Calls to immediately stop acquiring US defence technology for the CAF are about as realistic as mounting an expedition to find a living gryphon, that half-eagle, half-lion creature of ancient mythology. Just as the Carney government is pursuing a long-term strategy to transition the nation’s economy away from its overdependence on Canada-US trade, shifting defence procurements away from American technologies can only happen progressively. Neither objective can be achieved overnight.
Most Western alternatives contain at least some US technology. For example, Saab’s Gripen E/F fighter aircraft, considered by some to be a viable alternative to the Lockheed Martin F-35, has substantial American content subject to US ITAR controls – including its GE F414 engine as well as a number of key life support and sensor systems. Saab requires US government approval to export the aircraft and purchasers need continuing US authorizations to acquire spare parts. Washington has already used its leverage to block a proposed Gripen sale to Colombia. Proponents of the Gripen point to a long-rumoured non-US alternative Rolls Royce engine, but this exists only in the world of internet speculation. There is no prototype or plan for its production. Canada can certainly decide to buy the aircraft, but doing so would not give it independence from US technology controls.
There is a good reason why Canada and others have long depended on US technology: the scope and scale of the American defence industrial base (DIB) vastly outweighs that of any other Western nation. While the European Union collectively has an economy larger than that of China, it does not have a single DIB but rather 27 national ones with widely varying degrees of cooperation among them. Many of these nations, like Canada, have leading-edge technology in niche areas, but only the US can afford to invest in large-scale development and integration of the wide range of advanced technologies that go into the design and manufacture of the full array of major 21st Century defence systems.
While a number of Western countries design and produce warships, fighter aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles, and other major platforms, most of them incorporate US technologies. In some cases, this is to ensure interoperability with American and other partners, but more often it is to contain costs. Integrating suitable existing components into the design of systems typically costs much less than developing your own, and the economies of scale achieved in US production are difficult to match.
Consequently, countries like Canada face a significant challenge in moving away from reliance on US defence technologies. The transition needs to be carefully planned and implemented, and will take time. It also requires some significant investments in new industrial capabilities under the Defence Industrial Strategy. To determine priorities for those investments, the government must rationally assess and balance the full range of defence and security risks faced by the nation.
Most of the calls to buy non-US equipment are founded on fears that the American government could decide to cut off access to critical support or supplies needed for CAF operations. While that is certainly possible, what is less clear are the circumstances under which Washington might see it as being in the US national interest to neuter their continental defence partner’s military capabilities. Canada must weigh this risk against that of sending the CAF into a future conflict ill-equipped simply because Ottawa refused to buy American.
There have always been, and will always be, points of friction between our two countries. The current extreme disruption to Canada-US relations, however, is unprecedented and will almost certainly be time-limited to the tenure of Donald Trump as president. Whoever replaces him, the relationship is unlikely to return to what it was prior to January 2025, but neither will it remain this dysfunctional. The current state is simply not sustainable for either country – if only because defending North America requires close collaboration and tight interoperability between our respective military and security forces.
Pursuing greater independence from US defence technologies is a worthwhile undertaking for Canada, and long overdue. We should proceed with determination and discipline at a pace the country can afford, but we must also be realistic in our expectations. Seeking complete insulation from US defence technologies would be no less irrational than trying to eliminate all trade with our continental neighbour – neither effort is going to be any more successful than a gryphon hunt. We can, though, in both cases substantially reduce the scope and impact of our dependency. It will take years of sustained investment, but we can get there.
Colonel Charles Davies (Retired) served for four years as the strategic planning director for DND’s Materiel Group and three years as senior director responsible for defence materiel acquisition and support policies, business processes and standards. He is a Senior Fellow of the CDA Institute and the author of “True North Strong? A Canadian Citizen’s Guide to National Defence
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
Photo: Daniel Torok / Official White House Photo via Flickr
