. 12)

penditure budget. The Department of National Defence requires immediate, additional annual funding to maintain current capabilities, and implement proposed long-term capital programs. Defence spending should, at a minimum, remain constant over a five-year period. Additionally, re-equipping the Canadian Forces must continue to focus on the purchase of affordable, combat effective, off-the-shelf weapon systems.

Plan of Action

The Canadian Forces have suffered from neglect for too long and this irresponsible situation cannot be allowed to continue. Like the Canadian people they defend, the Canadian Forces deserve responsible, interested, and committed, Government support. Accordingly, within one year, as part of a new action plan, a new Defence Review must take place and a Canadian Forces end-state model completed which will define the following issues:

- specific long term national security policy objectives based upon a new examination of the international environment and Canada's interdependencies;

- a balanced mix of achievable operational capability to meet those security objectives in such a way that Canada's military forces will not face a commitment/ capability gap in the future;
- Dedicated, strong, and dynamic military leadership.
- Properly equipped, operationally effective, rapidly deployable combat capable military forces geared to Multilateral and joint operations anywhere in the world.
- New corresponding personnel, administrative, command, and management structures to emphasize operational effectiveness, efficient resource management, clearly defined roles and accountability;
- The necessary Command and Control infrastructure capable of operating in a hostile 'information age' environment and;
- Resulting long term capital procurement plan and its sustainability, based upon constant funding over a five year period and sound national security objectives.

This will ensure that Canada will enter the new millennium with an affordable, operationally effective, combat-ready, modern, military prepared to meet any national security challenge.

CANADIAN DEFENCE: A SITUATION REPORT

Colonel (Retd) A. Sean Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst

Budget 2000

Members of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) may take pride in the fact that the campaign mounted by their organization played an important role in convincing the government to increase the funding of DND in federal Budget 2000. They must not, however, rest upon their laurels. A battle has been won, but the war is far from over. Arguments to convince the Canadian public and their government that the armed forces are still in crisis must continue unabated. The importance of this action will grow in the months ahead, as a federal election is already visible on political radar scopes.

The analysis of Budget 2000 issued by CDA on 29 Feb 00 remains valid, and a copy is posted on the website: www.cda-cdai.ca. The main conclusion is that the new money provided by the government amounts to only 50% of what DND needs to address its broad range of problems and to rehabilitate the CF.

The best that could be said is that the increased funding in Budget 2000 provides some stability and allows a modicum of rational planning to occur over the next two to three years. It will also address a few of the more critical problems, such as the alarming deficits in the operating budgets of the three services.

As noted in the analysis, the most important implication of the funding shortfall is that it will still be necessary to "re-prioritize" the organization and capabilities of the CF by implementing a number of the so-called "desperation options." The current CF model is still unaffordable. Translated, this means that selected operational capabilities will be reduced and/or eliminated, and the overall operational effectiveness of the CF will remain on a downward curve. Senior leadership at NDHQ is preparing to

brief the government on this matter, but chances of success in the short term appear to be slim.

Defence Planning Guidance 2001

It is important for members of CDA to understand that, beyond the budget problems, DND and the CF are in the early stages of a process of rapid and fundamental change. The process is being driven by new realities in the world at large, by bureaucratic initiatives launched by government, and by the imperatives of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which is impacting on armed forces in all of the developed nations.

In responding to this challenge, DND has created over the past two years an improved framework for force development, including organizations and doctrine — covering both joint and single service operations. The framework is presented in a number of related documents, the most important of which are the 1994 Defence White Paper, which remains the approved government policy, and Strategy 2020 which extrapolates that policy into the future — and attempts to deal with the challenges of the RMA. A common shortcoming of both these documents is that they do not accept the possibility of major war in the foreseeable future, and thereby create the impression of a self-fulfilling prophecy; ie, a threat analysis designed to fit limited CF capabilities.

Of more immediate importance are two other documents: DND Estimates Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP); and, Defence Planning Guidance 2001 (DPG 2001). (Both are available on the DND website: www.dnd.ca). The former is produced in response to Treasury Board direction, and gives details of departmental

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expenditures and plans over a four year period, starting with the last FY. The latter is a DND in-house product, and is especially important as it is where “the rubber meets the road.” It gives direction to senior leaders in DND as to how they are to spend their limited funds over the next three FY – while attempting to stay on track with the White Paper and Strategy 2020.

It is in DPG 2001 that the smooth transition from the White Paper to Strategy 2020 breaks down in the face of the 50% budgetary shortfall noted above. Moreover, this situation forces adoption of arbitrary “rob Peter to pay Paul” measures outside the direction given in DPG 2001, thereby undermining the credibility of that document. As an example, the army has had to “borrow” money from the capital account over the past several years to address a mounting deficit in its operations account. It is now pay back time and the army must return the money to capital. The only way this can be done without recreating the deadly shortfall in operations is by accepting a significant reduction of army manpower – which partly explains why the army cannot sustain more than one battalion/battle group on overseas operations.

Despite the bold roadmap to the future provided in Strategy 2020 the persistent funding shortfall forces DPG 2001 to focus largely on existing commitments. This means that although the future CF would be technically modernized, it would not be able to generate much more than the one or two infantry battalion/battle groups, equipped for low intensity operations, as noted above. A few ships and aircraft would be added to legitimize the concept of “joint operations.” The liberal use of terms such as “affordable,” “hard choices,” and “low intensity” reinforces this interpretation. As well, close study of what is actually funded in the capital plan also leads to this conclusion.

On a different and more positive note, DPG 2001 does illustrate the extensive and rapid changes that are occurring in DND – from staffing concepts and procedures through to nomenclature. It is therefore essential that CDA members take the time to download and read DPG 2001 in its entirety. It is as close as one will get to a “one stop” education in the “new” DND and CF that are emerging right now. Unless members of CDA become educated in these matters they will not be able to press home their arguments to government and the public. This will be especially important in the pre-election period, when defence issues must be aired extensively.

Finally, one should consider a possible convergence between falling Canadian Forces’ operational capabilities, and the expanding influence of “human security” within Canadian foreign policy objectives. Documents produced for public information in both the defence and foreign affairs communities strongly endorse human security. As well, the Canadian Peace Alliance intends to conduct a cross-Canada “public inquiry” into Canadian defence starting in Jun 00. A similar exercise undertaken in the early 1990s originated the government’s commitment to human security. This new initiative might be presented as a “renewed mandate” on the same topic. The attractive political bait could be that lightly armed and rapidly deployable units permanently committed to the United Nations, even if only battalion-sized, would portray Canada as a saviour of that organization, and thereby burnish Canada’s fading international image. The punch-line of the sales pitch would be to suggest that this could all be done without spending more on defence.

To forestall such an outcome pro-defence organizations, with CDA in the lead, must continue to mount a strong campaign to convince government to produce the missing 50% of defence funding starting in the next fiscal year. Overall, defence must be established as an important issue of the next federal election.

FULLER THAN YOU THINK

Vice-Admiral G.L. Garnett, CMM, CD, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff

A recent edition of *On Track* published an article by Mr. Kasurak entitled “Is the Defence Glass Half Empty or Half Full”, offering a brief summary of some of the conclusions reached by recent Auditor General reports on defence activity. The nature and tone of this piece were such that I feel compelled to respond in order to clarify some of the issues presented, provide a more balanced perspective on defence issues, and perhaps offer some additional food for thought.

Before speaking to the substance of the piece, however, I would like to address the larger issue of strategic change. Although what Mr. Kasurak offers is valid in a certain context, it is important to recall the overall context within which DND and the CF have been grappling with the problem of institutional reform. The period covered by the Auditor General’s report was characterized by unprecedented operational tempos, extensive cuts to personnel, and a 23% reduction to the defence budget. Complete implementation of the ongoing reform program is and will remain one of our foremost priorities; but change must be accomplished in concert with, and not at the expense of, meeting our day-to-day operational commitments both at home and abroad. While

I agree that much work remains to be done to complete the implementation of reforms, I would also argue that considerable progress has been made to date, and that a more balanced assessment of the situation is warranted.

Leading and managing strategic change in the face of constrained resources and a demanding operational tempo is one of the fundamental problems gripping the senior leadership of DND and the CF. In June of 1999, the Department published *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*, which establishes a corporate vision designed to enable the defence establishment to sustain its ongoing operational commitments, while simultaneously undertaking an aggressive and wide-reaching program of reforms. *Strategy 2020* enables us to translate defence policy, as expressed in the *1994 Defence White Paper*, into defence activity and resource management in a coordinated effort to achieve established change objectives and shape the future force. Coupled with a developing Performance Measurement Framework, *Strategy 2020* will enable DND and the CF to evaluate our performance,

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validate our change objectives, and improve our business practices, all in a manner that is completely transparent to the Canadian public. The process whereby this will be accomplished is described in a paper entitled “*Mutabilis in Mobili: Leading and Managing Strategic Change in DND and the CF*”, which may be found on the DND website.

I would note that our performance to date in successfully implementing change was highlighted by the Minister’s Monitoring Committee in their final report of December 1999:

We are pleased to be able to report on how much progress has been made during our mandate with respect to institutional change....DND and the CF deserve to be commended for these achievements which, it should be noted, have been made at a time of serious difficulties for the defence team arising from a heightened pace and range of operational activities and the strains and stresses of financial and personnel shortages. (pp. 5-6)

Moving now from the general to the specific, I would like to offer a few observations on the issue of Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) in DND which, as Mr. Kasurak indicates, was the topic of a chapter in the November 1999 Auditor General’s report to Parliament. There is another side to the situation that Mr. Kasurak depicts in his article. In point of fact, the conclusions drawn from this audit are based primarily on the situation that existed in the Department from 1994 to 1997, a period during which the defence establishment was preoccupied with a wide variety of pressing operational and domestic matters. ASD, for good reason, was not at this time at the head of the Department’s agenda. This period also antedated

the development and publication of formal ASD policy and associated programs. We in the Department have recognized that many adjustments were required from those early days, but the majority of the improvements already made to the ASD management framework were implemented during the period 1997-99, and were therefore not included in the audit. Using Mr. Kasurak’s own examples, rigorous baselines are now being established for ongoing projects, using a “best practices” approach. As well, central oversight at the Assistant Deputy Minister level for each stage of an ASD review is another significant improvement designed to ensure that methodological rigour is applied throughout the entirety of the review process.

We are now into our first year of implementing *Strategy 2020*, but this visionary document has already had a major impact on the Departmental management system and the annual defence planning guidance, or DPG. As our corporate vision for leading and managing change, this document is enabling us to formulate the performance measurement tools necessary to validate defence activity and to measure the implementation of change. Concrete results stemming from all improvements to how we do business - including ASD - will be confirmed through performance measures and the necessary corrections fed back into the defence management system. The entire process will be increasingly transparent to the public.

Improved performance reporting, change measurement and effective feedback mechanisms are having a profound impact on the business of defence, and are helping us develop an institution that is not only combat-capable and cost-effective, but that is also more open and accountable to Canadians. In this context, the defence “glass” may be considerably more full than some people appear to think.

ONE SPOT, ONE SHOT ARMED FORCES...OR NOT?

*Major-General (Retd) Clive John Addy, OMM, CD
National Chairman, The Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada*

Today the Canadian Forces are embarking on a major organizational and doctrinal change with *Defence Strategy 2020*, a strategy that diverges widely from the strategic and militarily balanced underpinnings of government policy in the broadly supported *1994 Defence White Paper*. It is my view that the multi-purpose combat capability is being displaced or even abandoned in favor of a ‘narrow niche’ military expeditionary capability, focused at the low to medium scale of conflict, whose high tech costs risk dwarfing our forces and will not meet our national security needs.

The *1994 Defence White Paper* received widespread support and was well received by Parliament, however it has suffered from chronic under-funding and only partial implementation. The Defence budget fell from \$12 billion in 1994 to \$9.4 billion in 1998. Despite increased spending last year of \$175 million dollars in new funding and an additional \$150 million in a restored cut, the Canadian Forces required an estimated \$700 million per year alone just

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FORCES ARMÉES ‘MISANT TOUT SUR UNE SEULE OPTION’... UN PARI PRUDENT?

*Le Major-général (Ret) Clive John addy, OMM, CD
Président de la Fédération des instituts militaires et interarmées du Canada*

Aujourd’hui, les Forces canadiennes amorcent un virage fondamental en matière d’organisation et de doctrine dans le cadre de la *Stratégie de défense 2020*; cette stratégie met à l’écart les fondements stratégiques clefs de la politique gouvernementale exposée dans le *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994*, politique qui jouit encore de l’appui de bon nombre. A mon avis, le potentiel expéditionnaire limité de la *Stratégie 2020* ne répondra pas à nos besoins nationaux. Évidemment, aux yeux des hauts dirigeants du Ministère, de nombreux facteurs justifient de nouvelles forces militaires réduites et à haute technologie au détriment de forces souples et suffisamment étoffées. Il y a donc de sérieuses défaillances dans la *Stratégie 2020* mettant en doute la logique et le bien-fondé de l’abandon de la politique actuelle. Il faut examiner le tout avant d’amorcer ce dangereux virage. Ce débat va au delà du ministère. C’est une question nationale!

(voir p. 15)

to pay for the recent quality of life study initiatives. The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) pegged the current defence budget shortfall in operations and maintenance at approximately \$1 billion. The Auditor General stated in his April 1998 report that the Canadian Forces required an additional \$ 5 billion over the next five years to pay for the planned capital expenditures. Thus, it should be no surprise that, several programmes outlined in the White Paper have not been implemented such as a replacement for the Sea King Fleet.

It is therefore no surprise that the continued funding problem and the partial implementation of the *White Paper* has had a pronounced impact on *Defence Planning Guidance 2000* and *Defence Strategy 2020*. This impact borders on desperation brought about by the continued fiscal flagellation of the DND leaders. In *Defence Planning Guidance 2000*, a departmental document and “not government policy”, focussed on funding the first five years of *Strategy 2020*, it states that, “Defence as a share of Gross Domestic Product will continue to hold just above the one percent threshold.” Without additional funds, about double what has recently been promised, the Canadian Forces will be forced to make further personnel reductions and face ‘rust out’. The problem is that the Canadian Forces were already reduced to 60,000 personnel by the white paper, some 6,700 less than was recommended as the bare minimum by *The Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Report on Canada’s Defence Policy* in 1994.

Strategy 2020 is also a call for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to embark upon the Revolution in Military Affairs. *Defence Strategy 2020* states:

“ RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technology which combine with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.”

Defence Strategy 2020 and RMA seem to offer many ‘pluses’ from the perspective of a government demonstrably reluctant to fund its present policy. First and foremost, it would appear to lessen the need for personnel and platforms because of the increased lethality of ‘high tech’ weapons, and thus *might* be cheaper than the multi-purpose combat capable military called for in the *1994 Defence White Paper*. Add to this the rather pessimistic perception by National Defence that the future demographic and social make-up of Canada will be such that the Canadian Forces will be unable to attract and retain the 60,000 plus regular force required in the near future.

Moving to a revolutionary new military is expensive. In a study paper entitled, *Financing the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Professor John Treddenick of the Royal Military College points out that all 12 NATO nations including the United States would either have to dramatically increase their defence budgets or, dramatically reduce personnel costs through major troop reductions to finance the RMA.

For instance, for a 3% growth in ratio of RMA funds for equipment over personnel, Canada would have to either reduce personnel by about 29 percent or get a significant capital budget increase over 15 years. That increase in defence spending is evaluated at over 2% per year and would represent, at the end of the period, a Defence budget of approximately 1.9% of our Gross Domestic Product.

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Le *Livre blanc sur la Défense de 1994* a obtenu un appui général et demeure pertinent; cependant, un sous-financement chronique et une mise en oeuvre partielle lui ont nuï. Le budget de la défense est tombé de 12 milliards de dollars en 1994 à 9,4 milliards en 1998. Cette piètre contribution place le Canada au sous sol des contributeurs de L’OTAN et au 135^e rang parmi les pays du monde par rapport au PIB. Malgré une hausse des dépenses de 175 millions de dollars l’an dernier et une somme additionnelle de 150 millions découlant de coupures rétablies, les forces canadiennes avaient besoin d’environ 700 millions de dollars par année uniquement pour défrayer les récentes initiatives liées à l’étude sur la qualité de vie. La Conférence des associations de la Défense évaluent le manque à gagner de l’actuel budget de la défense en matière d’opérations et de maintenance à environ 1 milliard de dollars. Dans son rapport d’avril 1998, le vérificateur général a signalé que les forces canadiennes ont besoin d’une affectation additionnelle de 4,5 milliards de dollars au cours des cinq prochaines années pour effectuer les dépenses en immobilisations prévues. Ainsi, il n’est pas surprenant que plusieurs programmes esquissés dans le livre blanc n’ont pas été mis en oeuvre. Par exemple nous attendons encore une décision après six ans sur les hélicos *Sea King*.

Il est donc clair que le manque chronique de financement et la mise en oeuvre partielle du livre blanc ont eu un impact majeur sur le *Guide de planification de la Défense 2000* et la *Stratégie de Défense 2020*. On y voit un désespoir causé par la flagellation fiscale continue des dirigeants du MDN. Dans le *Guide de planification de la Défense 2000* – un document ministériel, et non une « politique gouvernementale »-, qui porte principalement sur le financement des cinq premières années de la *Stratégie de Défense 2020*, on déclare que « la part du produit intérieur brut (PIB) que représente la défense se maintiendra juste au-dessus du plafond de 1 p. 100 ». Sans fonds additionnels, les forces canadiennes seront obligées de procéder à de nouvelles réductions d’effectifs et feront face à la désuétude progressive. On se rappelle que le livre blanc avait déjà réduit les forces canadiennes à 60 000 effectifs, soit 6 700 de moins que le strict minimum recommandé par le *Comité mixte spécial sur la politique de défense du Canada* en 1994.

La *Stratégie 2020* appelle aussi le ministère de la Défense nationale et les forces canadiennes à s’engager dans le Révolution dans les affaires militaires. Dans cette stratégie, on déclare :

« la RAM est une modification profonde de la nature de la guerre occasionnée par l’application innovatrice de nouvelles technologies qui, en combinaison avec des modifications radicales des concepts opérationnels ou organisationnels et de la doctrine militaire, transforme de façon fondamentale le caractère et la conduite des opérations militaires ».

La *Stratégie de Défense 2020* et la RAM semblent offrir de nombreux avantages au gouvernement, manifestement récalcitrant à financer sa politique actuelle. L’hypothèse est qu’elle semble réduire l’importance des effectifs et des plateformes en raison de la puissance de destruction accrue des armes à haute technologie et, par conséquent, *pourraient* s’avérer moins coûteuses que les forces militaires polyvalentes prévues dans le *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994*.

(voir p. 16)

Needless to say, such an increase in the defence budget appears “unrealistic” to some without a major crisis. However, it remains at the lower bottom end for NATO countries, many of whom are far less involved than we in Human Security. In addition, one must recognize that a reduced regular military of 29,000 for Canada is laughable and proportionately far below what Canada had at its lowest ebb, the 1930’s depression, and far less than that which our allies would expect us to shoulder.

These factors must be weighed carefully by Canada before embarking on an RMA path with its narrow niche military. The *Strategy 2020* hypothesis is, of course, that: fewer and better equipped can do as much and better. But, can they do enough; and how few, before we do too little. There will be little if any cost savings. The implied drastic personnel cuts, alone, will have serious long term and irreversible operational implications. For instance, how will an RMA military deal with a Winnipeg Flood or an ice storm in central Canada (or two ice storms?) when it has only 29 thousand personnel and a battalion group overseas? The natural answer would be to call upon the reserves, but *Defence Strategy 2020* relies on expensive forces in being, not on a reserve mobilization base. There is little role other than augmentation assigned to the militia in *Strategy 2020*, even though the document suggests that the most frequent threats that we will face in the future will be asymmetric. Considering the reserves struggle to survive in the current fiscal environment, it would seem logical that they would face even greater restraint, challenges and problems in a fiscal fistfight to fund RMA. Would an RMA military geared solely for ‘push-button’ warfare even peace keep at all?

In the future, modern militaries are going to have to be just as able to confront irregular attacks or unconventional warfare, as they are conventional inter-state conflict. It implies a flexible structure capable of expansions and contraction. This demands people that are well trained and equipped and in sufficient numbers. These are issues that have not been thoroughly addressed by the Government of Canada, and must be, before we abandon by intention or default, the *1994 Defence White Paper* and multi-purpose forces capable of operating in any environment.

The basic tenets of the *1994 Defence White Paper* are still applicable today. Canada must structure and equip the Canadian Forces for the most probable types of operations that they will face. The Canadian Forces must be joint, credible, modern, flexible, and *sustainable*, and we must be able to project power and influence abroad. The Canadian Forces must be interoperable with our allied nations. There must be an RMA component to our medium-sized military, but it must not dominate the entire force structure, nor compromise the present policy of Canada, our *1994 Defence White Paper*, without a thorough, public and national review. We must retain the potential to fight a war. As MGen Lewis McKenzie said in respect of our approach to committing our troops to UN operations: “We are constantly structuring for the “Best Case” and hoping nothing goes wrong.” *Strategy 2020* is another dangerous example of the same disease on a grander scale. Canada must rely upon, fund and nurture an effective reserve force as a basis for national mobilization in the event of a major disaster or war. This will allow the Canadian Forces the capability to expand to engage in conflict at the higher end of the scale of combat beyond the two battle-group or brigade levels that we find already impossible to sustain.

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Ensuite, il y a une deuxième hypothèse, plutôt pessimiste, au sein de la Défense nationale à l’égard du tissu démographique et social futur du Canada. Selon elle, les Forces canadiennes seraient incapables d’attirer et de retenir la force régulière de 60 000 effectifs et plus dont on aura besoin dans un proche avenir.

La réalité demeure que de prendre un sérieux virage vers des forces militaires fortement axées sur la haute technologie serait coûteux. Dans une étude intitulée *Financing the Revolution in Military Affairs*, le professeur John Treddenick du Collège militaire royal souligne que les douze pays de l’OTAN, y compris les États-Unis, devront soit augmenter radicalement leurs budgets de défense soit réduire radicalement leurs coûts de personnel au moyen de réductions majeures des effectifs afin de financer la RAM.

Par exemple, avec une croissance de 3 pour cent du ratio des fonds RAM consacrés au matériel par rapport aux effectifs, le Canada serait tenu soit de réduire les effectifs d’environ 29 pour cent, soit d’accorder une hausse considérable du budget des immobilisations sur une période de 15 ans. Une telle hausse des dépenses liées à la défense est estimée à plus de 2 pour cent par année et représenterait, à la fin de la période, un budget de la défense correspondant à environ 1,9 pour cent de notre PIB. Il va sans dire qu’une telle hausse du budget de la défense semble « irréaliste » aux yeux de certains observateurs à moins d’une crise majeure. Cependant, nous serions encore classés parmi les plus faibles pays contributeurs de l’OTAN, bien que la plupart d’entre eux soient plus petits et que bon nombre d’entre eux soient beaucoup moins engagés à l’étranger. De plus, il faut reconnaître qu’une force régulière comptant 29 000 effectifs pour le Canada serait risible parmi nos alliés et, sur le plan proportionnel, nettement en-dessous du seuil le plus bas de toute l’histoire du Canada, à l’époque de la Dépression.

Enfin, le Canada doit examiner ces facteurs soigneusement avant d’emprunter la voie de la RAM et de se doter d’une force militaire à créneau étroit. L’hypothèse est que des effectifs moins nombreux et mieux équipés seront en mesure d’accomplir autant de boulot et mieux. Mais pourront-ils en faire assez? Il y aurait peu ou pas d’économies et les réductions d’effectifs connexes auraient des répercussions graves et irréversibles. Par exemple, comment des forces militaires issues de la RAM affronteraient-elles les inondations de Winnipeg ou les effets d’une tempête de verglas dans la partie centrale du pays (ou même deux tempêtes de verglas?) si elles disposaient seulement de 29 000 effectifs dont un groupe- bataillon à l’étranger? La réponse qui vient naturellement à l’esprit serait de faire appel aux réservistes, mais la *Stratégie de Défense 2020* compte sur de coûteuses forces régulières, et non sur des réserves mobilisables. Dans la *Stratégie de Défense 2020*, le seul rôle clairement attribué à la milice est le renfort individuel. Étant donné que les réserves ont de la difficulté à survivre dans le contexte financier actuel, on peut déduire qu’elles feront face à des défis et problèmes encore plus corsés pour soutirer des fonds et survivre. À l’avenir, les forces militaires modernes seront autant appelées à affronter des attaques irrégulières ou des guerres non conventionnelles que des conflits conventionnels entre états. Il faudra donc compter sur des effectifs en nombre suffisant, bien entraînés et équipés. Voilà des questions que le gouvernement du Canada doit

(voir p. 17)

To have such a structure, the Canadian Forces need an immediate infusion of additional funds to the base level of the defence budget of at least \$900 million a year, guaranteed for the next five. Most importantly, the Canadian Forces must not decline below the current regular force personnel ceiling of 60,000 sailors, soldiers, and aircrew. In addition, it is my view that the Canadian Forces should rethink increase and fund its reserve capability beyond the levels foreseen in the white paper and do so in all services. The “one spot, one shot” Armed Forces of *Defence Strategy 2020* will not meet Canada’s security needs in the 21st century. Let the debate begin!

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO CDS APPOINTED

The Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) initiative entered a new phase with the appointment of Lieutenant General Mike Jeffery as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Defence Staff for Land Force Reserve Restructure (SA CDS LFRR) on May 1st, 2000. His mandate is to present recommendations to the Minister of National Defence on a strategy and action plan for transforming the Army Reserve.

The Minister selected Lieutenant General Jeffery for this position after conferring with the CDS. The move was consistent with a key recommendation made by the Honourable John Fraser, Chair of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, in mid April in his Interim Report on Reserve Restructure. Mr. Fraser recommended that a higher ranking officer be charged with directing the LFRR project.

According to Lieutenant General Jeffery, the Army Reserve must be revitalized if it is to remain viable and sustainable. “This is a very important initiative. The Army Reserve is a vital national institution and a cornerstone of Canada’s military and cultural heritage. We must bring about the change required to ensure that it is an essential, vibrant, relevant combat-capable force in the Army of tomorrow and beyond.”

Despite a very compressed timeframe that will see Lieutenant General Jeffery report his recommendations to the Minister early this summer, one of the first orders of business was a cross-country consultative tour. Between May 10th and 15th, Lieutenant General Jeffery and a small team visited the four Land Force Area headquarters in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto and Edmonton to engage key interested parties and stakeholders. The feedback he received from Reservists, former Reservists, Honorary Colonels, Regular Force members and concerned citizens was invaluable, and will certainly be pivotal in the development of the Special Assistant’s recommendations to the Minister.

Initially undertaken in 1996, the current Reserve Restructure initiative has been studying options for creating a modernized, affordable Army Reserve structure with the breadth and depth of capabilities necessary to meet Canada’s evolving defence commitments.

examiner avant d’abandonner – volontairement ou implicitement – le *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994* et ses forces polyvalentes .

Les principes fondamentaux du *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994* demeurent valables aujourd’hui. Le Canada doit organiser et équiper les Forces canadiennes, d’abord mais non seulement, en vue des types d’opérations les plus prévisibles. Il faut que les Forces canadiennes soient combinées, crédibles, modernes, flexibles et soutenables. Ainsi, pourrions nous projeter, de concert avec nos alliés, de la puissance et de l’influence à l’étranger. Les Forces canadiennes doivent opérer de concert avec ces alliés, notamment dans le cadre d’opérations de coalition avec les États-Unis. Il faut donc que nos forces militaires de taille moyenne comportent un volet RAM, mais la RAM ne doit pas limoger l’organisation entière de nos forces, ni compromettre la politique actuelle du Canada – notre *Livre blanc sur la défense* – sans procéder à un minutieux examen public national.

Nous devons conserver le potentiel de faire la guerre. Comme l’a signalé le major-général Lewis McKenzie au sujet de notre approche à l’engagement de troupes en vue des opérations des Nations Unies : « nous nous organisons continuellement en fonction du « scénario le plus optimiste » en espérant que tout aille bien ». La *Stratégie 2020* est un autre exemple dangereux de la même maladie, mais à une échelle plus grande. Le Canada doit se doter du potentiel requis pour réagir et augmenter ses effectifs si jamais l’évaluation stratégique bienveillante s’avère fautive. Le Canada doit financer, veiller au développement et miser sur des forces de réserves efficaces; la pierre d’assise d’une mobilisation nationale en cas de désastre ou de guerre d’envergure. Il faut que les Forces canadiennes puissent augmenter leurs effectifs en vue d’engager le combat dans les conflits à grande échelle, au-delà des deux groupements tactiques ou de la brigade que nous n’arrivons plus à soutenir. Pour se doter d’une telle organisation, les Forces canadiennes ont besoin d’un apport immédiat de fonds additionnels d’au moins 900 millions de dollars par année, assuré pour au moins les cinq prochaines années. Surtout, il ne faut pas que les effectifs des Forces canadiennes tombent en-dessous du plafond actuel de la force régulière, fixé à 60 000 marins, soldats, et membres d’équipages d’aéronef. De plus, je crois que les Forces canadiennes devraient réexaminer, accroître et financer son potentiel de réserve au-delà des niveaux prévus dans le livre blanc, et procéder ainsi dans tous les services. Les Forces armées « Misant tout sur une seule option » proposées dans la *Stratégie 2020* ne répondront pas aux besoins de sécurité du Canada au 21^e siècle. Que le débat commence!

Despite the divergence of opinion amongst stakeholders, Lieutenant General Jeffery is convinced that there is considerable common ground on a number of fundamental issues. Rapid and tangible progress on these issues will serve to restore some of the trust that has eroded over time and allow for the substantive change that is required.

The key will be striking an appropriate balance in improving the operational capability of the Army Reserve while ensuring that the institution and its links to the community are respected.

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Lieutenant General Jeffery will consult with the Reserve community as he proceeds with his mandate. A consultative group representing key members and stakeholders will provide advice throughout the Reserve Restructure process.

Although consultation is crucial, Lieutenant General Jeffery recognizes that at the end of the day, tough decisions will have to be taken. "I will listen, I will discuss, I will confer – indeed, consultation will be an integral element of LFRR as we move forward. Working in close collaboration with the Army Reserve community is absolutely imperative to the success of this endeavour. However, those who are accountable will ultimately

have to make the critical decisions. My strategy will reflect this reality."

Lieutenant General Jeffery brings a wealth of experience and knowledge to his current position. He is currently in his 36th year of service and has served in a variety of command and staff positions. More recently, he was the Joint Task Force Commander for Operation ABACUS.

Lieutenant General Jeffery will assume command of the Army upon completion of his mandate as Special Advisor, in conjunction with the retirement of the current commander.

A GUNNER'S REMEMBRANCES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Captain (Retd) Peter Forsberg, CD, Public Affairs Officer

The following article is the fourth and final in a series of Peter Forsberg's reminiscences of two tours of duty he completed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

By now in my career I had spent most Christmases away from my family, either on duty or on leave, and being in Gornji Vakuf was to be no exception. I was pleased that the Brits retained the military Christmas traditions as I have known them, including the officers and senior non-commissioned members serving the men Christmas dinner complete with all of the trimmings. For New Years we opened the officers mess to all ranks, with yours truly tending bar after I had finished my work in the operations (ops) centre for the night!

For my last 2 ½-day leave I decided to go to Zagreb, of all places. I stayed in one of those dreary, Communist-era - actually depressing - hotels during my visit. It must be a small world, though, because I bumped into a Spanish officer from my headquarters and a few other officers I had met earlier who were in town for a G2 ops conference. The city is full of contrasting sights. Parts of Zagreb reminded me of the dark, dust-laden towns of the Ruhr Valley in early-1960s Germany. Other parts of the city are bright, clean, busy, and look like a setting for a Hollywood movie. The Intercontinental Hotel was as smart looking as Ottawa's Westin. Its lobby and public rooms were as elegant as one could expect in deluxe surroundings. Should I have been surprised to see so many UN civilians and other officials in residence?

Back in Sector South-West, I had a few opportunities to visit some of the other national contingents. One day I visited

TURKBAT, which was quartered in the town of Zenica, an important Tito-era steel producing centre about the size of Sudbury but polluted many times over. What depressed me the most was to see parked in a vehicle hangar a fleet of M113A3 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in pristine condition - they were spotless and they did not look like they were driven much, if at all. Why do we, as Canadians, allow our troops to operate in a far more hazardous environment with antiquated APCs when a near-third-world country is given up-to-date equipment that is underutilised?

By early-February, 1995 Lieutenant-Colonel Natynczyk and artillery Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Crosman had exchanged their respective positions between Sector South-West and HQ (United Nations Protection Force) UNPROFOR. One day I had the pleasure of accompanying Colonel Crosman to a meeting of the ops staff at Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) Command HQ in Sarajevo. I really looked forward to this trip because I had never been inside the city but had seen it from a distance whenever I approached or departed the airport. As I recall the trip Colonel Crosman and I travelled in a Land Rover that was driven by one of our Brit drivers. The journey from our HQ to Sarajevo took a little more than two hours with just one checkpoint to negotiate.

I found it difficult to really comprehend what my eyes saw. Although I did not see the Olympic Games when they were held in Sarajevo, I could not imagine how the city could have been a beautiful setting for the games only a few years before. I was more shocked to see the massive destruction of a large urban area than I was to see the near-

total destruction of hamlets near Sebrenica, during my first UN tour in 1993. On this wintery day we rode in silence down Sniper Alley on our route to B-H Command HQ. We passed by the Holiday Inn, with its walls pockmarked with bullet holes and riddled with gaping holes produced by artillery or mortar shells - we did not bother to check! Further along I saw some evidence of private enterprise: a blue and pink neon sign sticking out of the rubble, advertising a cocktail bar...We did not stop for that, either.

The HQ was established in the grounds of an old villa. Colonel Crosman introduced me to the HQ ops staff - mostly Brits. I was also introduced to the staff from the other sectors - Brit and Scandinavian. The staff from Tuzla struck me as being an exceptionally fine, professional team of officers. Following an hour and a half of briefings we were treated to lunch in the dining room. All that I can remember of the meal was that I ate one of the finest lettuce and tomato salads that I ever had. Or was it that my mind playing tricks on me in Sarajevo and that the salad was just an average lettuce and tomato?

After lunch we were turned over to FRENCHBAT for a tour of their observation posts (OPs). Every few minutes one could hear random bursts of small arms fire, but I could not tell from where. It seemed that the firing was coming from all around us. I remember being taken, first, to the Olympic stadium - what a fascinating modern cement work there was that formed the stadium. From there we were driven in French APCs to a couple of their OPs. From one OP I beheld a fine panoramic view of the city,

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looking from NW to East. The French soldiers appeared to be professional. The line of confrontation was pointed out to me. There really wasn't anything to distinguish the line from the zig zag of the roads and alleys throughout the city. In fact, parts of the line ran through buildings - some from front to back, others from one side to the other. It all looked very confusing to me. Other parts of the line would snake along streets and alleys, sometimes doubling back upon itself.

Our return journey to Gornji Vakuf was uneventful. We managed, however, to catch the tail end of dinner with CANBAT 2 - incredibly good rations and lots of them. It was hard not to overindulge in cold salmon, and cold lettuce and tomatoes. No wonder UNPROFOR liked to hold confer-

ences from time to time in Visoko.

Toward the end of February and the end of my tour at Sector South-West HQ Major Denis Fortin and I departed Gornji Vakuf to join 2 Svc Bn for our return to Canada. A few weeks prior to our departure, a Bosnian-Serb Army (BSA) colonel was invited to take up residence in our headquarters as the BSA liaison officer much to the annoyance of the Bosnian-Muslim (BiH) faction of the Bosnian-Croat Federation. Sector South-West HQ denied the BiH's request that we rid ourselves of the presence of the BSA colonel. In response the BiH established a blockade around the HQ compound 10 days before Denis and I withdrew from Gornji Vakuf. Thus, we were cut off by road from all movement outside the compound. We still had our helicopters, although the BiH

said that they could not guarantee their safety while they were in flight. The Sector Commander imposed an immediate restriction on the use of fuel, with first priority for communications maintenance. Luckily, there was a well with clean water within the compound. February was still a cold month but, as I recall, there was no severe hardship. The important thing was to maintain security of our fuel reserve.

With the BiH's blockade in effect Denis and I departed Gornji Vakuf via helicopter. As we ascended into the sky I could not help but think that, after surviving 38 years in uniform, how rotten it would be for me to get shot down on my last departure from the field. As it turned out I am thankful that the flight to Split and onward return to Canada were without incident.

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