Canadian governments have often trumpeted their investments in shiny new defence hardware, but few have shown comparable interest in ensuring proper maintenance of the assets the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has, or planned responsibly for their eventual replacement. Failure to pay attention to these unglamourous, yet essential, foundational activities inevitably resulted in many of the investments being effectively squandered: the equipment becoming unable to fully perform the job it was acquired for or, in worst cases, entirely unusable and left parked behind a warehouse. Neither of these outcomes is acceptable. The nation spends taxpayers’ money to buy defence equipment for a purpose, and it needs to be kept capable of fulfilling that purpose.
Unfortunately, the Government of Canada has a poor record in doing so. The Department of National Defence’s (DND) annual Results Reports reveal a multi-year history of dismal serviceability rates for key systems. Further, the CAF has repeatedly experienced critical platform “rust-out” events where modern replacements came either too late or not at all, leaving serious defence capability gaps. Examples include the forced total cessation of Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) submarine operations between 2000 and 2006, and the RCN’s subsequent struggle to keep the “pre-owned” replacement boats the government belatedly bought operational; the 2011 retirement without replacement of the Army’s mobile air defence system, a gap the government is now urgently trying to fill for the Canadian-led multinational brigade in Latvia; and the now nearly 10-year (and counting) gap in the RCN’s at-sea logistics capability, only partly filled on an interim basis by a hired modified commercial vessel. Add to this list the extended delays in replacing the aged CF-18 fighter aircraft, which is increasingly unable to keep up with evolving threats, among many other critical defence capability deficiencies.
The Carney administration cannot be included in this criticism, both because it has not been in office long enough and given the alacrity with which it is moving to fill the many gaps it inherited. However, it too needs to look beyond the here-and-now politics of defence investments and take concrete steps to institutionalize better-disciplined management of the CAF’s major equipment – ideally in a way that can endure beyond its own term in office.
Well-run corporations manage capital assets over their full life cycle: they plan the initial investments carefully, maintain the asset so it keeps performing, and prepare for its eventual replacement. Governments are not businesses, but taxpayers deserve the same diligence in managing the nation’s capital assets. That requires long-term strategic planning– something that rarely comes naturally in a political environment where decision-making tends to be transactional and horizons are short.
Overcoming this starts with public exposure. Equipment serviceability rates are now published in DND’s annual Results Reports, which has generated Parliamentary critique, media coverage, and public discussion about the poor results being achieved. In response, governments have been motivated to begin addressing spare parts shortages and other factors causing the problem.
This is worth building upon. Adding a capital asset life-cycle tracking component to the same report should similarly encourage better long-term management of capabilities. Reporting should include the current Estimated Life Expectancy – a well-understood engineering term that can be thought of as a “use by” or expiry date – for major equipment, prioritizing items that are most operationally essential, most expensive, and take longest to modernize or replace. It should also present realistic estimates of the lead times required to implement the upgrade or replacement of each, including the government approval processes involved in getting to contract award. Taken together, this information would provide a clear timeline for future government decision-making on investments required to ensure that key CAF capabilities do not “rust out” or become operationally ineffective.
Transparency of this kind is easiest to introduce when the news is good, so the Carney government, which is substantially increasing defence spending and rebuilding the CAF’s capabilities, has little to fear from such reporting. Indeed, it would showcase the government’s efforts and demonstrate serious intent to manage for the long term. Future governments, perhaps facing tighter budgets or different priorities, may see this differently, so the time to entrench this discipline is now.
Clearly, this capital asset reporting would not by itself guarantee consistent optimal long-term asset management, since it remains a political choice whether and when to make decisions. However, as a minimum it would better inform Parliamentary oversight and media reporting, and should, over time, encourage development of a government business environment that supports more effective and more strategic management of defence capabilities. Ministers can still ignore a looming problem or “kick it down the road” further. But with this information in hand, Parliament and Canadians would know it – and could demand better.
Colonel Charles Davies (Retired) served for four years as the strategic planning director for DND’s Materiel Group and three years as senior director responsible for defence materiel acquisition and support policies, business processes and standards. He is a Senior Fellow of the CDA Institute and the author of “True North Strong? A Canadian Citizen’s Guide to National Defence.
The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or its staff.
