




# ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

9 October, 2002

Volume 7, Number 3

## **A Nation at Risk:** **The Decline of the Canadian Forces**



Cover Photograph: AP/Wide World Photos

- **September 11, 2001 - September 11, 2002**
- **Security in a New Era**
- **Canada-United States Defence Cooperation**
- **Canada's Role in the Stabilization of Iraq**

## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

On 8 October, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) announced the release of its newest study, *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces*, at a press conference held in the National Press Theatre, in Ottawa.

CDA's mandate to inform the public of issues affecting Canadian security and the state of the Canadian Forces is

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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## MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin, OMM, DC

La Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) a annoncé, le 8 octobre, la diffusion de sa plus récente étude intitulée : *Une Nation vulnérable : le déclin des forces canadiennes*, lors d'une conférence de presse qui a eu lieu à l'Amphithéâtre national de la presse, à Ottawa.

La responsabilité de la CAD d'informer le public sur les questions relatives à la sécurité du Canada et à l'état des Forces canadiennes (FC) est assumée en partie par les activités de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD). L'Institut fournit des services d'information publique en publiant les résultats d'études, de colloques et de symposiums. Ce nouveau document appartient à la catégorie de la première de ces activités.

La diffusion de *Une Nation vulnérable* arrive au bon moment, étant donné l'état des FC et des ressources nécessaires pour respecter les engagements. Les événements qui sont survenus autour de nous depuis l'an dernier auraient dû sensibiliser les dirigeants de notre pays. La CAD a fait part de ses inquiétudes à maintes reprises au gouvernement et aux Canadiens concernant le besoin d'améliorer la défense pour protéger notre mode de vie démocratique et notre souveraineté.

Bon nombre d'autres organismes et groupes importants se sont joints à la CAD, le groupe le plus récent étant le Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, afin d'informer le public canadien de la nécessité d'une défense adéquate pour notre pays et afin de rappeler au gouvernement canadien

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### Donateur Patrons de l'ICAD

*The War Amputations of Canada* - Colonel J.H.C. Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC - Flight Lieutenant Lt (Retd) Howard Ripstein, CA

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achieved in part through the activities of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It provides public information services by publishing the results of studies, seminars, and symposia. This new document falls under the heading of the first of these activities.

The release of *A Nation at Risk* is timely, given the state of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the resources that are required to meet commitments. The events that have taken place around us over the past year should be a wake-up call for our nation's leaders. CDA has repeatedly voiced its concerns to the government and to Canadians over the need for improvements to defence to protect our democratic way of life and sovereignty.

CDA has been joined by many other notable institutions and groups, most recently by the House Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, both in informing the Canadian public of the need for an adequate defence of this nation and in pointing out to the government Canada's obligation to provide for the security of its citizens.

This study follows a CDA study published in September 2001, *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces*, the main conclusion of which is that across the broad spectrum of operational readiness, the level is lower.

*A Nation at Risk* explores the unsatisfactory condition of the CF. This study shows beyond doubt that a crisis exists in Canadian defence, and that the armed forces will unravel if funds are not provided in the forthcoming budget. History has shown that if a nation's armed forces fall into a state of disrepair, the nation itself is placed at great risk. This applies in particular to Canada. This study also reflects opinions from a broad range of Americans in government and in security advisory bodies.

CDA urges the Government to apply an immediate allocation of \$1.5 billion to the Department of National Defence and to undertake a full defence policy review, resulting in the publication of a new Defence White Paper in 2003.

son obligation d'assurer la sécurité de ses citoyens.

Cette étude fait suite à une autre étude publiée par la CAD, en septembre 2001, intitulée *Coïncé entre les deux : Une évaluation de la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes*, dont la conclusion principale affirme que dans l'ensemble du large champ d'activités de l'état de préparation opérationnelle, le niveau est inférieur.

Le document *Une nation vulnérable* fait état de l'état inacceptable des FC. Cette étude montre hors de tout doute qu'il y a une crise au sein de la Défense canadienne et que les forces armées se détérioreront si les fonds nécessaires ne sont pas attribués dans le prochain budget. L'histoire a montré que si les forces armées d'une nation parviennent à un état de délabrement, la nation elle-même devient très vulnérable. Cela s'applique notamment au Canada. Cette étude présente aussi les opinions de nombreux Américains membres du gouvernement et d'organismes de consultation sur la sécurité.

La CAD demande avec insistance au gouvernement d'attribuer immédiatement 1,5 milliard de dollars au ministère de la Défense nationale et de procéder à un examen complet de la politique de défense en vue de publier un nouveau livre blanc sur la défense en 2003.

Dans le présent document, on présente à nos lecteurs la préface de *Une nation vulnérable*. Le texte entier de cette étude peut être consulté dans notre site Web à l'adresse suivante : [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca). Les membres de l'ICAD en recevront un exemplaire en format papier.

Cet automne, l'ICAD, en collaboration avec le Queen's University Centre for International Relations, organisera le 5<sup>e</sup> Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés. Ce symposium soulignera le travail des étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise des universités militaires et civiles. Des recherches avant-gardistes de jeunes universitaires dans le domaine de la sécurité et des études sur la défense seront présentées. Le but du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les établissements d'éducation militaires et civils. Le conférencier principal sera le major-général à la retraite Lewis Mackenzie.

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In this issue, our readers are provided with the preface to *A Nation at Risk*. The full text of the study can be read on our website: [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca). CDA Institute (CDAI) members will receive their hard copy.

This Autumn, the CDAI, in collaboration with Queen's University Centre for International Relations, will hold the 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Leading edge research from young scholars in the field of security and defence studies will be showcased. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speaker is Major-General (Retd) Lewis Mackenzie.

Anyone with an interest in Canadian military history, national security and defence; defence alliances; peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations; conflict resolution; security and defence related economics; intra-state conflict issues; terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security are welcome to attend. Mark the dates of 1 and 2 November in your calendar to attend a stimulating gathering of some of Canada's best military thinkers. For more information please read the symposium notice elsewhere in this publication.

*ON TRACK*'s readers will be pleased to know that Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, PC, OC, OBC, CD, QC, LL.D. (Hon), has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2002. Colonel Fraser is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada.

The Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, will present the award on 15 November, at a mixed gala dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec. I am gratified to report that the Grand Hall, for this prestigious event, is completely sold out.

Where does Canada find itself in the year since 11 September, 2001? Issues are developing in several areas that are significantly affecting our relations with the United States. In

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Toutes les personnes ayant un intérêt concernant l'histoire militaire canadienne, la sécurité et la défense nationale, les alliances de défense, l'imposition de la paix et les opérations de maintien de la paix, les règlements de conflits, la sécurité et la défense liées à l'économie, les questions de conflit intra-état, le terrorisme et autres menaces non traditionnelles à la sécurité nationale, sont les bienvenues. Nous vous encourageons à inscrire les dates des 1<sup>er</sup> et 2 novembre sur votre calendrier en vue d'assister à une rencontre stimulante avec les plus grands théoriciens militaires. Pour obtenir de plus amples renseignements, veuillez consulter l'avis sur le symposium présenté dans la présente publication.

Les lecteurs de la revue *OnTrack* seront heureux d'apprendre que l'honorable colonel John Fraser, C.P., OC, O.B.C., CD, C.R., LL.D., a été choisi récipiendaire du Prix Vimy pour l'année 2002. Le colonel Fraser est un éminent Canadien qui a fait preuve des plus hautes normes de leadership au cours de sa carrière au service du Canada.

L'honorable John McCallum, ministre de la Défense nationale, présentera le prix le 15 novembre lors d'un dîner de gala dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau, au Québec. J'ai le plaisir de vous annoncer que la Grande Galerie fera salle comble pour cet événement prestigieux.

Où le Canada se retrouve-t-il depuis les événements du 11 septembre 2001? Des enjeux prennent forme dans plusieurs domaines qui affectent grandement nos relations avec les États-Unis. Dans le document intitulé *September 11, 2001 - September 11, 2002*, Don Macnamara, président de l'ICAD, nous explique comment les choses ont changé depuis les événements du 11 septembre. Il souligne les changements concernant la défense de la patrie, la sécurité à la frontière, les renseignements de sécurité et le terrorisme. Aux États-Unis, la nécessité d'un commandement militaire unique pour coordonner la défense de la patrie est maintenant claire et conduit à la création du Commandement du Nord (NORTHCOM).

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September 11, 2001 - September 11, 2002, Don Macnamara, CDAI President, provides us with a review of how things have changed in the year since 9/11. Don outlines changes in homeland defence, border security, security intelligence, and terrorism. In the United States the need for a single military commander to oversee homeland defence became clear, and led to the creation of NORTHCOM.

Canada has been reluctant to address the link between security and economics. Earlier this year, Richard J. Evraire, CDA Chairman, was invited to address the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in Toronto. His address covers the importance of international relations in maintaining the prosperity and well-being of Canadians, and threats to Canada and its national interests. We are pleased to include the text of the Chairman's address.

The reluctance of the federal government to review its position on the risks to the security of all Canadians, to reassess its policies and resources, and to talk intimately and at length with its citizens about their views, fears, and suggestions is inexplicable. The CDA, among many other defence-minded groups, strongly believes that the need for a full defence review remains acute, even if it must now follow the Department of National Defence's internal update. On September 9, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century released a document, the *People's Defence Review*, which sketches the main outlines of Canadian policy and lays out the minimum requirements for the CF at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. We have included in this issue of *ON TRACK* an excerpt from the *People's Defence Review*.

Questions have arisen regarding the ability of the CF to contribute in a meaningful way to the war against terrorism. Is it possible that Canada's armed forces are becoming neutralized? Richard Gimblett provides us with an option for the Prime Minister's legacy in his article, *Canada's Role in the Stabilization of Iraq*. That option is one that is less expensive than some of the ones that we have read about, and

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Le Canada a hésité à établir un lien entre la sécurité et l'économie. Plus tôt cette année, Richard J. Evraire, président de la CAD, était invité à présenter une allocution à l'Institut canadien des études stratégiques à Toronto. Son discours traite de l'importance des relations internationales pour le maintien de la prospérité et du bien-être des Canadiens et des menaces envers le Canada et envers ses intérêts nationaux. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure le texte du discours du président.

La réticence du gouvernement fédéral de revoir ses positions concernant les risques pour la sécurité de tous les Canadiens, de réévaluer ses politiques et ses ressources et de s'entretenir directement et longuement avec ses citoyens à propos de leurs visions, de leurs peurs et de leurs propositions est inexplicable. La CAD, ainsi que beaucoup d'autres groupes axés sur la défense, croit fermement en l'urgence de procéder à un examen approfondi de la défense, même s'il doit maintenant suivre la mise à jour interne du ministère de la Défense nationale. Le 9 septembre, le Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle a diffusé un document intitulé *People's Defence Review*, qui présente les grandes lignes de la politique canadienne et qui indique les exigences minimales pour les FC au début du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Nous avons publié dans la revue *On Track* un extrait du document *People's Defence Review*.

Des questions ont été soulevées concernant la capacité des FC à contribuer de façon importante à la guerre au terrorisme. Est-il possible que les Forces armées du Canada soient de plus en plus neutralisées? Dans son article intitulé «Canada's Role in the Stabilization of Iraq,» Richard Gimblett nous présente une option concernant l'héritage du premier ministre. Cette option en est une moins dispendieuse que certaines de celles à propos desquelles nous avons lu, une option qui représente l'intérêt du grand public. L'option de Gimblett, qui comprend une dimension financière souligne les capacités de nos forces armées de participer aux opérations à l'étranger.

La CAD a déclaré que le besoin pour le gouvernement de procéder à un examen détaillé de la défense, de pair avec un examen des politiques étrangères et industrielles, comportant des commentaires du parlement et du public, est urgent et d'une importance critique. Cependant, étant donné l'état de préparation actuel des FC, un besoin encore plus grand existe pour le gouvernement d'augmenter immédiatement le budget attribué à la défense d'au moins 1,5 milliard de dollars pour éviter que l'état de préparation opérationnelle n'atteigne un niveau inacceptable. Le rapport du Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants (CPDNAC) ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) et cliquez sur «Sujets Actuels»), déposé le 30 mai 2002, à la Chambre des communes, ainsi que le document du CAD intitulé *Coïncé entre les deux* ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca))

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one that is in the greater public interest. Gimblett's option, which includes a funding requirement, points out our Forces' capabilities for participating in overseas operations.

CDA has stated that the need for the Government to conduct a comprehensive defence review, linked with a foreign and industrial policy review, with parliamentary and public input, is of critical and pressing importance. Given the current state of readiness of the Canadian Forces, however, an even greater need exists for the Government to immediately increase the defence budget by a minimum of \$1.5 billion to prevent operational readiness from falling further below minimum acceptable levels. The SCNDVA report ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) then click "current topics"), tabled 30 May, 2002, in the House of Commons, as well as the CDA's "Caught in the Middle" ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) then click CF Opreadiness), and "Did you Know" ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) then click Outreach), very clearly describe the unacceptable state of the Canadian Forces. If you have not had a chance to read these documents, I urge you to do so and to undertake, in the weeks and months ahead, and with the help of your membership, to contact the Prime Minister and your Members of Parliament and ask them to actively support the SCNDVA report and call for Government action. In this vein, I would also commend to your attention the following website: [www.defendourcanada.ca](http://www.defendourcanada.ca).

Your CDA Executive is hard at work planning and executing the CDA Outreach program to which you gave approval during our most recent (February 2002) Annual General Meeting. Let us take advantage of the recently published Liberal party sponsored Pollara poll's very encouraging numbers indicating that some 48% of Canadians favour increased spending for defence, a 22% increase compared to this time last year. Your active support of your CDA's Outreach program would be greatly appreciated. Please put pen to paper and write to your local MP and while you are at it, why not encourage pro-defence friends to follow your example. For e-mailing your MP, follow the following procedure: type in name.initial followed by @parl.gc.ca, for example if David Pratt was your MP you would type: [pratt.d@parl.gc.ca](mailto:pratt.d@parl.gc.ca). Please circulate widely.

With thanks to *The Bowline Journal*, Fred Fowlow has written, in *Canada Needs a Military Strategy for Changing Times*, that last December's federal budget was a reasonable and necessary reaction to the September 11<sup>th</sup> disaster, but one which has not helped resolve the serious problems facing the armed forces. He, too, urges Canadians to put pen to paper (or fingers to keyboard - *ed.*), stating their brief emphatic language. Fred has provided us with a list of pertinent Ministers and MPs.

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[cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) et cliquez sur «CF Opreadiness»), et «Saviez-vous que?») ([www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca) et cliquez sur «Dépassez»), décrivent très clairement l'état inacceptable des Forces canadiennes. Si vous n'avez pas eu l'occasion de lire ces documents, je vous invite fortement à le faire et à vous engager, dans les semaines et les mois qui viennent, avec l'aide de votre effectif, à communiquer avec le premier ministre et avec vos députés afin de leur demander d'appuyer activement le rapport du CPDNAC et de réclamer une mesure gouvernementale. De plus, je vous invite à consulter le site Web suivant : [www.defendourcanada.ca](http://www.defendourcanada.ca) (Défendons notre Canada).

Votre conseil exécutif de la CAD travaille actuellement très fort pour la planification et la mise en œuvre du programme de sensibilisation auquel vous avez donné votre approbation lors de notre plus récente assemblée générale annuelle (février 2002). Laissez-nous profiter des chiffres très encourageants, publiés récemment dans le cadre d'un sondage Pollara commandé par le Parti libéral, qui indiquent qu'environ 48 p. 100 des Canadiens sont d'accord pour que l'on dépense plus pour la défense, une augmentation de 22 p. 100 comparativement à la même période l'an dernier. Votre appui manifeste concernant le programme de sensibilisation de la CAD serait grandement apprécié. N'hésitez pas à prendre un crayon et un papier et écrivez au député de votre région et, dans la même veine, encouragez vos amis en faveur de la défense à en faire autant. Pour envoyer un courriel à votre député, suivez la procédure suivante : inscrire premièrement le nom de famille suivi d'un point et de la première lettre du prénom suivie de @parl.gc.ca. Par exemple, si David Pratt était votre député, vous auriez à inscrire [pratt.d@parl.gc.ca](mailto:pratt.d@parl.gc.ca). N'hésitez pas à diffuser ces renseignements à beaucoup de gens.

Grâce au *Bowline Journal*, Fred Fowlow a pu écrire dans *Canada Needs a Military Strategy for Changing Times* que le budget fédéral de décembre dernier était une réaction raisonnable et nécessaire au désastre du 11 septembre, mais aussi un budget qui n'a pas contribué à résoudre les problèmes sérieux auxquels les forces armées sont confrontées. De plus, il demande avec insistance aux Canadiens d'écrire (ou de taper – *éd.*), en privilégiant un langage bref et soutenu. Fred Fowlow nous a fourni une liste pertinente de ministres et de députés.

David Mutimer est professeur en sciences politiques à l'Université York, et directeur adjoint du York Centre for International and Security Studies. Ce Centre est membre associé du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense et est spécialisé dans l'étude de la paix internationale et des questions de sécurité. Dans ce numéro de *On Track*, le Dr Mutimer nous

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David Mutimer is a professor of political science at York University, and is Deputy Director of the York Centre for International and Security Studies. The York Centre for International and Security Studies is an associate member of the Security and Defence Forum, and is dedicated to the study of international peace and security issues. In this issue of *ON TRACK*, Dr. Mutimer provides us with some interesting and thought-provoking impressions while spending time with Canadian Forces troops in Bosnia. Dr. Mutimer suggests the CF should be re-configured so as to contribute to peacekeeping operations rather than combat operations, even though CF personnel will likely be deployed to areas of conflict nonetheless.

In closing I wish to thank our members for their financial support for the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. We have still a way to go, however, to weave the **Voice of Defence** into the Canadian conscience and to encourage Canadians to express their concern for the risk to the security of this nation to which government inaction has exposed our country.

présente certaines impressions intéressantes et provocantes qu'il a obtenues lors du temps qu'il a passé avec les troupes des FC en Bosnie. Il propose de réaménager les FC afin qu'elles puissent participer aux opérations de maintien de la paix plutôt qu'aux opérations de combat, même si le personnel des FC sera pourtant vraisemblablement déployé dans des régions aux prises avec des conflits.

En terminant, je tiens à remercier nos membres pour leur soutien financier relatif au travail de la CAD et de l'ICAD. Nous avons encore du chemin à faire, mais nous devons ancrer **la voix de la défense** dans la conscience des Canadiens et devons encourager les Canadiens à exprimer leurs préoccupations relatives au risque à la sécurité de cette nation, risque auquel l'inaction du gouvernement a exposé notre pays.

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## A NATION AT RISK: *THE DECLINE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES*

### Preface

The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) is Canada's leading pro-defence organization, representing thirty groups with a membership of some 600,000 from all parts of the country. CDA's mandate is to study matters of national security and defence and to bring recommendations forward to the Government. The mandate also includes an undertaking to inform the public of issues affecting Canadian security and the state of the Canadian Forces. CDA's objectives are achieved in part through the activities of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), a non-profit and non-partisan organization, which provides public information services by conducting studies, seminars and symposia, and publishing their results in print and on the CDA/CDAI website: [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca)

This study confirms and extends the results of a CDA document published in September 2001, *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. Its main conclusion is that the Canadian Forces are only marginally capable of achieving the roles and

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## UNE NATION VULNÉRABLE : *LE DÉCLIN DES FORCES CANADIENNES*

### Préface

La Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) constitue l'organisme principal du Canada pour la défense formé de 30 groupes qui sont représentés par environ 600 000 membres de tous les coins du pays. Le mandat de la CAD est d'étudier les questions de sécurité nationale et de défense et de présenter des recommandations au gouvernement. Le mandat comprend aussi l'engagement de renseigner le public concernant les questions qui ont une incidence sur la sécurité des Canadiens et sur la situation des Forces canadiennes (FC). Les objectifs de la CAD sont atteints en partie par les activités de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD), un organisme sans but lucratif et neutre qui fournit des services de renseignements publics en menant des études, des colloques et des symposiums et en publiant leurs résultats dans des études et sur le site Web de la CAD : [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca).

Cette étude confirme et rend accessibles les résultats d'un document de la CAD, publié en septembre 2001, intitulé *Coincé entre les deux : Une évaluation de la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes*. La principale conclusion était que les FC ne sont plus en mesure d'accomplir

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**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS  
5<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM**

**“SECURITY AND DEFENCE:  
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES”**

**KEYNOTE SPEAKER:  
MAJOR-GENERAL (Retd) LEWIS MACKENZIE, OOnt, MSC, CD**

This autumn, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations at Queens University, will hold the Fifth Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The Symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Our aim is to showcase the leading edge research of young scholars in the field of security and defence studies and to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions.

The range of presentation topics will include: national security and defence; security and defence alliances; peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations; conflict resolution; security and defence-related economics; intrastate conflict issues; terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security.

**Date: 1-2 November 2002**

**Location: RCAF Ottawa Officers' Mess, 158 Gloucester Street (opposite L'esplanade Laurier) Ottawa, Ontario**

**Registration: CDA Members: \$25.00, Students \$10.00\* includes lunches  
Dinner Friday: \$25.00**

**To Register: Tel: (613) 236-9903  
E-mail: [projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca)  
Fax: (613) 236-8191**

\*Student presenters will not be charged the registration fee. Funding may be available to assist with the travel costs. Contact CDAI for further details.



**CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE  
5<sup>ième</sup> SYMPOSIUM DES DIPLÔMÉS**

**“SÉCURITÉ ET DÉFENSE :  
ENJEUX NATIONAUX ET INTERNATIONAUX”**

**CONFÉRENCIER PRINCIPAL :  
MAJOR-GÉNÉRAL (Ret) LEWIS MACKENZIE, OOnt, CSM, DC**

Cet automne, l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense (ICAD), en collaboration avec le Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's, organisera le Cinquième Symposium annuel des diplômés. Le Symposium sera l'occasion de mettre en valeur les travaux d'étudiants de maîtrise et de doctorat des universités civiles et militaires. Notre but est de proposer une vitrine des recherches à la fine pointe de jeunes universitaires dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense et de renforcer les liens entre les établissements d'enseignement civils et militaires.

La gamme des sujets de présentation inclura : la sécurité et la défense nationales; les alliances de sécurité et de défense; les opérations d'imposition de la paix et de maintien de la paix; le règlement des conflits; l'économie liée à la sécurité et à la défense; les enjeux des conflits intra-état; le terrorisme et autres facteurs non traditionnels constituant une menace à la sécurité.

**Date :** Les 1 et 2 novembre 2002

**Lieu :** Mess des officiers de l'ARC Ottawa, 158, rue Gloucester (en face de L'esplanade Laurier), Ottawa (Ontario)

**Inscription :** Membres de l'ICAD : 25 \$, étudiants 10 \$\*, déjeuners compris  
Dîner du vendredi : 25 \$

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\*Les étudiants qui font des exposés n'auront pas à payer de frais d'inscription. Des fonds pourraient être disponibles pour les frais de déplacement. Pour de plus amples renseignements, veuillez communiquer avec l'ICAD.

missions assigned to them in the *1994 White Paper on Defence*. This follows from the severe cuts in the budget of the Department of National Defence, starting in the mid-1990s. Recent increases in funding have been too little, too late, to rescue the Canadian Forces from a continuing steep decline in operational capability.

*A Nation at Risk* explores this unsatisfactory situation in greater detail, using much information from the Department of National Defence, obtained through the Access to Information process. This evidence shows beyond doubt that a crisis exists in Canadian defence, and that the armed forces will unravel if funds are not provided in the forthcoming budget to address a mounting list of deficits in accounts that support current operations, training, and replacement of ageing equipment and infrastructure.

History has shown that if a nation's armed forces fall into a state of disrepair, the nation itself is placed at great risk. This applies in particular to Canada, a nation whose prosperity and well-being rely upon a fragile environment arising from a concentration of trade with the United States, a large national debt, and a weak currency. Instability anywhere in the world could trigger results that would plunge the entire nation into a crisis. Credible and effective armed forces provide a stable foundation to mitigate such risk.

This study also reflects opinions from a broad range of Americans in government and in security advisory bodies. The cumulative outlook from their perspective is that Canada has damaged its relations with its chief ally and trading partner, the USA. This is the result of intemperate anti-American statements made by members of the Canadian Government and other senior officials, and the sharp decline of the Canadian Forces over the past decade – most recently visible in the withdrawal of the PPCLI Battle Group from Afghanistan before the end of the war in that country. Concerns of this sort on the part of the United States do not bode well for the resolution of trade disputes and, most importantly, raise the issue of erosion of Canadian sovereignty, as the Americans undertake security responsibilities that Canada should in part share.

The Conference of Defence Associations urges the Government, in conjunction with the Defence Policy Update currently being conducted, to apply an immediate allocation of \$1.5 billion to the Department of National Defence budget to slow the rate of decline of the Canadian Forces' operational capabilities. At the same time, CDA urges the Government to undertake a full defence policy review, with input from other Government departments and from the public and

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les rôles et les missions qui leurs ont été assignés dans le *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994*. Cela constitue le résultat des compressions importantes dans le budget du ministère de la Défense nationale qui ont débutées au milieu des années 90. Les augmentations récentes du financement ont été trop minimes et sont arrivées trop tard pour sortir les FC d'un déclin abrupt et continu.

*Une nation vulnérable* examinera cette situation insatisfaisante de façon plus détaillée en utilisant de nombreux renseignements du ministère de la Défense nationale obtenus à l'aide du processus d'accès à l'information. Cet élément probant prouve sans aucun doute qu'une crise sévit au sein de la défense canadienne et que les forces armées poursuivront leur déclin si les fonds nécessaires ne sont pas alloués dans le prochain budget pour éponger une liste d'accumulation de déficits en ce qui concerne les dépenses de fonctionnement actuelles, de formation et de remplacement d'infrastructure et d'équipement vieillissants.

L'histoire prouve que si les forces armées d'un pays tombent dans un état de délabrement, le pays lui-même devient très vulnérable. Cela s'applique en particulier au Canada, un pays dont la prospérité et le bien-être reposent sur un environnement fragile provoqué par une concentration commerciale avec les États-Unis, une dette nationale importante et une monnaie faible. Toute instabilité, n'importe où dans le monde, pourrait provoquer des résultats qui mèneraient à une crise ressentie dans le pays tout entier. Des forces armées efficaces et crédibles permettent une fondation solide afin d'atténuer un tel risque.

Cette étude présente aussi les opinions de nombreux Américains membres du gouvernement et d'organismes de consultation sur la sécurité. La vue d'ensemble de leurs perspectives est que le Canada a brisé ses relations avec son allié et partenaire commercial principal les É.-U. Cela constitue le résultat de déclarations anti-américaines malencontreuses faites par le gouvernement canadien et par d'autres hauts fonctionnaires et du déclin marqué des FC durant la dernière décennie, prouvé encore récemment avec le retrait d'Afghanistan du groupement tactique Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) avant la fin de la guerre dans ce pays. De telles inquiétudes de la part des É.-U. sont de mauvais augure en ce qui concerne le règlement de différends commerciaux et, plus important encore, soulèvent la question de l'érosion de la souveraineté canadienne, étant donné que les Américains doivent assumer les responsabilités relatives à la sécurité qui devraient être partagées avec le Canada.

La Conférence des associations de la défense demande avec

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Parliament, resulting in the publication of a new Defence White Paper in 2003. Only in this way can the serious risks to national sovereignty and well-being be avoided.

This study was conducted under the direction of Sean Henry, Senior Defence Analyst CDA, assisted by contributing authors: Robert Morton, Dr. Richard Gimblett, Dr. Donald Macnamara, Howard Marsh, John Selkirk and Hugh Smith. Questions and comments are invited through any of the means listed in the letterhead.

insistance, conjointement avec la mise à jour de la politique de défense actuellement en cours, d'allouer immédiatement 1,5 milliard de dollars au budget du ministère de la Défense nationale pour ralentir le déclin des capacités opérationnelles des FC. En même temps, la CAD insiste pour que le gouvernement procède à un examen complet de la politique de défense et que cet examen bénéficie d'un apport parlementaire et public considérable pour l'élaboration d'un nouveau Livre blanc sur la défense de 2003. Il s'agit de la seule façon d'éviter les risques importants pour la souveraineté nationale et pour le bien-être de la nation.

Cette étude a été réalisée sous la direction de Sean Henry, analyste principal, CAD, avec la collaboration des auteurs suivants : Robert Morton, Richard Gimblett, Donald Macnamara, Howard Marsh, John Selkirk et Hugh Smith. Vous pouvez faire parvenir vos questions ou vos commentaires par l'entremise des moyens présentés à l'en-tête de ce document.

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## SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 - SEPTEMBER 11, 2002

*Brigadier-General (Retd) Don Macnamara, OMM, CD*

In the beginning, September 11, 2001 or 9/11, as it is now known, had an impact on virtually every Canadian. There was a mixture of shock that a terrorist strike could occur so close to home, grief over the loss of loved ones in the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, or on board the four aircraft involved, with an outpouring of emotional support for the United States as it was reeling from the terrorist blow. Instant hospitality and care were extended by individual Canadians and their families to the 33,000 passengers (most from the United States) on 226 aircraft diverted to Canada.

Canadian Forces officers who happened to be in 'command chairs' at the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) were involved within seconds after the first attack. They took control as the attack details unfolded, scrambled interceptors that were airborne within six minutes of the order, and cleared all North American airspace. Their actions could well have contributed to preventing further incidents that day.

At the same time, the 9,000 kilometer Canada-U.S. border, and 147 border-crossing points, became effectively sealed as an anti-terrorist measure, and the thousands of just-in-time commercial deliveries crossing daily in both directions were slowed to a snail's pace, bringing automobile and other manufacturing in Southern Ontario and adjacent states to a near standstill. Airlines in Canada and the United States – indeed across the world – were hit when flights within and to North America were curtailed and hundreds of thousands of

reservations and holidays were canceled. Many individuals and enterprises pleaded for urgent government assistance to cover massive losses. And some, unable to survive, soon ceased operations, and ultimately were sold or merged with the survivors.

Governments in Canada offered immediate assistance to the Americans. Hospitals in Toronto, Montreal and other centers were cleared to receive victims before it became known that there were not a large number of survivors needing hospital care.

A few days later, at a national ceremony held on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, an estimated 100,000 persons gathered as an act of sympathy, remembrance and solidarity with the United States. And when the War on Terrorism was declared by President Bush, a substantial Canadian Task Force of patrol frigates, destroyers and a resupply ship, transport aircraft, elite special forces troops (JTF2) and an infantry battle group was organized and contributed to the growing coalition to fight the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. That meant the already over-stretched Canadian Forces were stretched further.

When the terrorists struck September 11 and in the days that

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followed, many Canadians and Americans felt personally vulnerable for the first time in their lives. National security was for many now, national insecurity, and as a result we began to examine the causes, the effects and the adjustments that needed to be made in our daily lives. In the United States, homeland security and homeland defence were moved to the front burner. In Canada, John Manley was named Minister for Public Security, and high level discussions commenced with the new United States Homeland Security Director, Governor Tom Ridge, on common security measures – including border management. The border issue became a focal point of those discussions as early – and erroneous – reports claimed that some of the terrorists who took part in the September 11 attacks entered the U.S. via Canada.

Polls taken immediately after the attacks reflected massive support by Canadians for military action in Afghanistan – even for increased spending on the armed forces. Some 80 per cent of Canadians polled indicated acceptance of mandatory fingerprinting and identity cards for all Canadians – most would even accept tapping of their phones or screening of their mail and measures against new immigrants. The Canadian Government, sensing the public mood and urgency for action, quickly drafted new legislation to deal with a changed domestic security environment. A new Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36) was passed in December, 2001, and a Public Safety Act (Bill C46) was given first reading in November 2001, although later withdrawn for amendment as the reaction tempo slowed.

The deployment of the 3 Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) battle group from Edmonton that was offered to the coalition was delayed until after Christmas so that its role could be clarified. Then, further delays exposed, among other things, Canadian weakness because we lacked independent strategic air and sealift capabilities. When finally deployed to Kandahar Airport, the 3 PPCLI Battle Group demonstrated to their U.S. colleagues and senior commanders that they were, and are, superbly capable. However, the loss of four of their number killed and eight others wounded April 18 in an accidental bombing during a training exercise evoked an overwhelming national response. There were services of recognition and remembrance not seen before for individual Canadian Forces personnel killed in the line of duty at home or abroad. Whether this ‘over-the-top’ reaction was a reflection of some guilt on the part of the Government, some anti-American sentiment because they were victims of an American pilot’s attack, or simply a genuine outpouring of support and respect for those fighting a war, was the subject of muted media discussion.

By June 2002 opinions had changed. A Pollara poll indicated that 77 per cent of Canadians did not believe a terrorist attack

would occur on Canada and only 14 per cent thought such an attack was likely. Clearly, as pollster Michael Marzolini said, Canadians had recovered from the shock of September 11. The new priorities were again the old priorities – health care, high taxes and government spending. Sensing this change, the Government withdrew the Public Safety Act for modification.

This reversal was in sharp contrast to the atmosphere in the United States. “That country is still at war, with a similar resolve to what Canadians were experiencing in late November. We have recovered from the shock, they haven’t. They are still looking nervously over their shoulder, while we doubt that terrorist attacks would ever happen here,” Mr. Marzolini wrote. A July COMPAS poll revealed that 75 per cent of those questioned thought that some kind of terrorist attack on North America was likely over the next few years, but only 33 per cent of those questioned thought that Canada was a likely target.

The realism of this Canadian view was challenged by John Thompson of the MacKenzie Institute, who was quoted as saying that Canadians have fooled themselves into thinking that the war is over because they want to believe Canada is “a peaceful kingdom and we have no troubles.” He added, “I’ve got news for Canadians ... we’re up to our necks in terrorism and always have been. We’ve had embassies taken over, diplomats shot, bombs here and, of course, al-Qaeda was planning on setting off fuel tankers inside Montreal.”

With Canadians beginning to relax within a booming economy and showing little fear of terrorism, Canada’s contribution to the coalition war on terrorism was sharply reduced with the return of the infantry battle group and a pull back in the size of the naval task force, all because the Canadian Forces are stretched beyond a sustainable limit. Their original deployment was popular, however, according to the June poll, with more than 75 per cent of Canadians saying they support the war on terrorism as being a ‘just war’, and almost 75 per cent still support some increase in spending on defence and domestic security. A recent Pollara poll indicated that 48% of Canadians support an increase in funding to support the Canadian Forces, a jump of 22% in the last year.

So, where does Canada find itself as we approach the first anniversary of September 11, 2001? Issues are developing in several areas that are significantly affecting our relations with the United States.

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## THE VIMY AWARD WINNER

The Vimy Award is presented annually to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The Vimy Award Selection Committee has selected Colonel the Honourable John Allen Fraser, PC, OC, OBC, CD, QC, LLB, as this year's recipient of the award.



## LE RÉCIPIENDAIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Distinction honorifique Vimy est présentée chaque année à un canadien ou à une canadienne ayant fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le comité de sélection du Récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy a, cette année, choisi le Colonel, l'Honorable John Allen Fraser, PC, OC, OBC, CD, QC, LLB, comme récipiendaire de la distinction Vimy.

Colonel Fraser is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada. The Vimy Award will be presented by the Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, at a formal reception and dinner to be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec, on Friday, 15 November, 2002, beginning at 6:30 PM.

John Fraser was born in Japan in 1931 and was raised and educated in British Columbia. In 1950 he enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment and, later, was commissioned as an infantry officer. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practised law until he was first elected to the House of Commons in 1972. In Government, he served as Minister of Environment, Postmaster General, and as Minister of Fisheries. In 1986, he became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by members of Parliament. He served as Speaker until 1994. In 1997 Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the (Department of National Defence) Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

*The Vimy Award/La Distinction honorifique Vimy* Le colonel Fraser est un canadien distingué qui a démontré les standards les plus élevés de leadership au cours d'une carrière consacrée au service du Canada. La Distinction honorifique sera remise par l'Honorable John McCallum, Ministre de la Défense nationale, vendredi le 15 novembre 2002, lors d'un dîner gala mixte dans la Grande Galerie, au Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau, Québec, débutant à 18h30.

John Fraser est né en 1931 au Japon. Il a grandi et fait ses études en Colombie-Britannique. M. Fraser a été associé aux Forces canadiennes depuis 1950, année où il s'est enrôlé en tant que soldat dans le West Coast Signal Regiment. Après deux années de service au sein du Corps d'instruction des officiers canadien, il a été commissionné en tant qu'officier d'infanterie. Il a été admis au Barreau en 1954 et a pratiqué le droit jusqu'à ce qu'il soit élu à la Chambre des communes en 1972. Il a été ministre de l'Environnement et ministre des Postes, puis ministre des Pêches. En 1986, M. Fraser est devenu le premier président de la Chambre des communes à être élu au scrutin secret par les députés. Il est demeuré président de la Chambre jusqu'en 1994. En 1997, M. Fraser a été nommé membre du Comité de surveillance du ministre de la Défense nationale sur les changements. Il en est actuellement le président.

### Homeland Defence

In the United States, in the months after September 11, the need for a single United States military commander to oversee homeland defence became clear, leading to the creation of a new Northern Command (NORTHCOM), ultimately to include

all U.S. Forces dedicated to the defence of North America. The nomination of the current Commander in Chief NORAD, U.S. Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, as the Commander in Chief NORTHCOM has led to serious questions concerning

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Canada's relationship to NORTHCOM and the future of NORAD itself. This relationship becomes even more important as it appears that U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) will come under NORTHCOM as will the pending and controversial Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system.

For some observers, this development is seen as seriously threatening Canada's role in cooperative North American defence. Persistent opposition to any notion of BMD deployment in some quarters has failed to take into account the fact that the United States will proceed to deal with its defence concerns in accordance with its own interests. Canadian participation may be welcome – indeed essential in General Eberhart's view - but it will necessarily involve Canadian contributions that will be recognized as significant and relevant – and it is not clear what they may be. But if Canada is shut out for whatever reason, the impact on our sovereignty and sovereign decision-making could be incalculable.

It is in Canada's vital interests to survive as an integrated political and economic sovereign state. Sovereignty includes the capability to be aware of and to control activities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the state, its airspace and maritime approaches. The capacity to maintain surveillance over Canadian territory is currently integrated with the NORAD system. Loss of that capacity would indeed affect Canada's sovereign capability. It is also a vital interest to defend the homeland against those elements, which could conspire to disrupt, diminish or destroy the state, its physical assets or its citizens, including their economic well-being.

Sovereignty also includes the capacity for decision-making in the sovereign interests of the state. If the United States were to decide to develop Northern Command to include all of its land, sea and aerospace defence needs without the inclusion of Canada, Canadian sovereignty would most certainly be affected. Therefore, credible and effective military capabilities that can be integrated with those of the United States in any North American defence entity will be essential to the preservation of Canadian sovereignty. This challenge, although already seen in the BMD debate, was intensified as a result of September 11.

### **Border Security**

Similarly, border security is a vital interest to Canada, given the economic dependency on cross-border trade with the United States. Canada cannot be seen to have any border or entry point – sea or air port – which could be an easy route for subsequent entry to the U.S., because that could lead to major and economically punishing border controls. While substantial progress has been made in improving access for routine travel and goods transportation at major crossings,

including Canada-U.S. customs co-manning of major seaports, there is still the matter of surveillance of the almost 9,000 kilometers of water and trackless land border.

### **Security Intelligence**

Border surveillance is also closely linked to the need for appropriate and improved security intelligence. The degree to which the September 11 events were the result of an intelligence failure – minor or massive – is the subject of continuing investigations within the United States government. There already appears to be a consensus that on the analytical side of the intelligence community – strategic intelligence analysis and interpretation – there is a weakness. The reason is analysts need to be well educated and skilled, and the work is labour intensive, that is to say, it is expensive. It may not be the most intriguing aspect of intelligence, but it eventually becomes the essential foundation. This means developing and maintaining a cadre of specialists in the economics, politics and cultures of all parts of the world to undertake continuous and comprehensive analysis of events, issues and trends which can affect a state's interests. In the United States, the new Department of Homeland Security is expected to have a new intelligence 'early warning' capability based on data and information gathered by the various military, political and economic intelligence agencies, all of which can be integrated and interpreted with a view to identifying terrorist activities and risks. Meanwhile, the Canadian Government has increased funding for both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to increase their staffing. The goal is not only more analysts but also to develop a better integrated intelligence management system in Canada.

### **Terrorism**

We need a clear understanding of the threat of terrorism to achieve the changes and get the financial resources for all the agencies and departments involved in defence of Canadian security. Canadians appear to believe that it won't or can't happen here – but as John Thompson has pointed out, we have substantial experience with terrorism already. Do we forget the Air India incident? Do we forget the FLQ crisis in Quebec?

No satisfactory or agreed definition of terrorism has been articulated. But, James M. Poland, professor of criminal justice at California State University, Sacramento describes terrorism as "the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience." Terrorism is intended to be disruptive

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and to cast doubt upon a government's capacity to deliver its first and most important social service – the safety and survival of the people and their personal and national assets.

Terrorism arises from many causes and especially those causes that produce people who perceive their situation as hopeless because of persecution, prejudice or injustice, described as politically-based terrorism, or where quick financial gain may be obtained, described as criminal terrorism. The results for the individual citizen can be the same. In a world with major economic disparities across nations, political and economic refugees seeking asylum, irredentist movements by the dozen, added to narcotics, weapons (including weapons of mass destruction) and resources (even water, is being used as currency), all potentially catalyzed by religious fervour, the causes are everywhere, the risks are constant. Governments and populations must be aware of the risks, and take what measures are appropriate to reduce the risks without creating an atmosphere of fear that would only play into the hands of terrorist groups. This may also mean that Canada will need the capability to defend its interests abroad – well beyond North America – in coalition with like – minded nations, with or without the United States.

## Conclusion

Canada's security equation has been changed by September 11, 2001. But because we are privileged to live next to the most powerful and wealthy nation in history, Canada will be challenged to defend its sovereignty and security in the face of the vastly superior political, economic and military power of the United States, a nation that is determined to ensure the defence and security of its homeland against the perceived terrorist threat. Canada must, therefore, ensure that it does what it can to protect its vital interests and that must ultimately and logically mean co-operation with the United States. If Canada is seen to be unwilling to provide for its own sovereign and security interests, that will invite the United States to make whatever provisions it must to protect against any weakness on Canada's part that may affect US security. And what the U.S. does in these circumstances will not necessarily coincide with Canada's interests.

*Don Macnamara, a retired air force Brigadier-General, is a professor in the Queen's School of Business and a Senior Fellow in the Queen's Centre for International Relations.*

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## SECURITY IN A NEW ERA: RETHINKING CANADIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

*Address by Lieutenant-General (Retd) Richard J. Evraire, Chairman, to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Spring Seminar, Toronto, June 13, 2002*

*"If you wish to preserve peace, para bellum."...old Roman proverb*

### *Introduction*

It gives me great pleasure to be with you today to participate in this important session aimed at improving Canada's security in the midst of change; change that includes an altered set of threats. I am especially pleased to have been called upon to define and discuss a so-called 'made in Canada' definition of security.

My presentation today will be in two parts. First, I shall speak about the importance of international relations, and especially international trade, in maintaining the prosperity and well-being of Canadians. I shall then discuss the existing and emerging threats to Canada and its national interests. Finally, I will connect the two parts by suggesting how Canada should proceed in terms of security policy and armed forces to guarantee peace with freedom for its citizens.

### *Defining Security*

Before tackling the question of made in Canada security, we should look at security in its own right. Many of you will recognize the following statements as being germane to national interests:

- peace, order and good government; and
- life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The first is a Canadian definition, the second - American. Many people use these definitions to justify and prove all sorts of Canada-versus-USA differences in outlook, culture and the like. My purpose is to note that in the context of the aims of security, they encompass a lot of common ground.

Unfortunately, life is not simple and, more to the point, everything has its price – especially if nations and individuals wish to be secure and reap the benefits defined by those two statements.

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Since the beginning of time, the fundamental drives of the human condition have remained much the same. I refer, of course, to the eternal forces of survival and competition, and the need to develop measures of security to deal with them.

In the past, Canadians have accepted the cliché of the so-called ‘fire-proof house’ – in other words, isolation from direct threats because of our three oceans, and protection provided by our superpower neighbour. Today, the cliché has worn thin, and may even have become dangerous, since there are now arsonists in the house; and the prominence of indirect threats is rising.

Until the early years of the twentieth century, Canadian security was provided mainly by the colonial powers -- France and Britain. In those early days, this entailed defeating internal threats posed by indigenous people, and external threats posed by other powers. However, the First World War marked a significant change. Canada made huge sacrifices in a foreign conflict where the direct threat to the nation was negligible.

Even then, an indirect threat to Canadian security was emerging, and this in part justified Canada’s large contributions. The nation was a leading member of the British Empire. The Empire was, essentially, an economic entity, in which trade and development were the underpinnings for progress. There is no doubt that jingoism and pro-British sentiment played a role, but the economic factor was present in the need to protect commonwealth and empire preferential trade relations.

This factor increased in importance during the Second World War, and has continued to dominate Canadian security requirements to this day. By and large, however, Canada has been reluctant to address the link between security and economics. In the past, Canadian complacency over security was aided and abetted by British military power -- the Royal Navy in particular.

It would seem likely that the unravelling of the British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s posed serious problems for Canada and its security. Trade preferences ended, and Canada faced cold war threats and a competitive economic world, largely on its own. In this respect the economic power of the U.S. was already exerting a relentless pressure. More importantly, since roughly the mid-1960s Canada has tended to rely on American military power, while struggling to explain away the price of such dependence.

Hence, it may be said that since Confederation, Canada has actually been linked to international affairs: first, as a participant in the global reach of the British Empire; and more recently, mainly as a player in western hemisphere continental trade, technology and investment flows, drawn into the

American orbit.

Canadian attempts to take an independent approach to international economic relations, initiated by the Trudeau government in the early 1970s, ended in the early 1980s -- with the implementation of the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and shortly thereafter the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Since then, the country has been searching for ways to balance the critical benefits of hemispheric free trade with the equally critical need to maintain national sovereignty and other national interests.

To advance its national interests, Canada has had to cultivate strong international relationships and has therefore sought membership in an extensive network of international associations and organizations, many of which were and are directly related to defence, but also to trade and other economic variables. These organizations are well known, and include the G-7/G-8 Group, the WTO, the OECD, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. This approach did not and does not suggest a shortfall in foreign aid, support for democracy, human rights and the like. But unless Canadian prosperity is assured, there can be no resources to apply to these programs.

Overall, Canada’s economic prosperity is highly dependent on foreign trade, and therefore on international factors, especially the degree of peace and stability within an increasingly globalized community. Close to 40% of Canadian GDP is generated by exports. This is more than double the average for all other G-7 nations. It is estimated that one in three Canadian jobs depends on trade.

This discussion leads inevitably to Canada - United States relations. Canadian trading arrangements with the U.S. are the most significant in the world. They account for close to \$ 2 billion per day in two-way trade. Some 87% of Canadian exports and over 70% of imports are with the U.S. With the implementation of NAFTA, Canada has become increasingly (some would say critically) dependent on trade with the U.S. in maintaining its own prosperity.

In the words of the 1994 report of the Standing Joint Committee on Canada’s defence policy:

“Our national interest ... (lies) in a stable international system governed by the rule of law, and a global economy in which all countries can prosper...”

*(continued p. 17)*



The national defence establishment, including the Canadian Forces, therefore plays a key role in a policy that provides the insurance and the means that allow the national interest to flourish. It contributes to stability at home and abroad, supporting development of an environment conducive to civil and beneficial international relations.

Since access to foreign markets is vital for Canada – a nation with a small domestic market, but with a high standard of living to maintain – it follows that Canadian contributions to international peace and stability are essential. As stated earlier, the well-being of Canadians is linked directly to the well-being of the United States, its largest foreign market. Overall, Canada's security policy will therefore need to be aimed at supporting and assisting U.S. initiatives to maintain the international stability necessary to its own prosperity and progress.

It could be suggested that the reduction of Canadian military forces assigned to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, i.e., failing to assist the U.S. in maintaining common security, could prejudice our security and well-being. A report of the C.D. Howe Institute, released earlier this week, suggests there could be 'linkage' between Canada's lamentable military contributions and American lack of interest in resolving critical Canadian problems, such as softwood lumber.

Having earlier, and often, made the point that Canadian national interests are critically dependent upon international trade, especially with the United States, it is now possible to analyse the threats to Canada against that background.

### *Threats to Canadian Security*

First, let me address the context in which threats are defined today, a context characterized by the phrase, 'exponential change'. On a cynical note, analysis of change has become a growth industry. However, we would be well advised to proceed beyond the cliché and understand the huge implications change will impose on society, and on military operations, in the years ahead.

Charles Darwin did not say survival depends on the strongest or the most intelligent, but rather on those best able to adapt to change. Since it is a human tendency, especially among politicians, bureaucrats and the military, to resist change, we would do well to heed Darwin's words as we hurtle onward into the world of 'everything everywhere'. That phrase describes the theme of a little known book by William Knoke, *Bold New World*. It provides a jarring glimpse of what changes lie in store for us in this century; including a prediction, by Knoke in 1996, that terrorism will become the dominant worldwide threat.

But to complicate the situation, there are elements that will remain largely constant in the midst of the torrent of change – and thereby further hinder our ability to make adjustments – especially in response to security threats.

For those who say that we are moving into a more peaceful era compared to the past, I draw attention to the consistent presence of savagery and brutality in our affairs over many millennia, the most notable and recent manifestations of which are conjured up by uttering the words: Bosnia; Rwanda; and, the World Trade Centre.

It is clear to me that 'history has not ended'. To be blunt, war, violence, brutality and aggression are hard-wired into the human psyche – and any nation that does not plan to deal with that reality is doomed either to subjugation, or to irrelevance. Although it is unfashionable to say so, the old roman proverb is still largely correct: "if you wish to preserve peace, *para bellum*."

With the sudden end of the Cold War, and the collapse of its accompanying bi-polar framework, the world entered a period of great uncertainty. Now alliances shift and threats arise or recede as actors attempt to identify their new roles in international affairs. A new pattern of stability is being sought; an elusive goal to be sure. What is equally certain is that future international security arrangements will differ from those of the past.

While some components of national power, such as natural resources, geography and demography have changed little, important new forces have come on the scene. Globalization of economic and financial affairs is moving ahead quickly, assisted by the so-called 'information revolution' that is already increasing the power of individuals, while at the same time raising to prominence international corporations and interest groups.

But even in this fluid situation, future world security will still gravitate around the interests of major players such as the United States, Russia, China, Japan, India, and a United Europe. Any number of possibilities exist for conflict within this group. Moreover, a number of flashpoints could, in the short term, call for armed forces to supplement diplomacy to end aggression and restore peace. The Middle East, the Sub-continent (especially Kashmir), South Asia, the Balkans, Korea, and Central Africa, are of course the obvious tinder boxes.

But new threats are emerging from the spread of terrorism, crime, pollution, population explosion, disease and resource

*(continued p. 18)*

depletion. Overarching these concerns is the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is truly a depressing state of affairs!

Response to conflict over the past decade has produced a doctrine of intervention, applied by coalitions under the United States, NATO, or the United Nations. Intervention serves to quell the clamour, amongst the public in western nations, to 'do something' to alleviate the human suffering served-up on their television sets each night.

Military operations have ranged from conventional combat to low intensity conflict, and a variety of peace support missions in between. Examples of all of these have occurred in the relatively short period since 1990. It is quite likely these scenarios will persist well into this century.

Adding to the complexity of national and international security is the rapid pace of advances in the field of high technology; for armed forces, it is the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The RMA entails dramatic progress in target detection, weapon accuracy and firepower. The downside of the RMA, however, is that it is expensive and, currently, the systems it produces are highly vulnerable to cyber-terror and a range of other relatively cheap and low-tech counter-measures – the essence of asymmetric threats.

The RMA creates several important challenges for nations – especially nations such as Canada, with only a foot in the door. The question is: can a nation choose not to advance further with the RMA and still expect to remain secure? Would not failure to do so quickly relegate a nation's armed forces to the second, third, or even lower tiers of operational effectiveness? Again, if RMA developments are implemented, then the cost of defence will increase.

As an aside, I should mention here the important and progressive step taken by the commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery. He recently announced that the army will soon enter a transformation phase, leading to the "army of tomorrow". It will formally break with the era of the cold war, and produce doctrine, organizations and tactics to respond effectively to the new security environment and the RMA. Unfortunately, as usual in this country, lack of resources will limit his scope in this exercise, but that General Jeffery has made the move is important.

*"...instability constitutes the primary threat to security in all its dimensions"*

Security today differs in many ways from what has been the norm for some 400 years. The essence of the new situation is captured by a quotation from General John Sheenan, US Marine corps:

" Unlike the ideology-based, correlation-of-forces model used during the Cold War, or its balance of power predecessor, today's security challenges are multi-dimensional and often transcend the power and authority of affected nation-states...therefore, security is derived from the **aggregate** of political, economic, cultural and military factors...today, **instability** constitutes the primary threat to security in all its dimensions. Instability **anywhere** affects **everyone** in a global economy. Moreover, with global communications and permeable borders, instability can overcome nearly every effort to contain it... (modern) strategy requires multi-faceted engagement at all levels."

I urge you to remember this quotation. We must not focus on one, possibly trendy, threat at a time – terrorism today, something else tomorrow. Although the government may not like the implications in terms of costs, the Canadian Forces must retain a flexible and multi-purpose combat capability.

Today, because of the continuing potential for conventional war, the emergence of asymmetric threats such as terrorism, and Canada's severely depleted military capabilities, our country's security displays new vulnerabilities – especially in relation to our heavy reliance on foreign trade in general, and with the U.S. in particular.

Let us not forget that, despite the optimistic words uttered by the government, our economic situation remains fragile due to high taxes, a weak dollar, a huge national debt, and low productivity. The unpleasant effects of all these factors would be exacerbated by major events of instability at home and overseas.

The run down of the Canadian Forces over the past thirty years weakens our ability to counter threats both at home and overseas. It has also squandered the enviable reputation Canadians earned by their sacrifices in twentieth century wars, and in the early days in NATO.

### *Summary*

I shall now summarize by drawing together the description of Canadian national interests, and the elements of a Canadian security policy to guard and advance those interests.

First of all, we must recognize the need for a flexible approach to security, and the need to maintain multi-purpose and effective armed forces to implement our security policy. The fundamentals of the latter remain much the same as they have in the recent past. We must take into account the need to protect

*(continued p. 19)*

Canada at home, in North America with the U.S., and overseas within coalitions. Events over the past decade, culminating in terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, have not changed those categories. What has changed is the quantity of resources needed to implement our security policy.

For example, I would suggest that, in a post-September 11 world, defending Canada has been subsumed within the requirement to cooperate with the U.S. (and Mexico) in the defence of North America – in the context of ‘Homeland Security’.

To combat the new terrorist threat, Canada will have to apply a number of changes to the organization and capabilities of its armed forces. Intelligence gathering, critical infrastructure protection, surveillance and response, and so on, will need to be allocated more resources. This was the focus of the last Federal budget in December 2001.

However, that budget tended to overlook the fact that effective armed forces are still the foundation upon which homeland security must be built. In this respect, those armed forces must be in a position to cooperate with and support the other components of national security provided by the Solicitor-General, CSIS, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Customs and Immigration, and others.

Overseas, the future, you might say, is already upon us with our multi-faceted contributions in the Balkans (NATO), Afghanistan (U.S. coalition), the Golan Heights (UN.), the Sinai (U.S. coalition). The policy underpinning these contributions is correct, and reflects the need for strategically deployable and flexible multi-purpose armed forces. The problem is that the government has not seen fit to provide adequate resources in the DND budget to implement these commitments properly and in a sustainable fashion. This has led directly to the hugely counter-productive decision to withdraw from Afghanistan before the war is over.

This brings me to my final point. We in CDA continue to

support the urgent need for a full blown and coordinated security policy review, combining the elements of foreign policy and defence policy with a government commitment to properly fund the new policy. Failure to do this for the 1994 Defence White Paper prejudices our security to this day.

Current Canadian foreign policy still bears the stamp put upon it by the advocates of ‘soft power’ and ‘human security’. However laudable in their conception and aims, these concepts rarely, and then only fleetingly and grudgingly, admitted that there is a need for effective Canadian armed forces to provide a framework for their implementation – including the propagation of so-called ‘Canadian values’. All of these components have a role to play in assuring Canadian security as I have defined it – but they cannot achieve it alone. Effective armed forces are required to oversee and protect their implementation.

### *Conclusion*

Canada’s security rests upon this country’s ability to contribute to international peace and security in conjunction with allies. Primary among the latter is the United States, with whose well-being Canada’s well being is closely linked. Working together will not erode Canadian sovereignty as much as it will be eroded by Canadian isolationism and a reliance on others to guarantee our interests at home and abroad. The ‘made in Canada’ security policy is out there, but it needs to be embraced.

Finally, I leave you with this very Canadian definition of security:

“Canada will truly be secure as a nation if it succeeds in preserving a way of life acceptable to the Canadian people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. This way of life includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life in Canada.”

Thank you for your attention.

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## CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE COOPERATION

*Prepared by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

*(The following is an excerpt from The People’s Defence Review, a report that was released by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, 9 September, 2002. The full*

*report is available on the Council’s web site, [www.ccs21.org](http://www.ccs21.org))*

The 1994 White Paper began its Chapter 5 this way: “The United States is

Canada’s most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as

*(continued p. 20)*

any in the world.” They engage in the world’s largest bilateral trading partnership. They share political, economic, social, and cultural values. “Geography, history, trust and shared beliefs have also made the two countries partners in the defence of North America,” the White Paper stated. This too, like so much else in Canada’s last white paper, is as true in 2002 as it was in 1940, 1957, and 1994. The difference now is that North America is under attack and Canada has fewer resources with which to respond.

The events of September 11, 2001 understandably heightened American concerns for homeland security. What is usually forgotten is that even before the Al Qaeda assault, US leaders were concerned about improving the defence of the United States against such possibilities, and that full-scale debates on National Missile Defence (NMD) and Homeland Security were already in progress. The terrorist attacks greatly accelerated these discussions and rendered academic at least some of their more optimistic and progressive assumptions.

The American debate will inevitably have resonance in Canada. As one recent DND document affirmed, the 9/11 attacks “validated and bolstered” the Canada-US defence relationship. The two northern allies have cooperated in the defence of North America since 1917 and, more formally, since the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940 that created the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The PJBD exists still, as do an array of literally hundreds of other joint bodies, treaties, and memoranda of understanding that detail and regulate the military relations of the two countries. The relationship is geographically, technologically, and politically intimate.

Since 1957, Canada has been a partner in NORAD, an integrated command based at Colorado Springs that has provided the continent’s air defence.

NORAD has been renewed every five years, most recently in 2001. A Canadian officer serves as deputy commander. It is possible that the US might want to place any deployed NMD system under NORAD to take advantage of the warning and assessment systems NORAD deploys. Canadian personnel help operate these systems and some are based on Canadian soil.

If Canada decided to oppose NMD research and eventual deployment, either the US would put the system elsewhere and create duplicate warning systems, or the Canadians in NORAD would simply be asked to withdraw and the agreement would languish. This would gut the integrated command and effectively eliminate all Canadian influence on continental air defence. It would also affect the flow of intelligence from the US to Canada. And there might be other implications, not least an obligation for Canada to increase substantially spending on the control of its own air space.

Participation in or support for NMD, on the other hand, might actually increase Canadian influence in continental defence. At the very least, Canada would be consulted when the decisions were made because it would have the right to that consultation. The choice to support NMD is Canada’s, but there is in fact no choice left to make: Canada should cooperate with the US in its own interests and seek actively to maximize its influence over NMD and, through it, NORAD. This logic applies equally well to the ‘weaponization’ of space, another military frontier to which the US will certainly proceed.

At the same time as this issue plays out, the United States is creating a Northern Command, a new military super-command that will become operational on October 1, 2002 under command of the same United States Air Force officer who also commands NORAD. NORTHCOM is a US-only command

that will coordinate the activities of the many smaller American military commands having continental defence responsibilities. After 9/11, it is clear, Homeland Defence is “the highest priority” of the US Department of Defense, and rightly so.

NORTHCOM is very unlikely to want direct Canadian representation, but its existence and mandate — to plan for the defence of the whole continent and for “security cooperation and military coordination” with Canada and Mexico — obviously affects this country. Its commander-designate told the *New York Times* that NORAD might in fact eventually expand to include Mexico or the US could form a separate defence command with its southern neighbour. “To defend this nation,” General Ralph E. Eberhart said, “we have to defend as far out as possible ... we need the support of Canada and Mexico to be able to defend our interests.”

What ought Canada to do in this situation? Should it argue that the existing arrangements provide sufficient Canada-US cooperation in defence? Or ought it to seek the creation of an expanded NORAD like arrangement, with or without Mexican participation, to cover air, sea, and land defences?

We do not see any real choice. The United States is determined to improve its homeland defences and is re-arranging its military forces and civilian agencies to do so. The Americans will approach this subject, as they must, from a continental perspective. Canada has the chance to participate in the planning and in the strategic decisions that will be made, if it chooses to do so. To stand back, to not press for a role in an expanded, bi-national or possibly a tri-national continental defence command (and we think a binational arrangement is in the Canadian interest more than a tri-national one at this time)

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is to turn the task over to the United States. Such a decision would *de facto* cede Canadian sovereignty to the US, a superpower that is prepared to do whatever is necessary to ensure its own security.

On the other hand, if Canada participates fully in the decisions that govern the defence of this continent, it maximizes the exercise of its national sovereignty by securing — and earning — a voice in the decisions that affect the both countries. There is and always has been a danger to Canadian sovereignty in working too closely with the US. This subject always demands Canadians' attention. But a clear understanding of the essentials in a time of crisis and a recognition that sovereignty can be lost by looking the other way are now required.

Certainly the danger is greater if Canada does nothing. For starters, it will be vulnerable, or at least decidedly more vulnerable than currently. Just as certainly, the superpower to the south will take Canada seriously only if Ottawa demonstrates that it is willing to pay for and maintain the hard power that alone can back up its foreign policy. There will be genuine shame if the United States is obliged to browbeat Canada into doing what it should do on its own.

Canadians should not be misled: the

United States *will* act alone if it must, but American leaders, sensitive to appearances and imbued with most of the same democratic and legal impulses as Canada's own elected officials, would much prefer willing Canadian cooperation in a new and broader Canada-US strategic partnership than any more arbitrary form of consensus building.

Negotiations with the US on some of these matters are underway; their result, according to media reports in mid-August is that a small binational planning cell will be attached to NORTHCOM headquarters. Although we must wait for further details and see how this planning cell functions in practice, in our view such a token arrangement is unlikely to be sufficient to coordinate North America's defences.

Cooperation between the two countries' militaries demands that they be able to function seamlessly together. Canada's navy, blessed with modern frigates, has this capacity and indeed operates easily, and regularly, within the impressive carrier battle groups of the United States Navy. It has been doing so since sailing alongside American forces in the Arabian Gulf in 1990-91. The air force is presently upgrading its CF-18 fighter aircraft to give them the ability to operate better with the United States Air Force. Only the army lags badly behind, but even here the 3rd Battalion

of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) in Afghanistan operated as part and parcel of an American Army regiment, and a Canadian major-general is now regularly posted to the US to serve as deputy commander of an American corps.

Cooperation of this type, intensity, and duration is less an end state than it is an ongoing process. Budget restraints, numbers of troops, and the logistical problems of traversing North America and adjacent waters to train with American forces will each impose unique restraints upon Canada's freedom of manoeuvre in its defence planning with Washington. The prejudices and insecurities (and sometimes the well-founded fears) of Canadian nationalists will do likewise, exercising a powerful political check on the integrative pressures in the defence relationship.

Canada should expect no blank security cheques to be written by America's security establishment, but neither should it write any itself in return. Cooperation with Washington will clearly demand an expansion of the Canadian Forces both in numbers and in the sophistication of kit. This will not replace a half-century of increasingly close defence ties, but instead will build on existing strengths and foster improvement in those areas in which Canadian military deficiencies threaten the security of us all.

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## CANADA NEEDS A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CHANGING TIMES

*Commander (Retd) Fred Fowlow, Director Maritime Affairs, The Naval Officers Association of Canada*

(Canada Needs a Military Strategy for Changing Times is re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor of The Bowline Journal – ed.)

Those who have followed the threat to the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces (CF) understand that the Cana-

dian military has been underfunded and undermanned for almost a decade. All taking place at a time when the vision for the future of the CF tells us that tomorrow's military performance hinges upon the investment the government makes in the CF today.

International peace and security commitments, as well as attending to domestic security and sovereignty matters, demands that the government offer more support to the armed forces, not less.

*(continued p. 22)*

David Pratt, Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) correctly describes the present day CF situation as one where our foreign policy has been writing cheques that our defence policy cannot cash.<sup>1</sup>

Few will disagree with Pratt. Canada needs a better defined foreign policy coordinated with a defence policy. A new policy which will ensure Canada maintains well trained, properly equipped, combat capable forces, at the same time allowing our forces to continue to be interoperable with our allies, using our own resources to transport and sustain them overseas when called upon to do so.

In May of this year, David Pratt's committee released the SCONDVA report entitled "Facing Our Responsibility: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces." This first-rate document contained twenty-five recommendations, all of which were supported by committee members of all political persuasion.<sup>2</sup> The report offers an excellent foundation for the development of a new foreign and defence policy.

In the months since his appointment, the new Minister of National Defence, John McCallum, has been stick-handling his way through government fog on a slippery learning curve. Recently he announced the setting up of an internet site where Canadians could offer their opinions regarding national defence policy. Those who do not have access to the internet are encouraged to submit their **comments using normal mail.** *A complete list of pertinent Ministers/MPs follows this article, together with their email addresses.* An interesting plan which will have to move at break-neck speed if he is to have it ready by his October deadline for a proposed defence budget for the up-coming budget cycle.<sup>3</sup>

The Minister's innovative action notwithstanding, Canadians must not be misled by the government's claim that all is well with Canada's military. The government's response to the Septem-

ber 11 attack on America and the war on terrorism, offers interesting behaviour on the part of DND bureaucrats. For example, the claim that it allocated \$7.7 billion for defence was misleading. The funds were allocated for the fight against terrorism, not the re-equipping of the forces as many Canadians were led to believe.

To be accurate, an infinitesimal amount of the \$7.7 billion found its way into the DND budget. Most of it was allocated to events which are generally unknown in character, in that they deal with unseen and unexpected issues such as providing equipment connected with security measures in the commercial airline industry, intelligence gathering, counter-acting chemical and/or biological war-

fare, and revamping Canada's immigration policy. A reasonable and necessary reaction to the September 11th disaster, but one which has not helped resolve the serious problems facing the armed forces.

The question concerning the state of the CF boils down to this: is the government committed and prepared to deal with underfunding and re-equipping issues as the forces prepare to adjust to the 21st century's revolution in military affairs?

We know Canada's military must be upgraded to the point where it can maintain a high level of interoperability with our allies. The CF must also have the

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### Members of Parliament Who Should Hear From You

The following is a suggested list of Ministers/MPs who should be written regarding the importance of their supporting Canada's defence initiatives. The postal address for all is c/o The House of Commons, Ottawa ON K1A 0A6, and remember, no postage is required:

Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister	<a href="mailto:chretien.j@parl.gc.ca">chretien.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. John McCallum, Min. Nat. Defence	<a href="mailto:mccallum.j@parl.gc.ca">mccallum.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. John Manley, Min. of Finance	<a href="mailto:manley.j@parl.gc.ca">manley.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. David Anderson, Victoria	<a href="mailto:anderson.d@parl.gc.ca">anderson.d@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Herb Dhaliwal, Vancouver S. Burnaby	<a href="mailto:dhaliwal.h@parl.gc.ca">dhaliwal.h@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. David Kilgour, Edmonton Southeast	<a href="mailto:kilgour.d@parl.gc.ca">kilgour.d@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Anne McLellan, Edmonton West	<a href="mailto:mclellan.a@parl.gc.ca">mclellan.a@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Hedy Fry, Vancouver Centre	<a href="mailto:fry.h@parl.gc.ca">fry.h@parl.gc.ca</a>
Reg Alcock, Winnipeg South	<a href="mailto:alcock.r@parl.gc.ca">alcock.r@parl.gc.ca</a>
Anita Neville, Winnipeg South Centre	<a href="mailto:neville.a@parl.gc.ca">neville.a@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Paul Martin, La Salle Emard	<a href="mailto:martin.p@parl.gc.ca">martin.p@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Andy Scott, Fredericton	<a href="mailto:scott.a@parl.gc.ca">scott.a@parl.gc.ca</a>
Elsie Wayne, Saint John	<a href="mailto:wayne.e@parl.gc.ca">wayne.e@parl.gc.ca</a>
Geoff Regan, Halifax West	<a href="mailto:regan.g@parl.gc.ca">regan.g@parl.gc.ca</a>
Mark Eyking, Sydney Victoria	<a href="mailto:eyking.m@parl.gc.ca">eyking.m@parl.gc.ca</a>
David Pratt, Nepean Carleton	<a href="mailto:pratt.d@parl.gc.ca">pratt.d@parl.gc.ca</a>
Marlene Catterall, Ottawa West-Nepean	<a href="mailto:catterall.m@parl.gc.ca">catterall.m@parl.gc.ca</a>
Joe Volpe, Eglinton Lawrence	<a href="mailto:volpe.j@parl.gc.ca">volpe.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Bill Graham, Toronto Centre Rosedale	<a href="mailto:graham.b@parl.gc.ca">graham.b@parl.gc.ca</a>
Hon. Lucienne Robillard, Westmount-Ville	<a href="mailto:robillard.l@parl.gc.ca">robillard.l@parl.gc.ca</a>
Dianne Abloncy, Calgary Nose Hill	<a href="mailto:abloncy.d@parl.gc.ca">abloncy.d@parl.gc.ca</a>
Rob Anders, Calgary West	<a href="mailto:anders.r@parl.gc.ca">anders.r@parl.gc.ca</a>
Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Calgary Centre	<a href="mailto:clark.j@parl.gc.ca">clark.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Jason Kenney, Calgary Southeast	<a href="mailto:kenny.j@parl.gc.ca">kenny.j@parl.gc.ca</a>
Stephen Harper, Calgary Southwest	<a href="mailto:harper.s@parl.gc.ca">harper.s@parl.gc.ca</a>
Art Hanger, Calgary Northeast	<a href="mailto:hanger.a@parl.gc.ca">hanger.a@parl.gc.ca</a>
Leon Benoit, Lakeland*	<a href="mailto:benoit.l@parl.gc.ca">benoit.l@parl.gc.ca</a>

\* Alliance Party Defence Critic

resources to transport troops and equipment in and out of overseas deployments, if and when our international commitments demand. Sustaining and supporting the military once in the operational area, also carries a high priority. Severe personnel shortages in a variety of technical trades must be resolved if training cadres are to be properly preserved.

The hoped for acquisition of a Canadian air and sea lift capability continues to prompt an inane response from the Prime Minister that we can always rely on civilian carriers to move our troops and equipment overseas.

There are other issues at stake. Canada's lost strategic air-to-air refuelling capability is not expected to be corrected until 2004.<sup>4</sup> The replacement of the near-forty year old Sea King helicopters years later. The availability of air force CF-18s and Aurora maritime patrol aircraft will be reduced during their major modernization.

Critics of Canada's defence policy are not alone in their assessment of the state of readiness of the CF. In his first annual report, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Gen. R. R. Henault tells us that the "past year has demonstrated with clarity that we are at a crossroads as an institution."<sup>5</sup> Time and space does not permit detailed comment concerning the CDS' annual report save that it seems to be telling Canadians — don't worry, be happy, we are on the right course as long as Canada doesn't find itself involved in a prolonged conflict overseas, or having to deal with another

flood or ice storm emergency at home.

Annex B to the CDS' report, Capital Procurement (Equipment) states the following: "To maintain Canada's ability to contribute to peace and security at home and abroad, the Canadian Forces must make focused investments in robust military capabilities."<sup>6</sup> Interestingly, this is exactly what defence analysts, retired military, the Auditor-Generals and many concerned Canadians have been saying for years, with no corrective action taken by the government.

Canada's security and sovereignty situation portrays a sad story of neglect which is reflected in the CDS' annual report when it identifies a list of procurement projects for the CF in the year ahead.

While it is not likely that the CDS' wish list will be satisfied in the short-term, his lengthy prioritized list warrants mention. It includes: the Maritime Helicopter Project, Aurora Incremental Modernization, CF-18 Incremental Modernization, Canadian Military Satellite Communications, Joint Space Capability, Afloat Logistics and Sea Lift Capability, Air Lift Capability, Strategic Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability, Command-and-Control and Air Defence Capability Replacement, Canadian Forces Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Land Forces Intelligence, and Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Capability.<sup>7</sup> Small wonder the Auditor-General's recommendations for correction of a bad situation in DND carried a price tag in the billions.

Crunch time has arrived. Canadians, and yes, that includes NOAC members, should put pen to paper stating their concerns in brief emphatic language. Tell the government that the SCONDVA report deserves full support and quick response by the government. More important, the government must extend to the CF proper financial support if the forces are to carry out the new defence policy which will hopefully emerge from the yet to be completed defence policy review.

#### FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> John Ward, "McCallum Plans to Use the Internet for Defence Policy Review, *Kingston Whig-Standard*, July 26, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> "At A Crossroads," Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002, p.40.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p.39.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

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## CANADA'S ROLE IN THE STABILIZATION OF IRAQ

*Richard H. Gimblett, PhD, CD*

Speculation mounts as to new policy initiatives being cobbled together by the Ottawa bureaucracy in the quest to secure Prime Minister Jean Chretien's legacy. Instead of throwing tens of billions of Canadian's hard-earned tax dollars into special interest group vote-buying with no sure promise of long-

term return, there is a relatively (in these terms) inexpensive option – and one that is in the greater public interest. In pursuit of mid-1990s cost-cutting, Mr Chretien and Finance Min

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ister Paul Martin presided over what has amounted to the ‘structural disarmament’ of the Canadian Forces (CF). Now that the economy has strengthened, and given the security imperatives of the War on Terrorism, the Prime Minister and his new Finance Minister, John Manley, have a moral obligation to save the military from final collapse.

Its present state is so perilous that a proper campaign to rebuild the Canadian Forces probably would take a decade. But that is a separate problem demanding a full Defence Review, and could not be completed in the time he has left. A true leader with real vision, however, would realize that an immediate opportunity exists to revive the CF just enough and just in time to participate in a useful fashion in the coming stabilization of Iraq.

It is significant that in their meeting in Detroit on September 9, 2002, to commemorate the first anniversary of the Islamist terror attacks against the United States, US President George W. Bush did not ask Prime Minister Chretien to commit Canadian Forces to any future operations – he must already have known the answer. The present debate as to whether Canada should or should not get involved in a future war is academic. Indeed, it diverts attention from the greater tragedy that we cannot.

It goes without saying that there will be no fighting role for Canada’s Army in the imminent United States assault against Saddam Hussein, at least not in any numbers worth mentioning. Even the low level of combat capability finally put together to deploy to Afghanistan, in the form of an under-strength battalion group (an *ad hoc* military formation unknown to most other nations), could not be sustained for more than a few months. Canada’s place there has been taken over by a force from Romania.

The Canadian government instead has chosen to set its priority on the continued occupation of Bosnia, even as it has had to scale that back too. Although even less challenging militarily in recent years, this is still a resource-draining commitment. Combined with the requirement to support internal security operations for the recent G-8 Summit at Kananaskis, the strength of Canada’s Army has been sapped. It has been recalled to Canada for a well-deserved rest.

The Department of National Defence euphemistically calls the present respite a “strategic pause.” With a bit of foresight, this could be seized as a chance for an emergency infusion of equipment and training for the coming challenge. When the US is done decapitating Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq will be in urgent need of something Canadians can claim some special ability in – nation-building. Creating a secure working environment within which a range of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can apply their humanitarian assistance will be no easy task. It will require an enormous number of

international troops, armed sufficiently to assert their authority in circumstances that will have no guarantee of being ‘friendly’. A decade ago, the Canadian Army spearheaded just such stabilization operations in Bosnia, and that region now is much the more secure for the effort. The combat capability of the Army has declined considerably since then, however. Liberals like to style this as “peacekeeping”, but 21<sup>st</sup> century peace support operations require a range of less-passive capabilities. A ‘quick-fix’ application of the right types of human and materiel resources is needed – immediately – to revive the Army’s demonstrated competence in this field.

This is not to ignore the possibilities for meaningful contributions by the other services. The Air Force has had 2-3 each of Hercules transport and Aurora maritime surveillance aircraft in the region, contributing usefully since early in the New Year. However, such small numbers hardly qualify as significant. And due to a combination of the obsolescence of the CF-18 Hornet fighter-bombers (secure communications and precision-guided munitions are special concerns) and a critical shortage of pilots, the Air Force probably could not assemble more than a half-dozen aircraft for offensive operations. Even then, it is unlikely they could deploy overseas in a timely fashion, as Canada has no strategic air-to-air refueling capability, and it would not be worthwhile for the US Air Force to divert such resources from its own higher-priority missions.

The one bright spot is the Navy. Because most Canadian politicians – and indeed defence analysts – do not understand the nature of sea power, they have fixated on the admittedly appalling state of the Army. A cynic could venture that this is probably to the Navy’s advantage, as the Army has been allowed to decline precisely so that it cannot participate overseas with meaningful force.

But realize it or not (indeed, like it or not), at present Canada has a world-class Navy. Forget the rust-bucket fleet of the 1980s. Within hours of the Prime Minister’s Thanksgiving order to deploy, a frigate on another mission was diverted to the Arabian Sea. Just a few days later, a complete Naval Task Group of modern destroyers, frigates and its own supply ship was on its way. Even while defence planners were trying to figure out how to get the Army battalion group to Afghanistan, the Canadian Commodore was assuming responsibility to direct a larger multinational task group of 16 warships from 8 coalition nations. He has waged a modestly successful campaign of Al-Qaida and Taliban leadership interdiction operations.

The silver lining to this cloud still casts a dark shadow. In dedicating virtually its entire operational fleet to this enterprise, the Navy is approaching exhaustion. Rumours persist

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that the on-going internal departmental Defence Update, seeking to extract further savings from the Defence budget, will recommend paying-off the Command and Control destroyers as well as the replenishment ships, removing 2 of the 3 vital elements of the trinity that constitutes the Naval Task Group (the other is the frigates that do the various tasks of fleetwork). If this narrow vision prevails, the Canadian Navy will no longer have the ability for independent command of operations or to deploy itself abroad without the help of the United States Navy (USN).

Unless, of course, a man of vision could recognize what an opportunity exists to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty to the world. Again, there is no question of the Navy having a direct role in operations against Iraq. It has no offensive 'power projection' weapons. But with the Canadian Navy being able to continue supporting operations in the Arabian Sea, USN warships would be freed for other tasks. Liberals would be able to point to an independent Canadian command as a major contribution to the allied effort.

Obviously, there are a number of military roles for Canada in the coming stabilization of Iraq. Those who argue otherwise are being disingenuous, as are government ministers who dismiss such notions as "hypothetical" (there is some faint hope in the fact that new Defence Minister John McCallum has not yet publicly uttered that phrase). Canada always gets involved in matters of global consequence because it is a responsible member of the world community. We did in the Gulf War of 1990-91, and even in Kosovo we saw the light and swallowed our reflexive anti-Americanism.

Too often, however, this military engagement has come after too much political back-biting to be truly effective in gaining Canada any diplomatic leverage with our American allies. Not since Lester Pearson have Canadian politicians and diplomats had the vision to capitalize on Canadian military suc-

cesses to turn them to political advantage (Brian Mulroney showed a glimmer during the Gulf War, but let the moment pass). Fresh opportunities loom – will someone seize them?

To summarize, then, how can Canada participate in the stabilization of Iraq? The Naval Task Group will continue to direct Al-Qaida interdiction operations in the Arabian Sea, but requires immediate emergency funding to sustain this high tempo of operations. Regrettably, given the long lead-times of aircraft and pilot production, there is no quick-fix for the Air Force. Other than adding another couple of aging Hercules transports to tactical airlift operations, it will have to sit this one out.

The follow-on task of nation-building, however, presents a unique opportunity for Canada to play a major role as honest broker in a region where everybody else (Europeans especially) have competing economic interests. The Army must take advantage of the present respite to begin preparations to deploy a proper Brigade to undertake postwar stabilization operations in Iraq (a brigade is the level of Army participation needed to ensure independent command of operations). But it needs emergency funding to fix up the light armoured vehicles and undertake the group level training to do so.

The common refrain continues to be of the need for a man of vision willing to authorize the relatively small but desperately needed basic military resources to make all this happen. Does Canada have one now?

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## FROM BOSNIA TO AFGHANISTAN: The Defence Review and the Future of the Canadian Forces

*David Mutimer*

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While spending time with the Canadian forces serving as part of SFOR in Bosnia, as I recently had the pleasure to do as part of a DND briefing tour, it was impossible not to be impressed with the work they are doing. In Bosnia, we had a chance to see committed Canadians providing vital assistance to a massive programme of social and political reconstruction.

With graphic images of torn limbs and shattered bodies, we

were introduced to the various forms of quick death and injury that waited for us if we ventured off the road anywhere in the country. We then spent a week driving through some of the most beautiful countryside I have ever seen, knowing that we could not walk through any of it.

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Bosnia was the site of some of the most bitter and shocking violence Europe has seen since the Second World War, and the task of putting it back together into something like a functioning community is a monumental one. Not only is the place riddled with landmines, but the infrastructure of the country — its buildings, roads, bridges, down to the smallest village houses — all show the physical effects of years of intense fighting. What is worse, the communities which lived there until the beginning of the 1990s were torn apart by the violence — a multicultural community shredded by waves of what we euphemistically call ‘ethnic cleansing’.

It seems particularly fitting that Canada, with its tradition of peacekeeping and its multicultural heritage, should be central to the efforts of reconstruction and reconciliation.

Canada is undertaking a defence policy review, and is doing so at a time when it has just spent nine months involved in a ground combat operation for the first time in decades. The review will have to come to terms with a military which will not, for the foreseeable future, be funded at the level that most officials in DND would like. The review will have to make some difficult choices about the kind of armed forces that Canada will maintain in the coming years. The choices that we are now facing are not new. Nevertheless, it is an opportune moment to consider how the decision should be made.

Over the past decade, as military spending has declined and the demand for international peace operations has climbed, the stance taken by DND has been that there is no conflict between a peacekeeping force and a war-fighting force. To do peacekeeping, we are told, Canada needs a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, just as for other military roles — as in fighting alongside the United States in Afghanistan. What I saw and heard while I was in Bosnia leads me to question this orthodoxy.

In fact, the first hint I got this year that this cant might be fallible came at a meeting in Ottawa several months before I arrived in Bosnia. A senior official on the military side of DND said that the demand for peacekeepers was always more than we were going to be able to meet. In particular, there was a much greater demand for specific services — communications and engineers — than the Canadian military had supply. As I thought about this, however, it occurred to me that the supply was assumed to be fixed in a way that it is not.

The Forces will try to maintain the number of communications specialists and engineers needed for a multi-purpose, combat-capable force. These professions will, therefore, make up a relatively fixed percentage of the overall force of the Canadian military. But what if the forces were configured more explicitly for making the contribution to international peace operations?

Knowing that these are the skills which are in demand and which Canada is expert in providing, we could build a force that is, in traditional, combat-oriented terms, over-stocked with communications experts and engineers.

At another briefing, this time in Bosnia, a commander complained that, while in the theatre, he was unable to do the kind of training with his troops that he would like to do. What I found interesting about this complaint was that he also said that there were greater opportunities for training in Bosnia than he would have had in Canada. In other words, being deployed as part of SFOR provided opportunities for considerable high-level training, but only of a particular kind.

Perhaps the most impressive experience of my time in Bosnia came when we visited a small base in Drvar. Drvar was at the centre of some of the worst ‘ethnic’ struggles between Serbs and Croats, as it is in the Croatian side of Bosnia, but was the stronghold for Marshal Tito. The Canadians are trying to provide security and support for a process by which those who were expelled can return and claim their homes. Clearly, this is a process fraught with difficulties and made worse by the active opposition of the local authorities.

We were told stories, for example, of returnees not having their electricity connected, despite its being supplied to houses next door, because the returnees are of the ‘wrong ethnic group’. In this context, the troops on patrol serve as police, as diplomats, and as intelligence officers. They need to provide physical security, for example, when returnees come to claim their homes and the international authorities must evict the present occupants. However, they also need to cajole the local officials into cooperation, and to develop ties with the local community, allowing them to drink coffee in the local cafes so as to keep a finger on the pulse of the community. In a very real sense, the forces on patrol are the eyes and ears of the international community’s efforts at reconstruction and reconciliation.

The fact that the operations, such as those in Drvar, were taking place while other Canadian soldiers were in Afghanistan led to an interesting contrast. On several occasions — and we were only in the field for four days — we heard grumbling from members of the forces about being in Bosnia rather than in Afghanistan. While the troops were clearly proud of their work in Bosnia, and even recognised its importance, for them real soldiering was what was being done in Afghanistan, not what they were doing in Bosnia.

From my perspective, the authenticity of the soldiering is less important than the difference. What these men and women

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are trained to do is not what they were being asked to do in Drvar. As excellent as their skills and training proved to be in Afghanistan — and I certainly have no reason to believe that the forces there did not perform their jobs to the highest possible standards — they were not the skills and training needed for the mix of policing and diplomacy Drvar requires.

The very real impression with which I came away from Bosnia, then, was that there is a difference between multipurpose, combat-capable forces and peacebuilders. The two groups require a different mix of expertise. They require both different equipment and different training on the equipment that they do share. Most importantly, they require a different mix of skills as well as of attitudes towards their identity as soldiers.

What is being done in Bosnia is every bit as important as what is being done in Afghanistan. What is more, it is something that cannot be done by civilians. Eventually, civilian police — ideally indigenous civilian police — will be able to replace the military, but not as a first step. At the moment, however, and certainly in the immediate aftermath of the wars, the SFOR

tasks are military tasks.

If we consider the choices with which we are now faced, and consider them honestly, my experience in Bosnia leads me to suggest that the defence review should lead to the re-configuration of the Canadian forces so that they become, in the first instance, contributors to international peace operations. Would such a decision mean that we would not be able to participate, in the way we have done, in future Afghanistans? Almost certainly. The hurdle which we, and particularly those in the military, have to overcome, is that there is nothing wrong with that.

Not everyone does everything, even in the rarified world of the armed forces. Not in any but the wildest dreams of Canadian military enthusiasts would one think that Canada could have the same capacities as the United States, or even as the United Kingdom. The question, therefore, is not how we can have it all, but rather which parts should we do, do well and fund appropriately? I say, stick with the Bosnias of this world. If we do, then the next place in which Canadians are likely to be deployed is, of course, Afghanistan.

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